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Abstract
SOCIAL TIES AND STATE FORMATION IN POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA
by
DAVID SIEGEL
Adviser: Professor Susan L. Woodward
This dissertation examines state formation in newly or recently independent states. Why
are state authorities able to exert control over provincial areas in some cases but not others?
How do the national authorities of newly independent states build centralized bureaucracies,
control state cadre, and ensure deference among their regional subordinates? Why do they
sometimes fail? I answer these questions by focusing on the social ties of state officials in the
periphery. Specifically, I argue that where the state’s regional officials are socially embedded in
local communities, the process of administrative centralization will proceed unevenly and
incompletely. It is only by dislocating state personnel from local social structures that they
become, as Weber described them, “servants of the state.”
While framed within theories from the literature on state formation, this study
demonstrates how the contemporary historical context reshapes processes of state development.
International policy prioritizes decentralization and regional representation over administrative
centralization and can have the unintended effect of creating social bases of support for the
state’s regional cadre, bolstering their independence, and undermining the state’s administrative
hierarchy.
This dissertation employs a comparative analysis of two post-Soviet Central Asian
states—Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan—during their first two decades of independence, from 1991
iv

to 2013. These two states share a common Soviet institutional legacy and adopted similar formal
administrative structures after independence; they are both non-democratic unitary states where
the highest-level provincial officials formally represent the central government in the regions,
not the populations living there. Yet, the politics of bureaucratic centralization and cadre control
have differed dramatically in each state. Central authorities in Kazakhstan have obtained firm
control over their regional cadre and mete out swift punishment for insubordination. By contrast,
central authorities in Kyrgyzstan have twice been overthrown by revolutions led by regional
elite. Moreover, they regularly face challenges from local cadre and ordinary people when they
seek to fire, relocate, or replace state officials in the periphery, in accordance with their formal
legal authority. In short, regional officials in Kazakhstan who challenge national authorities end
up in jail or in exile while their counterparts in Kyrgyzstan often end up in power.
The data for this study were collected during 15 months of fieldwork in Kyrgyzstan and
Kazakhstan. During this time I conducted ethnographic research at the village level in each
state. This included interviews with local officials and ordinary villagers as well as
observational research about the processes of local government. I also interviewed former and
current state officials in the capital city of each state, representatives of international
organizations, local scholars, and journalists. Finally, using local media sources, I created an
original database of provincial governors’ biographies and career trajectories. Using these data, I
analyze levels of social embeddedness for regional officials and trace local, provincial, and
national outcomes in state formation.
I find that Kyrgyzstan, which was dependent on international donors for aid, adopted
many of the reforms that donors favored, including a system of local self-government that kept
village-level officials socially embedded in local communities, forging close bonds between
v

those officials and the population. The pattern of state-society relations that resulted from these
close bonds undermined the central government’s ability to appoint and remove its own cadre at
the provincial level, leaving them only loosely integrated into the state’s administrative
bureaucracy. The insubordination of regional cadre becomes observable not only in
Kyrgyzstan’s two national-level revolutions, but in regular center-periphery political struggle
over the appointment of regional officials. With surprising regularity, local officials, backed by
supporters in their native villages and districts, have sacked provincial state offices, or resisted
central authorities’ orders for relocation to a different province.
Kazakhstan, which was wealthier at independence, was virtually immune to international
pressure to decentralize administration. There, central authorities maintained strict appointment
powers down to the village-level and used them to rotate cadre across regions, further
disembedding state officials from local social contexts and facilitating the centralization of
bureaucratic administration. The upshot is that regional cadre have few social bases of support
in the regions and are more dependent on their bosses in the capital city. This has facilitated
bureaucratic centralization; that is, it has enabled central authorities to construct a robust
hierarchy of state administration, given them more control over regional cadre and, therefore,
better reach into the regions themselves.
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Chapter 1: Introduction: Social Ties and State Formation
I. The Puzzle
In 2002, the governor of Kazakhstan’s Pavlodar province, Galymzhan Zhakiyanov, was
arrested on charges of abusing power. His real crime, however, was to publicly criticize
President Nazarbayev’s constitutional authority to appoint and remove provincial governors.
Zhakiyanov demanded that governors be chosen by direct election instead. In this and other
instances the president faced few problems overcoming and eliminating insubordinate
opponents. Zhakiyanov served four years in jail and was released on the condition of permanent
exile.
Even more than Zhakiyanov in Kazakhstan, the tenure of Melis Myrzakmatov in
Kyrgyzstan—the mayor of Osh city from 2009 to late 2013—was marked by highly public forms
of insubordination. Myrzakmatov not only flouted official government policies, he openly
questioned the legitimacy of the central government itself. Authorities in Bishkek, however, did
not have an easy time getting rid of him, even though they had the legal authority to do so.
When the president attempted to fire Myrzakmatov in 2010, thousands of his supporters
protested in the streets of Osh until the government relented, leaving him in office to serve
another three years.
The contrasting fates of Zhakiyanov and Myrzakmatov reflect a broader divergence of
state formation outcomes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. These are center-periphery conflicts
that reflect levels of centralized administration in each state, or the degree to which regional
officials are actually integrated into the state’s administrative hierarchy and subordinate to
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national authorities in the capital city.1 And, since the centralization of bureaucratic
administration is one of the key processes of state formation, these outcomes pose a number of
broader questions about state development in post-Soviet Central Asia, and in newly independent
states more generally: What enables rulers to centralize state administration and recruit
personnel in far-flung regions who accept their own subordination in the state’s administrative
hierarchy? Why do central authorities sometimes fail to achieve this? And, what are the ways in
which the contemporary historical context of neoliberal globalization—characterized, in part, by
a series of norms about modern statehood—creates differences in this process today compared
with the past? I seek to answer these questions in a comparative study of two post-Soviet
Central Asian states.
The remainder of this introductory chapter is organized in two sections. In the first
section I define state formation stressing the process of bureaucratic centralization and the
question of whether and how state officials are integrated into a state’s administrative apparatus
as subordinate agents to national authorities. Building on Weber’s concepts of patrimonialism
and rational-legal bureaucracy, I suggest that we understand administrative relations within state
bureaucracies as social relations, not only between national authorities and their subordinate
agents—as Weber emphasized—but also between those agents and the societies that they
govern.
Next, I review the ways in which the literature on state formation has emphasized the
importance of local social ties in the recruitment and integration of officials into state
administration, a key element in the process of bureaucratic centralization. A large body of this
literature holds that preexisting forms of social and political organization in peripheral territories
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Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are both non-democratic unitary states. Provincial governors and mayors of large
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often determined how provincial elites were integrated into officialdom. They also shaped the
kinds of institutions that structured relationships between those officials and nascent national
authorities, and also between those agents and society. These different patterns of social ties,
and the institutions that resulted from them, are what created significant variations in the kinds of
states that emerged across Europe, Russia, and large parts of the Middle East and Africa.
While this literature provides key insights into the broadest factors shaping trajectories
and outcomes of state formation, it tends to treat preexisting forms of social and political
organization as static, fully formed, and exogenous to centralizing states. This stems from the
deep historical context of these analyses, which focus heavily on European state formation over
the course of several centuries. The “state-in-society” literature—driven initially by a need to
explain the presumed anomalies in forms of state rule during the post-colonial period—has
drawn much more attention to the interactive processes of state power, stressing mutually
constitutive elements of both states and societies. Yet, this literature has said relatively little
about the process of state formation itself. Just as the state-in-society approach has shed light on
post-colonial regime politics and state-society relations, it can tell us a lot about state formation
in the post-Cold War era. I build on this literature taking insights that might be especially useful
for the analysis of state formation in newly independent, post-colonial states. I also point out
unique features of the contemporary international context of state formation, which has created
new pressures and imperatives to build different kinds of state institutions, and in different
sequences than in the past. Later in the dissertation I argue that these changes have had profound
effects on state-society relations in ways that have shaped state formation outcomes.
In the final section of this chapter I review the literature on state formation in post-Soviet
states, with an emphasis on Central Asia. In fact, political scientists have tended not to focus on
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processes of state formation, or the problems associated with building (or rebuilding) state
structures and administrative bureaucracies in the former Soviet Union. Instead, this literature
tends to focus almost exclusively on regime dynamics and transition, particularly
democratization or authoritarian consolidation.
Notably, an analytical focus on regimes does say something about state formation, if only
indirectly; it tends to assume that post-Soviet states are products of their Soviet past, highly
centralized and fully formed at independence. In other words, questions central to studies of
democratization—focusing on whether or how central authorities decentralize power—tend to
assume that state power is centralized to begin with, thus marginalizing questions related to state
formation. And, normatively, it tends to suggest that this starting point is problematic, or at least
undesirable. A primary focus on state formation brings some of these assumptions to light, and
raises questions about regime transitions that have not been sufficiently addressed. For example,
what happens when states begin to decentralize power that is not yet centralized, or devolve
authority that has not first been consolidated?
In contrast to political scientists, anthropologists and sociologists who study post-Soviet
states have stressed the virtual absence of state authority after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
implying challenges and dilemmas for central authorities who must contend with numerous
competitors in the periphery—typically current or former state personnel themselves, including
members of defunct security services, former managers of state and collective farms and
factories, and mid-level bureaucrats.
By focusing on whether and how national authorities integrate (or re-integrate) these
personnel into a centralized state bureaucracy, I draw on this anthropological literature to
reevaluate how political scientists have approached the problems of post-Soviet state formation.
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In the end, I seek to answer one main question: what accounts for the different outcomes of state
formation in post-Soviet Central Asian states and what does this tell us about contemporary state
formation? In the final section of this chapter I outline the subsequent dissertation chapters,
which seek to answer this question.

II. State Formation, Social Ties, and State-Society Relations as a Theoretical Framework
State formation includes a number of related processes, including the nationalization of
taxation and the monopolization of coercion. The process central to all of these, however, is
bureaucratic centralization (Tin-bor Hui 2005: 38-53; Vu 2010). Without a unified and
centralized administrative apparatus, central authorities will be ill-equipped to secure tax
revenues in far-flung territories, and will continue to face challenges from multiple and dispersed
centers of authority. Centralization is, by definition, the process by which territorial
administration is unified under a single hierarchy, and by which central authorities come to
occupy the top of that hierarchy. Whether and how state personnel are recruited and integrated
into the state’s administrative structures is a defining aspect of this process. But, the ways in
which administrative centralization unfolds can vary greatly, and sometimes it happens
incompletely, or not at all. One of the main questions that the literature on state formation seeks
to address is how and why the process of state formation produces such wide variations in the
form and nature of centralized bureaucracies.
Before discussing state formation, though, I would like to specify contrasts and
commonalities in different modes of state administration, with particular attention paid to the
social relations that define them. Above all else, “organized domination” of the kind that exists
in state hierarchies, “requires control of the personal executive staff” (Weber 1958: 80). Weber
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described the two most widely referenced styles of administrative relations through which this
control is achieved: bureaucratic and patrimonial (Weber 1978). A rational-legal bureaucracy is
defined by the strict delimitation of public and private realms, such that the offices of the state
are not the private domain of either the ruler or his or her staff, but established to serve
impersonal and functional purposes according to procedures defined by law. Offices are
arranged hierarchically, designed to carry out orders from state leadership (1978: 956-58).
In contrast, administrative relations in a patrimonial state are personalized, with little
distinction between public and private realms. The state itself is administered as the personal
possession of the ruler, and the personnel he or she appoints are frequently close acquaintances,
personal dependents, and even direct kin (1025-1031). Patrimonialism is depicted by Weber as a
subcategory of patriarchalism, akin to a father’s rule over a household, where “the belief in
authority is based on personal relations that are perceived as natural” (1007). In a patrimonial
state, hierarchy in administrative relations is not based on the laws structuring state offices—or,
rational-legal legitimacy—but on the same sociology that subordinates children to their
parents—traditional legitimacy (1006-1013).
Patrimonial and bureaucratic administration are, in short, two different ways of
understanding the social relations that tie central state authorities to their staff, the bases by
which the former obtain authority over the latter, and the overall character and nature of the
state’s administrative system. They are both hierarchies, but defined by different styles of social
relations between principals and agents. As others have suggested, we might conceptualize the
key differences as falling along a “personalism-impersonality continuum” within state
administrative relations (Rudolph and Rudolph 1979: 205). As Weber himself put it, they are
both types of “authority relationships” (1978: 212-216). We can imagine state formation as the

6

process by which these relationships are incorporated into state administration, the degree to
which bureaucratic centralization is actually achieved, and the character of social relations that
ensure it is.
Moreover, in how they shape social relations between agents of the state and members of
a broader society, patrimonial and bureaucratic styles of state administration share important
similarities. Both forms of rule mitigate against the development or maintenance of social ties
between state officials and the rest of society. This is because they both require the replacement
of elites representing local interests with state officials who have exclusive loyalty to central
authorities in the capital city, the very essence of centralized administration and a defining
feature of statehood. Yet, these important places of overlap between “ideal” forms have been
given relatively less attention than their differences.
For instance, Weber stresses that functionaries in both patrimonial and bureaucratic states
are appointed, not elected. Despite the fact that rational-legal bureaucracy is often associated
with democracy, bureaucrats themselves cannot be subject to elections. Their task as state
officials is to carry out orders from above, not to represent interests from below. As Weber
notes, “in all circumstances, the designation of officials by means of an election modifies the
rigidity of hierarchical subordination […] the official who is not elected, but appointed by a
master, normally functions, from a technical point of view, more accurately …” (1978: 960). In
fact, someone who is elected by the population, according to Weber, “is no longer a purely
bureaucratic figure” (220-1; 960). One reason that Weber regards rational-legal bureaucracy as a
superior form of administration is not because it is more just or representative of social interests,
but precisely the opposite: it fosters stronger hierarchy with stricter rules, making administration
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more unified and coherent, and less determined by centrifugal social pressures (973-975).2 Thus,
a rational-legal bureaucracy “could not be replaced by election from below” (Beetham 1985:
70).3
A system of appointments—whether in a rational-legal or patrimonial state—makes state
officials less responsive to social pressures because it weakens and possibly severs their social
ties to local and regional communities. They are not selected from or by localities, but sent to
them. State bureaucracy, writes Weber, “develops the more perfectly, the more it is
‘dehumanized,’” when its agents operate as socially disembedded officials, not as members or
representatives of particularistic (and decentralized) communities (Weber 1978: 975). The
bureaucracy becomes its own social structure. Bureaucratic centralization proceeds as officials
become embedded in the administrative structure and disembedded from society; each individual
bureaucrat is “forged to the community of all the functionaries who are integrated into the
mechanism,” and take on its interests as their own (Weber 1958: 228).
In patrimonial states, too, administrative control rests on weak social relations between
state functionaries and local communities. Weber writes, “just like bureaucratic officials, the
patrimonial officials usually develop into a status group set off from the ruled” (Weber 1978:
1026). To ensure that subordinates do not obtain too much independence, the rulers of
patrimonial states tend to recruit their own personal dependents and other socially displaced
persons—“aliens,” “serfs,” or “slaves,” in Weber’s language (1013-1031). They do so precisely
because this helps to ensure loyalty to the center, and subordination within the state’s

2

The oft-cited connection between rational-legal bureaucracy and democracy is the rule of law. Rational-legal
bureaucracy ensures that a rule of law can exist, which makes democracy possible. The key point is that even in a
democracy, bureaucrats themselves are not subject to election, lest they cease to be bureaucrats. This makes state
functionaries of all kinds—whether they be bound in a rational-legal or patrimonial system of administration—more
alike than different.
3
Emphasis in original.
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administrative hierarchy (1026). Elites in the periphery who are already embedded in local
communities, by contrast, will have independent bases of support, and their integration into state
administration will be compromised and remain incomplete.
In sum, neither rational-legal nor patrimonial bureaucrats are embedded members of
society, nor do they represent local and regional social interests. To the extent that they are
embedded in society and representative of its interests, the less they are state agents, the weaker
the state’s hierarchy, and the less complete the process of administrative centralization. State
officials in a patrimonial administration are personally dependent on the ruler; those in a rationallegal bureaucratic system are dependent on their office, as “servants of the state” (Weber 1958:
79). In both cases, though, the process of administrative centralization requires that state
officials, particularly those in far-flung regions and provinces, receive and execute orders from
above. This is what it means to describe national authorities’ control over cadre.
Thus, whether and how elites in the periphery become integrated into state administration
as its officials—whether they be rational-legal or patrimonial—is a question of what kind of
social ties bind them to the center, and whether and how their social ties to the periphery are
weakened or severed. This is what gives state bureaucracy—whether patrimonial or
bureaucratic—its autonomous character and ensures that it is relatively centralized. This is the
quality that makes both styles of administration different types of state administration. The
“coherence” of state administration, in short, “requires that individual incumbents be to some
degree insulated from the demands of the surrounding society” (Evans 1995: 30). As Huntington
observed, organizational autonomy from society “becomes a means to coherence” (1968: 22).
Conversely, we might note that the logic of state administration itself can take on a mechanical
and impersonal character precisely because the center seeks to manage multiple and complex
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localities by abstracting and homogenizing them, thereby undercutting the contextualized local
social knowledge of regional intermediaries (Scott 1998: 22-52). Local intermediaries become
useful to the state as administrators when they adopt the administrative abstractions of the state’s
bureaucratic logic, and abandon, ignore, or forget the social and contextual features of their own
localities (Ibid.).4
In terms of state formation, the key question becomes whether and how elites in regions
and localities are incorporated into the state apparatus as its officials. In answering this question
we should treat patrimonial administration and rational-legal bureaucracy not as exclusively
different forms of rule, but as similar ways of organizing social relations between state and
society, while acknowledging differences in social relations within the administrative
bureaucracy itself. We should seek to describe these relations empirically, explaining how they
shape, and are shaped by, the process of bureaucratic centralization, and the ways in which they
tie center and periphery together within a unified administrative apparatus. As Wolf said of
other reified concepts in the social sciences, state bureaucracy must be understood empirically as
“bundles of relationships” (Wolf 1997: 3). Thus, “we should treat states not as things but as sets
of social processes and relations” (Verdery 1996: 209).
This suggests a group of related questions to be answered empirically: What are the
social ties that define administrative relations between center and periphery? How are officials
socially situated in the periphery? And, even more centrally, how does their place in local social
settings affect subsequent trajectories of state formation as officials in the capital city seek to
subordinate them within a centralized state administration? How do we end up with different

4

In fact, as Scott argues, one of the fundamental purposes of the state’s abstract and socially ungrounded
administrative logic is to undercut the independence of local and regional elites. “The very concept of the modern
state,” he writes, applying this model to the realm of land tenure regulation, “presupposes a vastly simplified and
uniform property regime that is legible and hence manipulable from the center” (1998: 35, emphasis added).
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kinds of centralized administrations, and different kinds of administrative relations between
center and periphery? What are the different kinds of paths toward state centralization? We find
answers to these questions in the literature on state formation.

State Formation and Preexisting Socio-Political Organization in the Periphery
The literature on state formation has addressed two main questions. First, there is the
deeply historical and Eurocentric question of how the modern state developed, and why it
became the predominant form of political organization in the world today, eclipsing city-states
and empires. The most commonly cited answer is that modern states developed inadvertently, as
a result of the organizational demands of warfare in early modern Europe (Tilly 1975, 1992).
Others have built upon this to show that the historical, geographical, and strategic context of
warfare could determine the degree to which war actually had these effects (Centeno 2003; Tinbor Hui 2005).
But, a second question in the state formation literature asks why states vary in their
outcomes and trajectories of development. Even if states are the predominant forms of political
organization today, they vary in numerous ways, including in their styles of administration
(rational-legal versus patrimonial) as well as their levels of administrative centralization (the
degree to which central authorities control their subordinates). In seeking to explain variations in
the trajectories and outcomes of state centralization, scholars have focused heavily on the nature
of preexisting social and political organization in the periphery. This harkens back to Weber and
places social relations—both within state administration and between state and society—at the
center of analysis. State formation and centralization occurred as rulers sought to extract
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administrative agents from their local social bases and enmesh them in the state’s hierarchy
instead:
Of necessity, the prince sought to create a staff of helpers dedicated wholly and exclusively to serving him,
hence making this their major vocation. The structure of the emerging dynastic political organization, and
not only this but the whole articulation of the culture depended to a considerable degree upon the question
of where the prince recruited agents (Weber 1958: 84).

Indeed, the question of “where” the ruler’s agents come from is key. As aspiring state
leaders seek to achieve territorial encompassment of their rule, they interact with local elites who
are embedded in different kinds of social and political structures across different territories. The
nature of those preexisting social and political relations shaped both the kinds of institutions that
state authorities developed to manage center-periphery relations, and the degree to which they
were willing to recruit local elites into the state’s administrative hierarchy or marginalize them
from it. In other words, whether and how local and regional elites are integrated into the state
bureaucracy and recruited as its “officials” were shaped by their preexisting connections to local
and regional populations, which vary across territories.
The importance of this process in the formation of modern states is made evident by the
fact that so many scholars take the center’s dominance of the periphery for granted when
defining states themselves. The conceptualization of the state as a unified and internally
cohesive organization is so fundamental that when a state fails to exhibit these characteristics—
where, for example, central authorities have little control over their own cadre, or face regular
challenges from other local elites—scholars become reticent to call them states at all, at least not
without the modifier “weak,” “failing,” or “failed” (Boege, Volker et al. 2010; Migdal 2001: 5894). This conceptualization rests upon telling assumptions about how center and periphery came
together in the first place. Namely, it assumes local and regional social forces were rendered
obsolete by the process of state formation itself. As Migdal notes, scholars often “understand the
12

state to be the culmination of a process transcending the old localized organizations in societies,
which had previously made the rules” (Migdal 2001: 111). He cites King, who writes that the
modern state, which is defined by “a more impersonal and public system of rule over territorial
circumscribed societies,” is “distinguished from the largely localized and particularistic forms of
power which preceded it” (King 1986: 30).
The literature on state formation focuses precisely on the processes by which this
centralization occurred. Rather than treating disparate and localized loci of authority as
unimportant or obsolescent, this literature focuses heavily on the effect that these fissiparous
forces had on centralizing states. Even when central authorities do succeed in defeating
competitors in the regions, the institutions of the state itself often reflect these previous struggles,
creating variations in how those states are organized (Tilly 1992, Barkey 1994). As briefly noted
above, modern states vary in developmental trajectories and outcomes because of variations in
preexisting social and political organization in the periphery that nascent central authorities had
to contend with as they centralized administration.
Tilly, for example, describes how variations in social and political organization across the
territory of Europe forged distinctly different trajectories of state formation (Tilly 1992: 127160). Though European states ultimately merged into one kind—the modern “national” state—
their prior histories, defined by variations in social structure across territory, left notable “marks
on the state” in terms of their durable institutional configurations of administrative relations
(ibid. 26).5 Tilly identifies three main social structures that varied across territory: coerciveintensive regions (those dominated by agriculture), capital-intensive regions, (those dominated
by commerce), and intermediate capital-coercive regions (Tilly 1992).
5

Tilly defines the national state as a state “governing multiple contiguous regions and their cities by means of
centralized, differentiated, and autonomous structures” (1992: 2).
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As the relative intensity of agricultural production versus commerce varied across
territory, so too did the social arrangements that linked local elites to their communities. The
result was that local elites in different regions were integrated into the state differently, leading to
variations in the levels of bureaucratic centralization, and qualitatively different kinds of
administrative relations between center and periphery. The abundance of capital resources in
capital-intensive regions, for example, allowed central authorities to extract loans and taxes
without directly incorporating the holders of capital into the bureaucracy itself. Without the need
for the direct participation of regional elites in state administration, these regions—typified by
the city-states of Northern Italy—resulted in the formation of less centralized states with smaller
bureaucracies (Tilly 1992: 143-151).
In capital-scarce regions dominated by agriculture, though, the extraction of resources
was dependent on landlords’ direct coercion of peasants and serfs. In order to obtain their share
of these resources, aspiring state makers incorporated coercive-wielding local elites into the state
itself, granting them land and official title. The regions of Europe that were defined by these
kinds of local social arrangements tended to evolve into states like Russia, Poland, and Hungary,
with large and “bulky” centralized bureaucracies (Tilly 1992: 137-143). England and France
followed an intermediate capital-coercive trajectory, which entailed both processes
simultaneously, and produced outcomes more like the modern state that we know today (151160). The key point is that elites who were socially and politically embedded in different social
contexts struck different bargains with the rulers of emerging states in modern Europe. This
changed the kind of centralized bureaucracies that developed and whether and how local elites
were incorporated into that bureaucracy as state officials. Echoing Moore, state institutions
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came to reflect underlying social structures, which varied across both time and space (Moore
1966).
Similarly, Ertman describes variations in the trajectories of European states according to
preexisting forms of social and political organization in the periphery. Where territorially based
representative institutions existed at the onset of state formation, local elites were more likely
and better able to resist centralization. This is because territorially based institutions were
“inextricably linked to and rooted in organs of local government,” making local officials more
tightly bound to the communities that they represented (22). Local elites in these territories were
representatives of local interests rather than ready-made agents of the state. The result was that
polities in these regions were less likely to be highly centralized absolutist states (Ertman 1997:
19-25). This was true, though, only when local government bodies were participatory. Where
preexisting local governments were administrative instead, social ties between local elites and
their communities were weaker, and governance was already “carried out almost exclusively by
officials answerable to the center” (25). Because the elites in these territories were already
socially disembedded, they were more fully incorporated into the state apparatus, making the
creation of a centralized absolutist state more likely.6
Like Tilly and Ertman, Ziblatt argues that levels of state centralization vary according to
preexisting social and political organization in the periphery. Where preexisting political
organization in the periphery is characterized by more “infrastructural capacity”—namely, a
well-functioning system of public administration and strong formal institutions like a
6

For Ertman, variation in levels of centralization was independent of whether administration was characterized as
patrimonial or bureaucratic. As described above, bureaucratic and patrimonial states vary primarily in
administrative relations between rulers and staff, but are similar in how they disembed state officials themselves
from local social contexts. Though Ertman primarily treats the development of rational-legal bureaucracy as an
historical and technical issue, he does acknowledge the politics of centralization. The necessary condition is that
“[R]ulers successfully resist the appropriating designs of their elite staffs and retain the right to remove officials at
will” (1997: 8-9). Just as Weber emphasized, the power of appointment was key.
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constitution and parliament—central authorities will be more likely to decentralize authority,
leaving independent power in the hands of local elites (Ziblatt 2004: 78).
In contrast, when the peripheral subunits lack formal rational-legal institutions of public
administration, central authorities will be less likely to find a reliable partner whom they can
trust to carry out the objectives of the central government. Central authorities, in this case, “are
tempted by the prospects of sweeping away existing units, leading the way to greater
centralization” (78-79). Ziblatt’s scope is limited to Europe and applies best to nascent states
with central governments that have already-established rational-legal bureaucracies prior to
centralization.7 But, Gerring, et al. expand the argument to all levels of center-periphery
administrative relations, whether international, national, or subnational (2011).
Others have focused on the causal impact of preexisting social and political organization
in non-European contexts to explain variations in the kinds of state institutions rulers adopted to
incorporate regional cadre into a centralized administrative apparatus. For example, following
Tilly’s work, Tin-bor Hui argues that key differences in social structures at the starting point of
state formation placed China and Europe on drastically different paths of development. Unlike
early modern Europe, ancient China engaged in little international trade, and, therefore, lacked
the capital-intensive regions that existed in Europe. Where central authorities in the capitalintensive regions of Europe could forego bureaucratic centralization—bargaining with private
capital instead—state makers in China did not have this option. “The only way they could build
larger armies and raise higher revenues,” she writes, “was to build up their administrative
capacity” (2005: 51). This meant that central authorities relied little on regional elites and built

7

That is, the variation in the periphery between patrimonial and rational-legal bureaucracy is not seen as varying in
the center, which is assumed to already be defined by rational-legal bureaucracy. This likely stems from Ziblatt’s
empirical cases, late nineteenth-century Germany and Italy.
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bureaucracies from the capital city outward, such that the state became highly centralized, much
more so than the states of early modern Europe.8
In the Ottoman Empire, Barkey suggests that the robust patronage ties that kept regional
officials subordinate to central authorities were “intensified by the lack of local village-based
organization and cooperation,” which precluded those officials from forming alliances with
peasant communities (1994: 11). Like Ertman, this suggests that centralization proceeded where
local officials lacked strong ties to the periphery. The independence of regional cadre in the
Ottoman Empire was undercut even further, however, when central authorities recruited
“bandits”—another difference in local social structure vis-à-vis Europe—to keep local
authorities in check, as I discuss in more detail below (Barkey 1994).9
Anderson describes how differences in local social structures set the states of the Middle
East and North Africa on a drastically different path from those in Europe, resulting in different
styles of bureaucratic authority (1987). “The patterns and outcomes of state formation and
bureaucratic development,” she writes, “depend on the character of society and authority at the
outset of the transformation” (4). Because societies in the Middle East were traditionally
nomadic, organized into tribes, and engaged in long-distance trade, there was little landed wealth
(Anderson 1987; Khoury and Kostiner 1990). The result is that nascent state authorities in the
Middle East, unlike their counterparts in both coercive- and capital-intensive regions of Europe,
were less able to identify and recruit regional elites into the state; administrative centralization
proceeded unevenly and incompletely, reflecting diffuse underlying social organization.

8

Conversely, the state in China was also much less representative of social interests. A highly centralized
bureaucracy enabled the Chinese state to dominate society and crush opponents, preventing the kind of collective
action that enabled certain populations to wrest representative institutions from the nascent state makers of Europe
(Tin-bor Hui 2005: 39-53).
9
They also kept regional officials socially disembedded by rotating them across territory, as I discuss in the
following chapter (Barkey 1994: 11).
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Likewise, Boone argues that the distribution of power between center and periphery in
post-colonial African states, and the administrative relations that define them, “are partly
artifacts of the organization of power within agrarian society itself” (2003: 2). That is, they were
shaped by the variations in preexisting social structures in the periphery. More specifically, the
presence or absence of hierarchy in local social structures, in conjunction with local elites’ level
of economic dependence on the center, determined the institutional strategies that state rulers
could adopt in an effort to incorporate or exclude local elites from state administration.
In territories where local social structures were hierarchically organized, central
authorities could either share power with local elites, ruling indirectly, or they could attempt to
displace them, usurping their power altogether. Which of these options they chose depended
upon whether local elites were economically dependent on the center. Where local elites had too
much economic independence, central authorities faced the risk of defection and, thus, pursued a
strategy of usurpation rather than power sharing. Where local elites were dependent on the
center economically, central authorities were more likely to be assured of their subordination,
and integrated them directly into the state bureaucracy. In territories where society lacked a preexisting social hierarchy, usurpation would not be necessary and power sharing would not be
possible. In these cases, says Boone, rulers would simply “attempt to govern from the center,”
refusing to give any significant power to rural actors, an institutional outcome she calls
“administrative occupation” (ibid.: 17-38).10 In other words, rather than risk the incomplete

10

These three institutional outcomes governing center-periphery relations assume that central authorities have an
interest in controlling and incorporating the territory in question. Boone also includes a fourth outcome. Faced with
territory that has no economic value, ruling elites might choose not to incorporate it into the state at all—Boone calls
this, fittingly, “non-incorporation.” That is, rather than adopt a centralized versus decentralized administrative
structure, ruling elites might choose to build no structure at all, voluntarily leaving that territory outside of the state’s
realm of control.
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integration of local elites into the state administration, state authorities marginalized them
altogether.
All of these approaches highlight the interaction between differently embedded regional
elites and central authorities in shaping trajectories and outcomes of state formation. They also,
however, all treat these interactions as historical and completed. Through whatever institutional
arrangement that incorporated or excluded regional elites, central authorities ultimately end up in
charge of a more or less centralized, yet fully formed state administration. Migdal’s contribution
to this literature—which was briefly described above—was to criticize the tendency to treat
states as the final outcome of these processes, and to problematize the image of central
authorities as achieving domination over other state officials.
Instead, Migdal suggests that states are arenas of ongoing political struggle that rarely (or
never) become fully unified; personnel are never extracted from local social bases, and their
integration into the state’s administrative hierarchy remains incomplete and problematic for
ruling elites (Migdal, Kohli, Shue 1994; Migdal 1988, 2001). This “state-in-society” approach
was primarily a reaction to scholars’ emphasis on state autonomy, which tended to take
administrative cohesion for granted, assuming not only that the state dominated society, but that
it dominated itself as well (Skocpol 1985). Even approaches that stressed the ongoing interactive
nature of state power and social forces—like Mann’s concept of “infrastructural power”—tended
to treat states and societies as fully formed and distinctly separate entities (Mann 1993).11

11

The concept of “infrastructural power” is meant to complicate the presumed one-way and hierarchical relationship
between state and society common in other neo-Weberian accounts. Mann defines infrastructural capacity as “the
institutional capacity of a central state, despotic or not, to penetrate its territories and logistically implement
decisions.” Importantly, this is conceived as “a two-way street” because it not only enables the state to control
society, but “also enables civil society parties to control the state” (Mann 1993: 59). Even still, Mann regards states
and societies as distinct and the process of centralization as a “tightening of state-society relations” whereby social
relations are captured in a single national sphere rather than multiple local or regional spheres (Mann 1993: 60-1).
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But, an additional impetus behind the state-in-society approach came through efforts to
understand political struggles in post-colonial states that seemed to be anomalies under the old
Eurocentric paradigm (Migdal, Kohli, Shue 1994; Migdal 1988, 2001). This approach urges us
to “disaggregate” the state itself, emphasizing that administrative integration is a contentious and
ongoing process, particularly in newly independent states. It also emphasizes the ambiguous and
changing boundary between “state” elites and other social forces. In the “conflict-laden
interactions” over power, writes Migdal, state actors and social forces often form alliances and
coalitions that cut across the very boundaries by which they are distinguished (Migdal 2001: 1022). This suggests that treating state and society as discrete and separate entities that interact
with one another—which the state formation literature tends to do—is problematic. Migdal
argues that,
[T]here has been an unfortunate tendency in social science to treat the state as an organic, undifferentiated
actor. States have been assigned an ontological status that has lifted them apart from the rest of society. As
a result, the dynamics of the struggles for domination in societies, in which components of the state have
played differing roles in various arenas, have been obfuscated. Those struggles have not only been about
who seizes the commanding political heights in society. They have involved alliances, coalitions, and
conflicts among social forces in multiple arenas, including components of the state (123).

In this light, the center’s dominance over the periphery and the integration of its own
cadre into state administration is a source of internal political division that remains unresolved.
Contra Weber, the hierarchy of state administration is not autonomous from society, nor are its
agents disembedded from local social structures. Rather, agents of the state—as much as central
authorities might seek to disembed them from their social bases through either rational-legal
bureaucratic offices or the personal dependencies of patrimonialism—remain members of
society, responsive to social pressures, and frequently divided in their loyalties. Though Weber
described state bureaucracies as “dehumanizing,” we are reminded that administrative structures
“are human as much as they are mechanical contrivances” (Rudolph and Rudolph 1979: 198).
Weber, along with his followers, tended to ignore “the reciprocal relationship between
20

environmental forces and actors on the one hand and bureaucracies on the other, and the impact
of this relationship on organizational goals, resources, and internal power relationships” (ibid.
209).
Following from this, Migdal urges us to recognize that state officials are not a
homogenous group of actors. Rather, officials at different levels of state administration find
themselves differently embedded in varying social contexts. The officials in the capital city who
occupy the “commanding heights” of the state’s presumed administrative hierarchy are located in
different social contexts than those in territorially dispersed field offices, or those at the bottom,
who work in “the trenches” in face-to-face contact with the population that the state is seeking to
govern (ibid: 123). In proposing an “anthropology of the state,” Migdal writes that social
scientists
[N]eed a method that looks carefully at [the state’s] different parts (just as anthropology often focuses on
small portions of society); they require an approach that analyzes how its various components, often
impelled by conflicting interests and pulling in different directions, relate to one another. Such an
anthropology would reject the assumptions implicit in many studies concerning the smooth interlocking of
relations within and between the organs of the state organization or of a state that simply reflects the will of
its top leaders (Migdal 2001: 116).

Despite this emphasis on the ongoing political struggle between state and society, the
disaggregation of the state between its highest and lowest levels, and the depiction of fluid
conflict between center and periphery, proponents of the state-in-society approach have rarely
addressed state formation explicitly. Nevertheless, this approach has clear implications for how
we understand state formation: it suggests that state formation is an ongoing process with no
clear endpoint, especially in newly independent post-colonial states. The center never truly
incorporates the periphery so much as it remains in struggle with it. Central authorities might
recruit local elites into state administration, but they remain wary of these officials’ social ties in
their own territories, fearing they might undermine administrative hierarchy, or even threaten the
tenure and security of central authorities themselves (Migdal 1988).
21

As a reaction against the neo-Weberian literature that stresses state autonomy, the state-in
society approach also tends to emphasize how societies shape states rather than how states shape
their societies. But, a truly interactive approach would allow that states—even if imperfectly
unified and powerful—can shape the social forces that they are interacting with, even as the state
itself is simultaneously transformed. State institutions themselves might reinforce or even reforge the kinds of social ties that exist at the local level. Social structures in the periphery and
the social relations between local elites and local communities might be produced by the
interaction itself, even if inadvertently.
Indeed, particularly in the context of contemporary non-European states, scholars have
suggested that we understand states and societies as a perpetual object of contention, subject to
continual renegotiation and transformation. States can be changed through struggles with
society, but the society in which the state is embedded changes simultaneously, with different
social forces rising and falling, such that the distinctions between state and society are always
blurry and in flux. Changes in social forces are the impetus behind contestation and, over time,
shifts in state-society relations are reflected in transformations of the state itself (Hagmann and
Peclard 2010: 541). This suggests, further, that the Eurocentric Weberian model of statehood is
not a necessary outcome or a standard by which we can or should measure success or failure of
state development in the non-European world (Boege, et al. 2010).
Overall, then, the state-in-society approach suggests a flaw with the very idea of
preexisting social and political organization as depicted in the state formation literature. As I
described above, the literature on state formation treats preexisting social and political
organization and central states as exogenous to one another. That is, it assumes that social and
political organization in the periphery is, in fact, preexisting, and that central authorities and
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regional elites first come into contact as discrete, fully formed entities. The possibility that
social and political organization in the periphery is itself produced and transformed through the
process of state formation, and that center and periphery can shape each other in interactive ways
over time has rarely been given serious consideration.
Barkey’s study of state centralization in the Ottoman Empire is one of the few studies
that does so. Barkey argues that centralization in the Ottoman Empire followed a different
trajectory than in European states precisely because of the different social structures that existed
there and the different strategies that rulers adopted to manage center-periphery administrative
relations (Barkey 1994). More specifically, she argues that the state recruited poor rural vagrants
as mercenaries to fight wars. During periods of demobilization these newly made soldiers
became bandits, preying on the countryside. Rather than repress bandits by using force, though,
Ottoman rulers hired them to fight against their own regional bureaucrats as a check on their
independence. In this way the banditry was incorporated into the state itself, and the lines
between bureaucrat and bandit—and between state and society—were continually redrawn.
The key point is that the banditry was not merely a preexisting or exogenous social
element that rulers had to contend with. Rather, it was partly a creation of the state itself and one
that was reproduced by the strategies rulers adopted to manage administrative relations with
subordinates in the regions. The outcome of state centralization did not merely reflect struggles
with preexisting social forces; it was the process of centralization itself that produced them.
Endogenous social forces—or what can be called “new social formations” (142)—were
strategically incorporated into or expelled from the state bureaucracy as strategic contexts
changed over time. This constituted a unique Ottoman path toward state centralization (Barkey
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1994; 2008). Theoretically, this work fills a gap between the state formation literature and the
state-in-society approach.
The present study seeks to build on this approach. As I suggest below, the contemporary
historical context not only gives us a unique opportunity to do so, but might require it of us.
Relatively new norms about statehood and state development—particularly those that prioritize
political and financial decentralization—can reshape how state and society interact with one
another during the process of state formation, sometimes by changing the sequence of how state
institutions are built, and by shaping local social ties and state-society relations endogenously, in
ways that can either undermine or reinforce administrative centralization over time.

III. Contemporary State Formation and the Post-Soviet Context
Unlike in earlier historical periods of state formation—from which the vast majority of
the literature draws its cases, including Barkey’s—newly independent states today exist in a
world already defined by statehood, with strong international norms and pressures that can shape
the kinds of institutions that central authorities build, and the kinds of states that are regarded as
the “right” kind. This includes, for example, pressure on the national authorities of newly
independent states to decentralize power to the local level and to adopt democratic reforms
regardless of whether state administration is centralized to begin with. But, this contradicts the
historical sequencing of how western states themselves developed. Even though European states
did eventually decentralize power to ensure local representation and adopt a host of other
democratizing reforms to “legitimize” their rule vis-à-vis the population, they only did so late in
their historical development, after a long historical process of state centralization and
consolidation.
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For example, prior to the eighteenth century, the rulers of nascent states in Europe relied
on socially embedded independent magnates. They did so out of necessity. The creation of a
full-time professional class of administrators spanning vast territories was simply too expensive
(Tilly 1985: 174). These regional and local elites were not incorporated into state administration,
but merely “collaborated with the government without becoming officials” and were given
tremendous leeway and independence in how they carried out their duties (Tilly 1985: 174-75).
Over time, rulers sought to reduce the risks associated with these independent contractors—
whose very independence made them “potential rivals” and “possible allies of a rebellious
people”— and gradually centralized control by replacing regional magnates with their own
officials (ibid; Tilly 1992: 103-117). It was precisely by “extending their officialdom to the local
community” that administrative centralization proceeded (1985: 175).12 In fact, the entire
process can be summarized as the movement from indirect to direct rule (Tilly 1992 103-114).
Socially embedded local elites were replaced by the state’s own bureaucrats, who were
enmeshed in the administrative hierarchy of the state rather than in local communities.13
Democratic reforms like local self-government came much later, only after direct centralized rule
was the norm; it was a decentralization of already centralized power.
As for the “legitimacy” of the state, its agents, and its activities, Tilly suggests that this
mattered less than we tend to think and might serve merely to justify or explain the state’s
centralization and monopolization of force rather than enable it (1985: 171). That is, legitimacy
became significant only after centralization occurred, not before or during. Moreover, building
on Stinchcombe’s definition of legitimacy, Tilly argues that the legitimacy that matters most is

12

A second important innovation in this process, according to Tilly, was the creation of police forces that were
directly subordinate to the central government.
13
I discuss the politics of this process in chapter 2.
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between rulers and staff, not between rulers and ruled.14 Legitimacy is “the probability that other
authorities will act to confirm the decisions of a given authority” (171). In the context of state
formation—and in state rule generally—the primary concern is whether officials accept the
orders of central authorities. Can central authorities build such an administrative structure? This
question, again, lies at the heart of state centralization. It entails related questions about who fills
state offices and whether and how they are integrated into the state as its officials; as a sequential
process, the kind of legitimacy that mattered first was that state personnel accept subordination
and eschew any claims they might have to represent regional or local communities or social
interests.
However, international norms of modern statehood—driven largely by the Western
liberal hegemony in the post-Cold War era—encourage newly independent states to reverse this
process.15 Decentralization is prized over centralization, devolution over consolidation, and
representation over administration. All of this is intended to create legitimacy for the state and
its leaders in the eyes of society. The “transition paradigm,” which was widely adopted in both
scholarly and policy circles, embodied many of these normative positions. But, as the critics of
these ideas later noted, the proponents for democratization in newly independent states “did not
give significant attention” to the effects of democratization on a society “while it is grappling
with the reality of building a state from scratch or coping with an existent but largely
nonfunctional state” (Carothers 2002: 8-9, 16-17). In fact, we know from other sources that the
“[c]onsolidation of state power” is “an essential prerequisite for democratization”
(Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992: 9, see also pp. 63-69). How can power be
decentralized if it is not yet centralized? What happens to social and political organization in the
14

In fact, Weber says the same thing.
In fact, western-international organizations, like the IMF and World Bank, alongside the US government,
sometimes coerce them to do so.
15
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periphery when it is given priority over state centralization? How do state and society interact
when the historical sequencing that shapes center-periphery relations proceeds in a different
order? How is the trajectory and outcome of administrative centralization changed as a result?
If the contemporary era creates a new historical context for recently independent states in
general, nowhere is this truer than in the former Soviet Union. Newly independent post-Soviet
states were not only forged in a world with strong pressures and norms about democracy and
statehood, as described above, they also had to contend with international perceptions that
excessive bureaucratic centralization was a legacy of the Soviet Union. If international policy
called for states to decentralize and democratize state power and administration, nowhere was
this seen to be more apt or relevant than in the former Soviet Union.
Much of the more policy-oriented political science scholarship on the region adopted this
logic, focusing heavily on questions about whether and how post-Soviet states transition to
democratic market economies, which also imply internationally appropriate models of statehood
(Dawisha and Parrott, eds. 1997; Gleason 2004; Olcott 2005). The assumption here is that
administrative centralization was not a goal that newly independent states needed to achieve, but
an historical burden that they needed to overcome. The result is that questions at the heart of the
literature on state formation—including the challenges of integrating cadre into a unified and
centralized administrative bureaucracy—tended to remain unaddressed.
In fact, some scholars’ emphasis on democratization and decentralization tended to
highlight Soviet-era bureaucrats’ resistance to change, implying that dismantling state
bureaucracies was more important than building them. In extreme examples (though typical of
the neoliberal perspective), state bureaucracy and democracy are framed as virtually
incompatible. Aslund, for instance, argued that the need for economic reform and political-
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administrative decentralization required new national authorities “to minimize the role of the old
state apparatus” and “break the hold of the old system” (2007: 33). Rather than focusing on how
to recruit and integrate state officials into a hierarchical administrative structure—central to the
process of state formation—the question was how to expunge or disempower existing
bureaucrats. Aslund writes, “[…] the state bureaucracy had numerous reasons to oppose a
radical reform program. Under reform, it would lose its prior power, and most of its human
capital would become obsolete because the old socialist micromanagement of enterprises no
longer existed” (35). Obsolescent state cadre, it was suggested, would need to be removed in
order for reforms to be implemented. If democratic reform and decentralization were seen as a
post-communist “revolution,” then “the state bureaucracy represented a ‘counter-revolution’”
(36). Democratization seemed to require the removal of incumbent bureaucrats, not their
integration.
But, were the newly independent post-Soviet states really so robust and centralized after
the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991? While very few studies sought to ask this question or
framed it as a problem, a handful of political scientists did urge us to do so. Some pointed out
that studies of post-communist states tended to take state power for granted, and to wrongly
assume that there was too much of it (Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong 2002). Instead, we were
prompted to consider the presence of multiple actors in competition with new national
authorities, including local elites, foreign governments, and international organizations (ibid.).
Others argued that the relevant legacies of the Soviet era were not impersonalized administrative
centralization, but the persistence of personalized social relations between and across state
ministries that threatened to undermine the post-Soviet state building process (Beissinger 1997).
To some, similarities between post-Soviet states and post-colonial African states suggested that
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questions of state formation and administrative strength should be at the center of attention
(Beissinger and Young 2002).
Despite these few works, however, little empirical research on post-Soviet state
formation has been carried out by political scientists.16 As noted above, the prioritization of
political and economic reform and transition—which normatively stresses the need for
decentralization rather than centralization—precludes such studies, or at least marginalizes their
potential importance. Even Easter’s study of state formation in Russia and Poland—which
focuses on taxation—treats the post-communist state as unique precisely because “state building
begins with the state already in possession of an abundance of power resources in relation to
society—the inheritance of the old regime” (2012: 2).17
Anthropologists, in contrast, took a dramatically different view of the post-communist
state, and one that tended to be less centered on analytical and normative theories about regime
transition. In the anthropology of post-Soviet states, the collapse of the Soviet Union is treated
as a genuine breakdown of the old order. In this light, the national elites of newly independent
states—even if they were Soviet-era elites—did not inherit the robust and highly centralized
administrative machinery of the Soviet state itself. Soviet-era elites may have survived, as did
many of the formal offices that they held, but the relationships and linkages connecting all of
these offices into a functioning administrative hierarchy did not. Nobody doubts that the
bureaucrats and state functionaries in the provinces of newly independent states no longer
answered to Moscow; but, anthropologists suggested that they did not answer to the new national
authorities in their respective capital cities either (Humphrey 2002; Verdery 1996).
16

I discuss some below.
Cooley offers a more nuanced view. He argues that the more a specific state function was controlled directly by
Moscow during the Soviet era, the less it continued to operate in the immediate collapse of the Soviet Union; but,
areas of administration that were already put in the hands of republic-level authorities during the Soviet era
remained largely intact after 1991 (Cooley 2005: 109-125).
17
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Indeed, to anthropologists the collapse of the Soviet state did not leave behind equally
centralized protégé states so much as fissiparous decentralized authorities that were altogether
disconnected from each other, and from their new capital cities. Humphrey argues that the
collapse of the Soviet Union created “widespread uncertainty about government and law at
‘higher’ levels of the body politic” and showed how the surviving social, political, and economic
organizations in the periphery became new “suzerainties,” run by “local bosses” (Humphrey
2002: 5-6). Former state bureaucrats—both members of local governments and managers and
directors of state farms and factories—took control of new economies and localized political
structures. In short, they began to operate outside the state itself. Even the national currency
diminished in importance as economic activity was increasingly carried out in the regions
through barter or coupon, and depended heavily on personal relationships and local social ties
(11-12). These conditions also gave rise to organized crime in place of the state and its laws:
“As governmental decrees become less effective, the sheer number of informal contracts has
risen, and these in particular are neither serviced by banks nor protected by the law” (13).
Verdery provocatively suggests that the relevant transition that needed to be studied was
not from socialism to capitalism or democracy, but from socialism to feudalism (1996: 205).18
The overlapping structure of the Soviet economy and society, where factories and farms
provided not only jobs, but also housing, schools, hospitals, and cultural institutions, lent itself to
the fracturing of authority after the Soviet collapse. Each enterprise became a virtual manor with
its own lord, with very little tying them together across newly independent states’ territory. The
collapse of the party-state, she writes,
Reinforced the tendencies to personalism and patronage inherent in such arrangements, making many
people dependent on their locality, their workplace, or their boss for access to food, housing, and loans.
18

Verdery’s empirical focus is on Romania, but her argument is intended to apply to post-socialist states in general,
including those of the former Soviet Union.
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Belonging to a suzerainty, by either having a regular job or enjoying some other tie to a powerful and
successful patron, meant dependence, but as in feudal times it also meant at least minimal security (206).

This ad hoc decentralization resulting from the collapse of the Soviet state included not
only the reemergence of highly personalized local dependencies, but also demonetization of the
economy, the growth of “localized protection” groups, and “rampant lawlessness and scorn for
central directives” (207). In short, Soviet-era “state” officials in the periphery became local
“lords” when the Soviet Union collapsed. Central authorities in the capital cities of newly
independent states lacked subordinate administrative personnel in the provinces who would carry
out their orders.
Volkov, too, stressed the parcelization, decentralization, and localization of authority that
resulted from the Soviet collapse (Volkov 1999, 2002). In particular, he describes the virtual
disintegration of Russia’s state security apparatus as tens of thousands of former state cadre
moved into the “private security industry” after 1992 (Volkov 2002: 24; see also Ledeneva 2006:
66-72, 177-181). Personnel who were formerly integrated into the state’s centralized
administrative structure suddenly situated themselves in multiple different organizations. While
private security could be either legal (private security firms) or illegal (organized crime), the key
point is that private security itself is highly decentralized and stands in marked contrast to the
centralized state (Volkov 1999). There is no more dramatic or literal illustration of state
disintegration than when former officials strike out on their own as “violent entrepreneurs,” in
countless organizations spread across the state’s territory. As Volkov writes, the scenario “is
plausible only insofar as it assumes that no central authority, that is, no state, exists” (2002: 26).
Importantly, local elites in these contexts were becoming deeply embedded in local social
contexts as their ties to the state loosened (Humphrey 2002: 15, 18; Allina-Pisano 2004). As the
process of administrative centralization (state formation) disembeds local elites from local social
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contexts and integrates them into a unified administrative hierarchy, the Soviet collapse placed
them back into local social contexts, creating mutual dependencies for survival based on face-toface and highly personalized social ties at the local level.19
How did the central authorities of these newly independent states build (or rebuild) state
bureaucracies, recruit and integrate regional cadre, and weaken or sever their local social ties?
How did they succeed or fail in doing so, and why? These are questions that the present study
seeks to answer through a comparative analysis of state formation of two post-Soviet Central
Asian states that have dramatically different trajectories and outcomes in state development since
1991: Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Research Design, Methodology, and Chapter Outline
This study adopts a most-similar research design. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan not only
shared similar social and political institutions during the Soviet era, but also have a common
nomadic and cultural history predating Soviet and Russian rule by hundreds of years.20 Yet, as
noted directly above, and in the introductory paragraphs of this chapter, they have had
dramatically different trajectories of state development, with central authorities in Kazakhstan
building a fairly robust and centralized state bureaucracy while their counterparts in Kyrgyzstan
face continual challenges from regional authorities, if not outright rebellions. Before proceeding,
then, it is important to address at least two independent variables that might account for these
differences: Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have different kinds of political regimes and
19

It is also true that Soviet cadre policy itself made this outcome more likely after 1991. As I discuss in the next
chapter, both the policy of local cadre recruitment (korenizatsiia) and then the “stability in cadres” policy during
Brezhnev’s long tenure had strong localizing effects on cadre recruitment in regions and provinces. The complete
dissolution of the Soviet state—as described by Humphrey, Verdery, and Volkov—deepened and strengthened these
local social ties.
20
This is not to suggest that they were ever identical, only that they are similar, far more alike than any two
randomly selected countries.
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dramatically different levels of economic wealth. Since these represent competing explanations,
I address them here.
One comparative study from 2004 confirms that state administration in Kyrgyzstan is not
as well developed as in Kazakhstan. Using measures of the technical, implementational, and
political capacities of state administration, Cummings and Norgaard find that Kazakhstan
“appears to exhibit fewer problems” than Kyrgyzstan. The reason, they suggest, “appears to be
primarily because of Kyrgyzstan’s stronger regional state interests and social interests, both of
which challenge central state authority” (2004: 703).21 This, though, poses more questions than
it answers. Why does Kyrgyzstan have stronger regional and social interests? Why, conversely,
have authorities in Kazakhstan been able to avoid precisely this kind of contentious centerperiphery dynamic, especially given the two states’ relatively similar starting points at
independence? In posing a tentative answer, Cummings and Norgaard rely on what has become
a conventional wisdom: Kazakhstan has substantial wealth from oil production, and, therefore,
succeeded in building a more robust state apparatus. This points toward differences in the levels
of economic development between these two states.
In fact, existing empirical research undermines this conventional wisdom. Jones Luong,
for instance, showed that high levels of oil and mineral wealth in Kazakhstan have actually
empowered regional governors vis-à-vis the central government, leading to de facto
decentralization (Jones Luong 2004). Interestingly, Cummings has suggested the same (2000).
If this is true, then Kazakhstan has achieved relatively high levels of administrative centralization
despite its oil wealth. More generally, the literature on the resource curse undermines the notion
that resource wealth necessarily contributes to stronger state institutions (Karl 1997; Ross 2012).
21

Their study was based on interviews and surveys of 125 “medium-ranking officials” in the executive and
legislative branches of each state in 2002.
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Indeed, Hertog’s study of Saudi Arabia shows that oil wealth has caused administrative
disintegration as powerful members of the state bureaucracy use income from oil rents to build
virtual fiefdoms that they control personally, almost entirely outside the state’s formal
administrative hierarchy (Hertog 2010). If administrative centralization entails the integration of
cadre into the state—as I suggested above—then oil wealth in Saudi Arabia appears to have had
the opposite effect. In other oil-rich countries like Nigeria and Azerbaijan, authorities in the
central government appear to have little or no influence in large swaths of the state’s territory.
One study of oil-rich post-Soviet states shows that the institutions governing the ownership and
management of oil resources have a much greater impact on outcomes than the mere presence or
absence of those resources (Jones Luong and Weinthal 2010).
This means that the effect of oil wealth on administrative centralization is contingent. If
Kazakhstan’s oil wealth facilitated higher levels of administrative centralization compared to
Kyrgyzstan, we still need to explain how and why it did so. The present study will address this.
I show that Kazakhstan’s economic wealth has had a two-fold effect on state development. First,
it gave Kazakhstan immunity from the pressures of western countries and international donor
organizations that promoted decentralization and regional representation; second, it gave central
authorities the economic resources to keep local officials financially dependent on Astana.22
Kyrgyzstan, which lacked this wealth, became dependent on international organizations for aid,
and adopted many of the reforms that these donors favored or required. This includes the
creation of a highly decentralized system of local self-government. It is this divergence that
mattered most in these two states’ subsequent trajectories of state formation: different systems
of local self-government changed the ways in which local officials carry out local governance,
22

Arguably, this second factor derives from the first since part of the decentralizing reforms that international
donors favor is financial decentralization and the creation of independent local budgets. I address this in chapter 3.
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reshaped state-society relations more broadly, and led to dramatically different center-periphery
politics around cadre appointment and regional representation. In short, it shaped whether, how,
and why local officials were either embedded in local social structures or integrated into the
state’s administrative hierarchy instead.
A second factor setting these two states apart is their regime type. Observers are quick to
note that Kazakhstan is a consolidated authoritarian regime, and Kyrgyzstan, even if not a
democracy, is more pluralistic, competitive, and open. In fact, the vast majority of political
science research on this region focuses primarily on the politics of regimes and regime
transitions, rather than on state formation, as I noted above. What is it, though, that makes
Kyrgyzstan more democratic than Kyrgyzstan? Kyrgyzstan, like Kazakhstan, has been under the
control of one dictatorial president or another for most of its history since 1991. Likewise, the
independence of parliament and the judiciary, though relatively robust since constitutional
reforms were undertaken in 2010, has hardly been a regular or reliable feature of Kyrgyzstani
politics. The only features of Kyrgyzstani politics that have been routinely democratic—
relatively speaking—are its decentralized system of local self-government and its fairly high
levels of public participation in politics, either formally, through regional representation in
parliamentary elections, or informally, through mass mobilization and protest.
These are precisely the factors that I will be addressing. I will be addressing them,
however, not as elements of a partially democratic regime, per se, but as concrete manifestations
of the institutional configurations of state power and administration. That is, I focus on the
institutions of local government, not on democracy. In doing so, I follow some of the more
recent and innovative work on democracy, which suggests that we disaggregate democracies into
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their component parts and focus more explicitly on subnational variations in governance
(Coppedge and Gerring, et al. 2011).23
Insofar as regimes are understood as different ways of organizing and configuring state
institutions, I am looking at regimes by exploring these different institutional configurations.
Similarly, I look at protest and mass participation in politics not as an aspect of
democratization—or even as an aspiration for democracy, a notion that has already been
challenged in the Central Asian context (see, for example, Radnitz 2010)—but as concrete
manifestations of local interests. As one classic study on social movements has noted, labor
activists in the United States did not protest against capitalism. Rather, they protested against
their working conditions (Piven and Cloward 1977: 20). Likewise, we might say that ordinary
people in Kyrgyzstan’s villages do not protest against authoritarianism. Rather, they protest to
defend or promote popular local leaders, who are also their friends, family, and acquaintances.24
Just as the concrete institutional setting of the workplace determined the grievances and targets
of workers (ibid.), the institutional setting of local governance can shape preferences about what
kinds of officials best serve local interests, and which ones do not.
All of this is to say that this study does not overlook regimes at all, but merely discusses
them in their concrete institutional manifestations. For that reason, the word democracy appears
few times in the chapters that follow; in its place, there will be discussions about local elections
or appointments, independent or dependent local budgets, local protest mobilization or its
absence, and the direct participation of ordinary people in local governance or their exclusion.

23

I focus specifically on subnational variation between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Though some level of
subnational variation exists within these states (as it does to some degree in every state), I do not address that here.
24
In a parallel example from the post-communist world, Allina-Pisano notes that local officials in Ukraine did not
thwart privatization because of ideological resistance to capitalism; they were opposed to breaking apart large
collective farms because of the negative effects that they believed this would have on production, food supply, and
the provision of social services in rural areas (Allina-Pisano 2004: 573-574).
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In sum, research presented here takes variations in regime type and levels of economic
wealth into account by saying precisely how and why they matter in shaping different trajectories
of state formation. It does so by narrowing our focus to the institutions of local government and
suggesting that different configurations of state organization at the local level dramatically
reshape the social relations that state officials have with local officials—the institutions of local
government can embed state officials in a local community or insulate them from it. If socially
embedded local elites are less likely to accept direct subordination in the state’s hierarchy—as I
suggested in the review of literature above—certain kinds of local government institutions make
the task of bureaucratic centralization more difficult, at least from the perspective of national
authorities. Finally, to the extent that the local social ties between state officials and local
populations are shaped by the institutions of local government, we can say that local social ties
are endogenous to state formation. Social relations in the periphery are not necessarily a
preexisting given that national authorities confront in their quest to centralize power, but are
themselves partly produced by the kinds of institutions that were created during the process of
state development.
Thus, to the extent that the literature on Central Asia has focused on regimes alone, I do
not address it in this introductory chapter. Importantly, though this work does have some
implications for administrative centralization. As some have reminded us, the projects of
authoritarian consolidation and state building are not always mutually exclusive and are
sometimes overlapping (Slater 2010).25 The post-Soviet policy of “cadre rotation,” which I
discuss in chapter two, is one example. Additionally, to the extent that this literature outlines the
more concrete dynamics of local social networks, state-society relations, center-periphery
25

At the same time, we must keep in mind that this is not always the case as authoritarian leaders’ sometimes
undermine state institutions in an effort to bolster their own personal power (Migdal 1988).
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politics, and protest mobilization, I borrow from it heavily. Subsequent chapters of this
dissertation build on this previous work. Explicit citations and references are made throughout,
noting where I build on or depart from what has already been done in studying the region.
Back to the main question: How, precisely did the central authorities in Kyrgyzstan and
Kazakhstan seek to build (or rebuild) state administrations, recruit and integrate regional cadre,
and weaken or sever their local social ties? How did they succeed or fail in doing so, and why?
And what can this tell us more generally about state formation in the contemporary historical
period? The remaining chapters seek to answer these questions and are outlined as follows:
In chapter two, I argue that the policy of “cadre rotation” was widely adopted by the new
national elites of post-Soviet states to disembed regional officials from their social contexts and
recentralize state administration after the Soviet collapse. I begin by outlining the state
centralizing logic of cadre rotation in historical context and in various world regions, including
within the Soviet Union itself. I then present evidence from an original database of provincial
governor biographies in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan since 1991. These data show that
Kazakhstan has been much more effective in socially disembedding its regional cadre, regularly
rotating them across provinces and in and out of the central government, thus preventing them
from building or maintaining social bases of independence and power in the regions.
Kyrgyzstan, in contrast, has been less successful in implementing cadre rotation for extended
periods of time. There, regional governors rarely serve in more than one province, and attempts
to relocate them and replace them with “outsiders” are often met with powerful local resistance
by local elites and the communities that they are socially embedded in. In short, chapter two
describes how central authorities in both states adopted the same policy for integrating regional
cadre into state administration; Kazakhstan succeeded, but Kyrgyzstan failed.
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What accounts for these different outcomes? In chapter three, I disaggregate the state to
show that even as national leaders adopted the same cadre policy at the provincial level, the two
states differed dramatically in the kinds of institutions that were built at the lowest levels of
administration, in villages, towns, and small cities. Kazakhstan rebuilt and reinforced the Sovietstyle “power vertical” down to the village level.26 Kyrgyzstan, in contrast, decentralized
administration by establishing a system of local self-government. At the village level this
included elections, an independent budget, and virtually unlimited decision-making authority
about what problems to solve and how to solve them. Importantly, the reason for this divergence
in local-level state institutions was exogenous. Kyrgyzstan was financially dependent on
international donors and created and implemented local self-government reform under the
guidance and tutelage of international organizations. Kazakhstan’s oil wealth insulated it from
international pressure, and enabled authorities to withstand or ignore what little pressure was
brought to bear.
Yet, it was not the mere creation of new formal institutions at the local level that mattered
most; rather, it was the effect they had on local social ties. In chapters four and five, I show that
differences in local government institutions had broad and profound effects on local social ties
and broader state-society relations. They did so by changing the way that state officials were
embedded in society, and how ordinary people came to interact with the state, through the
personae of their own local officials. Insofar as these changes in local social ties were directly
linked to the institutions of local government, they follow path-dependent patterns over time. As
26

The term “power vertical” (or “vertical of power”) in the post-Soviet period is most closely associated with
Vladimir Putin’s presidency, particularly during the period 2000 to 2008. During this time, Putin “sought to
recentralize control, strengthen the central state and establish a strong vertical of power by appointing loyal figures
to important positions to implement policy decisions” (Monaghan 2012: 1). The term is regularly invoked in other
post-Soviet states and refers to the recentralization of state administration such that regional-, provincial-, and locallevel officials are subordinate and loyal to central authorities. I use the term throughout the dissertation and intend
for it to have this meaning.

39

I show in chapter three, the institutions of local government in both states were not created in a
singular moment, but through piecemeal reforms over the span of a decade or more. Moreover,
the institutions themselves established different processes of village governance that shape and
reshape local social ties on an ongoing and daily basis.
For example, chapter four shows that the election of local officials in Kyrgyzstan’s local
self-government system made it far more likely that state officials at the village level were lifelong members of the community. Moreover, it shows that their financial independence from
Bishkek made them heavily dependent on the local population. A paucity of local funds meant
that the mobilization of local contributions—cash, labor, and other materials—became an
essential part of local governance, a tendency that was reinforced by the requirements of
international donors. The result is that everyday village governance in Kyrgyzstan requires the
direct participation of local residents, and also places local officials’ own social networks at the
center of this process. Thus, local officials in Kyrgyzstan became even more socially embedded
in local communities, reinforcing moral economies of mutual obligation and reciprocity that
local officials themselves participate in. The process of local governance became increasingly
personalized, informal, and independent from the central government over time.
In Kazakhstan, though, a system of appointments at the village level and a total lack of
financial independence meant not only that village-level authorities were less likely to be from
the community that they were appointed to, but also that the community itself played virtually no
role in everyday governance, thus placing social space between the “officialdom” of the state—
in the personae of the local official—and the rest of society. Chapter four ties these broader
differences in state-society relations to specific differences in local government institutions and
concludes with an ethnographic study of local governance in each state to demonstrate this
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contrast in fine-grained detail. The key point is that these changes were endogenous to the
process of state formation itself: the social ties between state officials and local populations
were either strengthened or weakened through the institutions that central authorities created at
the local level after independence.
Chapter five broadens the argument to show that these different patterns of local social
ties have a broader effect on state-society relations. Using interview data from field research in
both states and national polling data from government and non-governmental organizations, two
clear patterns of state-society relations emerge. In Kyrgyzstan, ordinary people show the highest
levels of trust for local versus national officials while in Kazakhstan the opposite is true. In both
chapters four and five I also discuss the role of President Nazarbayev’s political party in local
governance in Kazakhstan, and show how—purposefully or not—it has tended to undermine the
local social bases of local authorities while strengthening people’s ties to the party, and to the
president himself. In Kyrgyzstan, “local” cadre took on practical importance for ordinary people
giving the distinction of local versus non-local distinctly political overtones; the system of local
government in Kazakhstan, by contrast, made this an unlikely outcome.
This set the stage for differences in each state’s center-periphery politics of cadre
appointment and administrative centralization. In chapter six, I return to the politics of regional
cadre appointment and cadre rotation. Building on the different patterns of state-society relations
forged by differences in the systems of local self-government, which are laid out in chapters
three through five, I describe the specific ways in which cadre rotation was thwarted in
Kyrgyzstan but accomplished in Kazakhstan, thereby undermining efforts to centralize
administration in the former, but not the latter. I do so by using events data from specific
contentious episodes surrounding regional appointment and representation.
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In Kyrgyzstan, efforts to remove or replace socially embedded cadre at the provincial
level could be met by powerful local resistance, and sometimes local populations have removed
or replaced appointed governors with their own “people’s governor” instead.27 Sometimes, in
the face of local protest, central authorities acquiesced, leaving in place state cadre that they did
not choose. In Kazakhstan, however, the president’s formal appointment authority has rarely
been questioned. When it has, the president easily bests his rivals without public backlash. The
result is that Kyrgyzstan’s regional governors who challenge central authorities remain in power
and obtain high levels of independence; in Kazakhstan, they end up in jail, or in self-imposed
exile. More frequently, though, they accept their own subordination, stay quiet, and follow
orders. Put differently, regional personnel in Kazakhstan are better integrated into the state’s
administrative bureaucracy while those in Kyrgyzstan remain embedded in regional and local
communities, thus undermining state centralization. The short narrative at the opening of this
chapter—which shows the contrasting fates of two regional officials in Kyrgyzstan and
Kazakhstan when they challenged the central government—is typical of this broader pattern and
will be outlined in extensive empirical detail in chapter six. It summarizes the core contrast in
the two states’ trajectories of state formation: central authorities in Kazakhstan control cadre
while their counterparts in Kyrgyzstan do not.
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A “people’s governor” is a locally selected leader who is installed into the governor’s office against the will of
central authorities. Invariably, people’s governors in Kyrgyzstan have deep local roots, relatively wide social
support in their regions, and, in many instances, years of experience as officials in the local governments of their
home villages.
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Chapter 2: Centralization, Cadre Rotation, and the Politics of Regional Appointment
“Cadre shuffling will always continue. With regard to the current government – this is just a category of people who
happen to occupy it right now. Cadre changes are the most widely discussed question. Who is removed and who is
appointed, such is the topic for much gossip. I want to say from my own enormous life experience in leadership that
succession [in office] is always necessary. Therefore, I am always trying to make sure that succession [of officials]
always happens.” Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Kazakhstan, interview on live television, as reported by local
press, December 13, 2015 (Tengrinews 2015).
“…The rotation (transfer) of state servants, occupying different categories of state office, is carried out with the goal
of achieving the more effective use of the potential of state servants according to the demands of the state […] State
servants can be transferred to work in another locality, or in another state organ or institution […] if circumstances
require such measures to prevent serious harm to the public service.” Kyrgyzstan’s Law on State Service, Article
28.

I. Introduction
In the opening section of the previous chapter, I described the contrasting fates of two
high-level regional appointees in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. These cases represent broader
patterns of center-periphery politics in these two states: provincial and local officials in
Kazakhstan who challenge the central government end up in jail, or exile; their counterparts in
Kyrgyzstan end up in power. These two patterns represent contrasting outcomes in state
formation, defined by differences in central authorities’ control over cadre, and, therefore, over
state administration.
More specifically, these patterns reflect political struggles that revolve around the power
of regional appointment and representation, raising a series of questions about how that power is
used: Who is to govern the regions on behalf of the state? Whose interests will they represent?
How are they to be selected? Under what conditions can they be removed? Who will have the
power to appoint and remove them? I define the struggle over how these questions get answered
as the politics of regional appointment.28 The outcomes, in turn, reflect broader patterns of
center-periphery relations, administrative control, and centralization during the processes of state
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I might also call this the politics of cadre appointment. I use the terms cadre, personnel, agent, bureaucrat,
functionary, and official with the intention that they should have the same meaning.
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formation. They also, I argue, tell us a lot about the processes of bureaucratization. As I
described in chapter one, the process of bureaucratic centralization often entails the dislocation
of local elites from local social contexts, integrating them into the state’s administrative
hierarchy. Thus, differences in how the above questions get answered reflect different
trajectories and patterns of bureaucratic centralization and state formation in these two states.
In this chapter, I do three things. In the first section, I lay out the ways in which the
politics of regional appointment have manifested themselves during the process of state
formation in different historical and regional contexts. In all of the cases described here, the
appointment of regional personnel has been a political struggle defining relations between center
and periphery. Central authorities adopt appointment policies to ensure the loyalty of their
personnel, but differing social and political environments can sometimes constrain their ability to
achieve this goal. This, in turn, defines levels of centralization, for it determines who will
govern the regions on behalf of the state, and to whom they will be loyal. One theme pervades
the appointment strategies for maintaining the subordination of regional personnel: more often
than not, central authorities seek to ensure the loyalty of regional officials by restricting the kinds
of social relationships they can develop with the populations they are appointed to govern. This
will provide the context through which I analyze regional appointment politics in post-Soviet
Central Asia.
In the second section, I discuss cadre appointment policies and politics in the Soviet
context. Regional appointment policies had a particularly salient profile in the former Soviet
Union, including within the states that are the empirical focus of this study. I describe the ways
in which cadre appointment policies were used by central authorities in the Soviet Union to
centralize power, bureaucratize the party-state, and subordinate regional elites. I do so for two
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reasons. First, I show that cadre policy was a fundamental aspect of state policy in Soviet
governance, including the center’s governance of the regions. Second, I seek to establish the
historical context for strategies of cadre appointment in the immediate post-independence period,
between 1991 and 2013. Two aspects of this post-Soviet context are particularly relevant: First,
the centrality of appointment powers in Soviet governance helped to reinforce the value of
appointment powers for political actors. In post-Soviet states that have constitutionally
structured appointment powers analogous to the Soviet system, the value of controlling certain
offices remains high, for it enables actors to install loyal cadre below them. Second, following a
broad consensus in prior scholarship, I show that Brezhnev’s cadre policies had a noticeable
localizing effect on regional administration. I argue that this created unique challenges for the
leadership of post-Soviet states after independence. Newly independent Soviet states were born
with entrenched and already-established regional elites with whom central authorities had to
contend when centralizing power and establishing their own authority in the regions. They had
to develop new cadre policies to ensure the loyalty of their own agents. Thus, I suggest that
“cadre shuffling” in the post-Soviet context should be understood as a distinct reaction to
Brezhnev’s “stability in cadres” policy.
Lastly, I present empirical evidence from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan showing distinct
differences in central authorities’ abilities to achieve their preferred cadre policies. I do this by
looking at differences in each state’s realization of its constitutionally mandated appointment
powers and by analyzing their relative successes or failures in implementing officially stated
preferences for cadre policy, which entail the shuffling and rotation of regional personnel. Using
an original database of governors’ biographies and career trajectories in every province (oblast)
from 1991 to 2013, I show that Kazakhstan has effectively achieved a cadre rotation policy while
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Kyrgyzstan has succeeded only for short periods, typically facing resistance by local populations
to the appointment of “outsiders” in their regions and localities. The result is that central
authorities in Kazakhstan are better able to choose their own agents in the periphery and,
therefore, have agents that are more loyal to the center. This both reflects and defines
Kazakhstan’s relatively higher levels of state centralization, administrative control, and
bureaucratization.29

II. The Center-Periphery Politics of Cadre Appointment and State Centralization
The central authorities of unitary states face a common challenge: to govern multiple
regions from a single capital city. To do so they must appoint personnel to the various regions of
the state who will act on their behalf. Control emanating from the center partly rests on the
degree to which regional appointees are subordinate to the authorities in the capital city, carrying
out orders and directives as commanded, and operating as agents of the state. When the state’s
own officials have loyalty to other social forces, or strike out on their own, the power of central
authorities outside the capital city will be highly constrained, and maybe non-existent. This
section shows that the aspiring rulers of centralizing states have often used their authority to
recruit, appoint, and remove cadre to ensure loyalty and subordination. In particular,
appointment and relocation of regional officials has often been employed with the goal of
disembedding cadre from local social contexts, thus better ensuring their dependence on higher
authorities.
Machiavelli, for instance, argued that policies of regional appointment were central to
rulers’ power in the regions (Machiavelli 2003: 19-21). He defined two possible modes of
29

To reiterate a point made in chapter one that highlights the functional similarities between patrimonial and
rational-legal administration in state hierarchy, I use the term bureaucracy here somewhat generically. I address this
in more detail in the concluding section of this chapter.
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regional administration: one in which central authorities appointed their own officials as agents
of the state and the other in which they worked with pre-existing local elites who were then
tasked with governing the regions they lived in. He advised aspiring rulers to follow the first
model, which was the one used in fifteenth-century Turkey. There, regional authorities were
appointed as ministers by the prince’s “favor and permission.” The result, which reinforced this
power, was that a Turkish ruler could send “different administrators” to the regions and “change
and move them around at his pleasure” without facing any backlash (Ibid.: 19). That is to say,
the Turkish ruler could rotate and shuffle personnel, thus precluding their ability to form
meaningful social ties to any particular region or locality, ties that might undermine their loyalty
to the center. The prince in Turkey controlled cadre, and this constituted control over the state.
Regional administration in fifteenth-century France, however, followed the second
model. There, central authorities relied on barons with deep social ties governing communities
“who recognize them as lords and have a natural affection for them” (19). Unlike in Turkey,
where leaders chose their own favored administrators, French rulers relied on pre-existing local
elites with independent sources of power in the regions that they governed. As a result, they
found themselves in a continual struggle for power with their own cadre. The “official”
character of French regional authorities was compromised. As Machiavelli wrote, they were
“beloved” by their own (local) subjects, and had “their own prerogatives” that “the king [cannot]
take away except at his peril” (Machiavelli 2003: 19-21). The Turkish model of cadre
appointment, Machiavelli concluded, was more conducive to rulers’ centralized control of
administration.
Machiavelli’s conclusions about center-periphery relations suggest that the impulse
toward centralizing state control stands directly at odds with localism, or the degree to which
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local officials are socially embedded within, and represent, the communities that they govern.
Indeed, insomuch as the process of state formation has been characterized by the centralization
of state administration, central authorities have adopted cadre policies that explicitly undermine
the local social ties of regional officials. Burbank and Cooper show that rulers of empires
typically manipulated appointees’ social ties, noting that the nature of such ties could
compromise their loyalty (2010: 13-14). Barkey notes that state makers, when seeking to
develop unified and centralized control, must establish “an administration loyal to the center and
staffed by officials independent of kinship, tribal, and other class or cultural groups.
Representatives of the center are sent to the periphery and slowly overcome the rule of regional
institutions and elite” (Barkey 1994: 3). State control over cadre, she notes, was ensured by
strengthening officials’ ties to the center while simultaneously breaking their ties to the
provinces, a practice that “was maintained by such practices as rotation of regional offices”
(26).30
Likewise, the rulers of the Roman and English empires would transfer personnel directly
from the metropole into peripheral territories. These officials “were expected to act in the
imperial interest” precisely because they remained “dependent on linkages to home” (Burbank
and Cooper 2010: 14). In this way, regional officials’ social ties to the center would displace
local elites’ social ties to the periphery. For centuries after Charlemagne’s rule over Europe,
successive conquering princes and kings would “replace the existing local rulers with their own
friends, relations or servants” as “representatives of the central ruler” (Elias 2000: 198). In early
modern Europe, state rule was analogous to family rule, whereby patrimonial forms of authority
took on a distinctly familial (and gendered) flavor in what Adams dubbed the “familial state”
30

Likewise, “the state ensured the loyalty of its servants as it rewarded them through incorporation, and it rotated
them to keep them from developing alternative allegiances” (233).
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(Adams 2005). In the patrimonial state described by Weber the ruler appoints only “personal
dependents,” or socially non-embedded “aliens” of whose “obedience he can be absolutely sure”
(Weber 1978: 1013-1031). The administration of the state, based upon the ruler’s own
household, is administered by those “nearest to the ruler,” such that loyalty is “based on a strictly
personal relationship to the ruler” (1030-1).31
If rulers could not appoint their own family, they at least sought to avoid appointing
socially embedded local elites. They would sometimes appoint slaves or “other people detached
from their communities of origin” to regional outposts (Burbank and Cooper 2010: 14). The
weak social connections they were expected to have there was considered to better ensure their
loyalty to the center. Ottoman sultans, for instance, took boys from Christian families, raised
them in the palace, and groomed them to become the empire’s most powerful regional
administrators (Ibid.). The Ottomans borrowed this tactic from others. Previously, as the
Islamic empire expanded into increasingly broader territories, the caliphs had done the same:
“the caliph depended on making people without social standing or kinsmen into the dependent
instruments through which he exercised power over subjects” (Ibid., 76-77). Prior to the rise of
the Islamic empire, the Byzantines and Persians had ruled their vast empires in the same way
(Ibid.).
Another strategy of regional appointment that can undermine local social ties is to forbid
officials from governing the regions that they were born in, appointing them, instead, to serve in
places where they are less likely to have any family, friends, or other acquaintances. Under the
centralized rule of China’s Qing dynasty (1644-1912), where “all local officials […] were agents

31

As outlined in chapter one, patrimonial and bureaucratic forms of administration are two different ways of
solving the problem of loyalty. The former incorporates a ruler’s kin or quasi-kin relationships into the state while
the latter expunges agents’ social relations altogether seeking to undercut loyalty to social groups while
institutionalizing loyalty to the center as a “loyalty to office” (Weber 1978: 959).
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of the central government,” this was institutionalized as the “law of avoidance” (Chu 1962: 1,
21; Watt 1972: 20). According to the law of avoidance, local officials were prohibited from
serving in their own home province, or even in a neighboring province if it was within 500 li of
their hometown (Ibid.).32 Moreover, individual officials could not be appointed to serve in the
same locality, district, or even province with other members of their clan or extended family
(Chu 1962: 21-22). The express purpose of the law of avoidance was “to check officials from
utilizing existing personal contacts in the districts” where they were appointed (Watt 1972: 20).
Sending personnel from the center to the periphery does not ensure their loyalty
indefinitely, of course. For if left in one place too long, socially disconnected officials can put
down roots and develop the very kinds of corrupting social connections that central authorities
seek to avoid. Elias describes how over the course of centuries in medieval Europe “the same
patterns and trends show themselves over and over again in [the] apparatus for ruling” (2000:
198). Close friends and relations of the ruler were sent to the regions to govern as outsiders;
then, overtime, they became socially embedded and were more likely to challenge the authority
of the king in the name of “their” region. Where rulers could not break out of this cycle, they
ended up with states that were highly decentralized. Particularly in the German territories of
Europe, Elias describes Otto’s successive military conquests: “Wherever he could he tried to
replace the descendants of lords installed by earlier emperors, who now opposed him as local
leaders, with his own relations and friends” (201). Within as little as one generation, though,
those relations and friends would claim their domain as hereditary property, seeking political
independence from the prince who appointed them there (Ibid. 197-203).

32

500 li is approximately 250 kilometers, or 155 miles, not a short distance considering the time period in question.
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In addition to appointing officials to regions where they will be outsiders, then, rulers
have also used strategies to prevent those same officials from losing their outsider status by
serving in one region for extended periods of time. State rulers might rotate personnel across
different regions on a regular basis, thereby ensuring that social connections to any one of them
remain fragile. Another strategy is to break up appointees’ tenure in regional posts with
regularized rotation into and out of positions within the central government itself, such that a
single official’s career might take place in multiple regions, punctuated by regularized sojourns
in the capital city. Collectively, I call these strategies “cadre rotation” or “cadre shuffling.”33
They are defined by a common logic: to enhance the loyalty of regional cadre by undercutting
the social ties that might foster loyalty to local communities or other sub-national networks.
For example, in addition to the Qing dynasty’s “law of avoidance,” described above,
policies on promotions and relocations in imperial China used tenure in office as a factor,
making it the only criterion not directly related to job performance. Every three years the
Chinese government would conduct a general assessment of regional officials’ work, known as
the “great reckoning.” Eligibility for promotion and relocation was based primarily on merit, but
in the absence of outstanding job performance, service within a single province for three to five
years proved sufficient for transfer to a new position (Chu 1962: 32-35). That is, tenure
exceeding five years was, by itself, considered grounds for relocation. The normal term in any
regional post was three years (Watt 1972: 59). The law of avoidance, along with the
enforcement of short tenures and regularized transfers, says Watt, “implies a striking imperial
distrust of local administrative power, or local society in conjunction with local administration”
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I adopt this term from its usage in the post-Soviet context. Cadre shuffling is not confined to regional
administration, though I focus on that here. Central authorities might also rotate or shuffle personnel within the
central government itself, by moving them among different ministries, for example.
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(Ibid.: 22).34 Similarly, rulers of the Mongol empire—which at its height spanned all of Eurasia,
from Moscow to Beijing—kept local officials in check by continually “moving them around the
empire” (Burbank and Cooper 2010: 107-108).
It was not only in historical empires that cadre rotation was used. One study of cadre
management in contemporary China notes that the Communist Party favors high turnover rates
in personnel because “shorter tenure reduces the time available for officials to build up an
identity with their current positions and to form local political alliances” (Huang 2002: 70).
Likewise, the “official explanation for the rotation practice sets forth an explicit control
rationale.” If officials know that they are “to be rotated to different positions” then they will
“gain little by over-aggressively pursuing the interests associated with their current positions”
(Huang 2002: 72). In fact, provincial officials in China are sometimes relocated to provinces
with vastly different characteristics, requiring different skill sets, suggesting that rotation and
loyalty sometimes trump competence and knowledge (Huang 2002: 73).
Indeed, Benedict Anderson describes how the centralization of modern states went handin-hand with the “internal interchangeability of men and documents,” and required the
recruitment of state officials who had no independent power in the regions. He goes on to
compare the spatial mobility of Europe’s early bureaucrats with their predecessors, the socially
embedded nobility. The rotation of regional bureaucrats across territory ensured that they
remained without meaningful social ties in the periphery, became interchangeable, and
contributed to the unification of a centralizing state apparatus.
Sent out to township A at rank V, [the bureaucrat] may return to the capital at rank W; proceed to province
B at rank X; continue to vice-royalty C at rank Y; and end his pilgrimage in the capital at rank Z. On this
34

To skip briefly ahead to one of the case studies used in this dissertation, I note here that Alikhan Baimenov, the
Chairman of Kazakhstan’s Agency for Civil Service Affairs, cites the historical origins of cadre rotation in imperial
China. In China “rotation took place even 2,000 years ago,” according to Baimenov (interview with author, July 10,
2014).
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journey there is no assured resting-place; every pause is provisional. The last thing the functionary wants is
to return home; for he has no home with any intrinsic value (Anderson 2006: 55, emphasis in original).

Thus, any single region will see multiple functionaries come and go, none of them putting
down roots: “…official A from province B administers province C, while official D from
province C administers province B” (ibid.: 56). While the itinerant bureaucrat is chronically
detached from local communities, she becomes socially assimilated to the language, norms,
values, and customs of the capital city instead. This too unifies the center while distinguishing it
from the periphery. The “center” begins to emerge not only as a physical place, but as culture
and identity, a set of values, and as a symbol of state power (ibid.; Ferguson and Gupta 2002:
987; Geertz 2000: 121-146). Indeed, “inner thrust of absolutism” in Europe, says Anderson, was
“to create a unified apparatus of power, controlled directly by, and loyal to, the ruler over against
[sic] a decentralized, particularistic feudal nobility” (Anderson 2006: 55).35
In the context of what has been discussed above, we should note that the modern state
bureaucracy mitigates the effects of local social ties by externalizing them from the institutions
of rule, or at least claims to. As discussed in chapter one, the rulers of a rational-legal
bureaucracy govern through a hierarchical staff defined solely by their offices, as ministers and
administrators, not by their social position as barons or lords. According to Weber, the defining
feature of the modern bureaucracy is that it “separates the bureau from the private domicile of
the official and, in general, segregates official activity from the sphere of private life” (Weber
1978: 957). This requires a cadre selection process favoring elites who are un-swayed by their
own connections to society, if they have any at all.
Thus, in the modern bureaucracy potential ties to social forces are severed while loyalty
to the center is institutionalized as a “loyalty to an office,” which is enmeshed in a legal
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Emphasis in original.

53

administrative hierarchy as a subordinate position. The “modern loyalty to an office,” says
Weber, “does not establish a relationship to a person […] but rather is devoted to impersonal and
functional purposes” (Weber 1978: 959).36 The ruler of the modern bureaucratic state can be
better assured that the subordinate office itself produces loyal and reliable agents, regardless of
who those agents are, for their own social ties, to the extent that they have any, have been
neutralized by the office itself.37
The picture painted by Weber is purposefully oversimplified as an “ideal” type. But even
if taken with a grain of salt, it appears that the modern bureaucracy would solve some challenges
of regional appointment in central authorities’ favor, facilitating centralization. Indeed,
European states, over time, gradually adopted the bureaucratized form of centralized rule,
making it one of the defining features of modern statehood. Citing France as the classic case,
Tarrow notes that the center’s penetration of the periphery was accomplished primarily through
“the development of a loyal corps of civil servants who, through the process of routine
administration, eroded the power of independent communes and lords” (1977: 48).
Likewise, Tilly links bureaucratization and centralization in describing the emergence of
modern states in Europe (Tilly 1992). Focusing strictly on the staffing of a state’s military
institutions, he notes that rulers first relied on independent elites and then, over time, moved
toward a system in which appointees were increasingly defined by the officialdom of state office
(Tilly 1992: 28-30). Centralization, in this sense, entailed the movement from indirect to direct
rule (103-114).

36

Emphasis in original.
Cadre rotation is a prominent cadre policy in non- or poorly bureaucratized administrative systems precisely
because local social ties remain a problem for central authorities. I suggest, though, that cadre rotation can have a
bureaucratizing effect insofar as it has the effect of disembedding personnel from local social contexts.
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In newly independent states, this process has sometimes proven to be difficult. Rulers
might seek to centralize and bureaucratize administration, but they do not always succeed in
doing so. This is because the determination of who governs the regions and how they are
selected is not simply a matter of choosing a particular strategy of rule, the preferred institutional
design, or the right policies of elite recruitment and appointment. Whether and how central
authorities appoint their own favorites to the regions to play the role of bureaucrat—if they have
the power to appoint them at all—remains a fluid political question. A ruler might desire to
build a centralized bureaucracy only to find that political reality does not allow it. This is
because consolidating and controlling power over the state often brings central authorities into
conflict with regional elites, and, perhaps also, with local communities (Barkey 1996: 3; Tilly
1992: 98-103; Scott 2009). As Weber notes, “the ruler is always confronted with the indignant
opposition of the native aspirants to office and sometimes also of the subjects” (Weber 1978:
1027). In the places where this is true, attempts by central authorities to regulate the social
relations of local officials through policies like cadre rotation continues to color relations
between center and periphery.
Migdal, for example, writes about the problems of state power in newly independent,
post-colonial states. As a result of colonial rule, the authorities of newly independent states
found themselves in political struggle with regional “strongmen” as they attempted to expand the
reach of the central government into society. Migdal highlights a paradox in the centerperiphery relations that unfolded as a result of this process: In order to expand state power into
society, the rulers of these new states typically must rely on already-established local elites and
notables. But, by relying on local notables, rulers risk giving up their own control, sometimes
even facilitating direct challenges to the central government (Migdal 1988: 206-237).
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As a way out of this paradox, rulers rely on a number of “strategies for survival.” Among
these are attempts to undermine the local social bases of state officials. To accomplish this, “the
powers of appointment and removal from office in state leaders’ hands proved an important tool”
for rulers (Migdal 1988: 214). Migdal cites cadre rotation (or what he calls “the big shuffle”) as
one of the key ruling strategies for central authorities in post-colonial settings as they seek “to
prevent threatening centers of power from coalescing” (214). In cases as varied as Haiti,
Pakistan, Egypt, and Mexico, Migdal catalogues the “forced circulation of elites” and “the rapid
rotation of individuals” throughout different parts of the state apparatus, to isolate them from
their social bases of support, or sever those ties altogether (215-217).
A second strategy of rulers in this context is to rely more heavily on their own family and
friends (Migdal 1988: 217-223). In order to further undercut the centrifugal pull of regional
strongmen, central authorities increasingly rely on their own dependents to serve in important
state offices, giving some states “an almost familial character” (217). Uncertain of regional
elites’ loyalty, rulers “have continued to use kinship ties as an important criterion for recruitment
to state posts” (218). They might also rely on other kinds of personal ties, binding the periphery
to the center through appointing officials with “common regional origins,” or shared ethnic,
sectarian, or tribal backgrounds (ibid.). Here social ties to the center displace the ties officials
might have with the periphery.
In both of these strategies, like those described above, the rulers of newly independent
states seek to avoid relying on socially entrenched local elites because their independent social
bases might undermine loyalty and subordination to the center (Migdal 1988). Migdal’s point,
however, is that rulers do not always have the power to do as they please. Central authorities
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engage in political struggle with regional elites and cannot overcome them easily, at least
without the possibility of facing a significant backlash that could threaten their hold on power.
Indeed, the process of centralization and bureaucratization in Europe was full of conflict
precisely because socially embedded regional elites resisted usurpations of their power and
privilege. In the mid-seventeenth century, French authorities finally sought to centralize power
along the lines that Machiavelli recommended, by stripping authority from the provincial
nobility and giving it instead to a new class of state officials, the Intendants. The Intendant,
unlike the landed nobility, wrote Tocqueville, “was never a native of the province to which he
was posted,” and obtained his post not “by right of birth, or by election,” but because he was
“chosen by the government” to “act as its provincial agent” (Tocqueville 1955: 32-40). The
social disruptions that rippled throughout the countryside as a result of this, however, would
come back to haunt authorities in Paris. To the “great lords” of provincial France, the Intendants
were “the creations of a usurped authority” (36). According to Tocqueville, the displacement of
the landed elite and the subsequent disappearance of the reciprocal services that they offered
peasants was one of the driving forces behind the French Revolution (ibid.).
It is essential to note, however, that the Napoleonic reforms of 1800 did not eliminate the
regional ruling apparatus of the old regime; rather, they built upon it.38 In the end, the French
Revolution marked the center’s victory over the periphery. The Napoleonic prefectural system
“expressed the radical idea that the state represented the national will against the fissiparous
tendencies of the provinces” and fully integrated all of France’s regions into a single state
administration (Tarrow 1977: 51). Authorities in Paris appointed prefects to each of the
country’s new territorial-administrative departements where they served as the region’s highest
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This was Tocqueville’s main point—the supposed innovations of the revolution had their roots in the old regime.
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official. Even though the prefect was a bureaucratic agent of the center in the periphery, officials
in Paris have proven cautious not to allow the prefect to develop independent sources of power.
During the Third Republic “prefects were rotated with every change in government” (Tarrow
1977: 56). Even in the Fourth and Fifth Republics, among a myriad of factors officials use when
considering prefectoral appointments and promotions, “one rule seems to be almost universally
respected; no prefect is appointed to a departement where he has close relatives, property or
particular interests” (Machin 1977: 176). In fact, notes Machin, the prefect who seeks to settle
down and buy a home within the departement he is appointed to “is almost inevitably
disappointed: he is always moved to another departement” as a result (Ibid.). That is to say,
even in post-World War II France central authorities have utilized the principles of cadre rotation
as a means of controlling appointed regional officials.
The Napoleonic prefectural system, it should be noted, is not simply one more example
of how cadre shuffling is employed. It serves as the prototype of regional administration for
modern centralized states, including the Soviet Union, to which I now turn.

III. The Politics of Cadre Appointment in the Soviet Union
In this section I discuss the politics of regional appointment in the Soviet Union. I do so
for two reasons. First, the Soviet Union provides us with another general case to illustrate the
politics of cadre appointment during the process of centralization. Here, as in the examples
above, the social ties of regional and local officials often make central authorities wary as they
attempt to govern the periphery. Second, it provides the historical context for the empirical cases
of this dissertation: post-Soviet Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. One aspect of this history in
particular is important to note. As noted in numerous other studies, the politics of cadre
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appointment in post-Soviet Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are shaped by the policies that were put
in place during the Brezhnev era, which had an overall localizing effect on cadre recruitment
(Jones Luong 2002; Collins 2006; Hale 2015: 53-57).
In the Soviet Union, perhaps more than anywhere else, the system of cadre selection was
viewed as integral to state power. Rulers in Moscow tightly controlled all major appointments
through the Communist Party’s “leadership management system,” the nomenklatura, which was
a “list of positions whose ranks are confirmed by higher authorities” (Harasymiw 1969: 493;
Voslensky 1984: 1). The Communist Party and the Soviet state had the same five-level
territorial-administrative organization. Put simply, the Soviet Union consisted of republics,
within each republic were provinces, within each province were districts, and within each district
were numerous villages and cities.39 Typically, the nomenklatura at each level was determined
by the level directly above it. When Moscow found the performance of a particular regional
administration to be lacking, though, it would assert direct control, usurping its appointment
power and “transfer[ing] that jurisdiction to its own nomenklatura” (Harasymiw 1969: 507).
Thus, center-periphery relations were not restricted to relations between Moscow and republiccenters, but between Moscow and all sub-union levels of the party and state, including, for
example, provinces, districts, and villages.
But, “far from being a mere administrative device,” writes Rigby, the nomenklatura was
“a basic factor in the distribution and exercise of power and privilege in Soviet society” (Rigby
1990: 6-7). The verticalism of state power in the Soviet Union was built upon its cadre
recruitment and appointment system, and the “political control of cadres,” as managed through
39

In the case of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan the dissolution of the union in 1991 made each republic an independent
state. Below this level, the main territorial-administrative divisions were preserved, now in a four-level system—
republic, province, district, village/city. Though the nomenklatura no longer exists, the main structure of
appointments follows the same logic; the republic appoints to the province, the province appoints to the district, and
so on. I discuss this below in more detail.
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the nomenklatura, was seen as intimately tied to the “political reliability” of those cadres—that
is, the degree to which they were loyal to and carried out the political priorities of the
Communist Party and the state. When the Communist Party faced administrative problems,
writes Harasymiw, “the answer […] in every critical instance [was] political centralization, that
is, greater party control over personnel” (Harasymiw 1969: 507). As in many of the cases
described above, authorities in Moscow often rotated personnel in order to ensure their
dependence on the center and preclude the development of strong social ties in the regions. The
“ruling group” in Moscow, wrote Fainsod, “endeavors to prevent the growth of ‘family relations’
between the controlled and the controllers by frequent shifts of personnel,” which was just one of
a “variety of ingenious devices” used by the ruling class to “make its control operative” (Fainsod
1963: 418).
In addition to loyalty, however, Soviet strategies of cadre recruitment, appointment, and
shuffling were based on two other logics. First, contrary to the anti-localism common in the
regional appointment strategies described above, Lenin’s theory of nationalism led him to favor
the recruitment of local cadre rather than sending out administrators from Moscow. That theory,
in short, posited that non-Russian ethnic groups would rebel if expressions of their national
identity were repressed, as was done under the preceding imperial regime.40 The resulting cadre
policy of korenizatsiia (nativization) sought to empower titular nationals to govern their own
republics, which tended to have an overall localizing effect on cadre recruitment practices.
Second, the Soviet leaderships’ economic priorities—agricultural expansion and rapid

40

An observer of tsarist Russia described the position of an appointed governor as “a military commander quartered
on a subjugated people, more than a public officer among his fellow subjects” (George Trevor, Russia Ancient and
Modern, as quoted by Rigby (1978, fn. 5)). Early on the Bolsheviks favored local selection of governors, an impulse
that quickly withered away under the centralizing imperatives of the Communist Party leadership, as I discuss
below.
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industrialization—often required the recruitment and appointment of highly specialized
personnel, sometimes making loyalty to the party a secondary concern.
During the entire course of the Soviet period, these three goals—loyalty, nativization, and
economic development—led to conflicting priorities in cadre recruitment, which, in turn, led to
frequent changes in strategy: if local officials displayed too much localism (mestnichestvo),
central authorities began to favor cadre rotation; but too many transfers could undermine the
work of regional officials, which thwarted industrialization, leading to longer tenures and
recruitment of specialists. Though cadre policy changed in small ways every few years, the
broadest and most significant changes in the strategies of cadre appointment and control were
associated with successive changes in top Soviet leadership, most notably in the transfers of
power among Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev.
The ways in which competing priorities were balanced over time has a two-fold
significance with regard to center-periphery relations in the post-Soviet period. First, Soviet
cadre policies allowed for much higher levels of local recruitment than we might expect,
especially considering that one of the nomenklatura’s ostensible purposes was a “check on
localism” (Miller 1983). Second, the Soviet Union collapsed at the end of a 25-year period that
happened to be marked by disproportionately high levels of local recruitment, even by Soviet
standards. This was the result of Brezhnev’s “stability in cadres” policy, itself a reaction against
Khrushchev’s penchant for cadre shuffling. As part of the Gorbachev-era reforms, attempts were
made to uproot the entrenched local elites of the Brezhnev era, who were viewed by central
authorities as irredeemably corrupt (i.e., insubordinate), but the center quickly gave in when
local communities mobilized to preserve the status quo (Critchlow 1988, 1991; McGlinchey
2011). This means that the immediate post-independence period has been one in which the
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central authorities of newly independent states have had to develop loyal cadre in the face of
highly entrenched local elites. This informs not only the cadre policies that they have sought to
adopt, but also contextualizes the overall value that political actors assign to the power of
appointment itself—being able to control who will serve where, and in whose interests they will
do so.
The full history of cadre politics in the Soviet Union has been covered by other recent
studies, treating it mainly as a glimpse into the mechanics of patronage—loyalty in exchange for
jobs (McGlinchey 2001: 51-66; Hale 2015: 47-57). To save space, I focus primarily on the
Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, which are the most significant for understanding the immediate
post-Soviet period.
However, there is at least one aspect of the Stalin years that is worth noting here. Stalin
faced many of the practical effects of Lenin’s nationalities policy, which included the
insubordination and disloyalty of local cadre. In fact, the revisionist history of the Soviet
Communist Party’s successive purges, in addition to Stalin’s “Great Terror,” suggests they were
driven by the perceived need to eradicate disloyal and ineffective cadre in regions and localities
(Getty 1985). If korenizatsiia was a “rooting” of cadres within regions and localities, then
Stalin’s purges were a violent and radical form of “uprooting.”
In accordance with the logic presented in the previous section of this paper, evidence
suggests that native local cadre in Central Asia, partly as a result of Lenin’s preference for local
cadre recruitment, tended to ignore, reinterpret, or subvert those directives that contradicted with
the social norms and expectations of the society that they lived and worked in (Massell 1974:
249-311). Tellingly, it was the top central administrator tasked with overseeing the Soviet policy
of women’s emancipation in Central Asia, Yemelyan Yaroslavsky, who was soon reassigned as
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the party’s “chief purger” (Massell 1974: 249-311).41 The purge of 1928-1929 took place across
the entire Soviet Union, but it started in Central Asia, and was explicitly linked to native cadres’
failure to implement policies related to the emancipation of women (Massell 1974: 318).
Massell notes that native Central Asian cadre were among the hardest hit in this purge,
losing approximately 25% of their ranks, compared with 10% Union-wide (Massell 1974: 249311). Between 1930 and 1938, a total of seven successive purges had “destroyed almost all the
fragile local Communist Party cadres in all the Central Asian republics” (Rywkin 1990: 108). In
just one purge, in 1937, the vast majority of surviving local cadre were replaced: more than half
of local party officials in primary party organizations (at the village level) and 70.8% of district
party committees (ibid.). The longstanding leader of the Uzbek Republic, Faizullah Khojaev,
was purged in 1937 and later executed. In the following year, three different individuals were
appointed and removed to succeed him, all of them “liquidated as enemies of the people” (ibid.).
Every member of Kazakhstan’s Politburo was shot while so few members remained in
Turkmenistan that a quorum could no longer be reached (ibid.).
The result was to enhance the power of Moscow in Central Asia: “native party cadres,
after the storm of 1937-38, became weaker and less efficient than ever and, consequently, more
dependent on outside (Russian) guardianship” (Rywkin 1990: 108). Indeed, this was precisely
the point. Lenin’s concern for native local cadre was being turned on its head and nationality
policy itself was revised to fit a cadre policy that served administrative centralization above all
else: a “growing suspicion of the Soviet Union’s ‘national periphery’ led to a corresponding
tendency to rely on the ‘Russian core’” (Martin 2001: 413). As chaotic and violent as the purges
were, at least one aspect was consistent and unambiguous. Among the shifting categories of
41

In relation to this role, Yaroslavsky authored the book Kak Provodit Chistku Partii (How to Conduct a Purge of
the Party), published in 1929.
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purge targets—which included “class-aliens,” “double dealers,” “degenerates,” “careerists,” and
“underminers,” among others—one appeared on all of the lists: “violators of discipline who fail
to carry out party decisions” (Getty 1985: 49).

Khrushchev: Cadre Shuffling and Reorganization
Khrushchev famously denounced Stalin’s purges at the Twentieth Party Congress in
1956, but this did not prevent him continuing to centralize power by utilizing the party-state
apparatus that Stalin had created. Rather than fight insubordinate local cadre with terror and
purges, Khrushchev adopted an “experimental style” of cadre management based on the
continual and unpredictable institutional reform of regional administration (Miller 1971: 80).
This, in addition to the adoption of a cadre rotation policy, effectively ensured that regional and
local officials had abbreviated and insecure tenures. Officials were regularly being transferred
from center to periphery, and across regions, while, simultaneously, particular regional and local
administrative structures were being created, combined, or eliminated. Thus, Khrushchev did
not merely shuffle officials across different regions; he also shuffled the very institutions and
offices that those officials inhabited. As one study notes, “the presence of an official or a post on
a nomenklatura list clearly did not guarantee a secure future, since the post could be abolished
and the incumbent redeployed” (Hill and Lowenhardt 1991: 233-34). This insecurity of tenure
would be a means of mitigating against the development of localism.
At least formally, though, many Khrushchev-era administrative reforms had an element
of administrative decentralization. Khrushchev frequently spoke about the value of local
initiative to enhance efficiency in production and governance. But he never truly promoted
activism at the local level. When he demanded that officials and managers get “closer to
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production,” he was referring to the center, not the periphery. Getting closer to production
typically entailed “the transfer of personnel from upper to lower levels of the bureaucracy, the
transfer of chief administrators and trusts from Moscow to the provinces and regions they were
charged with supervising, the transfer of scientific researcher institutes to the countryside or to
the provinces, and the shifting of regional coordinative personnel […] for the sake of closer
supervision of day-to-day affairs” (Breslauer 1982: 43). The agricultural departments of districtlevel party committees were eliminated. In their place, outside “instructor groups” were created
and sent to the countryside; each individual instructor was “permanently attached to one or two
[collective farms] and was expected to live in one of them” so that they could “exert continuous
pressure” and “mobilize local Party members” (Miller 1971: 83).42 In short, central authorities
relied less on local cadre, and more on the transfer of officials from center to periphery.
Perhaps the must famous of Khrushchev’s reforms was the replacement of over 140
central or regional ministries with newly created regional economic councils (sovnarkhozy) in
1957. The sovnarkhozy overlapped with the administrative territories of obkom first
secretaries,43 thus significantly enhancing the power of regional executives at the expense of
central ministries (Fainsod 1963: 395). Fainsod notes that a more regionalized approach to
economic production had long been resisted because elites in Moscow feared “that any
substantial relaxation of central controls would result in localism running rampant” (ibid.: 396).
After the reforms were implemented these reservations proved to be justified. The sovnarkhozy
tended to horde money and resources in their region, placed the needs of their own plants ahead
42

This created its own set of challenges since district-level party secretaries had no interest in travelling around or
living in the rural areas of their districts and typically ignored orders to do so. “[I]t is perhaps understandable,”
notes Miller, “that many of them did not wish to move themselves and their families from the relative comfort of the
raion [district] centers” (86). At a meeting of the Central Committee in 1954 Khrushchev complained that “many
raikom secretaries visit the machine-tractor stations and the kolkhozy only on the fly, as rare guests. They go there,
hold a conference, and run home to the raion center” (ibid.).
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The obkom first secretary is a position roughly equivalent to governor.
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of national plants, and had little regard for the larger national strategy if it did not give their
region maximum benefit. In sum, they did not follow orders and “sought to create self-contained
regional empires instead of meeting national needs” (Fainsod 1963: 396). Khrushchev’s
response was recentralization and increasing controls over regional officials. Between 1960 and
1961 the highest officials of the party’s regional apparatus were purged; nearly half of all obkom
and kraikom first secretaries, who controlled the sovnarkhozy, were “replaced or transferred”
(Miller 1971: 92; Breslauer 1982: 98-99). In 1960 and again in 1962, the Central Committee
consolidated disparate regional sovnarkhozy into larger units. In Central Asia, for example, all
of the sovnarkhozy were replaced by a single organization, which was “designed to strike a blow
against excessive localism” (Fainsod 1963: 397).

Brezhnev’s “Stability in Cadre” Policy
While Khrushchev’s regular shuffling of cadre may have mitigated against the
development of localism, it also undermined the ability of regional officials to do their jobs. At
least this was the consensus among the elites of the Brezhnev era (Rigby 1978: 7). The major
failures of Khrushchev’s leadership—most prominent among them economic stagnation—were
attributed to the instability of cadre tenure in the periphery. A prominent Central Committee
journal lamented that “[t]he frequent restructurings and reorganizations have entailed repeated
mass reallocation of officials” and that “this switching around of cadres has not allowed them to
concentrate on the decision of long-term questions of economic development of the oblast, krai,
or raion.”44 Rather than treat “frequent changes of [cadre] as a virtue,” as a leading party paper
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complained,45 an emerging value of the Brezhnev leadership was “the desirability or necessity of
administrative stability” (Breslauer 1982: 153). The new cadre policy, based on longer and more
secure tenure, would become known as the “stability in cadres” or “trust in cadres” policy.
The goal of Brezhnev’s stability in cadres was not necessarily to ensure loyalty and
subordination, but to facilitate better quality work, develop a pool of more experienced
personnel, and to soothe the spirits of disgruntled regional officials. This entailed a new kind of
thinking about insubordination and disloyalty. Brezhnev regarded the work of regional officials
as difficult, and acknowledged that failures and mistakes were not always the result of conscious
insubordination.46 The new refrain of elite in Moscow was that “deviance would not be equated
with corruption or sabotage, and that Soviet officials would enjoy physical security and job
security,” so long as they were not dishonest or incompetent (Breslauer 1982: 153). The
Brezhnev leadership, writes one author, “bent over backward” to restore trust in cadres, which
included “an atmosphere of stable routine” characterized by “the remarkable absence of
leadership turnover” (Miller 1971: 99).
A study of Soviet regional leadership during the Brezhnev years notes that the rate of
turnover of obkom first secretaries had already decreased in 1965 while, by the late 1970s, only
nine regions of the Russian Federation (RSFSR) had a first secretary who was changed twice;
only two had a secretary who was changed three times (Rigby 1978: 12). Moreover, this
coincided with increases in the levels of local recruitment. Rigby shows that, during the
Brezhnev years, the vast majority of obkom first secretaries were being recruited from within the
oblast, whereas most of Khrushchev’s appointments came from outside (ibid.: 13). This is a
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Partiinaia zhizn’, as quoted in Rigby (1978: 6).
Brezhnev himself was appointed by Khrushchev as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan
in 1955 and was already recalled to Moscow by 1956. He was tasked to oversee the Virgin Lands campaign, which
proved to be an abysmal failure (Olcott 1987: 226-228).
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trend that accelerated over time: between 1965 and 1971 approximately two-thirds of first
secretaries were chosen from within the region; between 1971 and 1976, five-sixths were (ibid.:
14). Coding for career, birth, and education, one study notes that the obkom first secretaries who
were “actual regional natives” nearly doubled after 1964, from 23 to 41 percent (Moses 1974:
230). In sum, stability in cadre coincided with the localization of cadre selection, more along the
lines of cadre policy under Lenin.47
Thus, Brezhnev’s solution to the perceived chaos of the Khrushchev era succeeded in
creating secure tenures and stable routines for provincial and national officials alike, but it did so
“with well-known results”—namely, increasing levels of localism and the proliferation of cadre
who “took advantage of their enhanced authority to line their own nests and to recruit successors
of a similar disposition” (Hill and Lowenhardt 1991: 234). For example, the Communist Party
First Secretaries who were appointed to the five Central Asian Republics between 1959 and 1969
remained in power until the mid-1980s.
These exceptionally long tenures “enabled them to put their personal stamp on the
republican machinery as in a fiefdom, appointing their followers to senior posts at republican,
oblast (province) and raion (district) levels” (Critchlow 1988: 145). They had become deeply
entrenched in overlapping networks of social, political, and patronage relations and had acquired
substantial local followings (ibid.). So, too, did their own appointees, who governed the oblasts,
which would be the largest sub-national administrative territories once the republics became
independent states in 1991. The governors of oblasts in Central Asian states, in turn, were able
“to develop close personal ties and professional networks within their regions, to build loyal
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In fact, the Brezhnev elite revived a quotation of Lenin’s as a way of critiquing Khrushchev’s cadre rotation. But
now the emphasis was on organizational efficiency, rather than nativization of cadre: “Do not start everything over
again from the beginning, do no reorganize right and left, but learn how to make the best use of what has already
been created. As few general reorganizations as possible…” (quoted in Rigby 1978: 6-7).
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followings among local leaders as well as the regional population, and to form a strong
allegiance toward and affinity for their own oblasts” (Jones Luong 2002: 71).
One of the major elements of Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms was to route out
entrenched regional elites, whose “local-interest networks” had “seriously eroded Moscow’s
ability to enforce directives” (Critchlow 1988: 142). The catch-all word to describe the
insubordination of local elites became “corruption.” But, as Critchlow argues, the corruption
that local elites were accused of was not limited to narrow self-interest and personal enrichment;
local officials frequently acted “in the interest of their localities,” for example, by using
resources for building projects that were not authorized by the center (144).
At the 1986 Party Congress, a new cadre rotation scheme was announced, described as
the “exchange of experienced staff between the republics and the centre” (Critchlow 1988: 154).
In 1990, at the Twenty-Eighth Party Congress, the Khrushchev-era rule of “systematic turnover”
of cadre was officially re-adopted (Hill and Lowenhardt: 1991: 239). But after the long
Brezhnev-era, these reforms were too little, too late. Local elites were so deeply entrenched that
they were able to mobilize local supporters against their own removal, using appeals to “local
patriotism” to resist firings and transfers (Critchlow 1988: 154). Personnel who had been
officially removed would recruit their supporters for letter-writing campaigns, the signing of
petitions, and other appeals to Moscow; more often than not they were successful in getting new
appointments in a “revolving-door fashion” that officials in Moscow regularly complained about
(ibid.). In some cases local mobilization was less subtle.
In 1986, public protests broke out in the streets of Almaty, the capital of the Kazakh
Republic, when Gorbachev tried to unseat D.A. Kunaev, Kazakhstan’s First Secretary since
1960. Gorbachev’s pick to replace Kunaev was Gennady Kolbin, an outsider who was
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“parachuted in from Moscow” (Cummings 2005: 16). When the protests spread further,
Gorbachev relented. In the end he succeeded in negotiating Kunaev’s retirement and appointed,
instead, a prominent insider in Kazakhstan’s republic-level politics, the incumbent prime
minister, Nursultan Nazarbayev.48
It is possible that Gorbachev’s reforms might have succeeded if they had been given
more time, but the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. The newly independent states, as a result,
would effectively inherit the entrenched regional elites that Brezhnev’s “stability in cadres”
policy helped to incubate and grow. New central governments and ruling elites would need to
overcome these regional and local elites in their attempts to centralize power, and often adopted
cadre shuffling policies to do so, with differing levels of success. In the next section I discuss
the politics of regional appointment in the post-Soviet era, focusing primarily on Kyrgyzstan and
Kazakhstan, the latter of which has been more successful at maintaining its own regional
appointment powers and subordinating cadre. I present evidence below that will show it has also
succeeded in implementing a cadre rotation scheme while Kyrgyzstan has failed to do so. I
argue that this represents Kazakhstan’s overall higher levels of administrative integration and
centralization in comparison to Kyrgyzstan, where the central government regularly battles
regional elites and local communities over who will govern the regions.
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Though they were both top officials in the Kazakh SSR Nazarbayev and Kunaev were rivals, not allies.
According to Gorbachev’s written account of the episode, Kunaev urged him to transfer Nazarbayev to Moscow, or
send him abroad—“Kunayev painted an extremely negative picture of [Nazarbayev], constantly repeating: ‘This is a
dangerous man. He must be stopped.’” (Gorbachev 1995: 330-1). Thus, in taking over the reins of the state there no
reason to believe that Nazarbayev had the full cooperation Kunaev’s allies, his appointees in the center and in the
periphery, as some have suggested (see, for example, McGlinchey 2011).
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IV. Post-Soviet Contexts: Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
The prior section showed two main things. First, that the power of appointment in the
Soviet Union was a key element of Soviet hierarchy and administration. Second, as a result of
Brezhnev’s stability in cadres policy, the end of the Soviet era was marked by the increasing
entrenchment of regional and local elites within the communities that they governed. This set of
facts serves as the context within which I analyze cadre politics and centralization in the postSoviet era.
In this section I wish to say two things about the post-Soviet context. First, in post-Soviet
states where administrative hierarchy is modeled after the Soviet-style prefectural system—
namely, where regional governors are appointed by the center and have some power to appoint
their own subordinates—there is continuity in the value that elites place on the power of
appointment itself. In such settings the politics of regional appointment continues to shape
relations between center and periphery. Second, I suggest, following a consensus within the
literature on post-Soviet Central Asian politics, that the result of Brezhnev’s stability in cadres
policy meant that the new national leaders of Central Asian states had to contend with
entrenched regional elites in their quest to centralize power (Jones Luong 2002; Collins 2006).
Just as Brezhnev’s stability in cadre policy was a reaction against Khrushchev’s penchant
for rapid and unpredictable cadre shuffling, the leaders of post-Soviet states have tended to adopt
cadre policies in reaction to Brezhnev’s stability in cadre, namely, rotation and shuffling of
officials. In post-Soviet discourse, cadre rotation (rotatsiia kadrov) is often described not only as
a way to eliminate disloyal or insubordinate cadre, but also as a weapon in the “struggle with
corruption” (Razuvaeva 2012). Corruption might be common in post-Soviet states, but central
authorities do not invoke the term to refer exclusively to officials pilfering public resources or
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taking bribes for their own self-enrichment (Critchlow 1988). It is also understood to refer more
broadly to the multiple and extra-official dealings local officials engage in with their friends,
family, and other local acquaintances. It is precisely these kinds of extra-official social ties that
central authorities seek to undermine with cadre rotation, thereby better centralizing
administration within the state’s hierarchy.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, cadre rotation policies were adopted in numerous
newly independent post-Soviet states, not only in Central Asia. In Russia, for instance, the
struggle to appoint and rotate regional cadre has been a recurring aspect of center-periphery
politics since 1991. In the early 1990s, authorities were still able to manipulate appointments in
the nomenklatura to prevent national independence movements in the periphery from gaining
real traction (McCauley 1997: 79-81; 99-102, 120-128). In 2004, Vladimir Putin turned back
some Yeltsin-era reforms, reestablishing the “single chain of command” by reclaiming the
formal power to appoint regional governors directly, rather than have them chosen through
elections (Baker 2004). Several scholars have argued that loyalty—though not necessarily
competence—has been the main criterion for the selection of regional cadre in Russia since the
reestablishment of gubernatorial appointments in 2004 (Chebankova 2005; Reuter and Robertson
2012). It was at this juncture that Russia’s provincial governors came to be seen as
“representatives of the president” rather than representatives of their regions (Kryshtanovskaya
and White 2009: 287).
Cadre appointment in post-Soviet Russia has also been characterized by the regularized
rotation of personnel. In 2011, in the third year of his presidency, Dmitrii Medvedev announced
that “one must not sit in one place […] the person who wants to continue in service needs to be
moved around – some horizontally [to different regions] and others vertically [to higher or lower
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levels]” (Medvedev 2011). “For the last three years,” he noted, “I changed half of the governors
– in some places because of disturbances or problems, and in some places simply because
rotation is necessary” (Ibid.). At the end of Medvedev’s presidency, in 2012, the direct election
of governors was granted as a concession to a growing political opposition. But, Putin swiftly
reinstituted the appointment of governors when he resumed his presidency less than one year
later. In 2013, now as prime minister, Medvedev announced that “any executive, either at the
regional level or […] on the federal level, must undergo rotation, that is, he must change his
place of work” (RIA Novosti 2013).
Likewise, in Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili undertook a series of reforms that included the
wholesale replacement of his predecessor’s entrenched administrative personnel. Rather than
ushering in a period of democracy and openness as many Western analysts believed, it was a
strategy adopted by central authorities to ensure the loyalty of their own staff (Timm 2012: 174177). The “arbitrary nomination, suspension and re-appointment of state elites” served to
prevent cadre from developing too much power in sub-national organizations. Timm writes of
Georgia that “[t]he unpredictability of rotation ensures that actors seek to hedge their power base
not within the subsystem they currently command but towards the ruling elite,” making it “a vital
means to ensure loyalty” (Ibid. 176). The provincial appointment policies of President Kuchma
in Ukraine also showed high levels of “leapfrogging,” or “frequent reshuffling” (Matsuzato
2001: 424-430).
In contrast to Russia, Georgia, and Ukraine though, elites in Central Asia were rarely
recruited to serve in union-level posts during the Soviet era and tended to spend their entire
careers within their own republics (Laitin 1991; 1998: 59-82). The result, some have argued, is
that, at the moment of independence, Central Asian regional elites were even more deeply
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entrenched than in other post-Soviet states (Burg 1986; Jones Luong 2002). The national elites
of newly independent Central Asian states, like their counterparts elsewhere, sought to adopt
cadre rotation policies as part of an effort to centralize power.
Before discussing the politics of regional appointment in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, a
few things are important to note. First, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are both unitary nondemocratic states in which provincial governors are appointed to represent the central
government in the regions, not the populations living there.49 Second, the formal constitutional
provisions for the appointment of governors is the same in each state: central authorities have
the authority to appoint their own governors, and to remove them at will.50 Thirdly, each state
has declared, with varying levels of formality, that it is official policy to rotate personnel across
regions (po gorizontali) in accordance with the logics described throughout the previous sections
of this chapter.
In Kyrgyzstan, provisions for the rotation of cadre are formally written into law. Article
28 of the Law on State Service, titled “the rotation (transfer) of state officials,” says that “the
rotation (transfer) of state servants, occupying different categories of state office, is carried out
with the goal of achieving the more effective use of the potential of state servants according to
the demands of the state,” and “also lowers the risk of corruption.” The law goes on to state that
“state servants can be transferred to work in another locality, or in another state organ or
institution […] if circumstances require such measures to prevent serious harm to the public
service.” The determination of what constitutes “harm to the public service” and the means by
49

As if to make up for their failure to do this in practice, the position of governor in Kyrgyzstan was formally renamed in the aftermath of revolution in 2010. They are now formally known as “Special Representatives of the
Government of the Kyrgyz Republic in the Provinces.” I will refer to them simply as governors. According to the
Constitution of Kazakhstan (Article 87(3)), every governor, in addition to every appointed executive head that
serves under the governor, is “a representative of the President and the Government of the Republic.” Officially,
they are called akims, but I will refer to them here as governors.
50
See Article 87(4) of the Constitution of Kazakhstan and Article 89(7) of the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic.
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which it can be preempted are made by officials who have the authority to appoint; namely,
those in the capital city.
We know, moreover, that both of Kyrgyzstan’s first two presidents, Akaev and Bakiev,
pursued policies of cadre rotation, seeking to appoint personnel from the south to positions in the
north, and vice versa (Anderson 1999: 40; Roy 2000: 115; Collins 2006: 243-244; Ramas 2013:
136, 139). This was not done arbitrarily. Akaev, himself a northerner, tended to appoint
northerners to the south and Bakiev, who was a southerner, tended to appoint southerners to the
north. In both cases the logic was the same: each president would seek to displace locally
entrenched elites with cadre to whom they themselves had ties (for Akaev see Collins 2006: 243244).
But in doing so, successive Kyrgyz presidents faced formidable opposition from local
elites and local populations. As early as 1992, when President Akaev sought to remove
Bekmamat Osmanov from his post as the governor of Jalal-Abad oblast, he faced intense local
resistance, at least according to what few written accounts of the episode exist. Though he
ultimately succeeded in getting Osmanov to resign, the “strength of local feeling” forced him to
replace Osmanov with a “representative of another powerful local family,” rather than with one
of his own loyal cadre; Osmanov, meanwhile, remained a prominent and powerful figure in the
region (Anderson 1999: 40). Akaev encountered similar constraints on his appointment
authority in subsequent years, as did his successors. This means that authorities in Bishkek have
rarely been able to implement cadre rotation completely, or for extended periods of time.
Overall, the center-periphery politics of cadre appointment in Kyrgyzstan have been
characterized by consistent resistance to the appointment of outsiders in the regions, or the
removal of embedded regional elites, or both. It is worth noting that the “Aksy events” of 2002,
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in addition to the revolutions that toppled both Akaev and Bakiev in 2005 and 2010,
respectively, were led predominantly by regional elites (Radnitz 2005; 2006; 2010). Moreover,
the immediate cause in all of these cases was a dispute over regional elites’ access to office. I
discuss the empirical details of these and other contentious episodes of regional appointment
politics in chapter six.
Kyrgyzstan’s current government continues to grapple with the same problems. Three
years after the April Revolution of 2010, Prime Minister Satybaldiev proposed a series of
controversial reforms aiming to restore and strengthen the “vertical of power,” or the central
executive’s control over the executive heads at each lower level of territorial administration, for
example governors of provinces and akims51 of districts (Satybaldiev 2013a; 2013b; National
Council 2013: Sec. 2.1). At the district level, one proposed bill would empower a permanent
“manager” (rukovoditel) of local state administration to “realize the unity of state policies in the
sphere of state service” by helping to organize “the appointment, shuffling, rotation, and removal
from state service, those occupying posts in the state administration,” among other things
(Satybaldiev 2013a, Art. 12-1).52 In connection with these proposed changes, the Deputy
Director of the State Cadre Service, Bakhtiarjan Fattakhov, explained that his office was helping
to draft a bill strengthening the institution of cadre rotation as “an important part of a campaign
against corruption.” According to Fattakhov, the bill would ensure that “one person cannot
continue to work in one place. People need to be moved around and work in new places and this
will reduce the risks of corruption.”53

51

In Kyrgyzstan an akim is the head executive of a district (raion), which is one administrative level lower than
governor.
52
By making this a “permanent” position, the bill stipulates that it is not tied to the fate of the akim of the district.
The manager of the district apparatus would be appointed by the governor of the oblast, who answers directly to the
president and prime minister.
53
Interview with author, November 18, 2013.
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In Kazakhstan, the policy of cadre rotation is less formally institutionalized under law,
but still publicly (and privately) acknowledged by state officials. Moreover, cadre rotation is
discussed by analysts, written about in the press, and noted in countless studies on Kazakh
politics, even if only obliquely.54 One study notes that, “frequent cadre rotation” has “kept akims
from either becoming too popular with constituents or entrenching themselves” in local social
and economic structures (Junisbai 2010: 256). Zauresh Battalova, a high-profile opposition
leader and former Senate Deputy, notes that “you can see that akims’ positions are rotated,
especially on the oblast level, and you can see they all make up one list—the same names—with
people appointed to different regions.”55 A 2013 report by Freedom House notes that, to “further
exert control,” President Nazarbayev “has continually shuffled akims, not allowing them to
spend more than a few years in office and rewarding them with a better position for their
compliance” (Dave 2013: 273). A former regional and local official himself noted that, despite
having an official four-year term, “any akim can be changed whenever the president wants.
Everything depends on the central government.”56
In an interview on live television in mid-December, 2015, President Nazarbayev
indicated that rotation was a virtual requirement for anyone working in state administration:
Cadre shuffling will always continue. With regard to the current government – this is just a category of
people who happen to occupy it right now. Cadre changes are the most discussed question. Who is
removed and who is appointed, such is the topic for much gossip. I want to say from my own enormous
life experience in leadership that succession [in office] is always necessary. Therefore, I am always trying
to make sure that succession [of officials] always happens (Tengrinews 2015).
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Until very recently two major websites in Kazakshtan—Tengrinews and Zakon—both had a prominent link on
their homepage for “rearrangements” (perestanovki). There, readers could stay up to date on every new round of
dismissals and appointments in the government, center and periphery, which occur on an almost daily basis.
55
Interview with author, June 26, 2014.
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Berik Abdugauly, former akim of Ulytau raion (Karaganda oblast), deputy akim of Karaganda oblast, akim of
Arkalyk city (Kostanai oblast), and Advisor to the First Deputy Prime Minister. Interview with author, June 20,
2014.
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Alikhan Baimenov, the Chairman of Kazakhstan’s Agency for Civil Service Affairs,
elaborated more precisely on the logic of cadre rotation, echoing the themes outlined in the first
sections of this chapter.57 First, he said, cadre rotation has an integrative effect that is essential
for a unitary state. By moving people to different regions “we hope that there will be regional
interpenetration, exchange of experiences and ideas across regions, and cultural harmony.” He
also described this as the fostering of “professionalism and the development of corporate
culture.” By “corporate culture” the Chairman was referring to an environment that would have
“a positive effect on the real content of a unitary state.” When officials serve in multiple regions,
they will learn that they work for a single entity (Kazakhstan) and not for any particular region.
Second, cadre rotation is “an anti-corruption measure.” By appointing people “from one region
to another,” it prevents them from obtaining too much personal power in any region or state
agency. Relatedly, the Chairman defended the center’s power of appointment itself, explaining
that regional and local elections would have a disintegrative effect on the state without actually
giving any voice to the masses. This is because, if elections were instituted, “the influence of
informal local relations” would play “a big role in choosing local officials.”58 In the interests of
preserving and creating a strong unitary centralized state, appointment powers must be retained
in Astana and utilized to systematically rotate cadre across regions and between ministries. This,
at least, is the official line.
The data show, however, that despite adopting essentially the same policy—one based on
the regular and systematic rotation of regional personnel across regions—only Kazakhstan has

57

Interview with author, July 10, 2014.
In 2013, Kazakhstan did initiate an “experiment” in which the heads of villages were selected via election. But
the elections were indirect, being held among members of the village council. Since every village council is filled
with members of the president’s Nur Otan party, critics consider this as much a form of indirect appointment as
indirect election. In any case, executive heads of districts and provinces (to which Chairman Baimenov was
referring) continue to be appointed.
58
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achieved this policy in practice. Kyrgyzstan, in contrast, continues to face pushback by regional
elites and local populations, significantly constraining the formal appointment authority of the
central government. Using a database of governor biographies in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,
encompassing all appointments from 1991 to 2013, I coded for instances in which an individual
governor was appointed multiple times to serve in different regions.
In Kazakhstan there were 111 governors appointed to 16 different administrative
provinces between 1991 and 2013 (See Table 2.1 below).59 Of these, 44 appointees had
previously been appointed as the governor of another region. To put that differently, nearly 40
percent of all governor appointments entail the rotation of personnel from one province to
another. But to say this somewhat understates its prevalence because every appointee who falls
into this category was appointed somewhere for the first time; thus, the number of appointees
being rotated across regions can never approach one hundred percent. The 40 percent of all
governors who have been rotated across regions represent second, third, and even fourth terms as
heads of different provinces in the course of a single individual’s career.60 I take this as evidence
for the successful implementation of cadre rotation in Kazakhstan for provincial governors.
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I include the 14 currently existing oblasts and the two cities with oblast status, Astana and Almaty, where the
akim is appointed according to the same process as in any of the other oblasts.
60
To illustrate, consider the biography of Krymbek Kusherbaev. Kusherbaev was appointed as the governor of
West Kazakhstan oblast (2000-2003), and then as governor of Mangistau oblast (2006-2011), and then as governor
of Kyzl-Orda oblast (2013). In my dataset the first appointment is not coded as cadre rotation because it was
Kusherbaev’s first post as governor and he had not previously served as a governor of any other province. However,
the second and third appointments are. It is also worth noting that Kusherbaev served in various high-level posts
within the presidential administration and central ministries. Thus, his stints in the regions were mixed with long
tenures in the capital city, a common career trajectory for many of Kazakhstan’s governors that shows their close
ties to the center.
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Table 2.1: Appointment of Governors to All Provinces (oblasts), 1991-201361
Oblast (province)
Kazakhstan
Akmola
Aktobe
Almaty city
Almaty oblast
Astana city
Atyrau
East Kazakhstan
Jambyl
Karaganda
Kostanai
Kyzylorda
Mangistau
North Kazakhstan
Pavlodar
South Kazakhstan
West Kazakhstan
Country total KAZ
% of country total
Kyrgyzstan
Batken
Chui
Issyk-kul
Jalalabad
Naryn
Osh
Talas
Country Total KYZ
% of country total

# of governors

# with prior appointment in
central government

# with prior appoint. as
gov. of a diff. province

9
7
5
7
5
6
11
6
4
6
7
9
7
9
8
5
111
100%

5
1
4
4
4
4
8
4
3
2
5
5
3
7
4
3
66
59.5%

3
2
3
3
2
2
6
2
2
1
2
2
3
5
4
2
44
39.6%

11
10
12
17
13
13
9
85
100%

4
6
5
4
6
10
1
36
43.4%

2
3
1
2
1
1
2
12
14.1%

61

Sources: These data were drawn from a variety of newspapers and other websites that keep biographies on highlevel officials in each state. These included: www.knews.kg, www.centrasia.ru, who.ca-news.org, www.vb.kg,
stanradar.com, www.zakon.kz, bnews.kz, and biografia.kz
Coding: (1) As prior central government posts I include here only high-level positions. This includes any position in
the presidential administration, in the prime minister's office, or top-level positions within a government ministry (as
minister or deputy minister). (2) Within the category "prior appointment as governor to another region" I also
counted prior appointment to (a) Soviet-era equivalent posts, e.g., a top-level officials in the oblast committee
(obkom), provided it was in a different region than the present appointment (b) positions as deputy governors of a
different region. For both (a) and (b) such information was not always available so there might be cases that exist
but were not recorded; however, these should be equally distributed across provinces in both states. Finally, I only
included prior appointments to defunct provinces if they were territorially distinct from the present province in
question. (3) For governors of Kyrgyzstan's oblasts I include illegal installment of “people’s governors.” Thus, the
data includes instances in which governors were installed--for either long or short terms--without formal approval of
the central government, or ex poste facto confirmation. Since the data set is supposed to capture the politics of
regional appointment, leaving these cases out would inaccurately portray Kyrgyzstan's central government as having
total mastery over these offices.
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The research done by Schatz on appointments in Kazakhstan paints a complementary
picture. Schatz includes a large range of officials in his dataset—not limited to provincial
governors alone—and codes for their personal origins rather than their regional destination as
appointees. What he finds is that all high-level appointments in Kazakhstan, including
governors, are disproportionately chosen from the south and southeastern parts of the country,
the home region of President Nazarbayev. This is also the region surrounding Almaty, the state
capital until 1997. Schatz’s point is to show that choices for appointment in Kazakhstan depend
on direct ties to the president (2004: 95-112). If we assume for a moment that all regions in
Kazakhstan have the same total number of appointees, then it must be true that a disproportionate
number of appointees in the western, northern, and eastern regions of the country are outsiders,
hailing from the south and southeast. To the degree that cadre from the south and southeast are
likely to have closer ties to the president—as Schatz contends—we can ascertain that regional
appointments in Kazakhstan are characterized by the transfer of officials from center to
periphery.
Even though Schatz presents these data as evidence for the role of clan-based networks,
he comes to conclusions that frame Nazarbayev’s main concerns in terms of center versus
periphery, in accordance with the logics discussed in this chapter with regard to regional
appointment: Nazarbayev, driven by a fear of regionalism, “rotated oblast akims frequently,
rewarding those who were particularly loyal and relocating those who appeared to challenge his
central control […] [t]hrough this rotation, Nazarbayev sought to undermine regionalisms that
could compete with the power of the center, not to mention his personal power […]” (Schatz
2004: 104).
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In addition to rotating governors across different regions, governors’ career trajectories
show that the majority of them—nearly 60 percent—held high-level posts in the central
government before being appointed to the provinces (see Table 2.1). Moreover, repeated
appointments to different provinces, in accordance with cadre rotation, is often broken apart by
appointment to posts in the central government itself. The leader of a non-governmental
organization (NGO) in Almaty that deals with issues of regional governance observed that,
“some people are moved from the akim of the region to the ministry, and then from the ministry,
again, to the akim of some region.”62 For example, one prominent ally of the president, Danial
Akhmetov, was appointed as the governor of East Kazakhstan oblast in November 2014. His
immediate prior post was as the Minister of Energy and Infrastructure, which he held from 2012
to 2014. Prior to this, he was Kazakhstan’s Minister of Defense (2007-2009), Prime Minister
(2003-2007), the governor of Pavlodar oblast (2001-2003 and 1993-1997), and the governor of
North Kazakhstan oblast (1997-1999). The career trajectories of other prominent elites show a
similar pattern. See, for example, Akhmetzhan Esimov, Umirzak Shukeev, Imangali
Tasmagambetov, Kazhmurat Nagmanov, Shalbai Kumakhanov, and Krymbek Kusherbaev,
among others (for Kusherbaev, see previous footnote).
In contrast, the governors of Kyrgyzstan’s provinces tend to be appointed to a single
oblast throughout their careers. There, 85 governors were appointed to seven different
administrative provinces between 1991 and 2013 (see Table 2.1).63 Among these, 36 (or 42.4%
of the total) had previously been appointed to a high-level post in the central government. But,
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Interview with author, April 2014 (Int1_23).
I include Kyrgyzstan’s seven current oblasts, but not Bishkek or Osh cities. Unlike Kazakhstan’s two major
cities—Almaty and Astana, which are governed as oblasts—the appointment of personnel to Bishkek and Osh has
been so hotly contested that the center has, at times, conceded and allowed elections. This means that not every
mayor of Kyrgyzstan’s two major cities was an appointee at all. This is, in itself, a reflection of the center’s lack of
control over regional cadre; in chapter 6, I discuss the contentious case of Osh city in extensive detail.
63
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what is most striking about the Kyrgyz case is that there were only 12 cases in which a governor
who had served in one province was then later appointed to a different province. Put differently,
we can say that the rotation of governors across regions, though an officially stated policy
preference and provided for by law, actually occurred only 14.4 percent of the time. But,
moreover, in at least four of these twelve instances, the central government faced public backlash
in the province that was set to receive an outsider and either to overcome public resistance to
install their choice, or concede to public demands by installing a local favorite. This means that
in one-third of all cases that the central government attempted to rotate cadre across regions, it
was met by resistance in the periphery. In addition to this, there were at least nine instances in
which local populations unseated the central government’s appointed governor and (unofficially)
replaced him or her with a local favorite or “people’s governor” (narodnyi gubernator). In some
of those cases the government arrested the pretender; but in others they conceded, leaving in
place a person to govern a province on their behalf that they did not want or choose.
Zhusubek Zheenbekov, for example, a native of Jalalabad oblast, seized control over the
governor’s office during the Tulip Revolution of 2005, with the help of his supporters. After the
revolution, the newly installed president, Kurmanbek Bakiev, retroactively confirmed the
appointment, officially sanctioning a choice made in the periphery, not in the center.64 Later, in
January 2006, Bakiev tried to relocate Zheenbekov to Talas oblast, a province in the north. This
change was met by a powerful local resistance, both in Talas and in Jalalabad.65 Bakiev met
with Zheenbekov’s supporters in Jalalabad, trying to convince them that the change was
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It is worth noting that Zheenbekov was (and still is) a member of Bakiev’s rival political party, the SDPK,
making it likely that Bakiev was merely conceding to a reality over which he had no control, rather than affirming
his own preference.
65
The choice of Talas was probably not random. The incumbent governor of Talas, Iskenderbek Aidaraliev, was
the only Akaev-era governor to survive the 2005 revolution; hence, Zheenbekov faced hostile protests upon his
arrival in Talas as did Aidaraliev in Jalalabad.
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necessary. As a presidential spokesperson explained to the press, Bakiev was “replacing
[Zheenbekov] as part of a policy of [cadre] rotation” (RFE/RL 2006). Zheenbekov served as
governor of Talas for almost one year, and was then given a post in the central government as
First Deputy Minister of Emergency Situations. After a second revolution in 2010 that toppled
Bakiev, Zheenbekov was again selected by a local “people’s assembly” (kurultai) as the
governor of Jalalabad. In the four-way contest that ensued, he voluntarily ceded the post to his
friend and political ally, Bektur Asanov (also a Jalalabad native). Later still, in March 2014,
Zheenbekov was formally appointed as governor of Jalalabad oblast, making it the third time he
was chosen for the post, but only the first time he was formally selected by the government,
indicating that, perhaps, the central government had modified its selections based on local
popular demand. Notably, conceding to popular demand is itself a constraint on the center’s
ability to select whomever it wants, particularly if it prefers candidates from outside the region.
In chapter six, I discuss these and other contentious episodes of regional appointment in
more detail. For now I simply want to establish a basic fact about outcomes in the cases of
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Despite having identical formal authority for the appointment and
removal of provincial governors, and despite having nearly identical cadre rotation policies to
move their governors across regions, central authorities in Kazakhstan have achieved their goals
while their counterparts in Kyrgyzstan face frequent battles with regional elites; moreover, these
are battles that they often lose.
What does this mean? I suggest that Kazakhstan’s success and Kyrgyzstan’s failure in
implementing cadre rotation is a measure of each state’s overall level of centralization and
administrative control. There are two ways in which this is true. First, cadre rotation is a state
policy. If the central government is unable to implement its policy in the face of regional
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resistance, it means that the center lacks power over the regions. As with policy in any other
realm—agriculture, taxes, development, housing, etc.—the state, if it chooses to do so, must
have its way in all of its regions; when it cannot, it is an indication of weakness emanating from
the center. Thus, I use the relative success or failure of cadre rotation policies as a measure of
bureaucratic centralization, or the degree to which regional cadre are actually subordinate to
central directives. By this measurement, Kazakhstan has achieved a higher level of bureaucratic
centralization—central authorities there have integrated regional administration under a central
apparatus, can place loyal agents where they wish and remove those who are insubordinate, or
those who simply do their jobs poorly.
In addition, though, I would like to suggest that the relative success or failure of cadre
rotation is more than a mere measurement of state centralization. In the context of the first two
sections of this chapter, we can conclude that cadre policy is not like other kinds of policy
because it is policy about the organization of power in the state itself. Cadre policy is designed,
in part, to regulate administrative relationships between the central and regional arms of the state
vis-à-vis each other and in relationship to society.
Thus, the failure of Kyrgyzstan’s government to successfully achieve cadre rotation is not
merely a measurement of its limited power and centralization; it is also a possible recursive
cause of it. The inability to achieve cadre rotation now means the limited ability to maintain the
loyalty and subordination of regional cadre later. As Huskey and Iskakova note about
Kyrgyzstan, localism helps to bolster the position of regional officials by creating a “‘posse’ of
guardians who can be mobilized to descend on the capital with yurts and banners to defend their
native son or daughter against attacks by the [central] authorities” (2010: 252). In contrast, the
well-known analyst, Dosym Satpaev, says of Kazakhstan that, “the regions are tightly connected
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to Astana. The ties are very strong. The akims are actually part of the same bureaucratic system
as the central government and they play their roles as some kind of regional ministers.”66
Before proceeding, one other issue needs to be addressed. A skeptical reader might
wonder if the appointment of loyal cadre to the regions in Kazakhstan can be considered
bureaucratization at all. Is Nazarbayev truly engaged in administrative centralization, or is he
merely bolstering his own personal power? Put differently, is he building a state, or a
dictatorship? I have two answers to this question. First, this analytical distinction, while
important, does not mean that these two processes are incompatible. As other studies have
noted, the projects of state building and authoritarian consolidation are not mutually exclusive
and may even be overlapping (Slater 2010). The national authorities in both Kyrgyzstan and
Kazakhstan might seek to rotate cadre as a means of bolstering authoritarian regimes, but that
does not mean this is the only outcome, nor does it mean that it is the primary purpose.
Second, personalized bureaucracies are still bureaucracies, even if they are not rationallegal ones. State bureaucracies come in a variety of forms. As I outlined in chapter one, and in
early sections of this chapter, the unifying feature of different kinds of bureaucracies is
administrative hierarchy, which entails the integration of a socially disembedded cadre. This
unifying feature can be seen in patrimonial and rational-legal bureaucracies alike. Ledeneva’s
study of the Russian sistema makes this point repeatedly: the informal power networks that form
the basis of state governance constitute a type of bureaucracy insofar as it stands apart from the
personal whims of the dictator (2013: 82, 90, 245-6). That is, the bureaucracy may be
personalized, but it is still a structure, or system. National authorities make decisions that are
widely obeyed, yet even they are unable to fundamentally transform or reshape the system itself.
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Interview with the author, April 2014.
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This is what Ledeneva refers to as “the leadership trap,” which helps to illustrate that even a
patrimonial bureaucracy has an autonomous character (25). Thus, we should not confuse the
absence of a rational-legal bureaucracy with the lack of bureaucracy itself, nor should we assume
that a patrimonial bureaucracy is indistinct from the dictator who rules it.
The data and measurements I have presented here apply only to the highest sub-national
administrative territories in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan—the province (or oblast)—with which
central authorities have the most direct connection. Though the oblast structures of each state
are mostly the same, as are the powers and policies for appointing personnel there, the oblasts sit
atop different kinds of state structures below them. It is in the institutions governing villages and
cities, I argue, that different kinds of social forces are mobilized or marginalized, creating the
potential for upward pressures on the oblast level that manifest themselves in the politics of
regional appointment, as I have outlined here. Importantly, the continuing predominance of
“localism” in Kyrgyzstan’s politics is not the persistence of a pre-modern traditionalism, nor is it
a self-perpetuating legacy of the Brezhnev era. I argue, instead, that it is an endogenous aspect
of Kyrgyzstan’s post-Soviet state formation.
Brezhnev’s stability in cadre may have fostered the proliferation of entrenched elite at all
levels—the republic, province, district, and village—but in Kyrgyzstan, the system of local selfgovernment that was established after independence effectively institutionalized this localism
into the state, integrating it into everyday village governance even as the state seeks to stamp it
out in the provinces. In Kazakhstan, by contrast, the system of local government effectively
undermines local social forces, expunging local social ties from the state. What we observe at
the province level, then, is a reflection of state-society relations forged at lower levels of state
administration, which have sometimes bubbled up into observable contentious episodes over
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regional appointment. In the next chapter, I focus on the differences in each state’s institutions
of local government, the origins of these differences, and the broader effects that they have on
state-society relations within the larger four-level administrative system that was inherited from
the Soviet Union.
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Chapter 3: Institutions of Local Government
“Let me explain my work to you: I am the representative of the president and the government in this territory […] It
is my job to carry out the state policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan and explain the policies of the president of
Kazakhstan, his orders, his decisions…I must spread his message in order to improve the social and economic life of
the population.”
- Village head (akim), South Kazakhstan oblast, Kazakhstan67
“I personally hate when officials from Bishkek try to interfere or tell me what to do. I do not allow it. As for the
akim [head] of the district, he has no power over me and I have no power over him.”
- Village head (ayil okmotu), Naryn oblast, Kyrgyzstan68

I. Disaggregating the State
In the previous chapter I showed that Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have the same formal
territorial-administrative system governing relations between center and province: they are both
unitary states; central authorities have the formal authority to appoint and remove provincial
governors; provincial governors are appointed as the representatives of the central government in
the regions, not as representatives of the populations living there; and, both states have a policy
of cadre rotation with regard to their provincial governors, seeking to move them across regions
in order to prevent them from developing deep social ties in any one of them. But, I also showed
that Kazakhstan has actually realized its cadre rotation policy while authorities in Kyrgyzstan’s
central government have struggled to do so because of resistance in the provinces themselves. I
take this as a measure of Kazakhstan’s higher levels of administrative centralization, reflecting
broader differences in the trajectories of state formation between these two states during the postSoviet period.
But why, given similar starting points in 1991, has one state achieved administrative
centralization while the other has failed to do so? The crux of my argument is that differences in
the institutions of local government in each state have fostered different kinds of social relations
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Interview with author, May 15, 2014, KAZ_Int1_27.
Interview with author, July 19, 2013, KYG1_Int1_31ii.

89

between local officials and the populations that they govern, and it is this that has shaped
communities’ preferences for local versus non-local cadre in their more encompassing provinces
and regions.69 Put differently, the politics of regional cadre appointment differ in each state
because the broader territorial-administrative system that each state’s provincial institutions are
connected to also differ, as do the state-society relations that each system reproduces. Despite
inheriting the same four-tier administrative system from the Soviet Union, and the “power
vertical” that held it together, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan departed in how they organized the
very lowest level of state administration, in villages and small cities. In this chapter I focus on
these local-level institutions.
Figure 3.1: Territorial Administrative Levels in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan

Republic/National Level

Province (oblast)

District (raion)

District

Province

District

District

Village
(local level)

Village

Village

City

This image depicts the 4-level territorial-administrative state structure in Kazakhstan and Kazakhstan. The state is
divided into provinces (oblasts), each province is divided into districts (raions), and each district includes multiple
villages and cities. Throughout this dissertation, I distinguish between the national-, provincial-, and district-, and
69

Throughout this chapter I make a sharp distinction between “local” and “provincial” levels of government. In all
instances I use the term “local” and “local government” to describe the lowest levels of state organization in villages
and small cities. Provinces are larger and more encompassing territories that might include several hundred
different villages (or “localities”).
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village-levels. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are organized roughly the same way at the provincial and district levels.
The key difference is at the village level: Kyrgyzstan has a system of local self-government in villages and small
cities while Kazakhstan has a system of local state administration. The differences between these two systems of
local government are described in this chapter.

The ways in which these different levels of the state fit together have enhanced the
coherence of the national state in Kazakhstan, but undermined it in Kyrgyzstan. This raises
ontological questions about the study of state development. What we ordinarily call “the state”
has not developed as a singular cohesive entity in post-Soviet Central Asia. Rather, different
parts of the state—defined here as different levels of the territorial-administrative system,
divided into provinces, districts, and villages—have developed differently, have interacted with
each other differently, have incubated different kinds of state-society relations, and, ultimately,
have caused the kinds of observable outcomes in center-periphery relations (at the national and
province levels) that I described in the previous chapter. I focus on the local level—on the
institutions of local government, in villages and small cities—as the sites at which significant
differences in state formation emerge. The different kinds of state-society relations incubated at
the local level, in turn, create different social contexts in which provincial and national-level
administrators must operate, and in which center-periphery relations are defined.
The reason that different kinds of local government institutions have affected levels of
administrative centralization and shaped the overall coherence of the state, I argue, is because
they forge different kinds of state-society relations. In Kyrgyzstan, the institutions of local
government have allowed and even encouraged local-level officials to utilize social ties when
doing their jobs. In effect, the process of local government has institutionalized deep and
overlapping social relations between local officials and the communities that they govern,
building those relations into the apparatus of the state in its localities even as authorities in
Bishkek seek to stamp out those same kinds of social relations in the provinces. This
91

contradiction undermines the coherence of the national state and circumscribes the center’s
influence in the periphery, thwarting efforts to achieve administrative centralization and bolster
state control over cadre.
In contrast, Kazakhstan’s institutions of local government cauterize and neutralize
multiple and overlapping social relations between local populations and local officials, fostering
a very different style of state-society relations and enabling central authorities to hold more sway
in the provinces of the state, better incorporating all of its territory into a singular and coherent
administrative structure. Thus, I suggest that different styles of state-society relations—defined
here by the social relations between local officials and the populations that they govern—are
endogenous to the process of state formation; they are forged, in part, by the creation of new
institutions at the local level. This affects how people understand and interact with the state,
even at the provincial and national levels. It affects, for example, how ordinary people and local
elites respond to state policies like cadre rotation, among other things.
In chapters 4 and 5, I discuss how the institutions of local government shape different
kinds of state-society relations in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. In this chapter, I simply give an
overview of the historical development of the institutions of local government since the collapse
of the Soviet Union. I do so for two reasons. First, since I argue that the divergence in the
development of the institutions of local government explains broader differences in state
formation and the relative coherence or incoherence of the national state itself, understanding
why these states adopted different institutions at the local level is crucial. I show here that the
reasons were largely exogenous. Because Kyrgyzstan was heavily dependent on international
donors, it adopted many of the neoliberal reforms that these donors favored, including the
development of a decentralized local self-government system in its villages, towns, and cities.

92

Second, the institutions of local government contextualize the social role played by local
officials in the village. It is the institutional context in which they do their jobs that shapes the
kinds of relationships they have with their co-villagers; partly determines their moral, social, and
official responsibilities; and affects the kinds of interactions that ordinary people have with the
state itself, in the personae of their local officials. What are the institutions of local government
in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan? How and why do they differ in each state? In this chapter, I
answer these questions; in the next two, I address the broader effects that these institutions have
on local social ties, state-society relations, and on the development of the state itself.
Throughout this chapter I understand local government to be the lowest level of public
administration in a state’s territory and regard variations in the institutions of local government
as different kinds of local government systems. That is, I define local government solely by the
territorial level at which it operates. Thus, I take Kyrgyzstan’s system of “local selfgovernment” and Kazakhstan’s system of “local state administration” as variations of local
governance because they are two different ways of organizing governing structures at the lowest
level within a state’s territory. The institutions of local government are the formal rules and
organizations that structure the roles, responsibilities, powers, and processes of the government
and its officials at the lowest level of the state.
To preview what follows, I will show that Kazakhstan has effectively maintained a
Soviet-style system in which the “power vertical” descends from the capital city directly into
villages and cities; just as the executive heads of districts are appointed by the governor of the
province, the executive heads of villages and cities are appointed by, and subordinate to, the
executive head of the district where they are situated. Kyrgyzstan, in contrast, has adopted a
series of reforms since 1991 that have decentralized power to the local level. Village-level

93

officials are elected by the populations they govern and have the ability to make their own
decisions about what problems to solve and how to solve them without consulting any higher
authorities within the state. Moreover, they can secure finances for their work independently of
the central government. However, revenue streams from third-party sources come with
conditions, including the requirement of a “local contribution,” which entails mobilizing local
populations to participate in local governance and the implementation of village projects. In the
next two sections, I describe the historical development of these institutions in Kyrgyzstan and
Kazakhstan, respectively. In the final section of this chapter I discuss the role that international
organizations played in the development of local self-government in Kyrgyzstan.

II. The Institutions of Local Government in Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan began a process of political and financial decentralization in the early 1990s,
developing a western-style system of local self-government. It did so in fits and starts with
central authorities sometimes rolling back or stalling reforms when they could. Even still, a
number of key formal institutions are now well established. I intend to focus primarily on two of
them, representing the political and financial aspects of decentralization, respectively: the
elected local executive (ayil okmotu70) and the independent local budget. I focus on these
because I consider them to be the most significant in explaining how villages in Kyrgyzstan are
governed, particularly in comparison with Kazakhstan. But I will also briefly discuss the elected
village council (the ayil kenesh) and multiple community-based “user associations.” Taken
70

Ayil okmotu literally means “village government,” but it refers both to the entire apparatus of the executive organ
of government in the village (including its full staff) and also to the individual head of the ayil okmotu. That is, the
“head of the ayil okmotu,” a position roughly equivalent to a village mayor, is often simply referred to as “the ayil
okmotu.” Strictly speaking, the “village government” does not always correspond to a single village. In areas with
lower population densities, multiple villages might be incorporated under a single village government, which has
just one ayil okmotu and one village council. For the sake of simplicity I will use the term “village” and “village
government” as singular entities.
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together, this bundle of institutions forms the core of Kyrgyzstan’s system of local selfgovernment, making it unique among the other states in the region.

Table 3.1: Institutions of Local Government in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (village-level
institutions)
Kazakhstan

Local
Executive

Local
Council
Community
User
Associations
Independent
Local Budget

-

Kyrgyzstan
-

-

Appointed
No decision-making authority
Resources controlled and
allocated by higher state
authorities
Represents the president

-

No

-

Yes (members elected)

-

No

-

Yes

-

No

-

Yes

-

Elected
May decide “issues of local
significance”
Access to independent
sources of finance
Represents local
communities

In reviewing these reforms in Kyrgyzstan, one dominant theme emerges. It was not the
mere existence of these institutions that mattered so much as the way in which they were created,
which has had a significant impact on how they operate. The successive acts and decrees that
established the institutions I will discuss below often lacked substantive direction on how they
should function once they were created. Local communities were given the right to address

95

“issues of local significance” without being given specific instructions for how to do so.71 The
result is that local authorities—primarily the ayil okmotu—are supposed to represent the interests
of local communities, address local problems, and secure the necessary capital and labor to do so
on their own, without the help of higher-level state authorities. With a mandate to do something,
but given an ill-defined menu of options for how to do anything, this sphere has become the
creative domain of local officials in conjunction with the populations that they govern. The ayil
okmotu was created by law, but governs by improvisation. And this, as I will show, happens
through regular interaction with the communities in which they live and work.
The reason for this highly formalistic approach to creating new institutions has much to
do with the impetus behind their creation. As I discuss in the final section of this paper,
decentralization in Kyrgyzstan was driven largely by international donors. In many instances
laws were written and decrees were issued in order to keep money rolling in; less thought was
given to the substance or implementation of reform itself, and sometimes central authorities later
eliminated reforms they did not like. This means that the overall historical trajectory of
decentralization has been uneven, the implementation of certain reforms half-hearted, and the
overall goals poorly defined.
The crucial outcome I want to underline here is that Kyrgyzstan’s villages are run by
highly independent local authorities who are given few guidelines for precisely what job they
should be doing, when or how to do what job, or even what their main responsibilities are. At
the same time, the laws are clear that they should address local problems in collaboration with
the local population. This is reinforced by the conditions attached by lenders to local
communities, as I discuss below. Intentionally or not, the ambiguity surrounding the purposes
71

The quotation comes from the constitution (and various other sources of law) and designates the sphere of
activities for which local governments can take responsibility.
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and functions of local authorities has fueled their independence and autonomy from the central
government while simultaneously bolstering their ties to local communities.

The Foundations of Local Self-Government and the Ayil Okmotu
The foundation of Kyrgyzstan’s local self-government system is itself indicative of the
substantively hollow decrees and legislative acts that followed. Article 7 of the state’s first
constitution (1993) states that “local self-government in the Kyrgyz Republic is exercised by
local communities, which govern issues of local significance according to the law and at their
own initiative.” The language for this provision was adopted from the European Charter of
Local Self-Government (1985) (Fattakhov 2013: 8). The European Charter, however, describes
the rights of “local authorities,” not “local communities” (Article 3, Section 1).72 In Kyrgyzstan,
the creation of local authority would, itself, need to be specified in subsequent reforms.
In any case, the overall importance of Kyrgyzstan’s first constitution was minimal and
should not be overstated. The other states in the region also included vague aspirational
principles of local self-government in their constitutions after independence.73 Article 89 of
Kazakhstan’s constitution, for example, says that “[t]he Republic of Kazakhstan recognizes local
self-government, providing the population with independent solutions to questions of local
significance.”74 The difference between Kyrgyzstan and other states in the region is that
Kyrgyzstan was the only country in which these constitutional provisions were not a complete
72

Article 3 (1) of the European Charter of Local Self-Government says that “Local self-government denotes the
right and the ability of local authorities, within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a substantial share of
public affairs under their own responsibility and in the interests of the local population.”
73
All of the post-Soviet Central Asian states participated in the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which passed a Declaration on Principles of Local Self-Government in
1994.
74
Article 89, Section 1. Article 89, Sections 3 and 4, provides for the precise powers and organization of local selfgovernment to be determined by subsequent law. As I discuss below, however, subsequent law in Kazakhstan
undermined the very idea of local self-government, severely limiting the independent decision making authority of
local officials.
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dead letter. There, the vague constitutional provisions for local self-government were further
developed through subsequent legislation and presidential decrees, which were adopted between
1994 and 2009, under the guidance and tutelage of international donor organizations.
In August 1994, the president of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akaev, issued a series of decrees,
including “On the Reform of Local Self-Government in the Kyrgyz Republic,” which stated his
desire and intention to implement local self-government reforms. A subsequent decree issued
that same month created a Commission on Local Self-Government Reform. The Commission
developed the basic principles for reform that the president announced in a decree just one month
later. This later decree established local councils (ayil kenesh) at the village level with members
chosen through direct elections (Alymkulov and Kulatov 2001: 527). Nevertheless, the decree
did not specify any of the powers or rights that the local councils would have, or even which
public issues could be defined as “local” versus “national.” The president had effectively
“declared the right to self-government without providing the newly emerging institutions with
real powers” (ibid.).
This trend continued in subsequent reforms. New institutions were created, but their
powers and functions were poorly defined. In 1996, again by presidential decree, executive
administrative offices (ayil okmotu) were established in villages (Alymkulov and Kulatov 2001:
527-528). As under the Soviet system of appointments, the head of the ayil okmotu was initially
appointed by the top executive (akim) of the district in which the village was situated, with the
approval of the village council. But, between 1996 and 2001, direct elections for ayil okmotu
were rolled out in different localities; by 2001, all 453 ayil okmotu were directly elected by local
populations (UNDP 2012: 121). After coming to power through a revolution in 2005, however,
President Bakiev eliminated direct elections and instituted a system of indirect elections instead,
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which began in 2008 and have remained in effect since then (ibid.: 124). Currently, the ayil
okmotu is elected by the village council, the members of which are elected by the population, as
mentioned above.
Like the establishment of the local council two years prior, the decree establishing the
ayil okmotu did little to specify the ayil okmotu’s formal role or purpose. Communities’ right to
“self-government” was reiterated, new formal institutions were created to fulfill those rights, but
the precise powers of these institutions were never clearly defined in relation to the central
government. Even today these ambiguities have not been addressed. As a former director of the
National Agency on Local Self-Government Issues noted in 2013, “the first and biggest
problem” with local self-government in Kyrgyzstan “is the fact that there is no strict division or
boundary between state services and local self-government issues.”75 That is, the precise
differentiation of responsibilities between the local and central government has never been
clearly articulated by law (Ibraimova 2009: 58-59, 73-74). Indeed, the proponents of local selfgovernment in Kyrgyzstan frequently criticize the central government “for failing to implement a
coherent long-term strategy on local government development” (Marat 2012: 310).
Despite this, the institution of the ayil okmotu has taken on a prominent role in villages
across Kyrgyzstan. The ambiguity surrounding their formal institutional role has, perhaps
inadvertently, provided them with great leeway to do as they see fit, often finding creative ways
to solve local problems. They are given further impetus to do so, no doubt, by the consistent but
vague proclamations from the central government that it is their “right,” and the right of the local
community, to be self-governed. Interestingly, more than one ayil okmotu head told me that he
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Interview with author, August 2013 (KYG1_Int1_10).
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was not a state official at all, an understanding that is objectively false but serves to illustrate a
lack of clarity about precisely what their formal role is.76
Bakhtiyar Fattakhov, a political ally of President Akaev who held several ministerial
posts directly related to the development of local self-government,77 described the reasons for the
ayil okmotu’s importance, despite the state’s failure to define its functions. Fattakhov argues that
the ayil okmotu was desperately needed because the privatization of Soviet-era state and
collective farms had eliminated the position of farm chairmen, the institutional figureheads who
controlled the economic and social resources of the village. “As a result,” writes Fattakhov,
“nobody was occupied with the maintenance and development of village infrastructure”
(Fattakhov 2013: 8). In the early years of the post-Soviet period, then, villages completely
lacked an institution that was responsible for maintaining the most basic public services. The
result was “a period of anarchy” that “gradually brought about the destruction of social
infrastructure” and “the lowering of the quality of life” in rural areas (ibid.). It was in this
context that the ayil okmotu took on its real significance at the local level:
...in the person of the ayil okmotu, the inhabitants of villages, at last, received an organ [of the state] that
was occupied on a day-to-day basis with questions about the organization of life in the village. 460 rural
boards—ayil okmotu—became the real organizers of social-economic life in local communities (ibid.).

After the creation of village councils and village executives in 1994 and 1996,
respectively, the president continued to issue numerous decrees, many of which were little more
than concept papers laying out the problems with the reforms already undertaken, or searching
for the path forward.78 In 1999, the president issued a decree called “The Concept for
76

At this juncture it is worth recalling that Kyrgyzstan is a unitary state. The salary for every public official who
receives one, including all ayil okmotu, is paid directly by the central government in Bishkek.
77
Fattakhov served as Deputy Minister on Local Self-Government Issues, which became the National Agency on
Local Self-Governance after the Tulip Revolution in 2005. He then had a short tenure as the director of this agency;
he was appointed in 2010, but was then deposed that same year as the result of a second revolution in April.
78
It is also worth noting that the independence of the ayil okmotu was bolstered by changes in the status of local
property between 1996 and 1998. A decree in 1996 transformed land that had not yet been privatized into municipal
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Developing Local Self-government from 1999 to 2001.” Despite its forward-looking title, the
decree merely described problems with the reforms to date, without identifying clear solutions to
them (Alymkulov and Kulatov 2001: 528). Among the problems described were that local
councils were inefficient and lacked clear procedures to implement any decisions; it also noted
that ayil okmotu had begun to overshadow the role of local councils (Ibraimova 2009: 55).
All in all, the period between 1994 and 2001 was characterized by the creation of
institutions with poorly defined powers and responsibilities, but with a mandate to independently
address “issues of local significance.” An accounting of the reforms between 1994 and 2001
summarized the contradictions and ambiguities in Kyrgyzstan’s system of local self-government
accordingly:
There is no complete set of normative legal acts based on a uniform understanding of the nature, content
and forms of national policy on the decentralization of government and the introduction of new relations
between the center and regions. There is no set limit on the powers to be redistributed in favor of local selfgovernments, nor is there an official register of functions by territory […] The ambiguous delineation of
powers and responsibilities among bodies of different branches and levels of government poses another
major problem (Alymkulov and Kulatov 2001: 529).

Under a new round of reforms beginning in 2000, the position of the ayil okmotu was
bolstered by the creation of community user associations. Community user associations were
established through a series of World Bank programs and decentralized the governance of
specific issue areas to the village level. To illustrate some of the ways in which this has affected
local governance and the role of the ayil okmotu, I will briefly describe the governance of
pastures. The Law on Pastures (2009) placed the governance of all pasture land under
community associations of pasture users (“pasture user unions”), which are governed by an
executive body, the “pasture user committee,” each of which has its own chairman (Crewett

property, put under the authority of village officials; it did the same for “social infrastructure,” which included local
roads, schools, and parks (UNDP 2012: 121). Then, a constitutional amendment adopted in October 1998
established “community property” as distinct from state or private property (Alymkulov and Kulatov 2001: 528).
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2012).79 The pasture user unions include the entire community of users, but their jurisdiction
corresponds with the jurisdiction of village governments and the ayil okmotu.
This gives the ayil okmotu more expansive influence because it implicates him or her in
the management of pastures in at least two different ways. First, the law establishing pasture
user committees formally requires that the ayil okmotu be included as a member; thus, every ayil
okmotu is simultaneously a member of the corresponding pasture user committee, thus
expanding his or her official duties beyond the executive office of the village government.
Second, and perhaps more significantly, the ayil okmotu has become the de facto executive agent
of the committees. Even though each committee has a chairman, neither the committees nor the
chairmen have any formal powers to enforce their decisions. Thus, as a matter of practice the
ayil okmotu is called on to settle disputes between the pasture user committees and individual
shepherds within the community. The chairman of one pasture user committee put it
accordingly:
The laws are not written well. They are raw. This is the main problem. For example, people don’t pay for
using pastures but the law does not give us anything to do about it…so there is little we can do. In these
cases we go to the ayil okmotu. Then together we will go to the person’s house and demand that they pay.
So we always try to work together with the ayil okmotu.80

This not only suggests an increasingly larger role for the ayil okmotu, but is also an
indicator of the stature that many ayil okmotu heads enjoy. After all, the ayil okmotu has no
more formal authority to collect money for pasture use than the chairmen of pasture committees;
informal mechanisms alone enable an individual ayil okmotu able to do this—status, respect, and
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Prior to this, pastures were divided according to the multi-tiered administrative structure of the state. Nearby
pastures were governed by village authorities, more distant pastures were governed by district authorities, and the
most distant and remote pastures were governed by provincial authorities. This meant that any shepherd wishing to
graze animals on distant pastures—which is common practice, especially in the summer—would require
authorization from three different authorities, a process that proved to be too burdensome and was, therefore, rarely
followed and, ultimately, abandoned (Crewett 2012).
80
Pasture Committee Chairman, Jumgal ayil okmotu, Jumgal raion, Naryn oblast, July 22, 2013
(KYG1_Int1_40&41).
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some level of social support from within the village. Thus, the community user associations
draw on the ayil okmotu’s social role in the village while simultaneously bolstering and
expanding it.
The idea and structure of the pasture user unions were based on already existing
organizations within the country and are part of a broader trend toward decentralizing
governance. The “water user associations,” for example, have been under development since at
least 1994 and advanced tremendously in 2000 with assistance from the World Bank.81 Water
user associations are small community-based organizations that govern the use of water for
irrigation within a locality. Like the country’s 454 pasture user unions, the 481 water user
associations correspond to the administrative boundaries of ayil okmotu. Community Drinking
Water User Unions serve the same function for drinking water. Taken together, these
community based user associations expand the role of the ayil okmotu and multiply his or her
connections to co-villagers. Thus, based strictly on his or her formal institutional role in the
village, the ayil okmotu might have links with individual co-villagers that are defined in a
number of different ways. Importantly, these multiple links deriving from the ayil okmotu’s
formal institutional position are in addition to multiple ties he or she is likely to have with
friends, families, and other ordinary members of the community, ties that are often activated
during the process of village governance, as I discuss below.

The Independent Local Budget (or Financial Decentralization)
The final institutional component of local government in Kyrgyzstan that I will discuss
here is the independent local budget. The creation of local budgeting powers occurred in parallel
81

World Bank programs to assist in the development of water user associations included the On-Farm Irrigation
Project (Parts I and II), the Agricultural Investments and Services Project, and the Agricultural Productivity
Assistance Project.
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with the reforms described above, but its greatest impetus came between 2003 and 2004. By an
independent local budget, I refer not only to the ability of local officials to raise and spend their
own revenue, but also to their ability to receive financial and other resources from third parties,
without approval or input from the central government. In fact, because of the marginal local tax
bases in Kyrgyzstan, it is the ability to acquire funds from third-party sources that have mattered
most in village financing.
The first step toward creating financial independence for local officials was a presidential
decree in March 1996 establishing that local governments could “create extra-budgetary funds to
solve essential issues of local importance” (Alymkulov and Kulatov 2001: 528). Later, in
September 2003, the parliament eliminated budgetary transfers from local budgets to district and
provincial budgets. Henceforth, district and provincial budgets would be created solely through
transfers from the center while village-level budgets would be completely independent, thus
creating a “two-level” budget system that formally delineated the financial autonomy of villages
(UNDP 2012: 34).82 These reforms were implemented over subsequent years and were fully in
effect by 2007.
But the most significant aspect of financial independence in Kyrgyzstan is the ability of
local governments to secure funding directly from international donors, without the approval or
input of authorities in Bishkek. In fact, with the collaboration of international donors there are
now permanent non-state financial institutions in Kyrgyzstan that work directly with local
officials and local communities. Among the most well-known of these is the Agency for the
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In fact, the village governments still receive sizeable transfers from the central government to pay the salaries of
local officials and teachers in what are called kategorialnye grants. Local officials have no discretion over how to
use these funds. Nevertheless, this money is still considered part of the “local budget,” thus highly inflating the
revenue that local officials appear to have available to them. Most of the village officials I spoke with during this
research said that kategorialnye grants from the central government to pay salaries comprised between 50 and 90
percent of their entire budget.
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Development and Investment of Communities [sic], known by its Russian acronym ARIS.83
ARIS was created in 2003 through an initiative by the World Bank, in collaboration with
President Akaev. ARIS receives money in the form of grants from foreign governments and
international donor organizations and distributes this money directly to local communities and
local authorities. The distribution of money to local communities occurs primarily through an
application process—local communities request money from ARIS in project proposals. But
ARIS also distributes funds for projects that they initiate themselves; for example, in their
Agricultural Investment project, 450,000 som (nearly $10,000 in 2012 exchange rate terms) were
distributed to every pasture committee in the country.84
The availability of third-party financial support in Kyrgyzstan gives local authorities and
local communities the ability to secure funds without having to rely on the central government.
In fact, this is precisely the purpose. ARIS states explicitly that its funding “will enable local
communities and institutions” to “reduce their dependence on higher levels of government” by
“strengthening local capacity to select, design, and implement viable investments” (ARIS 2015).
Thus, unlike their counterparts in Kazakhstan, local authorities in Kyrgyzstan have the ability to
make decisions about what problems to address, and how to address them.
But, the significance of third-party financial support is not limited only to this. In fact,
the conditions imposed on the use of this money are arguably more significant than the money
itself. The standard protocol for the release of these funds to localities is to require a “local
contribution.” That is, local communities are expected to pay at least a portion of the expenses
of any project, either through cash payment, labor, or other in-kind contributions (Earle 2005).
Reliance on local contributions was already a practice by March 1996 when the president
83

Agenstvo Razvitiya I Investirovaniya Soobshchestv (ARIS).
Pasture committees are responsible for maintaining certain forms of infrastructure, for example, any roads or
bridges leading to or from remote pastures.
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recommended that local governments “mobiliz[e] inhabitants for relief and restoration programs”
(Alymkulov and Kulatov 2001: 528). Thus, even in the absence of outside funding, local
officials have relied heavily on the cooperation of village inhabitants to provide the resources
necessary to fix local problems. Sometimes the local contribution is the only contribution. In
most instances the only realistic way to fix a road is to recruit volunteers who can bring their
own shovels. But, by requiring local contributions in exchange for badly needed funds,
international organizations have helped to institutionalize this practice more deeply.85
The local contribution that donors require is typically nominal, sometimes as little as five
percent of the cost of the project. This is because the purpose of the local contribution is not to
raise revenue, but to encourage direct community involvement in local governance. To the
parties involved—donors, officials, and ordinary people alike—this is known as social
mobilization. The objective is to encourage ordinary villagers to work with their local
government and take a hands-on role in identifying and solving local problems (Earle 2005). As
a project coordinator from ARIS put it, “The main goal of our projects is not the implementation
itself, but to teach local communities to rationally use the wealth of the country. We teach them
how to use the money that they collect themselves for the improvement of infrastructure and for
maintaining pastures […] we’re interested in social mobilization, which is why we work at the
local level, in the village.”86
Similarly, the objective of the World Bank’s First and Second Village Investment
Projects (2004-2006 and 2006-2014, respectively), which distribute money directly to ayil
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Arguably, the practice of mobilizing voluntarily labor has a long history in Central Asia. The Soviet-era
subbotnik and the “traditional” Kyrgyz and Kazakh practices of ashar and asar, respectively, all entail voluntary
labor contributions to the community. What is unique in the post-Soviet period is that the institutions of local
government in Kyrgyzstan formalized and institutionalized these practices while those in Kazakhstan eliminated
them.
86
Interview with author, August 5, 2013 (KYG1_Int1_6).
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okmotu and localities, is not only to help develop local infrastructure, but “to assist the Recipient
with improving governance and capacity at the local level” (World Bank 2014: 29).87 The
Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) notes that its projects in Kyrgyzstan
“generate community-level capacity for tackling local development concerns” by focusing “at
the grassroots level” and “helping communities and local authorities work together” (IDA 2015).
This creates an integral role for the ayil okmotu, who is typically at the forefront of this
mobilization, activating his or her local social ties to secure the local contribution—both cash
and labor—in order to obtain the funds from donors needed to fix roads, schools, and other
village infrastructure. ACTED, an international NGO that provides resources for village
infrastructure projects, relies on local communities to do all of the labor themselves. An ACTED
project coordinator, speaking about the organization’s work, said that “this all requires
community work and community mobilization, and the ayil okmotu is at the center of this
mobilization. We cannot ask villagers to do these things. It is the ayil okmotu who goes into the
community and explains the project and gathers support and makes the mobilization happen.”88
As a high-level USAID official noted, “some ayil okmotu have gotten quite good at generating
their own streams of revenue based almost purely on their personality and connections. These
officials have the ability to initiate their own projects and act on their own without consulting the
central government.”89
As this testimony suggests, the ayil okmotu will not succeed in securing funds for local
projects if he or she does not have a base of support from within the community, which includes
the ayil okmotu’s own friends and family, in addition to other personal acquaintances (Earle
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This project was implemented by ARIS at a cost of $49.9 million.
Interview with author, September 2013.
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Interview with author, July 15, 2013 (KYG1_Mt1_34)
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2005). As one villager in southern Kyrgyzstan noted, “the ayil okmotu cannot do it himself.
There is no way he could do anything without local contributions. If he is going to solve any
problem at all he must get local support – he is dependent on people to do anything.”90 Thus,
reciprocity is built into the institutional relationship that the ayil okmotu has with local
communities and the social relationships that ayil okmotu maintain with co-villagers are
politically activated and institutionalized through the process of village governance.
In sum, local authorities in Kyrgyzstan have access to financing independent of the
central government, and can use this money to tackle an agenda that is generated within the
community, not in Bishkek. This, in addition to the various other local self-government
initiatives described above, gives them a great deal of autonomy and decision making authority
in villages vis-à-vis the center. However, this money comes with strings attached, strings that tie
local officials to the communities that they govern. This is not to say that conditionality creates
social ties between local officials and local communities; rather, it makes those social ties a
crucial aspect of village governance, in effect institutionalizing them within the state at the local
level.91 Put simply, the practical aspects of village governance require local officials to activate
and utilize their own social networks if they are to accomplish any goals, thus further
strengthening those ties while simultaneously politicizing them. In this way state formation at
the local level in Kyrgyzstan has differed dramatically with Kazakhstan, as I will now
demonstrate.
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Interview with author, October 1, 2013; Bazar Korgon ayil okmotu, Bazar Korgon raion, Jalal-Abad oblast.
Earle argues that donors’ emphasis on local mobilization stems from the mistaken Western-oriented view that
post-Soviet states lacked any grassroots community-oriented social fabric simply because they did not have welldeveloped “civil societies” in the neoliberal sense. Thus, the “community-based” approach to solving local
problems was linked not only to donors’ focus on political decentralization, but also “civil society” development
(Earle 2005; see also Petric 2005).
91
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III. The Institutions of Local Government in Kazakhstan
At around the time that central authorities in Kyrgyzstan first began establishing an
independent role for village executives with the creation of the ayil okmotu in 1996, their
counterparts in Kazakhstan began institutionalizing the total subordination of village executives
with the creation of a new constitution in 1995. In both countries, subsequent decrees and
legislative acts reinforced these divergent trajectories. In Kazakhstan the bundle of laws and
decrees issued between 1992 and 2001 subordinated village-level officials to higher-level
executives, diminished or eliminated their ability to make and implement their own decisions,
and ensured their financial dependency on the central government. Moreover, village-level
officials in Kazakhstan are appointed from above, not elected by the local population. In total,
this means that local populations in Kazakhstan are almost entirely excluded from the process of
local governance and have relationships with local officials that have little or no political
significance, if they have any relationship with them at all. Local officials themselves, in turn,
are almost entirely upward looking; that is, the only significant relationships they develop in the
course of doing their jobs are with the higher-level officials of the state who appoint, instruct,
and monitor them (refer again to Table 3.1 above).
As I just noted, Kazakhstan’s 1995 constitution helped to establish the subordination and
dependence of village-level authorities. In fact, the constitution of 1995 merely cemented and
consolidated a series of laws and decrees, passed and issued between 1992 and 1995. In January
1992, a law established “undivided authority” between the executive heads at different levels of
administration, thereby making the heads of village-level governments directly accountable to
the president or province-level administration (Makhmutova 2001: 411-412).92 This was
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The Law on the Suspension of the Validity of Some Constitutional Norms during the Transition Period (1992)
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reinforced one month later by a presidential decree which, “for the first time,” established “a
uniform structure of executive administration from the president to the heads of local
administration” (ibid.: 412).93
Kazakhstan’s first constitution in 1993 left several questions about local government
subject to subsequent legislation. By the end of that year the “Law on Local Representative and
Executive Bodies” established new institutions, and clarified the powers of others. First, the law
stipulated that representative legislative bodies (maslikhat) could be formed at the province and
district levels, but not at the village level. While the maslikhats at these higher levels would
consist of members directly elected by the population, the use of the term “local selfgovernment,” which had been used previously in a vague aspirational sense, was omitted
entirely; the maslikhat was defined as “an assembly of representatives of the citizens of a town or
rural district” rather than as an element of local self-government (Makhmutova 2001: 412).94
The same law further ensured that local self-government in Kazakhstan would not be realized by
explicitly stating that the executive heads of local administrations were to be the direct
representatives of the president, not local communities (ibid.).
The constitution of 1995 is often identified as the starting point of Kazakhstan’s
successful centralization (Olcott 2002: 87-88; Cummings 2005: 3-4).95 In fact, it merely
consolidated these earlier laws. Article 87, section 1, states that “local executive bodies shall be
part of a unified system” and should “guarantee the implementation of general state policies of
the executive power.” Accordingly, section 3 states that the head of the executive body at any
93

Decree on Improving the Organization and Activities of Public Administration Bodies under the Conditions of
Economic Reform (1992).
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In fact, elections for the maslikhats is a highly controlled process. Only candidates approved by the
corresponding akim are eligible to receive votes. I discuss this in more detail in the next chapter.
95
This is partly for reasons having to do with other aspects of government structure. For example, in addition to
consolidating the subordination of village-level officials, the 1995 constitution also enhanced presidential powers in
relationship to the legislature and judiciary; see references above for more detail.
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sub-national level “is a representative of the President and the Government of the Republic.”
This is understood to apply to the executive heads (akims) at all sub-national levels of the
government, in provinces, districts, villages and cities.96 The constitution is unambiguously
clear, then, that local officials are not intended to represent local communities. Rather, they are
in localities to implement the central government’s policies and represent its interests.
Two presidential decrees issued in 1998 and the Law on Local Public Administration
(2001) further defined the precise powers and responsibilities of local authorities (Makhmutova
2001, 2006; Wilson et al. 2002: 403). They did so by limiting their power and independence. In
reference to the 2001 law, a prominent opposition leader pointed out that, “even though it is
called the Law on ‘Local’ Administration, it is really only about the power of the central
government.”97 For example, the law states that sub-national government bodies—at the
province, district, and village levels—cannot make any decision that contradicts the central
government or that “impede[s] the creation of uniform” state policies (Makhmutova 2001: 415).
To ensure that all local initiatives conform with policies already established by the central
government, the president has the power to nullify decisions of any akim for any reason, or for
no reason at all; likewise, the akim at each administrative level has the power to nullify the
decisions of any lower-level akim within his or her jurisdiction (Makhmutova 2006: 279-80;
Cummings 2000: 11-12). Thus, village-level akims are triply subordinated and can have their
decisions vetoed at the district, province, and/or national levels.
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In Kyrgyzstan the term akim is reserved for the executive head of the district-level of government. In
Kazakhstan, however, the term akim describes the executive head of every level of government; there is a
provincial-level akim, a district-level akim, and a village-level akim. The village-level akim is the institutional
equivalent to the ayil okmotu in Kyrgyzstan. It is the executive head of the lowest level of government. Whenever
possible I identify akims in Kazakhstan according to their level of administration. As in the discussion above, the
term “local” will refer only to the village level. Accordingly, I use the terms “local akim” and “village-level akim
interchangeably.
97
Burikhan Nurmakhamedov, Vice Chairman of the opposition party Ak Zhol, interview with author, March 28,
2014.
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But, in practice, this rarely happens because village-level akims do not have the
opportunity to make decisions in the first place. All local initiative must first be approved by
higher levels of administration, if they are approved at all. This is because Kazakhstan has a
centralized budget and does not give local authorities any power to determine how money can be
spent. As a political scientist in Almaty put it, “the decision making process at the local level is
insignificant—you cannot decide how to use money that you do not independently possess.”98
Rasul Zhumaly, a former state official, noted that the village-level akim is given nothing of his
own “except maybe a little office and a formal position.” Anything else “he must obtain or
receive through the permission of the upper levels, from the district or provincial akim.”99
Similarly, Pavel Lobachev, the president of an independent research institute in Almaty
(“Echo”), notes that “the akim in the village has nothing. If he wants to change something he
must go to the district akim to seek approval. Then, the district akim can decide to approve the
project or not. The village akim cannot decide anything by himself.”100 More often than not, the
village-level akim in Kazakhstan is simply given instructions from above. The current legal
framework on local governance, then, “weakens local initiatives” and “lowers the activity of the
population in deciding questions of local significance” (Burlakov and Kaikenova 2004: 74).
In total, executive authority in Kazakhstan is strictly hierarchical such that “every level of
administration is subordinate to the higher level and takes no responsibility for its actions before
the population” (Burlakov and Shimshikov 2004: 62). The “vertical of power” extends from the
capital city, through provinces and districts, down to the village and “ensures that implementing
decisions are directed from the higher bodies to the lower ones” (Makhmutova 2006: 279). A
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Interview with author, March 20, 2014, KAZ_Int1_6
Interview with author, April 23, 2014
100
Interview with author, April 2, 2014
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Kazakhstani political scientist in Almaty described it as “the presidential vertical,” because
“every akim is a representative of the president and works for the president.”101 The result,
Cummings notes, is that “only the centre is recognized as the legitimate tier of government” such
that the entire system is, in practice, “characterized by a single authority” (Cummings 2000: 11).
This differs dramatically from Kyrgyzstan’s system of local self-government which “liquidated
the vertical subordination of local organs of power,” giving them autonomy to solve problems of
“local significance” on their own (Fattakhov 2013: 8).
As I noted in chapter two, central authorities in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have the
formal authority to appoint provincial governors. The selection of village-level executives,
however, is not the same, fitting into the broader differences in institutional development at the
local level described above. In section two of this chapter, I noted that the village-level
executive heads (ayil okmotu) in Kyrgyzstan are elected. In Kazakhstan, however, they are
appointed by the executive head at the next highest level of administration. Thus, in Kazakhstan,
the president appoints the governors of provinces, the governors of provinces appoint the
executive heads (akims) of the districts within their province, and the akims of provinces appoint
the executive heads of the villages within their district (also known as akims). Furthermore, “the
President of the Republic has the right to release akims from office at his own discretion”
(Article 87, Section 4).102 The result is that, unlike in Kyrgyzstan, village-level officials are “not
accountable to citizens but to those who have power and authority to hire and fire them”
101

Interview with author, April 1, 2014, KAZ_Int1_8
Article 87, Section 4 states that the president will directly appoint provincial governors and the mayors of
Almaty and Astana. The akims of “other administrative-territorial units,” namely, districts, villages, and smaller
cities, “shall be appointed or elected to office on the basis of the president’s determination.” Thus far, this has been
done via appointment, as I have just described. But, in a number of instances central authorities carried out
“experiments,” allowing for a small number of village-level executives to stand for election; in every instance they
considered the experiment to be a failure and eliminated the practice. But, in 2013, for the first time, there were
indirect elections for village-level akims nation-wide. Nevertheless, this was still a highly controlled process. The
district-level akim alone determined the nominees, and the district-level maslikhat (filled overwhelmingly with
members from the President’s political party) were permitted to “elect” one of them.
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(Bhuiyan 2010: 667). All of these measures further reinforce the subordination of local
executive heads, reduce the independence of village-level officials, and marginalize local
populations from local governance. As I will discuss more deeply in the next chapter, these
different institutional configurations shape the kinds of social relationships that local officials
can develop with the inhabitants of the villages that they govern.
Overall, local government in Kazakhstan has been described as “dependent local
government,” which is defined as a system in which “the central government designs policy,
[and] local government implements [policy] with funding allocated by the central government”
(Bhuiyan 2010: 660). In fact, the primary purpose of village officials within Kazakhstan’s
administrative system is to realize the policies crafted by the central government, exclusively
with money allocated to them for that purpose. This differs dramatically, then, with
Kyrgyzstan’s system of local self-government, in which local officials have independent decision
making power, independent sources of revenue, and can implement their own policies in
collaboration with the local population.
Table 3.2: Models of Center-Local Governmental Relationships

Issue

Model I
LG

Responsibility for
policy design
Responsibility for
policy implementation
Responsibility for
policy funding

Category

Model II
CG
X

X

LG
X

CG
X

X
X

Administrative
decentralization

X
Dependent local
government
(Kazakhstan)
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Model III
LG
X

103

Model IV
CG
X

LG

CG

X

X

X

X

X

Delegate local
government

Local selfgovernment
(Kyrgyzstan)

Adopted and modified from Bhuiyan (2010). LG = local government; CG = central government
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The testimony of local officials in both countries reflects the institutional role that they
play within the larger state structure in which they are situated. Summarizing his main duties, a
village akim in southern Kazakhstan said simply: “Let me explain my work to you: I am the
representative of the president and the government in this territory […] It is my job to carry out
the state policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan and explain the policies of the president of
Kazakhstan, his orders, his decisions…I must spread his message in order to improve the social
and economic life of the population.”104 The head specialist on “internal policy” at the akim’s
office noted, similarly, that, “the main job we have is to spread the law and the policy of the
president of Kazakhstan…to explain it to the population.”105
Their counterparts in Kyrgyzstan view their role differently. One ayil okmotu described
his relationship to higher-level state authorities accordingly: “I do not have to listen to the akim
[of the district] or the president. They don’t have any power over the ayil okmotu.”106 A resident
of Bazar Korgon village in southern Kyrgyzstan said that the role of the ayil okmotu is “to
support people’s needs and fix problems within the village.”107 Often, local officials in
Kyrgyzstan see the central government as an adversary that stands in the way of fixing villagelevel problems. As one ayil okmotu angrily declared:
All the officials at the higher levels are corrupt. In the Ministry of Finance and Energy…I paid money but
the electricity is still cut. This is because they don’t work, because they are corrupt…and all of them just
eat and drink everything. We have to kick their asses! All of them! Why don’t the Ministries work
together? Because they don’t have any brains!108

These reflect different understandings of local officials’ relationship to the state, and to
local populations. See, for example, local officials’ diagrams of government structures with
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commentary, provided in Diagrams 3.1a, b, c, d and e. Importantly, these understandings, along
with the practical realities of village governance within the institutional context described here,
shape the social relations that local officials have with their co-villagers. The next chapter will
address these social relations in detail, linking them to the institutional structure of state at the
local level as I have just detailed.

IV. Historical Context: An Exogenous Divergence
As I have already noted, the main reason for the differences in the development of
institutions of local government in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan was that Kyrgyzstan was far
more dependent on international donor organizations than Kazakhstan and these donors favored
and promoted a decentralized system of local self-government in villages and cities.109 But,
Kyrgyzstan’s high level of dependence on international donor organizations explains not only the
origins of its system of local self-governance. As I hinted at above, it also explains why those
institutions operate the way that they do. In other words, the activities of international
organizations explain both why Kyrgyzstan has (and Kazakhstan does not have) a system of
local self-government, and also why the formal laws that Kyrgyzstan’s system of local selfgovernment is built upon are sometimes fuzzy and ambiguous. The lack of vision and clarity
surrounding the formal aspects of institutions like the ayil okmotu is the result of the fact that
authorities in Bishkek created those institutions without being fully committed to their
realization, and perhaps even without having a clear sense of how they would be used going
forward.
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Since 1991, Kyrgyzstan’s relations with international donor organizations have encompassed a broad range of
issues from macroeconomic reform and privatization to legal reform and democratization. Unless otherwise noted,
the focus of this section is exclusively on the reform of local government, itself a sub-set of a broader international
democratization agenda.
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Since becoming independent, Kyrgyzstan has consistently relied on grants and loans from
foreign countries and international donors. Even at the earliest stages of independence,
observers noted that, “the country is too small and too poor to become economically viable
without considerable outside assistance” (Olcott 1996: 87). In a way, this is merely a
continuation of its dependent financial position within the Soviet Union, when the Kyrgyz
Republic relied heavily on transfers from the union level (Petric 2005: 323). At the time of the
Soviet Union’s dissolution, cash subsidies from Moscow accounted for 29.3 percent of the
republic’s total revenue (Zhukov 1996: 114). The crisis of the immediate post-Soviet period was
that these cash subsidies suddenly vanished. So, too, did access to subsidized fuel and
manufactured goods, along with funding for various union-funded social programs (Howell
1996: 56). By 1992, Kyrgyzstan was already on the brink of bankruptcy and turned to the
International Monetary Fund for an emergency aid package. In exchange for a $23 million loan
and $39 million in credit from the IMF, and an additional $60 million “soft loan” from the World
Bank, authorities in Bishkek agreed to a host of standard neoliberal macroeconomic adjustments,
including the elimination of subsidies, price liberalization, privatization of enterprises and land,
and the creation of a new national currency (Cooley 1999: 120-21; Abazov 1999; Petric 2005).
While conditions imposed by lending institutions helped to bring the economic crisis to a
halt, it led to widespread corruption and embezzlement as officials often took direct ownership
over newly privatized assets (Cooley 1999: 131-135). It also resulted in even higher levels of
poverty for ordinary people, who saw their incomes decrease even as social benefits and
subsidies were eliminated (ibid.; Baimyrzaeva 2005: 30). Kyrgyzstan’s GDP decreased every
year until 1996. In 2002, it continued to experience negative growth, making it the only country
in the entire Commonwealth of Independent States to do so (Zhukov 2005: 298). By 2003,
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Kyrgyzstan’s per capita GDP was only 65 percent of its 1990 level (ibid.). As part of a broader
global shift in lending behavior, failures of this kind led international donors toward a new
approach. If macroeconomic reform did not have the intended consequences, it was because the
existing political institutions of government were ineffective, wasteful, and corrupt. The focus
shifted to “good governance,” which included an emphasis on political and financial
decentralization (Baimyrzaeva 2005, 2010, 2011; Fraser 2009: 67-68).
A host of new organizations flooded into the region to provide “technical assistance” in
response to the new international perception that “important organizational changes were needed
in the bureaucratic organs” of the state itself (Cooley 2000: 36). Instead of simply giving
financial assistance, these international donor organizations provided “advice and expertise for
transforming various sectors” (ibid.). This included, for example, the drafting of new legislation,
research, and educational programs for government officials at all levels. But it also entailed
funding, typically to run informational programs, support local NGOs, “train” government
officials, and organize community outreach programs.
In Kyrgyzstan, the two organizations that provided the most significant levels of
technical assistance in crafting and implementing reforms for the development of local selfgovernment were the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and USAID, which
worked in conjunction with a host of local NGOs. But, many other organizations were actively
involved, including the World Bank (as mentioned in earlier sections of this chapter), the Asian
Development Bank, the European Union, and the Swiss Fund of International Cooperation,
among others. International donor organizations did not merely recommend particular reforms;
they were actively engaged in crafting legislation, lobbying government officials, and
implementing projects to facilitate their realization.
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As a former Deputy Minister on Local Self-Government Issues in Kyrgyzstan put it, the
UNDP was “the number one partner” and worked directly with the president to write the
National Strategy for Political Decentralization.110 The UNDP formally launched its Political
and Administrative Local Governance Program in 1998. The primary purpose was to advise
Kyrgyzstan’s national leaders on the best ways to develop a system of local self-governance.
Damira Sulpieva, the Local Self-Government Component Coordinator at the UNDP in
Kyrgyzstan, who has been with the organization since the early 1990s, says that the main role
UNDP played at the time was in bringing in international consultants to act as “political
advisors” for the government. Together with the government, she says, “we did much work for
the promotion of local self-governance,” and “within those [UNDP] programs we can say the
entire legal basis for local self-governance was formed.”111
But, the UNDP played an even more direct role than this, working with ayil okmotu and
local populations on “social mobilization” projects. In these programs, the UNDP fostered the
development of community-based organizations that would participate directly in the activities
of local governments, alongside the ayil okmotu.112 This activity started in 1998, and intensified
between 1999 and 2001; it continued until the Tulip Revolution in 2005, a year after President
Akaev, seemingly enamored with the program, declared it to be the “Year of Social Mobilization
and Good Governance” (IMF 2004: 16). As a spokesperson at UNDP explained:
First of all, we built capacities of the heads of ayil okmotu, of municipal servants, we tried to explain to
them what social mobilization would give them. And, of course, many of them were able to see it with
their own eyes. The community-based organizations [program] had a micro-capital component through
which we granted a number of funds, big funds, to local communities, and through these community-based
organizations they rehabilitated their own infrastructure, or built new objects of infrastructure. However,
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Interview with author, KYG1_Int2_1
Interview with author, August 6, 2013.
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For the sake of clarity, these community-based organizations are not the same as the community user
associations that I described above. A community user association (like those for pastures and water use) are formal
organizations created by law; community-based organizations are informal.
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119

we didn’t only want people to rehabilitate infrastructure. We wanted people to govern, to manage that
infrastructure after it was built or rehabilitated.113

Between 1994 and 2000, the UNDP spent a total of $12.5 million on its decentralization
initiatives in Kyrgyzstan (McGlinchey 2011: 93); in the period from 2000 to 2004, they spent
$8.1 million (OECD 2006).
The second biggest role was played by USAID, primarily through its funding of local
NGOs that promoted local self-government. The most prominent of these was the Urban
Institute. A former member of the Urban Institute in Bishkek, who has worked on issues related
to local self-government for twenty years, noted that the role of the Urban Institute “was very
big, especially in framing laws and amendments, and in bringing in the international experience
in order to explain how the development process should proceed.” He noted, moreover, that
organizations like USAID have directly helped to shape the functioning of institutions after their
creation. “There is a very big difference between the apparatus of the ayil okmotu today
compared to 1996 […]; the educational and training programs for ayil okmotus and their
employees has increased their capacity…this was because of the work of donors.”114 A USAID
report notes that the organization has been “engaged actively in strengthening the policy and
legal framework for local self-government, while working directly in and with local selfgovernments to enhance their ability to make good use of the authority and resources that they
have” (Conway 2008: 7).
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Interview with author, KYG1_Mt1_32. Along these lines a UNDP report notes that “with the support of the
UNDP and other international organizations, [Kyrgyzstan] is working on the establishment of community
organizations and local development foundations that work closely with [local self-government] structures. The
process of social mobilization and the establishment of community organizations and local NGOs allows the
involvement of the population in the management of issues of local significance” (UNDP 2012: 34).
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The Incoherence and Ambiguity of Reform
As I mentioned several times above, the incoherence and ambiguity surrounding the local
self-government reforms in Kyrgyzstan is partly explained by the fact that the impetus for them
came from outside the country. As others have correctly noted, “the Kyrgyz government lacked
a clear concept for the realization [of local self-government] from the start” (Alymkulov and
Kulatov 2001: 528). Indeed, it was not their concept at all. Put simply, donors’ collaborators in
the Kyrgyz government knew that their patrons favored the development of certain institutions,
but they did not always have a perfectly clear idea about what these institutions were supposed to
do, or how they should operate. In many respects, the central government’s support for local
self-government was more of a slogan than a development program (Mukanova 2009: 201, 204206). It was a way of securing needed funds and did not necessarily reflect a genuine
commitment to the reform process. As one study notes, “Most progress was accomplished in
producing various types of legislation and strategies, and establishing different organs to oversee
their implementation. But, implementation of those documents and strategies was minimal or
superficial” (Baimyrzaeva 2010: 289). Nadezhda Dobretsova, one of Kyrgyzstan’s most vocal
proponents for local self-government, complains that only a handful of officials in Bishkek
“really understand the role of local self-government in our system.”115
Bekbolot Bekiev, formerly a member of USAID’s Urban Institute, attributed the progress
toward developing a system of local self-government to the work of donor organizations, not the
government. In fact, he said, officials in the government never truly understood the purpose of
the reforms. Many were skeptical or outright hostile toward them.
People who work in the state generally have a negative attitude toward international initiatives, but make an
effort [publicly] to show that they support it […] USAID’s project for the development of democracy was
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not evaluated positively by the administration. I can even tell you frankly that some representatives of state
organs even see such work as espionage and as harmful to the country.116

The UNDP’s own comprehensive report on local self-government in Kyrgyzstan notes
repeatedly that the government was often an intransigent partner. It states that, “the key lesson
that we can draw from the 20-year history of the development of LSGs”117 in Kyrgyzstan is that
the government “is inclined to yield to the temptation of controlling the decision-making process
from above” (UNDP 2012: 31). The report blames national authorities for their lack of
commitment, and for their inability to flesh out basic reforms with more substantive legislation.
Addressing national elites’ continuing reservations with local self-governance, the report notes
the following:
As before, arguments for maintaining and even centralizing power receive greater attention in politics. As
such, local self-government is perceived as a threat to the authority of the center, and a factor breeding
separatism. This brings about the adoption of conflicting decisions, including at the legislative level, the
lack of effectiveness of reform, and even a rejection of some positive results. Therefore, overcoming the
tendencies of centralization of authority and resources is the main problem (UNDP 2012: 38).

Given its lack of genuine commitment to the reforms, it is not surprising that the central
government, at every turn, failed to clearly define the power and authority of local officials. It
helps to explain why the reforms were uneven, with elites in Kyrgyzstan’s national government
sometimes seeking to roll back or eliminate certain reforms, such that the nature and trajectory of
each institution has followed an incoherent historical development. It is the reason why
substantive issues regarding the power and independence of local government were left
unresolved, inadvertently giving local officials quite a bit of flexibility to determine things for
themselves. But this leaves us with the question of why authorities in Bishkek went along with
the reforms at all.
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Interview with author, August 20, 2013.
LSG stands for “local self-government.”
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While I stress that institutional reform at the local level in Kyrgyzstan was exogenous, it
would be too strong to suggest that it was entirely so. Authorities in Kyrgyzstan were not forced
to do anything. None of the reforms related to local self-government were undertaken through
highly formal and explicit contracts of the kind that might accompany IMF conditionality. The
influence of donors promoting local self-government was more informal, and required willing
and cooperative partners among the Kyrgyz elite. First among these was Askar Akaev, president
from 1991 to 2005. In a version of the “Great Man” theory of history, conventional wisdom
holds that Akaev was personally committed to the reform process and was the driving force
behind privatization, democratization, and decentralization (Olcott 1996: 87-91; Anderson 1999:
23-62; Spector 2004; Gleason 1997: 95). Proponents of this view highlight Akaev’s unique
personal attributes and liberal ideology. Trained as a physicist, he was thrust into the role of
president without any prior political experience and was only a half-hearted communist to start.
During the 1980s he was a prominent supporter of Gorbachev and perestroika. After Kyrgyzstan
became independent, he had a more open-minded and liberal approach in comparison with his
counterparts and predecessors. This led him to voluntarily and whole-heartedly adopt the advice
and guidance of international organizations (ibid.).
Still, this perspective ignores the economic, political, and historical context of Akaev’s
presidency. Akaev was financially dependent on international donors as a matter of fact, not by
choice. Unlike other countries in the region, Kyrgyzstan needed donor money and Akaev had to
make concessions in order to get it. Baimyrzaeva notes that “[o]verall, it appears that much of
the reform was produced and remained to please donors and continue securing their funds”
(Baimyrzaeva 2011: 559). In this light, Akaev’s personal views and background were not as
important as the political and economic context he faced as the president of Kyrgyzstan in the
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immediate post-Soviet period. So while Akaev may have initiated some liberalizing reforms, he
did so at a time when few other options were available to him.
It seems, moreover, that a lack of financial resources led to the prioritization of reform
at the local over the national level. Evidence suggests that President Akaev saw concrete
advantages in giving localities responsibility for their own affairs. The simple fact was that
Bishkek could not shoulder the financial burden for them. Referring to the creation of local selfgovernment, an Akaev ally noted that “the donors did not force us to do it, but we also didn’t
refuse because we did not have the money to contribute to development in local areas […] we
were weaker [than our neighbors] and decided to develop this way, with the help of donors.”118
Likewise, Makunova notes that it was “because of increasing fiscal pressure” that the central
government “found it politically appropriate to transfer responsibility for its functions to LSGs to
solve regional and local tasks” (Makunova 2009: 204). Thus, even if Akaev might have
preferred to maintain centralized political control over localities, the financial position of the
central government was so strained that ridding himself of the responsibility might have been a
relief. The villages were, quite literally, told to fend for themselves. From the perspective of
donors, this was an appropriate and even commendable logic. As the UNDP put it, central
authorities had “freed themselves from having to solve a whole range of issues and problems of
local significance” in villages and towns, “giving them the opportunity to pay more attention to
matters of national significance” (UNDP 2012: 34).
Conversely, it is notable that—despite his reputation as a liberal reformer—Akaev was
consolidating presidential power in the capital city even as he was adopting local selfgovernment reforms in villages. As one study points out, the reforms that were most fully
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implemented “affected lower levels of government, and ignored the highest levels”
(Baimyrzaeva 2010: 289).119 Indeed, by all accounts presidential power increased during
Akaev’s tenure. It seems that implementing reform at the local level was a way to appease
donors while still enabling the president to marginalize the parliament and attack both political
opponents and the press by manipulating the courts (International Crisis Group 2001; Freedom
House 2003). Many of those who had praised Akaev for his open-mindedness to Western norms
were soon disillusioned by his energetic accumulation of presidential power.120 This narrative
fits within broader trends in regime transitions during the post-Cold War period: authoritarian
rulers democratize only as much as is necessary to meet Western expectations or demands,
though not enough to complete a full transition to democracy (Levitsky and Way 2010). In
Kyrgyzstan, the democratization that did take place occurred primarily at the local level, as
described above.
If the main goal of local self-government reform was to appease international donors, it
appears to have worked. Kyrgyzstan, despite all of its objective failures and massively high
levels of corruption, remains a magnet for international donors in comparison to its neighbors.
Akaev’s multiple concessions on local government reform led many western observers to
conclude that it was the only country in the region that had any hope of transforming itself into a
western-style liberal democracy. A high-level official at USAID privately acknowledged that
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Ironically, the vast majority of reforms establishing local self-government were created in the most highly
centralized way possible, through presidential decree. Even more ironic is that this is part of what informed Akaev’s
reputation as a liberal, winning him praise from numerous western commentators.
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While failing to note the influence that international donors may have had on Akaev’s proclaimed liberalism,
western observers were quick to highlight the nefarious influences of Kyrgyzstan’s neighbors on Akaev’s
(supposedly) nascent authoritarianism at this time. Akaev’s “lurch toward authoritarianism,” writes one analyst,
“can be traced to a meeting between the heads of state” of the other Central Asian republics in 1994. At this
meeting, “pressure from Uzbekistan to agree upon an ‘Asian development path’ apparently persuaded Akaev to
abandon” his liberalism. As a result Akaev “disbanded the parliament, forced the resignation of the government,
cowed the judiciary, shut down the opposition press, set up a new electoral commission, and announced new
parliamentary elections” (Gleason 1997: 99).
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the an estimated 60% of all external budget support for the central government gets siphoned off
into officials’ salaries, both legitimately and illegitimately. The only reason donors have “not
completely given up” is because Kyrgyzstan is “still viewed as a hopeful case.” Compared to its
neighbors, it is “still more open, more democratic, and more willing to work with outsiders.”121
In sum, Kyrgyzstan developed a system of local self-government in order to appease
donors and keep a stream of foreign revenue flowing in. Kazakhstan, in contrast, was not
dependent on foreign aid and, therefore, was well insulated from the demands of western
governments and international organizations. Not only did oil revenue create a source of
financial independence, but the existence of known oil reserves also led many western
governments to mute their criticisms of the Kazakh government. That is, Kazakhstan was under
less pressure to reform and was better able to withstand what little pressure was applied, in
comparison with Kyrgyzstan. As one high-level official in Bishkek put it: “Why didn’t all the
other countries—like Russia and Kazakhstan—go this way? Because they had wider financial
opportunities.”122 Adil Nurmakov, a political scientist and journalist in Almaty, noted that it was
only because of oil and gas that Kazakhstan could avoid coming under Western pressure for
political reform. Kyrgyzstan, he noted, “had nothing to give except decentralization—that was
the ‘oil’ that they could give to the west.”123
As the director of USAID’s local governance and decentralization initiative during the
1990s said, the Kazakh government simply refused to cooperate with them. There was no
progress whatsoever because “there was no interest, no support, and no buy-in by the Kazakh
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government.”124 By the late 1990s, the USAID local government initiative in Kazakhstan was
completely phased out and USAID moved all of its resources and attention to Bishkek, where
real progress was being made, as outlined above. The result, then, is that Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan developed along very different paths when it came to the governance of villages,
towns, and cities.

V. Conclusions
As I have shown here, the reasons for the development of different local government
institutions in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are partly exogenous. Because Kyrgyzstan was
highly dependent on foreign aid, it implemented the reforms that international donors favored,
including the establishment of local self-government in villages and small cities. Kazakhstan, in
contrast, simply did not do so; central authorities there purposefully prevented the formation of
local self-government. The result is that during the 20 years following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, each state began to develop along different trajectories, building different kinds of
institutions at the local level. In Kyrgyzstan, elected village executives (ayil okmotu) were given
the freedom and flexibility to make their own decisions and were encouraged to work with local
communities and represent their interests. In Kazakhstan, by contrast, local village executives
are appointed from above and have no authority or resources to decide what projects to
implement, or how to implement them. If they were to work with the local population in
carrying out the interests of the community, it would matter little, for any local initiative they
sought to implement would require approval from higher levels of the state. Though, as I discuss
in the next chapter, the territorial structure and function of the president’s political party, Nur
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Otan, indicates that central authorities in Astana would prefer local communities have little
contact with state officials at all, encouraging interface with the party instead.
Importantly, the institutional structure of government at the local level has had larger
effects on the broader development of each state. This is because the different institutions of
local government I have described here helped to forge very different styles of state-society
relations. Kyrgyzstan’s institutions of local government activate and strengthen a host of
multiple and overlapping social relationships between local officials and the communities that
they govern. In Kazakhstan, the institutions of local government do precisely the opposite: they
isolate and insulate local officials from local populations, creating a clear legal and financial
dependency on the higher levels of the state while carrying out the functions of village
governance. The result is that ordinary people in each country came to interact with the state
differently, developed different understandings of how problems get solved and who solves
them, all of which has been personalized by interaction (or the lack of interaction) with their own
local officials. More specifically, it has led ordinary villagers in Kyrgyzstan to form strong
preferences for local cadre and has politicized the distinction between “local” and non-local (or
“outsider”) state personnel, a distinction that has much less significance in Kazakhstan. Related
to this, the institutions of local government in Kyrgyzstan embed local officials within a social
and institutional fabric that gives them the ability to push up against the rest of the administrative
system and contest central authority at the provincial level, and sometimes in Bishkek itself.
In the next chapter, I describe these differences in local social relations showing how and
why they are activated or neutralized, and the effects that this has on the central government’s
power in its more encompassing provinces and regions. Because the state is not a unitary
cohesive actor, but is itself comprised of multiple levels that interact differently with society, the
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ways in which state-society relations are shaped at the local level has consequences for politics at
the provincial and national levels, ultimately affecting the degree to which the state is cohesive
and centralized at all.
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Chapter 4: Patterns of Local Social Ties
I. Local Social Ties and State-Society Relations
In this chapter, I seek to show that the nature and style of social relations between local
officials and local populations conform to distinctly different patterns in Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan. My main claim is that ayil okmotu in Kyrgyzstan are more likely to be socially
embedded members of the community than their counterparts in Kazakhstan (the village akims).
In presenting data to support this claim, I will reference the institutional context of local
governance that I discussed in the previous chapter. In Kyrgyzstan, the institutions of local
government activate and strengthen multiple and overlapping social ties between village level
officials and the communities that they govern. In Kazakhstan, the institutions of local
government have the opposite effect; they insulate local officials from local populations, mitigate
against the formation of local social ties, and weaken those ties that might already exist. This
dynamic is reinforced in Kazakhstan—and perhaps partly produced—by the role of the
president’s political party (Nur Otan) in local governance, which I will address in the third
section of this chapter.
In chapter five, I build on this discussion by showing that differing patterns of local social
relations have had profound effects on how ordinary people understand their relationship to the
state. That is, they forge different patterns of broader state-society relations. Deep and
overlapping social ties are often built upon reciprocal obligations that are not only contractual,
but also moral, and enforced by the larger community; this facilitates the development of
personal trust and can discipline local officials to represent local interests and work more
diligently toward their realization. Less socially embedded local officials, in contrast, are not as
vulnerable to these social sanctions, and are less trusted as a result. They tend to be perceived as
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unresponsive to local needs and less effective in addressing them. The result is that social
relationships at the local level help shape perceptions about what (or who) the state is, what kinds
of things it can do, and how and why it does (or does not) do them. In particular, they can either
animate or neutralize the political distinction between local versus non-local cadre in more
encompassing districts, provinces, and regions.
Before beginning this discussion, I would like to clarify what I mean by local social ties,
identify different styles of local social relations, and describe how I intend to measure and
discuss them within the context of this chapter. Unless otherwise noted, the term “local social
relations” is used in a relatively narrow sense intended to describe only the social ties between
village-level officials and individuals within the community that they govern.125
A great deal of the existing literature on Central Asian politics and society has looked at
social ties primarily through the lens of clientelism, both between and among national elites
(Hale 2015; McGlinchey 2011; Engvall 2011), and also between local elites and local
communities (Radnitz 2010). In doing so, however, these authors have tended to homogenize
the concept, treating the ties between patron and client as non-variable. In particular, there has
been a tendency in prior work to treat clientelism in purely rationalistic terms, based on
assumptions about how these ties solve instrumental and material problems for those engaged in
them.
I build on this work in three different ways. First, I draw on the classic literature on
clientelism, which stresses that patron-client ties vary in their degree to which they are
instrumental or affective, personal or impersonal, coercive or consensual, in addition to many
other factors (Schmidt et al. 1977; Gellner and Waterbury 1977; Eisenstadt and Lemarchand
125

As in the previous chapter, I use the term “local” to refer only to the village level (not the district or provincial
level) and so I use the terms “village-level official” and “local-level official” interchangeably.
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1981; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984). They also vary in the number of dimensions that tie two
people together and can encompass and crosscut political, economic, and social spheres, or be
limited to a single realm. As Scott says, these relations can be either “multiplex” or “simplex”
(Scott 1972). In short, not all patron-client relations are of the same kind or quality.
Second, and related, I highlight the social as well as the rational elements of these ties.
However, I do so with the explicit understanding that social ties are far more encompassing than
patron-client ties alone, which I treat as just one of the many different kinds of ties that might
define a relationship between two people. Again, I draw on the classic literature on clientelism,
which describes these relations outside of strictly rational-instrumental or coercive terms and
regularly invokes concepts like kinship, friendship, personal loyalty, moral obligation, and longstanding family histories that defy pure rationality.
Finally, I stress the ways in which informal social relations are shaped and influenced by
formal political institutions. The emphasis on the relationship between formal and informal
institutions draws on the work of Helmke and Levitsky (2004), and, in the post-Soviet context,
Henry Hale (2015). The data presented in this chapter, however, focus exclusively on these
dynamics at the local level, between village-level state officials and ordinary members of the
local community. My main claim is that variations in the formal institutions of local
government, which I outlined in chapter three, shape different patterns of local social ties, which
I document below.
Measuring something as informal and opaque as “social ties” is admittedly difficult. I
approach local social relations from several different angles in the hope that, together, these
different approaches paint a clear picture that shows different patterns at the village-level in
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. First, I draw on the specific features of local government
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institutions discussed in the previous chapter to show that the varying characteristics of these
institutions make personalistic and impersonalistic social ties between local officials and local
populations more or less likely. In particular, different mechanisms of selection and
representation—namely, elections versus appointment of local officials—shape the likelihood
that local officials will be chosen from among the community or from outside. This, in itself, has
a large impact on style of local social ties. Personalized and encompassing social ties, for
example, depend on iterated face-to-face interaction. I suggest that local elections in Kyrgyzstan
makes it more likely that ordinary villagers become local officials, entering office with alreadyexisting social ties within the community; in contrast, the mechanism of appointment in
Kazakhstan, while not precluding the selection of ordinary villagers, makes it less likely.
Second, I discuss how differences in the processes of local government reinforce or
encourage interaction between local officials and the local population. Regardless of whether
officials begin their jobs as long-time village residents or outsiders, the process of governance
itself can either (further) facilitate the social embeddedness of local officials or discourage it.
That is, different starting points do not determine different outcomes because local social
relations are susceptible to change through process. Among the things that I will discuss, for
example, is that Kyrgyzstan’s system of local governance tends to produce longer tenures for
local officials and also requires them to rely on and mobilize their co-villagers in order to solve
local problems. The result is that their social ties with the community are continually activated,
expanded, and strengthened during the process of local governance.
In Kazakhstan, by contrast, the system of local governance produces short and uncertain
tenures for local officials and discourages iterated or regularized interaction with local
communities. In building on the institutional configurations of local governance in each country
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that I described in the previous chapter, I will also address the role of Nur Otan—President
Nazarbayev’s political party—pointing to the ways in which central authorities have partly
displaced local officials from local social contexts and encouraged citizens to interact with the
party apparatus instead. Through all of these ways, the line between state and society gets drawn
differently in each country. In Kazakhstan, local officials are unambiguously state officials,
while their counterparts in Kyrgyzstan sometimes appear to be little more than ordinary members
of the local community, and are, in fact, often former taxi drivers, farmers, and school teachers.
In the final section of this chapter, I present an in-depth comparative case study of local
governance that focuses on one village in each state. Based on observations and interviews
obtained through ethnographic field research, I show that the ways in which local officials carry
out their jobs—within the institutional context of local governance—strongly shapes their social,
political, and economic role within the community, partly determines the kinds of relationships
that they form with co-villagers over time, and also determines what kind of local problems are
addressed and how.
Throughout all of these sections I rely on ethnographic data from several villages,
interviews with present and former state officials at all levels, interviews with other local
analysts, and prior research from a variety of sources. By connecting all of these data together I
hope to paint a reasonably clear picture showing that local officials in Kyrgyzstan are more
socially embedded than their counterparts in Kazakhstan.
In the next chapter, I will show how these different patterns of local social ties, along
with the different kinds of responsibilities and obligations that they produce, determine how
ordinary villagers come to understand their relationship with the state in the personae of their
own local officials. It shapes ordinary villagers’ sense of personal trust in officialdom, and their
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perceptions of what kinds of state officials are effective and why. Following Scott, I argue that
personalistic social ties produce both “trust and affection” (Scott 1972: 94; 1976). This can
produce strong biases in the value of “local” versus “non-local” cadre in localities and regions
and cause ordinary people to mobilize in protection of “their own” local officials against attacks
by the central government, such as efforts to transfer them to a different region, rotate them
across regions, or simply prosecute them for “corruption.”126 I go on to address specific
contentious episodes of regional appointment and representation in chapter six.

II. Friend or Bureaucrat? The State Official in Local Social Context
At a minimum, crosscutting and multiplex social relationships require that individuals
know each other and that they know each other personally. Personal relations between two
people fall short of deep and overlapping social ties, but are prerequisite for them; they are a
defining aspect of whole person social relations. At a minimum, a personal acquaintance makes
deep and overlapping social ties possible and is an indication that personalistic social relations
might exist.
Do ordinary people know who their local officials are? Do they know them personally?
Data from several different sources show that ordinary people in Kyrgyzstan are likely to know
their local officials personally; people in Kazakhstan, in contrast, are less likely to know their
local officials personally and may not know who their local officials are at all. A 2012 UNDP
study shows that across all villages and cities in Kyrgyzstan, the vast majority of residents
recognized the name of the heads of local government structures (heads of ayil okmotu and
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deputies of village councils) in their own locality. The numbers varied across provinces, but
there was a clear majority in every one.
Table 4.1. Percentage of Residents Who Recognize the Name of Village/City Local Officials by Province127
Chui oblast ….. 94.1%
Naryn oblast ….. 90.7%
Talas oblast ….. 88.5%
Issyk-Kul oblast ….. 78.7%
Batken oblast ….. 71.6%
Jalal-Abad oblast ….. 70.4%
Osh oblast ….. 60.1%

Nationwide, the percentage of Kyrgyz citizens who knew their representative in the local
council hovered around 50% between 2007 and 2011 (UNDP 2012: 50-59). The report also
stresses the face-to-face nature of these relations, describing them as highly personalistic:
…in every village, the elder is a personal acquaintance, and every [village] leader is known and familiar to
his constituents. A survey, conducted as part of [the] research for this Report, confirms that three out of
four Kyrgyz citizens (75%) personally know their mayor or head of the village municipality [ayil okmotu]
(ibid.: 50).

Other evidence shows that these ties are both personal and deep. Speaking about the ayil
okmotu of Bazar Korgon—Zholchiev Abdykadyr—members of the community invariably
utilized a prism of longstanding personal acquaintance.128 “All his life he has worked with
people here,” noted a woman selling produce in the bazaar, “even before he was ayil okmotu
everyone knew him for the work he did on the kolkhoz.”129
Others knew him more directly. The vice principal of the local school said “I’ve known
Abdykadyr for a long time, ever since we were students on the collective farm…he has done a
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UNDP 2012: 51.
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Interview with author, October 25, 2013, KYG1_Int1_49i. As noted in the previous chapter, the territorial
boundaries of local governments in Kyrgyzstan were adopted from the boundaries of state and collective farms.
Abdykadyr, according to his own account, tried twice to get an education in Russia but was unable to. He started his
career as a brigadier in the kolkhoz. By the mid-1980s he had become an agronomist. After 1991 he was
temporarily the director of a cooperative farm that was formed when the kolkhoz was broken apart (interview with
author, October 7, 2013).
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lot for the community.”130 A currently unemployed man recounted both his own work history
with Abdykadyr and the patron-client ties he is known to have with others in the community:
“we worked together on the kolkhoz and I know him well—as the ayil okmotu he is very well
liked because he helps poor people and gives them money during the holidays.”131 The reason
this man knew about these disbursements of money is that his elderly aunt was one of the
recipients, creating another layer of ties between him and Abdykadyr. Whether this money came
from state coffers, from Abdykadyr’s own pocket, or from some other source was not known by
anyone, a fact that speaks to the blurry distinction between the ayil okmotu’s formal public
responsibility and his private personal obligations.
In these and other instances, a personal acquaintance with Abdykadyr was taken for
granted. I relay these accounts here not because informants thought their personal relationship
with the ayil okmotu was noteworthy, but precisely because it was so unremarkable.132 No
discussion about Abdykadyr was confined to his role as the “ayil okmotu” because Abdykadyr
was not known to people only in this way. For example, an aksakal (village elder) in Bazar
Korgon perked up when he heard Abdykadyr’s name and said, “he is a great man, an honest
man, and a hard worker.” Surprisingly, this comment was made in the context of a broader
discussion about how irredeemably corrupt and dishonest state officials are in post-Soviet
Kyrgyzstan. The officials singled out for corruption, though, were far away, in Bishkek. Local
officials are different. It turns out in this particular case that Abdykadyr’s father had been a
lifelong friend of the aksakal, and that he considered Abdykadyr as one of his own sons.133 To
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Interview with author, October 30, 2013, KYG1_Int3_43a.
Interview with author, October 17, 2013, KYG1_Int1_49e.
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A contextual and methodological note: Some of these accounts came from long formal interviews while others
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the aksakal, Abdykadyr cannot be placed in an abstract category like “state official” (whom he
identifies as corrupt) because their personal relationship is far broader, richer, and deeper than
this, defined by a lifetime of interactions.134 As these few examples serve to illustrate,
Abdykadyr is not only the ayil okmotu; to some he is also a former colleague, a classmate, a
patron, or the son of a lifelong friend, among many other things. These are multiplex wholeperson relationships built on personal acquaintance, and, in some instances, affection.
In contrast, the relationship between local government officials and local populations in
Kazakhstan has been described as one of “estrangement” (Bhuiyan 2010: 668). Writing about
local government in Kazakhstan, Makhmutova notes a social “alienation” between “authorities
and the people” (Makhmutova 2004: 8). Zhanibek Khassan, formerly a specialist on local
governance for the Soros Foundation in Almaty, says that “district and village level offices are
often run by absentee officials, people who officially occupy these posts but who are absent most
of the time and simply not interested.”135 This lack of deep and overlapping social ties between
state officials and local populations is also captured by the comments of one former high-level
official: “The government—the local government and the central government—they are living
by their own life, and society—teachers, local businessmen, and etcetera—they are living by
their own life. And these two sides of life are very separate.”136 Like many other ordinary
people, a social worker from a village in Sairam district (South Kazakhstan province) described
her akim strictly through the prism of officialdom, indicating a social distance between them:
134

This tendency to elevate the local officials and complain about “officials” as abstract unfamiliars is one of the
broader effects that I seek to describe. In fact, the aksakal went on to say that Abdykadyr would make a great
president. It is, I argue, precisely this style of personalistic local social relations that leads ordinary people to trust
and value their own local officials, politicizing distinctions between local and non-local cadre within the state at
higher levels. I discuss this dynamic in more detail in the next chapter, focusing on the ways that local officials
embedded within the fabric of a local moral economy enhances both levels of personal trust and evaluations of their
work.
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“The akim is just an official who wants to have a career. He doesn’t have an interest in local
problems or people’s interests. Very few officials are really trying to change things or improve
society—they just want to get a promotion so that they can get a bigger paycheck.”137 In contrast
to Abdykadyr, this akim is known as “the akim,” a nameless and faceless abstraction who is
understood to act strictly according to a logic that defines the narrow category to which he
belongs—he is “just an official.”
Other data suggest that people in Kazakhstan have similar relationships with members of
their maslikhat.138 In one study of maslikhat deputies in Almaty that was conducted by the
Youth Information Service of Kazakhstan (MISK), 2,635 households were surveyed in five
districts of the city. Across all five districts only 15% of residents could name their local deputy;
85% could not correctly identify their deputy’s name when it was read aloud. Only 4%
answered that they had ever met their deputy personally. Fewer than 40 respondents out of
2,635, or less than 2%, said that they had spoken with their local deputy in the past two years.139
Likewise, an analyst at Kazakhstan’s Institute of Strategic Studies, an official state
research center under the presidential administration, noted that maslikhat deputies have virtually
no contact with ordinary people. According to this analyst, the maslikhat “as a means of contact
between the local government and the local population does not work” because “most of the
deputies are businessmen or famous public officials who do not have time to talk or meet with
the local population. There is little contact.” Members of the maslikhats work full-time jobs,
usually as the heads of businesses and work “maybe only two or three hours a week” as
137

Interview with author, KAZ_Int1_33b
Maslikhats are representative-legislative organs at sub-national levels. There are no maslikhats at the village
level, itself an institutional feature that mitigates against personalized social ties at the local level. Here I discuss
maslikhats to illustrate an absence of face-to-face interaction between ordinary people and their formal
“representatives” at the lowest levels at which they exist, in districts and larger cities.
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“Results of Research on the Work of Deputies of the Maslikhat of Almaty City,” The Youth Information Service
of Kazakhstan, Presentation of Findings at the Kazhol hotel, Almaty, April 22, 2014.
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deputies.140 Rasul Zhumaly, a political analyst and former state official, put it this way: “I don’t
know even one member of the maslikhat. I don’t know who they are and I am a specialist. It is
the same situation in Shymkent, Dzhambyl, Karaganda, and so on.”141

Institutional Structure of Local Government and the Socio-Territorial Origins of Local Officials
A personalized familiarity between local officials and local residents has a lot to do with
who the viable candidates for these offices are. Where lifelong ordinary village inhabitants stand
some chance of obtaining office over outside elites, we can expect local officials to enter office
with already-existing personalized social relationships with co-villagers. Whether they can do so
is shaped by the formal institutional mechanism for selecting local officials, namely election
versus appointment. More specifically, elections make the selection of an ordinary local person
more likely while appointments make it easier for elite outsiders to assume local office.
As I discussed in the previous chapter, all village-level officials in Kyrgyzstan are chosen
through elections. Between 2001 and 2008, the ayil okmotu was directly elected. Since 2008,
the ayil okmotu has been indirectly elected by members of the local council. Members of the
local council are directly elected by the population of the village. In Kazakhstan, the only
village-level organ of government is the executive, the head of which (the akim) is appointed at
the district-level. Village residents do vote for members of the district-level maslikhat, but, as I
discuss below, these elections are tightly controlled, limiting the opportunity for ordinary village
residents to run for office and virtually foreclosing any realistic chances that they can become
deputies. Though the maslikhat is not technically a village-level institution—which, by itself,
dilutes any single deputy’s ties to the locality of his or her constituents—it is the lowest-level
140
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organ of the state besides the village akim and I discuss it here (as I did above) for purposes of
comparison with Kyrgyzstan.
In general, elections held at the local level allow candidates from within the community
to marshal the electoral support of their kin, clan, friends, clients, and other local acquaintances.
Ordinary villagers, in turn, can vote for candidates whom they already know personally,
including their own friends, relatives, respected village elders, teachers, or other local notables.
I hardly mean to suggest that local level elections in Kyrgyzstan are an idealistic form of
democracy, and we need not assume this in order to reach the conclusion that local village
inhabitants will make competitive candidates. Even if local elections function strictly according
to the logic of classic political clientelism, local candidates will have advantages over outsiders.
Local patrons, after all, will be in a strong position to win by mobilizing their clients who, as the
classic literature on clientelism suggests, are likely to also be their families, friends, and other
acquaintances (Schmidt et al. 1977; Gellner and Waterbury 1977; Eisenstadt, S. 1981; Eisenstadt
and Roniger 1984). Even if true, the key point is that the patron is local and is only able to
marshal support because of the obligations of reciprocity that will benefit his or her supporters in
that locality (ibid.). It also needs to be noted that local elections do not always result in a clear
consensus over who the ayil okmotu should be; however, they do make it likely that whatever
contest ensues will be between different local people, not between a local person and an outsider.
The twice-elected ayil okmotu (and lifelong resident) of Seidikum in Kyrgyzstan noted
that “the election system makes it almost impossible that someone will come from outside. The
election system is localized and people try to elect someone who is from here.”142 The director
of a local school from a different village in this same district—who also happens to be a member
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of the local council—said plainly that “[people] try to elect only friends and relatives, but at the
same time they want someone who will do a good job.”143 The ayil okmotu of Bazar Korgon,
Abdykadyr, claimed that there was a law requiring that candidates are local residents – “people
cannot be elected if they don’t live here, so outside people cannot come.”144 This means that
local officials in Kyrgyzstan are likely to enter office in their own village, where they already
have multiple and overlapping social relationships with the friends, family, and acquaintances
that they have accumulated over a lifetime. Indeed, they might be elected precisely because they
have a large network of acquaintances who support them.
The appointment of village-level akims in Kazakhstan, however, eliminates the necessity
for the explicit support of any segment of the local population. The process of appointment
occurs outside the village, is controlled by people who do not live in the village, and is
determined based on their interests alone. In this case, the district-level akim makes the
appointment, limited only by the demands made by his or her bosses at even higher levels of
administration. While some district-level akims might find it in their interest to appoint a local
person to this post, perhaps in an effort to establish trust with the population or obtain local
information, others will be more comfortable appointing their own confidants who could be from
any village within the district, or another region altogether. In short, the institutional bias toward
the selection of a local person is not the same as under an electoral system.
Sergei Khudyakov, the director of Kazakhstan’s Institute for the Development of Local
Self-Government (an independent NGO), stresses that local akims in Kazakhstan are more often
presented to the village rather than being selected from the village: “[t]hey are appointed and
that’s all. The akim from the district simply comes to the village, like normal, and just presents
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the new [village] akim to the population145…it can be any person, any person. The akim from
the district decides this alone.”146 The village-level akim, then, can be selected from among the
population in any given locality, but there is no reason why this should happen generally, across
multiple localities throughout the country.
The Vice Chairman of the party Ak Zhol, Burikhan Nurmakhamedov, notes that ordinary
people are simply excluded from the process: “Here the leaders come from the top to the
bottom, not from the bottom to the top. So the role of the population is very little.”147 A former
local akim himself noted that, “akims are not elected, they are appointed and take on a role like
the ‘city manager’ – it’s like the manager of a company, they come and go, they either solve
problems or not, but they don’t have any feelings toward the place or the people.”148 Just as
ordinary people can vote for their own acquaintances in local elections in Kyrgyzstan, districtlevel akims can appoint those they know themselves, people whom they can rely on and trust,
and who are likely to have travelled in their own social circles.
As I started to discuss above, this social alienation between the local officials and local
communities extends beyond formally appointed positions to the maslikhat, which is a nominally
elected representative body (Makhmutova 2004: 8). There are at least two reasons for this.
First, as noted above (and in chapter three), there are no village-level maslikhats in Kazakhstan.
This means that numerous villages are represented in a single district-level maslikhat, diluting
the degree to which deputies can truly know and interact with his or her constituents.149 Second,
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and more importantly, the elections for positions in the maslikhat are hardly elections at all, and
might just as easily be defined as a mode of indirect appointment.
For instance, elections for the maslikhat are rarely announced in advance, and the only
candidates who have any chance being elected are those who were privately informed of the
election ahead of time. Ordinary village or city residents do not receive this kind of information.
As one journalist in Almaty pointed out, these are “government insiders – basically people who
were invited to take the seat […] the result is that the composition of maslikhats across the
country is made of people who are very close to the central power structures and friendly with
those in power. These are not just ordinary people who choose to do this.”150 Often, it is the
district-level akim who plays the leading role in selecting candidates. Makhmutova quotes one
deputy who explains why he decided to run for office. “The akim called me and said: ‘Let’s
make you a deputy and then elect you as the Secretary of the maslikhat. I agreed with the akim’s
proposal” (Makhmutova 2004: 8). The result is that maslikhat deputies “do not express the
interests of their constituents and it appears that they are some kind of division within the
akimat” (Makhmutova 2004: 5).151
In Kyrgyzstan, the prior occupations of village-level officials confirms what we might
expect to observe under an electoral system for selection and representation. A list of individuals
serving as ayil okmotu in three provinces in 2013 indicates their immediately prior
occupations.152 It includes taxi drivers, school teachers, war pensioners, school directors and
deputy school directors, farmers and former kolkhoz workers, deputies of the corresponding local
150
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council, private business owners, and the “temporarily unemployed” (itself, perhaps, the most
common occupation in Kyrgyzstan’s villages). We should not forget that the multiple informal
roles that any one person might play—as a respected village elder (aksakal), clan member or
leader, or other respected local notable—are not accounted for in official record keeping.153
Altogether these data suggest that local officials are not only more likely to be known personally
by village residents, as discussed above, they are often ordinary people themselves, coming from
within the village’s own social fabric, and with relatively few ties to political and administrative
elites from the outside the locality.
The single most common occupation for currently serving ayil okmotu in Kyrgyzstan,
however, is as ayil okmotu of the same village. This indicates that village officials have
relatively stable tenures. In 196 different positions across three provinces, 103 (or 52.6%) were
filled by an incumbent village official, either the ayil okmotu or former member of the village
council; that number is 125 (or 63.8%) if we include individuals whose prior position was within
the district-level administration within the same district as his or her village. By contrast, only
six individuals (or 3.1%) were previously the ayil okmotu of a different village, while fourteen
others (or 7.1%) can be identified as having held their prior job in a state administrative position
at the oblast-level or in Bishkek city. Indeed, as I began to suggest above, the vast majority of
ayil okmotu in 2013 who were not themselves incumbent village-level officials held what we
might call “ordinary” local jobs, including as school teachers, taxi drivers, and farmers. 40
individuals—20.5% of all ayil okmotu in three provinces—fall into this category. Thus, we can
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definitively say that incumbent village officials and ordinary people, taken together, held office
as ayil okmotu in 143 out of 196 local governments across three provinces (73%) in 2013.154
This tells us that ayil okmotu in Kyrgyzstan are usually local people or local officials who
have held relatively long tenures. Importantly, longer tenures make deeply embedded social ties
more likely because even officials who come to office as outsiders might gradually develop ties
to the local community if they live and work there for an extended period of time. This is even
truer in Kyrgyzstan than Kazakhstan, where these relationships are crucial to the job itself, as I
started to discuss in chapter three and elaborate on below. In sum, local officials in Kyrgyzstan
are likely not only to be selected from among the local population, but also to serve within that
community for relatively long periods. If they did not begin their official career as a socially
embedded official, they are more likely to become one over time, continually reinforcing their
existing ties while building new ones.
Unfortunately, nation-wide data on village akims’ prior occupations in Kazakhstan are
not available. What limited information I am able to present here—based on direct interviews
with akims from several villages—is hardly representative. Nor is it conclusive. On the one
hand, I met and learned about village akims who had career paths very much like what the
process of appointment suggests: non-local or partially local people with ties to state elites, not
with ties to the local community. In the final section of this chapter, for example, I will discuss
the work of an akim from a village in Akmola oblast whose immediately prior job was as an
administrator in the district-level akimat, where he worked for six years. I will also describe the
work of an akim who was appointed to a village in a rural district of South Kazakhstan oblast but
who had previously lived and worked in Shymkent, the nearest major city. In a different village
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within this same district, an akim was appointed after having worked for the district-level akimat
for ten years.
In other instances, however, I met and learned about village-level akims who were, in
fact, lifelong village residents without any apparent ties to higher-level state elites. One akim in
a village in Akmola oblast, according to his own account, was trained as a specialist in
automobile mechanics, but ultimately became a farmer and was then appointed as akim. In
another case, from South Kazakhstan oblast, the village akim had previously operated a family
cattle ranch in the village, a common occupation in this region. In total, this is a limited and
mixed bag of cases from which no general conclusions can be drawn.
At the same time, the institutions of local government are themselves evenly distributed
across localities throughout the country. If the logic of appointment does make the selection of
locally embedded officials less likely, then there is reason to believe that village-level officials in
Kazakhstan have weaker ties to the villages and stronger ties to higher-level state elites than their
counterparts in Kyrgyzstan. Zamir Karazhanov, a political scientist in Almaty, argues that, taken
broadly, “the [district] akim selects the people he trusts most, and of course these are going to be
people close to him, other elites. It is not possible that he’ll just trust some teacher or farmer, he
doesn’t know any teachers or farmers. He hasn’t worked in that sphere so it’s illogical.”155
Interviews with villagers in multiple regions in South Kazakhstan, Akmola, and Almaty
oblasts also suggest that local akims tend to have relatively short and unpredictable tenures.
Moreover, short tenure is perceived by local people to stand in the way of getting to know their
own officials. For example, in several villages within a district in South Kazakhstan oblast,
numerous people complained that the akim was “constantly changing.” People found this to be
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important enough that it was often the first thing anyone said when describing the local
government. Throughout this district, the changing of village-level akims was accompanied by
public ceremony, which might have made it even more memorable. Each time a new akim was
appointed, the village square would be cleaned and decorated. Sometimes new flowers were
planted. When people recalled the tenure of a local akim, they marked time not by the changes
in akims’ names and faces, but by the recurring public ceremonies that would take place in the
square.
Our local authorities change all the time and I can’t even remember their names [familiia]. Who is the
akim now…Kainazarov? Bainazarov? Who can remember? I don’t know why they change all the time.
It’s hard to keep track of them. I only notice when there is a new akim because they change the square
around.156

People also tended to have an awareness that short tenures were an obstacle that stood in
the way of forming personal relations with the akim. In another village in Sairam, a farmer
recalled that the prior akim lived on his street, so he knew him; but he was replaced after only six
months. That akim had worked with the district-level authorities to approve a plan to pave local
roads, but it was never implemented, a fact that was also attributed to short tenure. “The akims
in my village are changing quickly. I have no idea why this is happening. The district akim
might sit for four years, but the village akims might sit for only a year, sometimes less.”157 In yet
another village within this district, a woman noted that “I knew who the previous akim was, but
they change all the time, so I don’t know the new one. They’re rebuilding the square, which is
always what the new akim does.”158
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III. Local Social Ties and the Process of Local Governance
While the territorial origins of local officials is one way of looking at their social ties to
local villagers, it may not be as important as the institutional demands of their jobs in fostering
new ties and strengthening old ones. It is not only who the local official is, but also how they do
their job that brings them into (or out of) interaction with ordinary members of the local
community. This, too, is partly determined by the institutions of local government, which shape
what kinds of responsibilities local officials have, and whether and how they interact with the
local population in carrying them out. In the previous chapter, I described differences in local
government structures and processes in each state and how they differently position local
officials within local communities. The institutions of local government in Kyrgyzstan facilitate
and even require local officials’ to politically activate and utilize their own local social networks
while their counterparts in Kazakhstan are discouraged from doing so.
In Kyrgyzstan, the ayil okmotu is institutionally situated so that asking for favors and
doling them out is a part of everyday local governance. In chapter three, I discussed how village
financing in Kyrgyzstan required the mobilization of the local population to contribute cash,
labor, or other in-kind contributions and that local officials were often at the forefront of this
mobilization. Third-party donor organizations typically require this “local contribution” as a
condition for releasing funds. They do so with the explicit purpose of mobilizing the population,
and enhancing the ayil okmotu’s dependence on local communities. In the process of designing
and implementing these projects, the ayil okmotu is simultaneously responding to local demands,
asking for assistance in implementation, and dispensing favors. Thus, his or her local social
ties—which include relations with family members, friends, and life-long acquaintances—are
continually activated during the processes of village governance.
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Hundreds of such projects take place everyday in villages and small cities across the
country. In the last chapter, I described multiple projects funded by the Agency for the
Development and Investment of Communities [sic] (ARIS), which has the explicit goal of
fostering cooperation between local officials and their communities.159 In another example, the
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) provided funding for the
construction of medical points in twelve remote village locations. In order to do so, they
depended on the ability of local government officials to mobilize the local population. Marat
Usupov, the Director of UNIDO in Kyrgyzstan, noted that “the ayil okmotu takes a very active
role in the governance of their territories and we rely on them to execute the projects. We do not
have a staff to build the aid stations. This labor must be provided by the ayil okmotu. In most
cases they must recruit volunteers, and generally they are successful at doing this.”160
The Aga Khan Foundation, too, provides funds for medical points, and also the
construction of kindergartens and the provision of clean drinking water, among other things.
They award grants of up to $10,000 for projects based on the proposals that members of local
communities develop themselves. Like other donor organizations, Aga Khan requires a local
contribution, which hinges on the ability of local government officials—ayil okmotu, deputies of
local councils, and members of community user associations—to recruit members of the local
community to directly participate in a project’s realization. An Aga Khan project manager in
Osh noted that these are all “joint implementation projects” that depend heavily on the ability of
local officials to manage their end of the project—they “play a big role in making this other side
[of the joint implementation] work, in mobilizing contributions.”161 Notably, not every project is
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successful. When it fails, it is often because the “relationship between the local community and
local authorities is not good” (ibid.). Conversely, when village officials have local acquaintances
who they can call for help, they succeed better at their jobs. As a high-level official from
USAID in Bishkek noted, “some ayil okmotu have gotten quite good at generating their own
streams of revenue based almost purely on their personality and connections. These officials
have the ability to initiate their own projects and act on their own without consulting the central
government.”162
The ayil okmotu of Tuluikun (Kara-Suu district, Osh oblast) described multiple projects
sponsored by ARIS, which provided 95% of project costs in exchange for a five percent local
contribution. “Before beginning any project we have to go into the community and talk to
people. People must agree in advance to help—to give money, or to agree to work—otherwise
the project will not happen.” He added that ARIS could never do this themselves. “It would be
difficult, very difficult because you must know the people—I’ve lived here my whole life.”
Laughing, he added, “everyone knows everyone here.” In other localities throughout Kara-suu
district, ARIS supported numerous projects in the same way: 1.3 million som163 for the village
of “Kyrgyzstan” and 400,000 for Ozkur to replace and fix electric cables; 700,000 som for the
creation of a computer lab and 300,000 for the construction of a “chess hall” (shakhmatnyi zal)
in Uchar.164 In every instance the ayil okmotu relies on local support and cooperation. As one
villager described, “generally the ayil okmotu does his best, but he cannot do much without local
help. These days most of the main jobs are done by common people.”165 One study even frames
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local governance in Kyrgyzstan as a collective action problem and describes the ayil okmotu as
the solution (Ibraimova 2009: 136-7).
Even in the absence of third-party financial support, local budgets are so small that the
mobilization of the local population is often the only viable way to tackle local initiatives.
Sometimes the local contribution is the only contribution. The ayil okmotu in a Kyrgyz village
succeeds at fixing the road when he knows enough people whom he can call on to shovel dirt and
rock. In a village not far from Karakol city (Issyk-kul oblast), a group of villagers worked with
the ayil okmotu to build a pond on a large abandoned plot that had recently been transferred to
municipal property. Together they dug out a sizeable pond and even stocked it with fish.166
Importantly, the ability to mobilize local social networks is a two-way street of
interconnected obligations. If the ayil okmotu can call on volunteers to help fix a road, it is only
because it is understood—even if only implicitly—that he, too, must provide his own help and
assistance to others when the time comes. Moreover, individuals who volunteer labor for
ostensibly public projects might be doing so out of their own sense of personal obligation to the
ayil okmotu, perhaps for a debt that was incurred in the past, maybe even before he or she held
public office.
It might also be the case that the ayil okmotu is simultaneously drawing on different
sources of authority, stemming from his multiple and overlapping social roles in the village. In
the abstract, he is requesting help from ordinary villagers, but in concrete terms he might be
calling on help from his brothers, former colleagues or students, or various other kinds of clients.
In these cases the ayil okmotu benefits from personalized forms of authority outside of his
official one. An element of coercion is implied here, but personal forms of authority and face-to-
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face clientelism are based on some level of trust and reciprocity, which is precisely what makes
them unique (Scott 1972; Powell 1977). Just as family, friends, and close acquaintances will be
in no position to refuse the ayil okmotu, the ayil okmotu will not easily be able to refuse them in
turn. These are diffuse reciprocal obligations embedded in whole-person relationships that are
neither public nor private alone; they are simultaneously public and private.
In fact, the reason the ayil okmotu might organize a project to fix the road in the first
place is because members of the local community have demanded that it be fixed, in which case
the mere organization of a crew to perform the work is fulfilling a responsibility that might be
public (and “official”) in nature, but still partly driven by private obligations to particular
individuals. Thus, the ayil okmotu is often simultaneously responding to local demands while
also relying on local social support to fulfill them; favors are being asked from some in order to
do favors for others, reinforcing the web of mutual reciprocity that connects local officials to
various members of the community. In addition to this, though, the ayil okmotu might very well
be carrying out small personal favors on a regular basis—providing his own labor,
transportation, and even money to help others. I discuss these dynamics in fine-grained
empirical detail in the village-level study that I present in the final section of this chapter.
Again, all of this is fostered by the institutional design of local government itself, which
in Kyrgyzstan vaguely tasks ayil okmotu with the responsibility to address “problems of local
significance,” as determined by the local community itself.167 As I discussed in the previous
chapter, local self-government, as the name implies, places the impetus for action at the
community level and tasks local officials with representing and realizing the interests of that
community. As one state official observed, the result is that “people learned the plain truth:
167
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local self-government is the authority [vlast] that they themselves form, implement, and control”
(Fattakhov 2013: 8). Recent research has shown that Kyrgyzstan’s local self-government
system, in conjunction with funding from external donors, has, in fact made local officials more
responsive to local needs and demands (Babajanian 2015).168
In Kazakhstan, however, the institutional design of local governanment makes local
officials’ own initiatives irrelevant and virtually prevents local communities from playing any
role in decision-making or policy implementation. As I described in the previous chapter,
village-level akims in Kazakhstan do not create policy; instead, they are tasked with
implementing policies that were determined at higher levels of state administration. When
offering solutions for how to make local government more effective, the advisor to a local deputy
did not suggest more interaction with the local population, but better communication with
Astana: “Collect all unresolved problems and send them to Astana so that they can be solved
through the vertical [of power] and the responsible state organs.”169
The result is that the process of local governance insulates the akim from the needs,
demands, and preferences of the local population and eliminates both the necessity and the
possibility of local, bottom-up initiatives. In fact, local akims who become overzealous
proponents or defenders of local interests are putting their careers in jeopardy and might even
face criminal prosecution for “corruption” or “abusing power.” Importantly, the institutional
constraints on the akim informs his own understanding of what his public and social
responsibilities in the village are, determining what things he should do and how he should do
them. As a public official who carries out the orders of state elites, there is rarely a situation in
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which the village akim might feel that he or she owes members of the local communities any
favors, or that there is an obligation to help any individual person. To quote Nurmakhamedov
again:
The [village] akims stand only before the higher akims and the president, and not the population. […] The
akim isn’t interested in village problems. He has no incentive to listen to local people and has no reason to
meet them and hear their opinions. He always looks up, and takes orders from the top. So what does he
need to listen to the village people for?170

Others have similarly noted:
Every level of administration is subordinate to a higher level and takes no political responsibility before the
population for its own activities. One can say that political responsibility is put exclusively on the central
organs of power. It appears that such a system does not give local authorities any of the needed motivation
for [their own] initiatives or for their full-fledged work toward the social-economic development of their
own regions (Burlakov and Shimshikov 2004: 62).

As one former local official himself explained, “everything is decided without the
approval [of] or consultation with the local population.”171 Thus, as the process of everyday
local governance unfolds, existing social gaps between the village akim and the local population
expand. And, if social relationships are maintained through reciprocal exchange, as Gullette and
Werner argue, then any social relationships with co-villagers that might already exist are likely
to wither away (Werner 1998; Gullette 2010a). These institutional constraints are obvious to the
akim, but not always evident to the local community, who come to see their local official as
distant and nonresponsive. When idle in his office, the akim might say that he is “waiting for
orders”—villagers, on the other hand, are likely to say that he is “sitting around.” That is, the
institutional constraints imposed on the akim are not always visible to the community, but his
repeated failures to address their complaints are.
When describing the work of the akim in his village, an unemployed young man in
Akmola oblast, put it simply—“He doesn’t work.” Pointing to a fallen tree that obstructed a dirt
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footpath in the small park where we stood, he said, “look, this tree fell over a month ago and it is
still laying here. The akim hasn’t done anything and he’s probably never going to.”172 An older
man in the village was less forgiving: “He does not fucking work. He does not do anything. He
sees nothing and he does nothing.”173 His wife added, “you can complain to him, but he won’t
do anything. The government gives him money but he doesn’t fix our problems. In the winter
we have no roads. There are two meters of snow and nobody to clean it. Even when there is no
snow the roads are all broken, you’ve seen it for yourself.”174
As I described above (and in chapter three), it isn’t the formal institutional role of the
village akim to “see” local problems, or even to hear about them from others in the village. If
something falls outside of his official duties, the akim is unlikely to address it. A tree that
unexpectedly falls in the park is just one example. In fact, he might even be reprimanded if he
were to begin taking on tasks at his own initiative, or in response to the complaints of villagers.
Virtually nothing is decided in the village itself.
This means that even when the akim is seen to be “working,” he is rarely addressing the
problems that people find important, and is sometimes doing things that are not seen as being
particularly useful to anyone. The reorganization of village squares to inaugurate the
appointment of a new village akim that was described above is but one example. Here local
officials’ work in Kazakhstan fails to be recognized as such by ordinary people because it does
not address what they perceive to be problems. Even though planting new flowers and
beautifying public space is probably intended to solicit the good will of local residents, it tends to
be viewed as a waste of time and resources, or simply self-indulgent. Zhangeldy Shimshikov,
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the director of the Center for Social-Economic Research, a subdivision within the Ministry of
Education and Science, puts it accordingly:
People [in a village] might demand that local officials start to clean up the roads and take away manure, but
they cannot just do this, and if they do it will hurt their reputation in the eyes of the government. Other
officials at the higher levels will not be satisfied by this work. They have to do as they’re told. So if
they’re told to water all of the plants when it’s raining, that is what they will be doing. Then, the people
will see them and ask “why are you watering the plants if it’s raining” and the akim can only say “this is
what I was told to do.” If you want to understand the work of local officials you have to remember the
vertical power relationships in the country.175

Indeed, I stress that the social relations that matter most to village akims in Kazakhstan in
the course of doing their jobs are those they have with their superiors at higher levels of state
administration, not with the local population. The everyday practice of village governance
institutionalizes a barrier between the local population and local authorities that both parallels
and reinforces the social disconnect between them. Their station at the bottom of a hierarchical
system, in which they answer only upward to those who hire and fire them, “causes their
independence from the demands of citizens and the inhabitants” of the village (Makhmutova
2004: 8.). Both because they are appointed and because they do not rely on the population for
anything, “akims do not know how or for what reason it is necessary it secure the support of the
community” (ibid.: 9).176 In the final section of this chapter I compare the work of two local
officials in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan and show how the same mundane official act—driving to
the district center—has profoundly different meanings because of the different institutional and
social contexts in which it is done.
Before moving on, however, it is crucial to note that, unlike in Kyrgyzstan, there is an
additional source of authority in Kazakhstan that the local population can turn to when their own
officials are unresponsive. The local-level work of the president’s political party, Nur Otan, has
tended to displace local officials as the main agents to whom local people can turn for help. The
175
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effect has had a tremendous impact on how ordinary people view their relationship to the state,
often seeing the central government (and the president himself) as the guarantors of local
interests, while local officials become pariahs who would be fired if only the president knew how
poorly they worked. I do not intend to suggest that ordinary people form deep social ties with
the party—which itself is an abstraction—but that the work of the party undermines any deep
social ties that might otherwise develop between the population and local state officials.
Whether this “good tsar” dynamic is the purposeful outcome of state and party
organization is not addressed here. But, it has certainly worked in the president’s favor, making
him a local hero in people’s own struggles against local officials. In the next chapter, I will
show—using both national polling data and local ethnographic data—that the ordinary people in
each state have inverse patterns of personal trust for local versus central authorities: people in
Kyrgyzstan trust their own local officials above and instead of central authorities, while those in
Kazakhstan trust the president (and his party) much more than their own local authorities. This,
as I will go on to show in chapter six, shapes how local people relate to “local” officials versus
outsiders and results in the different styles of contentious politics surrounding cadre appointment
that I described in chapter two.

Nur Otan and the Origins of the “Good Tsar” in Contemporary Kazakhstan
President Nazarbayev created Nur Otan in 1999. As one of the few full-length studies of
Nur Otan concludes, the main reason that Nazarbayev created the party was “in order to achieve
a better control of the formal sphere” of administration (Del Sordi 2012: 26). More specifically,
the president was rattled by the defection of a prominent former provincial akim and prime
minister, Akezhan Kazhegeldin in 1997-8 (Isaacs 2011: 82). I discuss this political conflict in
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more detail in chapter six; suffice it to say for now that open insubordination and confrontation
by a formal regional official prompted the president to take additional steps to control regional
cadre.
Indeed, as this section of the chapter will emphasize, Nur Otan is primarily a means of
monitoring and sanctioning the activities of appointed officials at all sub-national levels,
particularly akims. This includes deliberate strategies to limit local authorities’ interactions with
the communities that they work in, thereby undercutting the formation of local social ties. Thus,
Nur Otan reinforces and strengthens the formal administrative system of appointments.
Like the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that preceded it, Nur Otan is organized in
parallel to the state. It has a central headquarters located in the capital city and subsidiary branch
offices headquartered in each administrative center at the provincial, district, and village
levels.177 Just as the akim of each administrative level answers to the akim of the next highest
level within the state administration, the chairman of each party branch of Nur Otan answers to
the chairman of the party branch at the next highest level. When people believe that their local
akim is not solving their problems—which, as I discussed above, he often is not—people are
encouraged to go to Nur Otan, which can bring pressure to bear, often with positive results. I
will illustrate with one brief story from a village in Sairam raion, South Kazakhstan oblast,
focusing on the different roles played by Nur Otan and the local akim in relationship to the local
population.178
Here the provincial governor, in conjunction with district level officials, had dispatched
inspectors and engineers to the village and determined that the underground gas lines needed to
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be replaced. In fact, people had been heating their homes with coal for several years. The
provincial governor released funds to the village-level akim, who was tasked with issuing a
tender and finding a contractor to do the work.
It became immediately apparent to inhabitants of the village, however, that the person
who won the tender was not qualified to do the job. The pipes that he brought to the site were
old and rusty, and he worked with a crew of unskilled laborers who had no machinery. The crew
proceeded to spend several weeks digging holes to find broken underground pipes. The
contractor and all of his crew had come from Shymkent city and were not known by any of the
residents. Because the akim was not a local person, but himself from Shymkent, rumors quickly
spread that the contractor was a personal friend of his, and that he won the tender only because
they had secretly agreed to a kickback scheme.179 As one informant told me, “this is common—
the akim doesn’t want to find the best qualified person. He just wants to find someone who will
pay him the biggest share of the tender.” In this case, it was believed that the akim had pocketed
half of the money that had been provided for the project. This cannot be verified. But, the fact
that nearly everyone in the village believed it to be true demonstrates their frustration with a
process from which they were completely excluded, and the perception that the local akim works
only with and for his superiors and friends—not with or for the local population.180
If the contractor had succeeded in rebuilding the gas pipes, then villagers’ anger might
have remained latent. But, concerns over corruption and shoddy work were justified when after
six months of work the project remained incomplete. Winter came, but many people did not
provision themselves with coal as they ordinarily would have because they used their scarce
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resources for other things, having anticipated gas heat. People complained to the akim in person,
and he did nothing. So several villagers gathered together and went to Zhomart, a forty-year old
man who was regarded as one of the most educated the village. They asked Zhomart if he would
write a formal letter to the akim, demanding to know when the gas would be working.
The akim responded promptly to the letter. In his response to Zhomart, the akim claimed
that he had already confronted the contractor many times and threatened to refer him to the state
prosecutor if the project was not finished. But, nobody believed that the akim would call the
prosecutor for a problem in which he himself was complicit. The fact that he had not already
done so was evidence enough that he never intended to. So, the problem continued for several
more months. Eventually, the work came to a complete stop, leaving villagers convinced that the
contractor had simply run out of money and that the project would never be completed. In total,
more than a year passed after the project was first initiated.
Finally, Zhomart collaborated with other villagers to write a letter to Nur Otan, at the
district-level branch. The letter documented the costs of the project, the amount of time that had
elapsed, the old and rusty pipes, the shoddy workmanship, and the prior correspondence with the
akim, noting his reluctance to take action and his unwillingness to confront the contractor. Nur
Otan responded to the letter immediately. Within days they sent investigators to the village and
determined that the complaints were justified. They referred the case to the prosecutor (also a
party member) and the contractor was told that he had ten days to complete the project or face
prosecution.
The contractor and his workers came to Zhomart’s house, demanding that he withdraw
the complaint. There were seven men in total, all carrying shovels, implicitly threatening
violence. But, since Nur Otan had already been informed of the situation, he decided that he
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could safely refuse the men, which he did. Ultimately, they went back to work, completing the
project in one month, probably at their own expense. Today the village has gas heat, though
everyone is certain that the rusty pipes will probably break again soon, and they will have to go
through the entire process again. As Zhomart summarized the whole experience, “it was only
because of Nur Otan that we have gas. They did everything. The akim was corrupt and the
contractor was his friend, so he was never going to do anything about it. If the central
government did everything itself, we would not have all of these problems.”181
Indeed, this story encapsulates a broader political dynamic that expresses the different
kinds of relationships people have with Nur Otan in comparison to their own state officials. Nur
Otan is understood to represent local interests and help people with their problems while local
state authorities (akims) are frequently viewed as corrupt, working only for themselves. As a
woman in Sairam district put it, “Nur Otan will take the side of the people and fight for the
people’s needs and interests. The akimat is for taking care of official state business, but Nur
Otan is there to solve the problems of the people.”182 Countless residents from villages
throughout South Kazakhstan and Akmola oblasts described making regular visits to Nur Otan
party offices seeking solutions to problems that local officials would not address; many
recounted that they and others they knew would wait in long lines in order to do so, seeing this as
the best possible way to address local problems.
During the May 9 Victory Day celebration in Aksukent—the district-center of Sairam—
droves of teenagers and young adults arrived wearing Nur Otan hats and t-shirts, all gifts from
the party. One man in his early twenties described this as a social movement.
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This is the Nur Otan movement. The young people raise questions about the conditions where they live and
they bring these issues to the party’s attention. The party supports this and encourages people to make
suggestions and propose ideas. I personally want to start one of these [party] groups in my district…we
still don’t have paved roads or a sewage system [kanalizatsiia]. Why don’t we have this? It’s a shame to
live under such conditions. We wrote letters to the local akimat, and we also wrote letters to the president’s
administration and to Nur Otan. Only Nur Otan responded and they promised to come and look at the
situation and start working on it.183

As this testimony suggests, the party itself actively supports and encourages this kind of
local mobilization. In fact, Nur Otan does not function so much as a political party—focused on
mobilizing, organizing, and interacting with its own members—as a public institution, open to
everyone. Sometimes it stands above (and even against) actual public servants. Stanislav
Kankurov, the Deputy Chairman of the Nur Otan party branch in Almaty city, put it accordingly:
“Why do people think that Nur Otan is so influential and effective? Because we position
ourselves as a communication hub between the people and the government, the population and
the executive. It is one of the party’s aims, to achieve this communication.”184
Indeed, according to the party’s official doctrine, which outlines “new principles of
interaction” between state and society, the party seeks “to reshape a completely new character in
the relations between citizens and the state.”185 And, in recent years the party has sold itself
based on the concept of “public reception” (obshchestvennaya priemnaya)—the idea that the
party has an open door and is there to field public complaints. It is, in short, establishing itself as
a public ombudsman. The party recently launched an “E-party” project, which allows people to
communicate directly with the party through online interfaces. Visitors to Nur Otan’s website,
for example, will notice a prominent link in the center of the homepage for “public reception,”
where one can file an appeal directly to the party, make an appointment to meet with a party
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representative in their area, submit questions “about vital problems,” or become full-fledged
party members.186
Likewise, a party member and akimat employee in Shymkent city notes that Nur Otan
organizes weekly meetings with citizens—zasedanie po obrashcheniyu grazhdan—where
anyone can come and report problems.187 Sometimes the party requires different state officials
to attend these meetings and answer questions. Nur Otan, she says, “will solve problems right
there, when they arise during these meetings. The function of Nur Otan is to defend people’s
interests and protect the population.” The party also holds regular Open House meetings (Den
Otkrytie Dveri), sometimes as frequently as once a week. Each meeting is open to the public and
devoted to a single public issue. The relevant state officials are required to attend and answer
questions. In both of these examples, the president’s party provides the only link between
ordinary people and members of the state administration. And, it does so in such a way that puts
state officials on the defensive while the party positions itself on the side of the citizenry.
Importantly, one of the most significant elements of Nur Otan’s public personae is that it
is President Nazarbayev’s political party, and widely viewed as a direct channel to the president
himself (Isaacs 2011: 45). Summarizing a sentiment that was expressed in different ways by
countless informants, and implied by much of the party’s own literature, one former local official
put it simply: “Nur Otan – this is the president.”188 Because the party stands for the president,
and because it has made public outreach a key priority, people have come to see it as the best
avenue for action when their own local officials are not responsive. The editor of a small
newspaper in Sairam attributed Nur Otan’s popularity to “the enthusiastic and energetic
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personality of Nazarbayev.”189 Even a maslikhat deputy noted that people prefer to interact
with Nur Otan instead of local officials because it is “more scrupulous, more thorough…and, I
would not be mistaken to say that it is even more soulful [bolee dushevnyi].”190
But, akims at different levels of state administration are themselves members of Nur
Otan. In 2007, a ban was lifted that formally prohibited state employees from joining political
parties, at which time “the country’s Akims rushed to join Nur Otan […] out of loyalty,” though
this merely “made legitimate what was already informally apparent” (Isaacs 2011: 82). In other
words, the administrative relationship between local and regional officials and the party is very
close. Moreover, akims typically serve as chairmen of the party branch corresponding to the
administrative territory where they are appointed as akim. This means that the party and
government are fused together, at least according to their formal organization. How, then, can
the party discipline the akim and why would any akim, in his role as party chairman, take action
against the akimat that he or she has been appointed to run?
In fact, the party chairman is merely a figurehead. Party insiders and state officials report
in private that—like the Communist Party before it—the real locus of authority in any subnational party branch is the deputy chairman. That is, the deputy chairman is formally
subordinate to the chairman, but informally the boss of the corresponding party apparatus. This
is because the deputy chairman is directly appointed from party headquarters in Astana and is not
responsible to the chairman of the same party branch. To the contrary, one of the deputy
chairman’s ostensible purposes is to keep Astana informed about the work of the chairman, who
is also the corresponding akim. This, again, speaks to the administrative functions of the party,
helping the president maintain more control over his appointed akims at subnational levels.
189
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In addition, Nur Otan still has to win elections while the akims themselves do not. As
Hale reminds us, the national elites of post-Soviet countries are regularly engaged in “impression
management.” They rely heavily on public opinion to bolster perceptions of their invincibility,
and to shape expectations about the stability of their tenure (Hale 2015: 73-76). By disciplining
(or appearing to discipline) corrupt local officials, Nur Otan simultaneously solves public
problems and bolsters its reputation for honesty and efficiency. In 2008, the party initiated a
nationwide anti-corruption campaign. At the local level, campaigns like this make Nur Otan’s
activities highly visible, “ensures greater recognition with citizens,” and “adds to the perception
that the party is working on behalf of the president, who is working on behalf of all the people in
Kazakhstan” (Isaacs 2011: 148). By creating a responsive avenue to address local problems, Nur
Otan provides people with at least some tangible benefit, even if it is, ironically, used against the
party’s own members and the very state administrators who are supposed to provide public
goods.
The key result, as Zhangeldy Shimshikov noted, is that “Nur Otan brings some authority
to people and creates a resemblance of people’s power.”191 This also fits with a broader style of
governmentality that others have described. Nazarbayev has worked to build a relationship with
the population based on “beneficence and efficiency,” seeing its main task as “facilitating the
exchanges that will meet [people’s] needs and desires by providing incentive and corrections to
problems that crop up in the system” (Adams and Rustemova 2009: 1251). In comparison to
Karimov’s “paternalistic governmentality” in Uzbekistan, the predominant style of state-society
relations in Kazakhstan is described as “managerial governmentality” (ibid.).

191

Director of the Center for Social-Economic Research under the Ministry of Education and Science, Astana.
Interview with author, July 23, 2014.

166

Whether intentional or not, the party and government are fused together in a way that
allows the president to take credit for local accomplishments while simultaneously putting him in
the position to visibly punish insubordination. The perception is that when local problems
persist, it is because local officials are corrupt, acting against the will of the president; when local
problems are solved, it is because local officials are loyal to the president and do as he intended.
This is the classic “good tsar” phenomenon, the effects of which I discuss in the next chapter.
Importantly, then, the president’s party reinforces the same local social dynamics fostered by
institutions of local government.
I do not mean to suggest that ordinary people in Kazakhstan form personalistic social ties
to Nur Otan. For as much as Nur Otan is a proxy for the president, it is still a distant and
abstract one. I only mean to suggest that the work of the party, intentionally or not, undercuts
the kinds of social ties people might otherwise develop with their own local officials, all other
mitigating factors considered. The key result is that people form relationships to the state
differently than they do in Kyrgyzstan. As I will describe in detail in the next chapter, ordinary
people in each state inversely describe how they value the work of central versus local
government and also describe different levels of trust for local officials versus officials in the
central government, all of which is corroborated by national-level polling data.

IV. A Comparative Study of Social Ties and Local Government in Two Villages
The purpose of this section is to provide in-depth accounts of the varying relationships
and processes of village governance that I described above. It is divided into two sections, each
based around an ethnographic study of one village in each state. I discuss the socio-territorial
origins of two local officials and the ways in which they interact with the local community
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during the process of everyday governance. Aside from the names of the provinces (oblasts), all
proper nouns used here have been altered to protect the identity of informants. The names of the
villages themselves—Mountain village and North village—are entirely fictional.
The village-level data presented throughout this chapter are drawn from a series of other
villages in different regions, as noted in the text. Thus, this section serves to reinforce the
patterns presented above, though it does so in finer-grained detail. Unlike the data presented
above, though, which come from villages of varying sizes, with both small and large populations,
that are ethnically homogenous or ethnically mixed, and that are either relatively rich or poor, the
village studies presented here are better controlled for comparison. Both villages are relatively
small, with populations of between five to eight thousand people. And, both are relatively
remote and relatively poor, two factors that tend to go together in both states. This is important
because the rich social ties between local officials and communities that I describe in
Kyrgyzstan, which might intuitively be attributed to the smallness of the village, do not exist in
villages of the same size in Kazakhstan. Overall, this section can be read both as a paired
comparison of two villages, and also as two case studies that exemplify the contrasting patterns
described throughout this chapter, only in greater detail. In the final section, I provide some
further caveats on the substance of this section and the chapter as a whole.

Nurlan baike, Naryn oblast, Kyrgyzstan
The ayil okmotu of Mountain village is Nurlan baike. Nurlan is a lifelong inhabitant of
the village, which is located in a fairly remote and mountainous region of Naryn province. He
was born here and raised by his aunt, who lived and worked here all of her life, when it was a
collective farm. Now in her nineties, she continues to live with Nurlan and his wife, Meerim.
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Nurlan’s biological parents live next door with his youngest brother, Azamat, his wife, and their
three young children. His two younger brothers, Kanbolot and Talant, also live in the village
with their wives and children, as does his younger sister, Jyldyz. Nurlan’s wife and Kanbolot’s
wife are from neighboring villages, all within the same small district that is linked together by a
single, partially paved road. Nurlan’s four children are young adults who now live in Bishkek
and come back to the village at different times in the year to help with the family’s small
household farm.
Nurlan started his career as a teacher in the local school. He went on to become the
school principal, and then the school director, a position he held until he was elected as ayil
okmotu in 2005. His first term ended in 2009, at which time he was re-elected, this time
indirectly, by the local council, in accordance with the new electoral laws that were established
in 2008.192
When I first visited Mountain village, in June and July of 2013, nearly every household
was engaged in haymaking, creating fodder for the coming winter. But, among the nearly 7,000
inhabitants, only one person owned a fully functioning tractor. A lack of working farm
machinery was one of the biggest challenges faced by ordinary people throughout the region, and
the state programs for making machinery more accessible—which I discuss below—were hardly
adequate. Most people had to rely on their direct acquaintances for assistance in working their
fields. Many people went to Nurlan both because he was the public official most responsible for
providing this help, and also because he could actually provide it. The most reliable tractor in
the village was owned by Nurlan’s close friend, Turar. Nurlan and Turar described each other as
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relatives (rodstvenniki), but they were not, in fact, direct kin. Nurlan was more than ten years
older than Turar, but their fathers were close friends and the men had known each other their
entire lives.
Nurlan utilized his ties to Turar and routinely brokered arrangements with other villagers
who desperately needed help cutting and collecting grass. Turar not only provided his
machinery at Nurlan’s request, but often volunteered his labor as well. Nurlan called on Turar to
do this not only for other villagers, but for the municipal land in the village itself, which
produced fodder that Nurlan could dole out as he saw fit, to both his direct acquaintances and,
more broadly and generously, to those who were very poor and in need of help.
Nurlan called on Turar for his assistance on a nearly daily basis, usually for reasons
related to his tractor, but also sometimes because he owned a fairly reliable “mountain car.”193
In one instance, Turar was interrupted from his work early in the morning because Nurlan
needed Turar to drive him to the summer pasture, which was nearly three hours away on
unpaved mountain roads. Nurlan had promised to bring some staple food products—vegetables
and flour—to a close friend, Manas (also described as a “relative”). Manas was grazing animals
in the mountain pastures for the entire summer, without access to any products not derived
directly from the animals themselves.
Manas was not only a lifelong friend of Nurlan’s (and a close acquaintance of Turar’s),
he was also Nurlan’s shepherd and looked after his modest holding of ten horses and nearly
twenty sheep, which were among the hundreds put under his care by others in the community.
Manas was relatively poor and Nurlan both paid him for his services and regularly brought him
gifts, the giving of which was the ostensible purpose of this trip. But, Manas may have given
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more than he received in this instance, slaughtering a sheep to provide a meal for his guests. He
also provided bottomless servings of kymys (fermented mare’s milk), which was produced
through his wife’s labor, but using milk from the horses that were in their care, including
Nurlan’s. We ate with Manas’ family—his wife and five children—and with another shepherd
and his wife, who were invited by Manas and also known personally by Nurlan and Turar.
The purpose of the trip, it turned out, was not only to visit Manas and provide him with
goods, but also to visit other shepherds on the pasture, all of whom Nurlan described as
“relatives.” He gifted each of them with a large bag of tomatoes, which he had purchased at the
bazaar with his own money. It turned out that most of these shepherds also watched over a token
number of Nurlan’s animals. Nurlan had nearly 30 horses and 100 sheep in total, which he
divided among these different shepherds, who were also his friends and co-villagers. The social
ties between Nurlan and these shepherds, then, were simultaneously economic and social. But,
as the ayil okmotu of the village in which all of these men lived with their families, their ties
were political as well. Moreover, Nurlan was a member of the pasture committee, which
governs the pasture union that every shepherd in the community belongs to. This created yet
another link tying all of these individuals together. In this way the institutions of local
government—the ayil okmotu and the pasture community—reinforced and duplicated Nurlan’s
personalistic social ties with his co-villagers.
We stayed in the mountains for the night, sleeping in one of Manas’ two yurts. We drove
back to the village early in the morning, at which point Turar immediately headed off to finish
the work that Nurlan had interrupted him from the previous morning. He still had a lot of grass
to cut.
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Why was Turar so quick to help Nurlan? He endlessly volunteered his own time and
labor, answering all of Nurlan’s requests, and he did so willingly, without complaint, or at least
appeared to. Admittedly, visible appearances can be deceptive, most of all to the foreign (and
admittedly novice) researcher. In all likelihood, Turar must have sometimes experienced
resentment and bitterness at Nurlan, even if he could not express this openly.
There were many factors animating this relationship that were not easy to disentangle.
First, Nurlan was a close lifelong friend of Turar and his family, and he was also older than
Turar, which placed him in a position of authority independent of his role as a public official. In
their personal and inter-family relationships alone these men did not have equal status, which
made it virtually impossible for Turar to willfully refuse a request made by Nurlan. To do so
would have been highly disrespectful and almost confrontational. Nurlan’s role as ayil okmotu
both duplicated and bolstered the high levels of personal authority he already had in relationship
with Turar, and with others in the village like him. Thus, there was a coercive element to these
relations, even if only an implicit one stemming from unequal status.
But, it was not coercion alone. This was a deeply affective personal relationship that
encompassed a lifetime of interaction, close family histories, innumerable mutual acquaintances,
and patron-client exchanges. These ties produced reciprocal obligations that were diffuse and
subject to moral sanctioning by the larger community. Nurlan could call on Turar for help, but
he also had an obligation to provide things in return. That is to say, Turar did not endlessly give
things to Nurlan, but also received things from him (work and cash, for example). Reciprocity
was at the core of this relationship, which, in the classic literature on clientelism is precisely
what distinguishes patron-client ties from other kinds of relationships between unequal partners,
like explicit coercion, formal authority, or manipulation (Powell 1977: 142). Powell’s abstract
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description of clientelism aptly describes the relations between Nurlan and Turar, who was but
one of Nurlan’s “clients”:
In a typical transaction, the low-status actor (client) will receive material goods and services intended to
reduce or ameliorate his environmental threats; while the higher status actor (patron) receives less tangible
rewards such as personal services, indications of esteem, deference or loyalty, or services of a discretely
political nature such as voting (Ibid.).

Turar’s most notable benefit was that Nurlan sometimes provided him with paying work,
enabling him to generate a cash income in an economic setting with very few opportunities to do
so. When Nurlan called on Turar to provide his tractor and labor, it was usually for free, but
sometimes it paid. This is because Nurlan used his social ties to other members of the local state
administration—at the district-level—to broker relationships between Nurlan and farmers in
neighboring villages, who would then rent Turar’s tractor, and sometimes his labor.
Among Nurlan’s many acquaintances in the state administration was the then-serving
head of the Ministry of Agriculture at the district level, Marat, who himself had previously been
the ayil okmotu of a neighboring village. Nurlan and Marat had known each other since
childhood, and, as ayil okmotu of a neighboring village, regarded one another as friends and
colleagues. One of Marat’s official responsibilities in the ministry was the administration of a
state program designed to make farm machinery more accessible to rural inhabitants by
providing leases and subsidized loans for their purchase. Though the machinery was badly
needed by local residents, the Ministry of Agriculture required 30% of the lease payment in
advance. By Marat’s own estimation, based on his experience as a lifelong inhabitant of the
region and the former ayil okmotu of his own village, this was entirely unaffordable. “This isn’t
possible. I don’t know what they are thinking about. Maybe if people could pay 10% instead of
30%, it would be a useful program and people could use the machines to work.”194 The result is
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that Marat rarely tried to direct people toward these leases, even though it was his job to do so.
When farmers came to him with an interest in the tractor lease program, he frequently connected
them with tractor owners in the area who were willing to lease their own machines for a much
more reasonable fee. This included Turar, who was connected to Marat through Nurlan.195
Notably, Marat’s social ties to his own village ran deep and sometimes his personal
priorities competed with his official state obligations. In addition to Turar, two other tractor
owners in his own village were the beneficiaries of Marat’s placement in the ministry, receiving
work through their personal connections to him. Tellingly, the wall of Marat’s office was
decorated with only two things—an official seal of the Kyrgyz Republic and a calendar titled
“Red Moon Father,” each month of which featured the image of an historical figure from Red
Moon village, where Marat had lived his whole life.
Turar was hardly the only villager who benefited from his ties to Nurlan. As I described
above, Nurlan also provided scarce goods to shepherds (who were also his friends and relatives)
on distant summer pastures. In addition, on a nearly daily basis, he did favors—both big and
small—for ordinary people in the village who had varying degrees of connections to him
personally. While I have focused on only a few relationships for the purposes of in-depth
discussion, it needs to be noted that Nurlan personally knew every person he came into contact
with on a daily basis, calling them by name, exchanging handshakes and hugs, along with other
pleasantries. Whether walking or in his car, Nurlan stopped to talk with every person he
encountered and did so with great joy and enthusiasm.
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On one occasion, Nurlan spent an entire day helping a neighbor repair part of his roof.
Along with his brother-in-law, he helped an older woman deepen an irrigation ditch on her land
because she complained to him that her field was too dry. When a respected village elder came
to Nurlan to complain that that he had no electricity, Nurlan immediately offered to drive him to
the district-center—about 40 minutes away on poorly paved roads—to see if they could arrange
the necessary meetings at the district-level state offices.
Driving to the district center was something that Nurlan did on a semi-regular basis, but
he never did it alone. Invariably, his car would be overfilled with people who needed to be
dropped off in a different village along the way, or others who needed Nurlan’s assistance in
gaining access to other state officials. The district center also had innumerable small shops and
an open-air bazaar. Sometimes Nurlan took along neighbors just so that they could go shopping
for the basic goods that they could not get in the village. When I discuss the work of the village
akim in Kazakhstan, I describe how this same mundane act—driving to the district center—takes
on an entirely different meaning and function that result from the differing institutional and
social contexts of local governance.
People came to Nurlan with problems—big and small—at all times of the day, whether
he was at home or at the office. The irrelevance of the distinction between his public and private
dwellings (his office versus his home) mirrored those between his obligations as a public official
and those of personal acquaintance. Whatever the case, it must be stressed that Nurlan viewed
his responsibilities to provide this help and assistance as obligatory. Turning down requests for
help was not something he could do lightly. As evidence of this, he sometimes avoided people
so that he could preclude them from asking for favors that he could not refuse. For instance, he
frequently parked his car behind his sister’s house so that nobody could see when he was home.
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When his car was parked in front of his own house, it beckoned an interminable line of villagers
who were in need of some kind of help.
Aside from a scarcity of machinery used for producing fodder, another major
longstanding village problem was that wolves would frequently descend from the mountains to
prey on household livestock. Livestock in rural Kyrgyzstan are both the foundation of household
economies, and also one of the most reliable ways of storing wealth. Nearly everyone, rich and
poor alike, keeps some number of chickens, turkeys, cows, and sometimes horses and sheep on
their household plots year-round. When wolves prey on these animals, they threaten the
lifeblood of household subsistence.
The official state-sanctioned method for addressing this problem was to hire licensed
hunters. The hunters must be paid with village funds and also, for logistical reasons, be provided
with food and lodging. Since there were no licensed hunters in the village itself, hiring licensed
hunters would require that Nurlan spend scarce village resources to pay complete strangers. He
complained that professional hunters were only motivated to get paid and had no genuine interest
in helping people to protect their livestock.
Moreover, Nurlan himself was already part of a longstanding local hunting circle, even if
not an officially licensed one. In October and November each year, he rode into the mountains
with a group of acquaintances from the village to hunt Marco Polo sheep. Even though none of
these hunters were licensed to use guns or hunt wolves, and none were (officially) paid to do so,
Nurlan resolved to transform this hunting group into a quasi-public service.196 Among the
members of this informal outfit was Manas, Nurlan’s close friend and shepherd, Nurlan’s
brothers, and his brother-in-law, who summarized the logic succinctly: “Why pay? We can do it
196
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final section of the chapter.
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ourselves!”197 Several other men from the village were also involved. Importantly, the hunting
outfit did not hunt wolves willy-nilly, but responded directly to local reports of attacks on
livestock. When reported attacks became more frequent or widespread, local people would
complain directly to the ayil okmotu, who then mobilized his own personal acquaintances to
solve the problem.
In other instances, Nurlan called on a wider group of people for assistance with village
problems. The abstract example of fixing a road that I have already referenced above was
adopted mainly from what I learned here. All of the village roads were bumpy dirt paths that
periodically developed large holes, rendering normal driving impossible. As in countless other
villages in Kyrgyzstan, driving on these roads calls for the slowest possible speeds in
meandering S-shaped loops. The most important of these roads connects the village to the main
road of the district, which connects all of the villages in the district together. Even though this
main district road is only about two kilometers from the village center, it can take a full ten
minutes to reach it when the village roads are torn up, and even longer in heavy rain or snow.
On a semi-regular basis, when the condition of the main village road became particularly
bad, Nurlan would organize a crew of volunteers to repair it. As Nurlan said, “even when there
is no money, we have to fix the road and so we have to do it ourselves.” This, Nurlan
acknowledged, required great finesse and interpersonal skills on his part. “The effectiveness of
the ayil okmotu depends on how well they know people, and how they get along with
people…you have to be very flexible and work with everyone.”198 The village would never have
the money or resources to pave the road, so the main activity consisted of moving rocks and dirt.
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Younger men would move large rocks into the biggest holes, filling the space, which would then
be covered by shoveling mounds of dirt on top. Nurlan himself participated in the work.
Even when securing the services of private companies for the village, Nurlan’s role was
central, both in brokering outside assistance and using his local social connections to facilitate
their work from inside the village itself. In 2007, for example, Nurlan baike appealed directly to
two of the major telecommunications companies in the country, MegaCom and Beeline, to
provide cellular service within range of the village. He convinced them to do so, but had to
provide money, food, housing, and labor from the village. As he recounted:
These mobile companies did not realize that we had so many people who would start using their services,
but I told them how many we had. In order to agree, we had to provide the company workers with housing
and food—many lived in my house and in my brother’s house. And we also had to provide a lot of local
people who helped to carry dirt and brought and removed other materials from the construction site … the
company themselves brought the major equipment and other workers.199

Today, two towers stand on a hill just outside the village and nearly every villager uses a
cell phone. Even though this is not a public good, strictly speaking, everyone credits Nurlan
(and not, for example, the telecom companies) for providing it. Nurlan’s tenure marked a
moment in time when one aspect of village life changed in a memorable and beneficial way. He
appeared to do what others could not. But, in order to do so, he called on a wide array of people
in the village for the necessary assistance, a fact that was also prominent in people’s minds. An
elder woman, echoing what countless others described in villages throughout Kyrgyzstan, and in
Bishkek itself, “the ayil okmotu relies on everyone else.”200
To be sure, these are all modest accomplishments. But, they were accomplished with few
resources and against great odds, and without any help from the central government, a fact that
Nurlan took pride in and never failed to remind people of. Most important of all, he helped to
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solve concrete problems that people themselves brought to him. In order to do so, he relied
heavily on his own network of already-existing social relationships and exchanges of goods and
services with innumerable people that were diffuse, non-quantifiable, and crossed boundaries
between the public and private realms.

Galym, Akmola oblast, Kazakhstan
Galym is the akim of North village, Akmola oblast. He is a young man for his position,
appearing to be in his mid-thirties. He has a wife and three school-aged children. His children
live in the village only during the summer so that they can attend school in Astana, about three to
four hours away by car. Like Nurlan baike in Kyrgyzstan, Galym was born in the village that he
now governs, but his ties to the village run less deep. For one thing, Galym’s father was a
district-level akim in two different districts within the province, neither of which is the one in
which North village is located. Galym might have been born in North village, but he grew up in
multiple other localities. Then, as a young adult, he attended university in Almaty—then the
state capital, several hundred miles away. At university, Galym studied government
administration. Upon graduating, he got a job at the district akimat in the district where his
present village is located. He worked in the district administration for six years before he was
appointed to become the akim of North village, where he has worked for the last two years (as of
summer, 2014). In fact, until he was appointed as the village akim, Galym lived in the district
center, not in the village itself. That means that at the time of my visit, in June and July of 2014,
Galym had only been a full-time resident of this village for two years.
It should be immediately clear that Galym’s career trajectory is dramatically different
than Nurlan’s and his position as akim—a position to which he was appointed, not elected—and
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was likely achieved through the social ties he had to higher-level state elites, not to villagers
themselves.201 These could be ties formed through his father, friends in Almaty, or his
relationships with members of the district administration, where he worked for six years. In all
likelihood, this network of acquaintances was intertwined, such that they were all related to each
other. It is not farfetched to assume that he only attended the university he did and secured a job
with the district akim because of who his father was. Whatever the case, one thing was clear:
Galym’s whole social circle flowed through the state itself. As he put it, “my work has always
been connected to the state.”202
This does not mean that Galym lacked any ties to the village at all, only that these ties
were less personalized and more distant and dormant. He did have at least two direct relatives
there—both cousins—and possibly others. He also had a small budget at his disposal to hire
local people as “helpers.” No doubt, this small group of about six people—each supposed to
represent a household in which no one was employed—was dependent on the akim for this
modest income. But, to the extent that these were patron-client relations at all, they were onedimensional and limited to a simple contractual agreement: work for pay.203 In fact, the akim
rarely called on these workers for help of any kind. This is at least partly because the process of
village governance did not require it. On most days, the group of helpers sat dormant in the halls
of his office. Sometimes they swept and cleaned the grounds outside. The fact that Galym
rarely asked more of them was not because of a lack of tasks that needed doing, but because
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there was not more that he considered himself to be responsible for. Indeed, everyday local
governance did little to activate or strengthen the social ties that did exist.
Among the many things that village residents complained about, for example, was the
condition of the main park. Soviet-era flower beds were full of untamed plants and trees;
dilapidated benches were obscured by chest-high grasses and bushes; vestiges of dirt paths were
no longer traversable and barely still visible; and trash was strewn everywhere. It was hardly a
park at all. Rather, it was a patch of wooded land in the center of the village where a park used
to be. In the memories of village inhabitants, this was a well-maintained public space. Now it
cannot be used by anyone. In the third section of this chapter I described one villager who
pointed to a tree that had fallen in this park, across its only remaining footpath, and complained
that the akim had never bothered to address it.
Though maintaining the park was a task easily within Galym’s means—a task that even
his helpers could do—it still was never addressed and became a symbol of his disinterest in local
problems. Though people had more pressing concerns, nearly everyone complained about the
condition of the park. It summarized how nonresponsive Galym was to the problems of the
locality in general and reflected a broader dynamic.
In fact, in many instances Galym excused himself from solving certain problems at
villagers’ behest by claiming that it was not his responsibility to do so. In one instance, a village
resident’s dog attacked and killed two sheep that were under the care of a part-time shepherd,
Arman. Arman recognized the dog, went directly to its owner, explained what had happened,
and demanded compensation. When the dog’s owner refused, Arman went to the sheep’s owner.
Together they went to Galym so that the owner of the dog could be held accountable and the
owner of the sheep could be compensated for his loss. For several days, Galym was nowhere to
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be found, and when they finally secured the meeting, he blithely extricated himself from the
problem. This is how Arman described what happened:
The akim just said “there’s nothing I can do,” so I asked him, “What do you mean there’s nothing you can
do? You need to act according to the laws.” But he looked at me and said that there were no such laws.
You can see he is not able to do anything. In general he does nothing. He’s weak.

In another instance, a woman complained that a neighbor allowed his pigs to run loose
and that they were ruining peoples’ gardens. According to the law, she claimed, pigs have to be
kept in pens. But, when she complained to the akim, he declined to intervene, leading her to
believe that the pig owner must have bribed him.
At least part of this disconnect stemmed from the institutional configuration of the akim’s
position, whereby he was dependent on and subordinate to the akim of the district-level who had
appointed him. Galym never consulted with local people about what problems to address and
rarely had to work directly with anyone in the village for any reason at all. He had only one real
constituent and that person did not live in the village or know its problems. In fact, because
Galym was rarely in a position to provide help from those who asked for it, he considered his
few personal acquaintances to be especially burdensome. Sometimes people expected him to do
things for them because he knew their parents or grandparents, but he always had to turn them
away, having to explain that it was not his job. When recounting how acquaintances would
approach him for help, he seemed genuinely conflicted by the fact that he could not always help
them. Describing the ways in which he could offer help, he used only the first person plural,
making it clear that he did not act alone, but was merely part of a larger apparatus: “We help
them as we can. We are trying … but there are only so many things we can do.”204
The “we” in this sentence refers most concretely to Galym’s close working relationship
with the district-level akim. At the time of my visit, in June and July (2014), the main project
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that occupied Galym’s time was his work on the state program to provide clean drinking water
throughout Kazakhstan, “Su Arnasy.”205 Galym’s main task in this endeavor, as he described it,
was to “prepare all of the necessary documents” so that money could be provisioned from the
district budget to pay for the construction of water pipes and other infrastructure
(vodoprovod).206 To do so he works closely with the district-level akim, meeting with him on an
almost daily basis. Though no funding had yet been approved, Galym was optimistic that the
project could begin by the end of the year.
The scarcity of running water was among the most consistent complaints of village
residents, and many relied on river water for watering crops and animals and for washing
clothes. One elderly woman complained, “Of all the things, there is no water. Write that down.
You’re lucky if you live close to the river, but over there,” she said, pointing across town, “there
is no water at all.”207 Another woman complained that the spigot in her home let out water in
small drops. “How can people live the whole summer with no water?”208 Tellingly, though,
nobody was aware (or believed) that the local government was doing anything to address this
problem. All of the work that was being done—if it actually was being done at all—was done
behind closed doors, out of sight from ordinary people. When expressing doubts about the
prospects for running water in the future, one young man complained, “the officials just work to
fill their own pockets.”
Whether Galym was genuinely working toward solving this problem with the districtlevel akim cannot be determined here. What is clear is that whatever work he did remained
205
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invisible to everyone. In fact, most of his work took place in the district center, not in the village
itself. And this was something that people could see with their own eyes since the presence or
absence of his car at the village akimat was easily observed. Indeed, people frequently
complained that Galym was never in his office. Even though his trips to the center were
ostensibly related to his work obligations, villagers tended to interpret it as a form of laziness,
self-indulgence, and disconnection from them and their problems.
One part-time shepherd, for example, echoing a complaint that was widespread,
described how Galym was rarely in the village because he “drives around all day and is always
going to Centerville,” the district center. He went on to complain that “he gets paid no matter
what he does” so it was not necessary for him to spend any time in the village itself. Unlike the
village, the district center has stores, an outdoor bazaar with a variety of goods and foodstuffs,
cafes, bars, restaurants, and many other things. The complaint that the akim was “always going”
there is not only a gripe about absenteeism; it also insinuates that the akim has a privileged
lifestyle and is enjoying benefits that ordinary villagers do not have access to.
To Galym, though, frequent trips to the district center—where he had lived and worked
for the six years subsequent to this appointment—were an essential and unavoidable part of his
job. From his perspective he was not “driving around,” but “working.” The district center is
where he goes for regular meetings, and, ironically, the only place where he can truly make a
difference in the village, by winning his superiors’ trust, approval, and money. That is to say,
village governance in Kazakhstan does not actually happen in the village; it happens at higher
levels of administration. Absenteeism, in this light, is not a moral shortcoming of a disinterested
official (though it might be that, too)—it is an institutional requirement.
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Above, I described how Nurlan baike in Kyrgyzstan also made trips by car to the district
center. Here, too, the district center was a site of innumerable basic goods and services that were
not available in the village itself. Importantly, the social and institutional context in which these
two village officials performed this activity was different, and this changed the meaning of the
activity itself. In Nurlan’s social context, which blurred the distinctions between his public and
private obligations, his trips to the district center sometimes fulfilled official duties, but they
simultaneously implied moral obligations for him to assist friends and acquaintances. As I
described above, he would routinely take an overloaded car of people with him, dropping some
off in villages along the way, and bringing others to the center with him, helping them gain
access to other officials in the district administration itself, pulling strings to arrange meetings
and solve other problems for members of his community. Others would come along simply so
they could visit the bazaar. These were all people on whom Nurlan would later call for
assistance in addressing broader village problems.
For Galym, however, trips to the district center were neither a form of leisure activity (as
it was often perceived by villagers), nor did they imply a duty or opportunity to perform favors.
Instead, he describes his trips to Centerville as a burden that he would rather avoid; a one-way
trip by car takes about thirty minutes on poorly paved roads, and the gasoline is an expense that
he has to pay himself, so he says. During the time I spent in North village, I did not see Galym
bring anyone along on this trip, or offer to do so.
When asked why it seemed to everyone that so many basic public problems were not
being addressed—the roads included—Galym explained that there were already plans to pave all
of the village roads and to fix the water pipes, and even to provide cable internet service. As he
complained, somewhat ironically, in reference to his frequent trips to the district center, “I know
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better than anyone how bad the roads are.”209 But, the plans still needed final approval at the
district and provincial levels. This, he said, could take many more months and then even longer
to be implemented, a fact that he himself bemoaned and seemed exasperated by. It is a concrete
illustration of what Kazakhstani political analysts have described in the abstract, and what I
described above:
All regional power is very closely connected with Astana. That’s why very often in our regions we have a
lot of problems, local problems, because local powers are afraid to be initiators, they are afraid to be
independent. And this is bad because akims who struggle with local problems must react quickly but they
cannot because they have to explain the problem to the center and then receive recommendations and
instructions, get financial approval. All of this takes a long time. And then, in the end, the problem might
not be solved. What does the oblast-akim know about local problems? Nothing. But it is he and not the
village officials who decide everything at the village level.210

V. Caveats and Conclusions
To the readers who might wonder if all village officials in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
are identical to Galym and Nurlan, respectively, the answer is no. One can find, in both states,
examples of local officials who are crooks and liars, and others who are hard working and
earnest. Local officials, after all, are just people. The stories I have told above should not be
taken as anecdotes about people, but as ethnographies of local government processes. What I
have attempted to document are not the personal characteristics of the officials themselves, but
how they are socially situated in the village through the process of their official work. These
processes and relationships, I argue, are generalizable because they stem from the formal
institutions of local government, which systematically vary between the two states. Galym and
Nurlan were not necessarily different kinds of people; rather, they are similar people who did
their jobs in different social contexts and with different kinds of institutional requirements and
limitations.
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Even still, the various detailed descriptions of local governance processes in Kyrgyzstan
presented above might be faulted as being too naive, idealizing local officials as selfless dogooders. Here I would like to add some more complexity. Nurlan baike, though he did work
closely with the local community to solve real problems, and did so out of a sense of personal
obligation to individual people, was not merely a selfless public servant. Although I was never
in a position to see directly any of the personal-enrichment style corruption schemes he may
have been involved in, I can testify that his financial means far exceeded his official income. He
was not a rich man, but he did own an apartment in the center of Bishkek, where his children
lived, a feat far beyond the means of the average villager or the ayil okmotu’s modest salary.211
Indeed, by all objective measures, corruption is known to be endemic at all levels in both
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and this includes direct bribery, or paying for a public service that
is being deliberately withheld from those who refuse to pay (McMann 2014; see also
Transparency International).
I do want to emphasize, however, that not all acts of corruption are the same, and that the
social context in which corruption occurs changes its meaning in significant ways. In
Kazakhstan, I described a village akim in Sairam district who allegedly hired his own friend to
repair gas lines, taking a kickback in exchange. In Kyrgyzstan, I described how Marat and
Nurlan directed those in need of farm machinery to their own clients, very likely taking a small
cut of the fee for themselves. To this we might also add that, in his prior role as school director,
Nurlan may have secured jobs for friends and relatives, perhaps in exchange for kickbacks.212
Moreover, it is possible that he used village funds to pay himself and his friends for hunting
wolves, even though he was not legally permitted to do so. In all of these cases, local officials
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utilized their official positions to perform favors for friends while potentially enriching
themselves. They are all examples of corruption.
But, still, these forms of corruption are not the same (nor are they exhaustive of the many
forms of corruption that exist). Importantly, different social contexts change the meaning and
nature of these acts and who benefits from them. The difference stems from how the officials
themselves were socially situated in the village, who their friends (and clients) were and where
they came from. The akim I described in Sairam did favors for friends, but these were friends
who did not live in the community, which meant that he benefited his friend and himself at the
expense of the local population. The favors that Nurlan and Marat delivered, though not
accessible to everyone, were directed toward the members of their own communities. If they did
enrich themselves, they did so while also benefitting their co-villagers. It was the state that was
being shortchanged. The motivations to enrich oneself and also help others are not mutually
exclusive. Nurlan, for example, was obligated to find ways of helping Turar, who was not only a
loyal client, but also a close personal friend. He was at least partly driven by duty and
obligation. In this light, as paradoxical as it might sound, securing work for Turar at the expense
of a state program could be construed as a moral act.
I suggest that we problematize the singular idea of “corruption” and think instead about
different moral economies of corruption, which derive from the different social contexts that tie
individuals together, within and across state and non-state institutions. As Humphrey notes, the
common understanding that “one cannot bribe a relative or a friend” means that “inducements
paid to such closely related people do not count as bribes but as something else” (Humphrey
2000: 217-18). In this way the very meaning of corruption hinges on whether one’s local
officials are simultaneously one’s friends and relatives. As I attempted to describe above, this is
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the core difference in state-society relations at the local level in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.
The consequent variations in moral economies of corruption can be summarized accordingly:
some ordinary people in Kyrgyzstan might still be excluded from officials’ moral obligations to
provide help and assistance, but in Kazakhstan nearly all are.
I also do not intend to suggest that the provision of public goods at the local level is better
in Kyrgyzstan than in Kazakhstan, only that the experience through which its provision occurs,
and the interactions that ordinary people have with their own state officials in providing it, are
qualitatively different. Indeed, for financial reasons alone, village-level public goods provision
is more possible in Kazakhstan, so much so that projects can withstand pilfering by public
officials and still be seen to completion. The plans for new water pipes in Akmola oblast
described above could not even be contemplated at the village-level in Kyrgyzstan, at least not
without donor support.

The Moral Economy of Local Communities in Central Asia
Finally, by focusing on the social ties between local officials and local communities
throughout this chapter, I do not intend to suggest that local communities themselves differ
substantially in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. To the contrary, the social fabric of local
communities are quite similar in both countries, consisting of social ties between and among covillagers that are deeply intertwined and overlapping. Community members participate in moral
economies that entail reciprocal obligations and diffuse exchanges of mutual help and assistance.
What produces the variation that I seek to describe in this chapter is the degree to which local
state officials themselves are socially embedded in these communities and participants in their
moral economies. My main claim is that ayil okmotu in Kyrgyzstan are more likely to be
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socially embedded members of the community than their counterparts in Kazakhstan (the village
akims).
The anthropologist David Gullette, for instance, describes localized “networks of
assistance” throughout Kyrgyzstan whereby the members of a community rely heavily on
friends, family, and other acquaintances for mutual support on a regular and ongoing basis.
Gullette notes that “accessing forms of assistance or fulfilling obligations is a significant factor
in establishing and maintaining relations” in local communities (Gullette 2010a: 101). He
describes two main forms of support that local social relationships are used for, help and
assistance. Help, according to Gullette, takes the form of diffuse obligations; it is “support that
goes beyond reciprocal or calculable exchange” and is done because one “must” do it (ibid.:
102). It is, in other words, a social obligation, compelled by duty and the threat of moral shame,
regardless of what one might get in return. Assistance, he says, has more of an emphasis on
reciprocity, yet it is a reciprocity that is not usually quantifiable or explicit. “The kinds of
material reciprocated are important, but an equally strong emphasis, if not greater, is on the
maintenance of the relations between people” (ibid:103).213
By claiming that ayil okmotu in Kyrgyzstan are socially embedded members of their local
communities, I am suggesting that they, too, are participants in these localized “networks of
assistance.” I build on Gullette’s argument to show that that the ayil okmotu’s own networks are
politically activated through the process of village government. The institutions of local
government effectively incorporate local officials’ social and moral obligation into the state
itself, first, by favoring the installation of ordinary local people, and then by requiring them to
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access the help and assistance of their co-villagers, who themselves are making regular demands
on local officials for help and assistance. From this perspective, local self-government in
Kyrgyzstan does little more than formalize the social fabric of the village by giving it a title, an
office, and some formal responsibility. The ayil okmotu, for that reason, is bound by the same
moral economy as other villagers and the idea of strictly formal “official” responsibility is
decidedly fuzzy.
As was noted briefly above, the case of Kazakhstan is not different because local social
relations among villagers are different, but because local officials are insulated from those
relationships rather than embedded within them. As Werner has shown, life in rural Kazakhstan
is characterized by the same kinds of “networks of support” that Gullette describes in Kyrgyzstan
(Werner 1998). She describes local social networks as “a web of social relationships based on
one or more of the following criteria: kin relations, tribal affiliations, marriage alliances,
geographical proximity, shared schooling, shared workplace, and friendship” (601). These
networks, she argues, are maintained “by granting personal favours, presenting gifts, hosting
dinner parties and feasts, and supplying voluntary labor” (601).
Both Werner and Gullette identify the Soviet-era “economy of shortages” as the origin of
these mutually co-dependent and reciprocal social networks of support that were then
transformed to cope with the new kinds challenges that resulted from the transition to a market
economy. Thus, they draw on a larger literature on post-Soviet socio-economic systems
(Ledeneva 1998, 2000, 2006; Humphrey 2000)
Again, what makes Kazakhstan different from Kyrgyzstan is that these networks of
support do not link local communities with local state officials. This is because these links are
minimized by the institutional configuration of local government. Just as the institutions of local
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government in Kyrgyzstan incorporate local social networks into the state at the local level, those
in Kazakhstan expunge them, keeping these relationships outside. Thus, while local officials in
Kyrgyzstan are both burdened and empowered by the moral obligations that stem from the favors
they receive from and owe to their co-villagers, their counterparts in Kazakhstan are confined
only to what their superiors dictate and allow; they are embedded in an administrative hierarchy
that includes few connections to local communities. Indeed, the social relations that matter most
for local officials in Kazakhstan are those with higher level state elites who will determine not
only what jobs they might be eligible for in the future, but also what kinds of resources they can
attain to do the job they have now.
The institutions of local government in Kazakhstan shape the process of local governance
and the social role of local officials differently than in Kyrgyzstan in two ways. First, by
creating the greater possibility for the selection of local authorities from outside the locality, as I
described above. As a result, these authorities are less likely to be already-embedded in local
networks of support. Second, they are less likely to engage in reciprocal extra-official social
exchanges while doing their job because of the institutional constraints placed on what kinds of
things they are permitted to do as state officials and the obligations they have to their superiors.
At the heart of this qualitative difference in local governance are the contrasting ways
that ordinary people experience what the state is (or, rather, who it is), whether and how it works,
and why it works the way that it does. In Kyrgyzstan, the parts of the state that take on
significance in everyday life are at the local level; in Kazakhstan, they are at the national level.
In Kyrgyzstan, the advocate for local interests and needs is the local official; in Kazakhstan, it is
the president and his political party.
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The development of this localism in Kyrgyzstan, but not in Kazakhstan, as I have tried to
show, was endogenous to the process of state formation itself, stemming from the creation of
different kinds of government institutions at the local level. In the following chapter I elaborate
on the broader effects of these different local social relations and describe, in more specific
detail, the ways in which people understand their different connections to the local versus the
central apparatuses of the state through varying levels of trust, evaluation, and accountability.
These different patterns constitute different overall styles of state-society relations and set the
stage for different kinds of center-periphery politics related to appointment and administration.
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Chapter 5: Trust Relationships and State-Society Relations

In the previous chapter I described variations in local social ties between village-level
officials and the communities that they govern in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. What are the
broader effects that these ties have on state-society relations? I hinted at some of the effects in
the last chapter by describing differences in officials’ responsiveness to local demands, varying
distinctions of public versus private boundaries in local governance as well as official versus
moral obligations. Here I elaborate on two more specific effects that are related to and overlap
with these. Citizens in each state show different levels of trust for local officials and evaluate the
work of local versus national officials differently. That is, when we disaggregate the state into
its local and national levels, we find significant variation in state-society relations, and in how
ordinary people relate to state officials at different levels of state administration.
In the final section of this chapter, I describe the broader effects of these differences. The
embedded local official in Kyrgyzstan not only changes the way local government operates—in
comparison with Kazakhstan—it also affects how people come to understand the state itself,
what (or who) the state is, what it does, and how and why it does it. In Kyrgyzstan, this changes
state-society relations more broadly by shaping people’s relationship to higher organs of state
administration. It does so in two ways.
First, it establishes a general understanding that local cadre work for local interests,
according to the moral economy of the local community. Non-local cadre, as outsiders to this
moral economy, cannot be trusted in the same way. They are less likely to represent the
community’s interests and are not morally obligated to help or assist any of its individual
members. Second, and more concretely, many former local officials go on to have careers in
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higher levels of state office. Yet, people maintain expectations that “their” officials will continue
to offer help and assistance to them and their friends, families, and co-villagers. Through
appointment to higher levels of state administration—districts and provinces—and elections to
the national parliament, the state itself becomes infiltrated with local elites who maintain ties to
their home regions.
This sets the stage for political conflict with the central government over who will work
in the state’s regional offices, how they will be selected, and whose interests they will represent.
This conflict becomes acute when central authorities have explicit preferences for the
appointment of cadre from outside the region, or seek to remove a local favorite from office.
The policy of cadre rotation, for example, explicitly seeks to install outsiders to top-level
provincial offices, pitting central authorities against the perceived interests of local communities
and local elites. I discussed the politics of regional appointment in chapter two and elaborate on
specific contentious episodes of regional appointment politics in chapter six.
Overall, these effects inversely shape the political salience of “local” versus “national”
elements of state rule in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Ordinary people in Kyrgyzstan trust their
own local officials precisely because they recognize the political and social mechanisms by
which these officials can be held accountable for their work. Their counterparts in Kazakhstan
never develop the same kinds of social ties with local officials. To the contrary, as I began to
discuss in the last chapter, they often turn directly to the president’s own political party, Nur
Otan, because it is the only mechanism through which they can hold corrupt and ineffective local
officials accountable. The result is that people are more likely to side with the president against
their own local and regional officials, thereby strengthening the center’s control over its own
regional appointment policies and preferences, and, ultimately, over its own officials.
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I. Trust, Accountability, and Evaluation in Central Asian Villages
Importantly, social sanctioning mechanisms shape the kinds of relationships people have
with the state at its local versus national levels. People in villages throughout Kyrgyzstan, for
example, describe the value of local cadre according to the logic of moral obligation and indicate
that the threat of social shame is effective in making local officials accountable to local demands
and work toward the common good of the locality. Moreover, officials’ ties to localities are
understood to be sticky. They cannot easily extricate themselves from the village where their
own parents, children, brothers, sisters, aunts, and uncles all reside. Even if they moved
elsewhere, their families would be left behind, making them bound to return on a regular basis.
Since everyone knows this, the local official must be careful not to shame his or her self, or his
or her family.
Outside officials, in contrast, are seen as having little incentive to work for the good of
the community; they are unlikely to be disciplined by the same moral mechanisms because they
can leave as easily as they came. That is, to the degree that they are susceptible to moral shame
at all, they can free themselves of it by moving elsewhere for a different job. When they do so,
they leave little behind. They can (and will) leave with a clean break. This means that during
their tenure there are fewer mechanisms through which local people can extract help, assistance,
or other favors. Thus, local cadre are trusted and valued over and above outsiders, who are
treated with suspicion. One villager in Naryn oblast explained:
The ayil okmotu is a local person so people know him and he knows them. He knows the place and the
people and he knows how to talk to people. His family lives here, he is not going to go anywhere so you
can trust him to do honest work […] If he came from somewhere else he could just steal and be willing to
take bribes … everyone knows that he [a non-local] can just leave.214
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Likewise, a villager from Jalalabad oblast expressed the same idea, both trustful of the
socially embedded local officials and suspicious of the motivations of outsiders:
The reason [the ayil okmotu] works so hard and cares so much is because he’s from here and he knows the
people. I don’t think someone from outside [this district] would work so hard and if they did people would
have to ask “why is he working this way? What for?” And it would cause people to be more suspicious.215

Similar sentiments have been captured in other research. In a study conducted by the UN
Development Programme (UNDP), a village teacher expressed the importance of local officials’
involvement in the education sphere in the same terms: “We know [local officials] will help
because their own children go to the same school. They went to school here when they were
little. Their daughters and wives work here. And that’s how it’s always going to be” (UNDP
2012: 58). The head of a village council who also participated in this focus group expressed the
same logic: “…As a resident of this village and a patriot of my community I am vehemently
opposed to the separation of primary and secondary education from the LSG’s [local selfgovernment’s] sphere of influence. My children live and study here, and so will my
grandchildren, and I’d like to have an opportunity to affect the quality of their education”
(ibid.).216 In both of these examples, officials’ local origins and social embeddedness are
explicitly referenced as characteristics that produce higher levels of trust and accountability. A
policing advisor from the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in
Bishkek described how a provincial police chief spent an entire allotment of $20,000 from the
organization to build a new police station in his home village, where he grew up, and where his
family still lives. The OSCE officer noted that local officials almost always use the money they
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obtain from the organization to help their own villages “not only for their own personal comfort,
but in order to gain recognition in the community that they did something to help everyone.”217
A village elder (aksakal) in Bazar Korgon raion complained that higher levels of state
administration—in the district and province—were unwanted and unnecessary precisely because
their staff is further removed from the village.
Having a local person to do these jobs is better. Local people know more. They know the problems of the
community and the people of the community so they are the only ones who can help. The akim [of the
district] and the governor, these are just names. They don’t know anything or anybody. What do we even
need them for? It’s just extra positions that take money from the budget.218

Likewise, a former state official bemoaned the fact that “people think that if a person is
local he is interested in helping local people, but if he is not local he is only interested in helping
himself.”219 Frequently, the same logic was abbreviated by ordinary people in simple
statements: “Local officials care about the community because they live in it.”220 Officials in
the central government, in contrast are “just businessmen,” who “have no respect for people.”
They “don’t know people” and “don’t care” about them.221 One village elder, describing
officials in the central government, said, “they don’t even know their own job. They don’t care
about people’s needs. They work for a day and leave.”222 Another said, “It’s always better to
have local people running the government. If the person is local, then they understand local
problems, they get along better with people, and they are more honest. They will not steal from
the people whom they know. But, the people in Bishkek steal.”223 And, “the akim [of the
district] does not really work in the village or know about the village in depth. The ayil okmotu
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needs to have this power” (ibid.). This person is suggesting that ayil okmotu should take on the
powers of higher-level state offices, in this case, the district akimat. Indeed, this is part of a
broader dynamic that I discuss in more detail in the final section of this chapter: because socially
embedded local officials are the only ones who can be trusted to help the village and its
inhabitants, people want to see them promoted to higher levels of state office.
Local officials used similar logic, indicating their own sensitivity to the judgment of
community members, and their motivation to manage moral shame. The ayil okmotu of Kenesh
(Jalalabad oblast) said:
When [a local official] is from Kenesh it means that their parents live here, their friends live here, they are
in touch with people, and they must live with these people. And this means he has obligations to the
community and must work honestly. He must go to weddings and funerals and it is very hard to do these
things if you’ve cheated people and not maintained your responsibilities to them. I think only local people
can truly be trusted to do honest work for the community. Anyone else can just leave when they finish
their job. They have no responsibility to the community. They will just take their money and go
someplace else.224

Another ayil okmotu explained that, “it is easier to be from here. I get a lot of help from
people and they trust me to do the right thing.” He then shared a Kyrgyz saying: “If someone
comes from another place he can eat and leave, but if he’s a local person, he will eat and still be
here.”225 The imagery of “eating and leaving” was widely invoked to describe the work and
motivations of non-local state cadre. “Eating” is a euphemism for self-enrichment, corruption,
and bribery. It evokes the concept of “feeding” in pre-modern Russia where “an administrative
position ‘fed’ the person who occupied it” through “various forms of ‘private’ taxation,” which
only became known as “bribery” or “corruption” with the introduction of a rational-bureaucratic
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system of administration (Volkov 2000: 42-43). In Kyrgyz villages, the offense is not “eating,”
but “eating and leaving,” or, taking without giving back, enriching oneself while contributing
nothing to others. While anyone might eat, only outsiders could eat and leave. The deep social
ties of locals, on the other hand, ensured that they would be bound by reciprocal obligations;
they, too, would eat, but they would feed others as well.
In the previous chapter I described the work of Nurlan baike, an ayil okmotu from a
village in Naryn oblast who was motivated by a sense of personal obligation to his co-villagers.
Though he often asked much from others, he could only do so because he was able provide help
in return. He was never in a position to deny requests for help from fellow villagers, even for
problems that were private in nature. As I noted, his inability to refuse requests was so strong
that his only respite was to preclude people from asking by hiding his car behind his sister’s
house when he was home so that he could not be found.
Polling and survey data in Kyrgyzstan suggest that higher levels of trust for local versus
central state authorities is not limited to a few villages. It is nation-wide and generalizable. A
state poll, for example, measured citizens’ levels of “personal trust” (lichnaya doveriya) with
respect to multiple state agencies and ministries. It was conducted in all seven oblasts plus
Bishkek and Osh cities. It showed that the organs of local government enjoy the highest levels
of trust when compared to every other state institution. The poll tracked levels of personal trust
for every ministry of the central government, all state structures at the oblast and raion levels,
including executive and legislative bodies, and the organs of local self-government in villages
and cities. Of the 41 institutions listed, the organs of local self-government ranked the highest in
levels of personal trust and is one of the few state organs to receive an overall positive rating
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(National Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic 2013). All of the central government
agencies received negative ratings, except for the State Agency for Culture and Sports.
Likewise, the findings from a series of focus groups conducted by USAID showed that
local government institutions enjoy the highest levels of public support. The report found that
“unlike the general cynicism towards the role of the President and Parliament, there are higher
expectations for sub-national government structures, and groups expressed that a number of
entities are currently meeting or viewed as capable of meeting public expectations” (USAID
2013: 32). The report also notes that even in the specific localities where officials’ work was
evaluated poorly, people still testified “that they could continue to demand more of their local
officials” and “find a way to get things done.” The report concludes that, “while there was a
wide range of satisfaction with ayil okmotus, they did come across as being viewed as legitimate,
generally well-intending problem-solvers or conduits to higher levels of government” (ibid).
Other field research has shown that local officials are relatively responsive to local demands and
prioritize local needs (Babajanian 2015).
In contrast, ordinary people in Kazakhstan tend to have higher levels of trust for the
central government than their local officials. They use precisely the same logic as their
counterparts in Kyrgyzstan, and even sometimes the same imagery, but because their local
officials are less frequently embedded in the community, they draw opposite conclusions. One
villager in Akmola oblast complained that, “the local akim eats a lot […] He takes everything for
himself…he steals money, he takes bribes, he takes everything and gives nothing back.”226 A
former local akim said that, “it is when people believe that the person does not really belong that
problems arise. There is this discrepancy between the people and an akim who was simply
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appointed and who is going to leave. In such situations there is room for corruption and mistrust
from people.”227 The leader of an NGO in South Kazakhstan noted that the local akim is “simply
doing his job, taking orders from his bosses and so I don’t think he can be trusted for a long-term
relationship. He is not interested in my work, or in helping my organization.”228
Interestingly, in both Akmola and South Kazakhstan oblasts ordinary people described
their own local officials as the most corrupt in the entire country. A sixty-three year old engineer
living in Sairam raion complained that ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union it was
necessary to pay a bribe in order to win tenders for work. “I can’t find any work because I won’t
pay. But, it’s not like this in the north, only in the south.”229 A pensioner from another village in
this same district described her own akim as “wildly corrupt,” but, said that “in the north it’s
different. In the east it’s different. Here in the south the officials are the most corrupt.”230
In the northern province of Akmola, though, people say the same thing about their own
officials. A shepherd in a village there said “our akim is corrupt, but the akims in other regions
don’t work like this. Even the other akims in Akmola are better than this.”231 An unemployed
woman who survives by selling just a few liters of milk each day said, “our village is a mess
[bardak]. It isn’t like this everywhere in our country. You should see the other villages and
regions so you know.”232
Clearly, all of these people cannot be right. What it reflects is that everyone knows their
own officials to be corrupt, and imagines that other officials are not. In fact, for those who like
and trust the president (as I discuss below), this is a necessary belief. If one’s own local official
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is corrupt, it is because he is a bad person and is deceiving the president; but if every local
official is corrupt, it suggests that there is something wrong with the entire system of power, and
even implicates the president himself. To claim that one’s own local officials are the most
corrupt in the entire country is to perceive an anomaly; such an official would be fired, if only
the president knew.
Indeed, officials from the central government—and the president in particular—are not
treated with the same disdain and suspicion as local officials. To the contrary, they are viewed
as the antidote to the dishonesty of their local officials and the only element of the state that
works for the good of the country.
The [local] government is not effective, I would say. If you ask a local official here for help with
something you will need to pay a bribe. But, in Astana the central government works as they need to, as
professionals. When there is a problem they fix it. It’s their job … The people who work there are wellraised, educated, skilled, and they work quickly and professionally. Here a problem might get solved, but
it will not be completely solved, and it will take a long time, and nobody will do anything unless they can
make money from it somehow.233

Likewise, the director of a local NGO in South Kazakhstan oblast said, “local politicians
are the most corrupt. In Astana they do good work.” Then, as if stating a maxim she added, “the
farther you get from Astana, the more corruption you will find.”234 A taxi driver from a rural
area in Akmola oblast describes his local akim as incompetent and disinterested. But, he has a
different opinion of how officials in the capital city do their work, based on their close physical
proximity to the president:
When I was in Astana I could see the results and the changes made by the government. It’s because the
president lives there and he can watch over the work of all the officials and so the akimat and the akim in
Astana work well. They are the best in the country.235

If not viewed as overtly corrupt, local officials are at best seen as deeply flawed, and too
self-absorbed, unskilled, or uninspired to help the president achieve his vision for the country.
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An elderly woman in Sairam said, “nobody likes the local officials, but the officials in Astana are
different.”236 Invoking a Russian saying—“a fish rots from the head”237—a woman selling
textiles at the bazaar said, “If the president is bad, the whole country will suffer. That’s the main
thing. I trust Nazarbayev. Right now we are lucky.”238 At the apex of power stands a visionary
leader; at the bottom his incompetent lackeys.
While people have firsthand experience with the detachment of their local officials, as I
described in the last chapter, the president’s integrity is never in question. A retired teacher in
South Kazakhstan oblast complained that the local officials were “morons” who do not know
how to talk to people and do not understand people’s problems. The president, however, is
“elegant,” “smart,” “energetic,” and “cares about the country.”239 A taxi driver in this same
region said, “I trust the president, he’s great, he’s wise, he’s old. But, he’s too far from us and
the people in the akimat don’t follow his orders. We are proud of him, but he can’t solve
problems in the village unless the akim follows orders and works honestly.”240 Note the
different depiction of central and local authorities by a school director in Shymkent:
In Astana and Almaty the officials are very close to the president so they have good leadership and
management. But when the president's orders go to the regions and other cities it is worse. I had a chance
to meet our akim. He is a good man. By the way he talks and the things he says, it appears that he cares
deeply about the city. But, when they give orders something happens there.
Maybe they just don't communicate, or maybe they have the wrong expectations. For example, when the
government says that they want to help HIV families, they just write down an order on a piece of paper,
they give it to some department, and then the order is passed down lower and lower, and at the local level it
is just a piece of paper, it has no heart, no vision … it has no inspiration and no sense of importance … it
has nothing to do with the nice speech that the president made at the beginning … it's just an official order.
It feels like the people in the akimat are just saying to themselves ''just one more order…I hate it.''241
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In the previous chapter I described the work of Nur Otan and its role in helping local
people address corruption and ineffectiveness in the work of local cadre. This reinforces (and
perhaps partly produces) the “good tsar” dynamic whereby people believe that the only reason
their own officials work so poorly is that the president is unaware of what they are doing. If only
the president knew, he would fire them. This sets the stage for how the politics of regional
appointment play out, which I address in the next chapter. Unlike in Kyrgyzstan, the
replacement or removal of local cadre by the central government is often a moment of great
satisfaction. It is just deserts, revenge, and further evidence that the president wants to improve
the work of public servants.
A shopkeeper from a village in Akmola oblast noted that “people say that the president
has only a small staff. Of course, he cannot monitor and control the work of every local official
and so they can work in a corrupt way and the president does not always know about it. When
he does, he fires them. This happens a lot.”242 Indeed, as I mentioned in the previous chapter,
village officials often have short tenures. Though we do not know the precise reason for why
this is, the upshot is that it simultaneously keeps local officials unembedded from social settings
while making it seem as if the president is routing out corruption. In this context, the president’s
tendency to rotate cadre across provinces conforms to local interests and expectations. In
contrast to Kyrgyzstan—where local cadre are strongly preferred to outsiders, for the reasons I
described above—local cadre in Kazakhstan are more likely to be disliked, such that the
president’s decision to bring in new cadre is celebrated rather than bemoaned or resisted.
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A brief anecdote will help illustrate this.243 While working in a village in Akmola oblast,
I unexpectedly had to leave for Astana, about four hours away by car. I had an interview with
Alikhan Baimenov, then the Chairman of the Agency for Civil Service Affairs. When I told two
of my key village informants about this meeting, they became serious. One of the two men, a
part-time shepherd named Almas turned to the other, Erlan, and said, “he [Baimenov] is in
charge of everyone … after the president.” As they thought about the fact that Baimenov had
authority over their local akim, they began to hatch a plan. Together they reviewed all of the
akim’s misdeeds and flaws, all the times he could never be found or reached, specific instances
when he refused to offer help or solve a problem, and cases of alleged corruption.
They then began to formulate specific questions that they would like Baimenov to
answer. And then they turned to me. Almas said, “You need to tell him that you talked to the
people in [our] village and you saw for yourself how badly the akim works and that everyone
complains about him. And you need to ask him ‘why does the akim work so badly?’” In short,
they wanted me to file a report of complaint with the central government on their behalf. There
was an unspoken but implied expectation about what would happen once this information was
relayed to central authorities. If Baimenov knew of the akim’s poor work, he would reprimand
him, or maybe fire him, and see that a more honest and hardworking person was put in his place.
Erlan and Almas then imagined variations on this theme. They urged me to meet with
the akim himself, and to tell him what I would say to Baimenov. “You go to Astana next week,
that means this week you need to meet with the akim. I want to see the look on his face when
you tell him you’re meeting with Baimenov! His jaw is going to drop!” The two of them
became intoxicated by the thought of this scenario. They were laughing and slapping their
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knees, repeating to me and to each other “I want to see the look on his face!” They wanted to see
for themselves how the akim would respond when he learned his fate, when he became aware
that he would pay for his wrong doing and be fired. Luckily, Erlan and Almas were not entirely
serious, and never intended for me to file a report with Astana (though they were probably glad
that the seed had been planted in my mind). What they were really doing was engaging in
fantasies of justice (Scott 1990: 36-44).
The telling component of this anecdote is that the two shepherds expected justice to be
done merely by informing the central government of the problem. It was taken as self-evident
that if the highest officials in Astana knew what was happening, they would take action. And I,
through a single meeting with one of the president’s close associates (who was in charge of cadre
policy), represented the link that would convey this information directly to those in power. It
never occurred to them that their own akim was simply working according to the rules of the
system that he was a part of, or that Baimenov would simply be disinterested. In reality,
corruption appeared to be a normal part of the system and punishment “suspended,” and meted
out selectively, based largely on political criteria (Ledeneva 1998: 77-78; 2006: 13)
Though I intend for this story to display a core dynamic of state-society relations between
center and periphery in Kazakhstan, the precise scenario itself is highly unusual. Rarely or never
do most ordinary village inhabitants come into contact with a foreign researcher who also
happens to be en route to Astana to meet with officials who are close to the president. This does
not mean they have no means to convey their grievances to the president, however. As I
discussed in the previous chapter, Nur Otan often plays this role in everyday life, as people’s
conduit to the president, and the only place where they can turn when their local officials are
lazy, corrupt, or simply bad at their jobs.
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One shopkeeper in a village in Sairam district explained how she attempted to address
local problems.
Of course I would try and go to the akimat first, but they don’t listen to anyone. They won’t do anything
and they won’t listen to my problems. They just follow their own rules and their own plans. But Nur Otan
will listen. And they will look into problems and fix them. And they’ll do it quickly. Even when the akim
agrees to fix a problem, it takes a long time.244

Similarly, a man in Akmola oblast said that “If we cannot solve a problem, then we go to
Nur Otan. They work hard to solve problems. They develop schools, they visit the area, and
they evaluate the work of the village and city officials and report their research directly to the
president.”245
Other research corroborates these general dynamics, and also paints an inverse picture of
trust in national versus local state institutions in comparison to Kyrgyzstan. A public opinion
survey conducted by International Republican Institute showed that the president consistently
received the highest favorable ratings of any institution in the country, including in comparison
to local and regional akimats and maslikhats (IRI 2011: 45). Between 2008 and 2011, the
president’s favorability ratings hovered around 90% (ibid.). In another survey of 1,807 people in
all fourteen provinces, over 90 percent were familiar with Nur Otan, and 70 percent gave it a
positive evaluation. The next most prominent party, Ak Zhol, was recognized by only 42 percent
of respondents and only 6.9 percent gave it a positive evaluation (Umbetalieva 2010). One study
notes that Nur Otan is the only party with the country with any meaningful presence outside of
Almaty and Astana, such that every other party has “weaker recognition” and “lack the tools and
ability to shape their relationship with society” (Isaacs 2011: 144-5). In sum, “the center of
attention and concentration of positive political feelings remains focused on the president of the
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country,” even “despite disagreements with the practices of making and implementing decisions”
(Umbetalieva 2010).
Similarly, research institutes in Almaty have found that public trust for the president and
his party heavily outweighed trust for local-level officials. A survey by the Central Fund for the
Development of Democracy, which included 1,192 respondents from all fourteen oblasts plus
Astana and Almaty, found the lowest levels of positive evaluation and trust for all sub-national
levels of administration. In general, “the highest levels of trust were shown toward the higher
organs of the vertical of power, most of all, the head of state” and “in practically every oblast the
highest levels of trust were fixed on the President” (Umbetalieva 2009).
In contrast, “extremely low levels of trust were shown toward […] the local organs of
power—oblast, city, and raion akimats,” with the percentage of respondents expressing trust
hovering between 32 and 43 percent (Umbetalieva 2009). The study concludes that:
… the ineffectiveness of local state structures among Kazakhstanis has practically acquired the character of
an axiom, which is adhered to by every stratum and group of the population. Respondents of every age and
level of material circumstances, living in various settlements and abiding by the most different preferences
in the majority of things, all give a negative evaluation to the work of local structures […] In other words,
the ineffectiveness of the local structures of authority stand out as invariable for the population, and, in the
perception of the population, the official of the akimat is considered to be a dishonorable and spoiled
official (6).

State research institutes show the same dynamic. One report notes that “practically threefourths of the population of Kazakhstan trusts the president” while people tend to trust “local
organs” to a “lesser degree.” More precisely, 74.8 percent said that they trust the president while
only 52 percent said that they trust the akim of their city or village. Additionally, though, people
tend to trust their local officials with less intensity than they trust the president. The above
percentages indicating levels of trust are disaggregated accordingly: 41.4% said that “fully trust”
the president while 33.4% said that they merely “trust” him; but, only 15.5% said that they “fully
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trust” their local akim while 36.5% said that they merely “trust” him or her (Mukhamedzhanov
and Zhusupova 2011: 346-365).
In recent research on the work of maslikhat deputies in Almaty, only 4% of residents
evaluated the work of their deputy positively.246 2,292 out of 2,635 respondents, or 87%, said
that they did not know enough about the activities of their deputy and could not answer the
question. In fact, as noted in the previous chapter, nearly 85% did not even recognize the name
of their deputy when it was read aloud. Yet, despite not knowing who their deputy was, or
having a familiarity with their work, residents were “ruthless” in criticizing their deputy’s job
performance in the written comments section of the survey.247
In fact, many respondents consciously attributed negative evaluations of deputies’ work
to the fact that they did not know him or her personally. One respondent said, “We don’t know
the local [officials] and they don’t do anything. They don’t help us with our requests.” Another
asked, “How is it possible for him to work? Nobody knows him!” An elderly person
complained, “They said that on the Day of the Elderly someone was going to give out resources,
but where are they? I’m 92 and don’t have any help.” Still, another complained, “The deputy
sees nothing and we know nothing about him.” Another said simply, “I give him a dvoika,” or a
failing grade. The phrase “he does not do anything” (nichego ne delaet) appears countless times
in the responses. Overall, the study concludes, “deputies weakly interact with voters, and a low
level of familiarity with who the deputies are and a lack of information about their activities can
be observed.” This “low level of information makes evident a low level of trust and a high level
of criticality toward the maslikhat among citizens” (fn. 33).
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All of the polling data and reports presented in this chapter should be taken with a grain
of salt. What is important here is not any singular measure of trust or likeability for any specific
institution or person, but the broader patterns within and between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
with respect to central versus local authorities. President Nazarbayev’s 90% approval ratings,
for example, are likely inflated. But, what all of the data show is that he is evaluated more
positively and given higher levels of trust when compared with his own local and regional
officials.248 The data from Kyrgyzstan suggest the opposite. There, the institutions of local
government are evaluated more positively than the central government, or the president. Overall,
the emphasis here is on the relative measures, not the absolute ones: each country exhibits
different patterns of trust and evaluation for central versus local authorities, and does so in ways
that corroborates the ethnographic and interview data that were presented in this chapter, and the
previous one. These suggest different overall patterns of state-society relations.

II. Broadening the Scope: Local Social Relations as State-Society Relations
Here I would like to expand the scope of localism in Kyrgyzstan. While I have
emphasized that variations in social ties at the local level in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan stem
from different institutions of local government, the effects of these relations are not limited to the
local level alone. First, the relations that people form with their local officials change the
relationship that they have with the state itself. The local official in Kyrgyzstan is often a
personal acquaintance, but he or she is simultaneously a public official and the main (and
sometimes only) interface through which ordinary people interact with the state. This shapes
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more general understandings about what the state is and how it operates, and has implications for
how people interact with the state more broadly, at the district, province, and national levels.
Second, and more concretely, village-level officials in Kyrgyzstan often go on to have
political careers in higher-level state offices. They may have started as a teacher, taxi driver, or
farmer, but tenures as ayil okmotu or as deputies in local councils can reshape career trajectories,
especially for those who are good at their jobs and have strong local support. As they enter
higher state posts, they take on different official responsibilities, but also have new and
expanding sets of resources with which to meet the expectations of friends, families, and other
local acquaintances back home. It is this that sets the stage for the contentious politics of
appointment in districts, provinces, and in the capital city itself, where local communities’ and
central authorities’ expectations clash about what these offices are for and in whose interest the
officials appointed there are supposed to work. A lawyer specializing on local self-government
in Kyrgyzstan described the nature of this conflict:
Before you could see that there was always rotation, people from one region were appointed to other
regions, but now the development of local self-government is pushing the other way […] the previous ayil
okmotus become akims because they know the structure, the people, and how to organize themselves.
During Akaev’s time and Bakiev’s time this rotation was usual. Now this type of thing does not work,
people do not accept it.249

In the previous chapter, I described the work of Marat, a former ayil okmotu who was
later appointed to become the head of the Ministry of Agriculture outpost in his district. His covillagers obtained benefits from his placement in this post that they would not otherwise have
had in ways that reinforced a basic principle: state officials have obligations to help
acquaintances in their own locality. Nurlan baike, meanwhile, had open aspirations to become
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the next akim of his district.250 He would frequently express his desire to obtain this post—“god
willing” (kudaiga shugur)—and his disappointment that he had not been selected already.251
According to an official at the State Agency on Work with Local Self-Governance, the
subsequent appointment of former ayil okmotu heads to higher state positions is common in
Kyrgyzstan—“there are many cases when an ayil okmotu becomes an akim […] in general there
are many people who used to be ayil okmotu who move up into higher positions.”252 That is,
multiple parts of the state are infiltrated with local elites, including former local officials. This
reinforces the value of having local people appointed to higher-level positions as former village
officials go on to secure more resources with which to help their home communities.
Dzhumagul Egamberdieva, for example, taught Russian language and literature for 23
years at the local school in her village, Terek-Sai, which is located in Chatkalskii district,
Jalalabad oblast. In 2005, through direct elections at the village level, she became the head of
Terek-Sai ayil okmotu. Three years later, she was appointed as akim of Chatkalskii district. In
2014, she was appointed as governor of Jalalabad oblast, a high-level state position that
nominally (and officially) represents the central government in that province. As I started to
describe in chapter two, governorships have been a continual object of contention between local
elites and central authorities. Nowhere has this been truer than in Jalalabad oblast, which I
elaborate on in detail in the next chapter to contextualize what Egamberdieva’s appointment to
this post represents in broader center-periphery politics.
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At the time this research was conducted, the post of akim in Kyrgyzstan referred only to the top executive office
at the district level, not to be confused with the post of akim in Kazakhstan, which refers to the top executive office
of any level, village, district, and province.
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Similarly, the most recent governor of Talas oblast (as of April 2015), Koisun
Kurmanalieva, is a life-long native of the province and served in her local village council for
eight years. Kurmanalieva was installed as a “people’s governor” in 2010 when her supporters
gathered in the province center and demanded the resignation of the state-chosen incumbent,
who was appointed from a different province. This event occurred at the outset of a nation-wide
revolution with governors deposed in every region of the country, which I also address in detail
in the next chapter. Her “appointment” was confirmed by a new transitional government in
Bishkek ex post facto. She held the post for five years and resigned on the fifth anniversary of
the 2010 revolution, April 6, 2015 (Podolskaya 2015).
Likewise, Kyrgyzstan’s national parliament (Jogorku Kenesh) includes a number of
prominent local politicians, many of whom were former village-level officials. Abdimutalip
Kochkorbaev, a parliamentary deputy since 2011, was elected as the ayil okmotu of Mady, his
home village, in 2001, 2005, and 2009. Prior to this he worked as a teacher of Kyrgyz language
and then held several positions in the districts neighboring his hometown. Likewise, Esengul
Isakov, who worked first as a driver at a local metallurgical complex and then as a shepherd of
his local sovkhoz (Kyzyl-Suu), served on the Almaluu village council (1995) and then as the
head of the ayil okmotu (1996-99 and 2003-2005) before ultimately being elected to parliament
in 2010.253 As prior research has shown, average villagers throughout Kyrgyzstan tend to
support their “native son” in national elections. In parliamentary elections in 2007, campaigners
in one village asked people simply “to vote for oz kokurok kychygybyz (our son, our brother, our
dignity, and our foal); someone who was better than any outsider” (Ismailbekova 2014: 87).
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Almaluu ayil okmotu encompasses the former sovkhoz (Kyzyl-Suu) and the villages of Almaluu and Bordu and
is located in Kemin district, Chui oblast. Esengul was born in Bordu.
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Unlike village outsiders, the “native son” is “seen as representing the village as a whole, rather
than a constituency of individuals” (ibid. 93).
A closer look at Kyrgyzstan’s national parliament offers an additional lens through which
to view local expectations and the pull of local social ties on state officials because Kyrgyzstan
switched to a proportional representation (PR) system in 2010. At this discrete moment in time,
deputies were no longer the formal representatives of their own localities. By all accounts,
however, this changed little about their actual behavior. The proponents of the PR system
continue to be puzzled and frustrated by the fact that parliamentary deputies are concerned
almost exclusively with the affairs of their own home village even though they are elected from
party lists at the national level. An analyst in Bishkek who works with parliament through the
Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society explains that parliamentary deputies “still work based
on their regional status…if he is from this village he thinks he has to work only for this village,
this is our problem.” She went on to complain that, “it feels like they have this complex, where
they cannot grow out of their region […] it’s comfortable for them to have this village-level
mentality, to say that ‘I have to work here, I am from here.’ No! You came to a national
institution and you need to stop thinking only about your village!”254
A program manager at the Westminster Foundation for Democracy in Bishkek says that
the point of the proportional representation system was to get deputies to think more about party
platforms and less about their own regions. But, “people don’t act this way, nobody cares about
the programs.” In order to attract votes, the parties “have to bring people from local
communities.” The result is that “deputies raise only their own local questions, like ‘in my
village there is no school, or no bridge, so we need to put this in the budget’…they just represent
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local interests.”255 A former assistant to a deputy from the Ak Zhol party noted that “members of
parliament spend a lot of time in the regions, in their own villages…they build things, or they
help people with money, even money from their own pocket. When they vote on bills they are
concerned with what will be popular among villagers but they don’t think about the national
interest.”256
A USAID report complains that the national reach of the five major political parties are
not built upon strong party platforms, but on personalistic social networks in different regions
and localities. Despite the veneer of national-level support for certain party lists, “party leaders
continue to maintain clientelistic relationships with large families based in the regions and rely
on particular party members’ ability to mobilize voters locally” (USAID 2013: 33). That is,
people vote for a party only when specific individuals from their region or locality are put on the
list, the very dynamic that a PR system is intended to undermine. In front of a parliamentary
assembly in 2013, Vice Prime Minister Otorbaev noted that “regionalism” was too strong in the
country, and complained that “the election system is proportional, but people vote for candidates
according to regional affiliations” (Turgaev 2013).
Indeed, despite the party-list system for elections, the parties themselves appear to place a
heavy emphasis on a candidate’s local prominence, among other things.257 A former high-level
official from the Ata-Meken party who now works in the Central Election Committee described
how one of the party’s main recruitment strategies was to work closely with members of local
governments. “The party is always looking to add such members. It’s important for the party to
have people who have their own political weight or power at the local level […] who are
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respected in their region. In national elections people judge the party according to the work of
these people, these local officials.” Even if such officials never make the national party list, or
they are too low on the list to be elected to parliament, the party can help give them a “social
lift”—i.e., a promotion—by getting them appointed to other state positions “so that people from
the local level can grow higher.”258
Likewise, a former head of the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK) in Chui
oblast noted that the party was always trying to win support outside of the party leaderships’ own
home regions, which are predominantly in the north. “Of course, we invited different people
from every oblast, especially prominent local people.”259 For SDPK, an emphasis was placed on
prominent local elites from the south. Among the examples he cited was Egamberdieva, the
former ayil okmotu from Terek-Sai in Jalalabad oblast, whom I discussed above. He also
mentioned Soorobai Zheenbekov, the former school teacher and kolkhoz director who later
became a parliamentary deputy from his region in Osh oblast. In the aftermath of the revolution
in April 2010, he was elected by an unofficial public assembly (kurultai) to become a “people’s
governor” of the province and was subsequently confirmed by the transitional government.260
Likewise, Karamat Orozova helped SDPK to garner votes in the remote southern
province of Batken and was first elected to parliament in 2010. Orozova has lived in Batken her
entire life and worked in the district-level organs of the communist party throughout the 1980s.
In the post-Soviet period she became the director of the local kindergarten, Teremok, and worked
as a prominent regional representative of the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society from
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Zheenbekov was informally chosen as “people’s governor” on April 9. On May 13, the supporters of his
predecessor, Mamasadyk Bakirov, reclaimed control. Bakirov’s deputy, Aitmamat Kadyrbaev, took over the post of
governor. The central government, which was then dominated by members of the SDPK party, sided with
Zheenbekov, who was able to reclaim his position, which he still holds (as of April 2015).
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2001-2010. As the SDPK official described, “she was an activist in Batken for many years, just
from society […] during the instability of 2010 when there was an interim government, we
helped to make her the governor [of Batken] […] then she became deputy governor.”261 In 2013,
she went back to parliament on the SDPK party list.
It is not only the major parties that face these incentives to select prominent local leaders.
A member of the new startup “Labor Party” (Emgek) described the same dynamic as the leaders
of the larger parties described above “…to win elections the party is looking for people who have
a good reputation in the regions. In order to have a good reputation the people have to live there
or at least be regularly visiting and helping the population, for example, giving money to help the
poor, or even fixing roads.”262
As these stories suggest, the electoral incentives that parties face in constructing their lists
are quite similar to pressures that the central government faces in choosing its governors. In both
cases the party (or the central government) are formally free to choose whomever they want, but
there are strong local preferences for the selection of local leaders. This is because of ordinary
people’s understanding of what the state is and what it can do for them, which comes from their
experiences participating in their local government and the trust that stems from personalized
social ties with local officials. In the case of the appointment of governors, local preferences for
the appointment of local cadre happen to be directly at odds with the central government’s policy
of cadre rotation in the provinces, as I discussed in chapter two. Indeed, undermining the local
social bases of provincial state officials is precisely the purpose of cadre rotation.263
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She held the governor’s post for only one month.
Personal correspondence, February 24, 2015.
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parties in Kyrgyzstan, partly for the reasons described here, are fragmented, regionalized, and dependent on
prominent local and regional politicians. Kazakhstan, by contrast, is dominated by a single party, which is deeply
262

218

We see the same dynamics with party lists. Even though the PR system should
discourage party leaders from placing such a strong emphasis on recruiting regional
representatives, the informal pull of local social ties creates a set of countervailing incentives.
The existence, prevalence, and importance of such strong local ties were shaped and
strengthened by the institutions of local government. It was through these institutions that
ordinary people formed relationships to the state itself, in the personae of their local officials.
But, as I have also tried to argue, the effect of these state-society relations is not limited
to the local level alone. Even officials who never formally served in local government structures
are still partly bound by the logic and expectations of local social ties that the institutions of local
government helped incubate and integrate into the state. Like the major political parties,
individual politicians themselves have to meet expectations that they will provide help and
support to the individuals whom they knew through childhood, and their friends and family. The
nature of social ties between local officials and local communities in villages and cities shapes
state-society relations in general, and places pressure on national-level officials to act according
to its logic. This is true even for the most famous national-level politicians.
Throughout the Bazar Korgon district of Jalalabad oblast, for example, people still refer
to the native-born parliamentarian and leader of the Ata Meken party, Omurbek Tekebaev, as
“our deputy” even though he does not formally or officially represent the region.264 When
people referred to him as “our deputy,” they were invoking an informal role based on moral
obligations to assist his community, not as his formal role in parliament. If anything, his high
profile in government only made him better equipped to do this, giving him access to resources
that he could use to help people back home. His family still lives in the region and he visits on a
tied to the president of the country, as I described above. We might say that, in Kyrgyzstan, the parties are
dependent on local officials; in Kazakhstan, local officials are dependent on the party.
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regular basis, always coming with gifts. For example, he has provided computers to several local
schools in the area, including the one he used to teach at.265 Many people described Tekebaev’s
obligations to the region according to the same moral logic that they used to describe their local
officials, which I described above:
Of course if the person is from here they will try and bring projects when they are in power. They have an
obligation to their families and to their village. Tekebaev tries to do this. He always tries to help Akman
and Bazar Korgon [district]. But, if they don’t have a lot of power then they can only do this in a limited
way.266

Another villager from Akman noted that Tekebaev “always finds ways to help us here
and we already know him so it is comfortable to ask for favors […] If more people were like
Tekebaev things would be better for Bazar Korgon [district].”267 In fact, other people are like
Tekebaev, though not because they are helping Bazar Korgon; they are are helping their own
villages instead.
All of this is to suggest that promotions to higher level state posts do not sever officials’
social obligations to their regions, or even their home villages. To the contrary, an official’s
access to increasing levels of resources also raises expectations about the kinds of help that covillagers will be able to receive. One study of elite politicians in Kyrgyzstan emphasized the
primacy of personalized localism in determining how elites are motivated to do their jobs and
even why they seek to obtain high-level state positions in the first place (Huskey and Isakova
2010). Through surveys and multiple interviews with prominent state elites, the authors
concluded that personal status was more important than anything else. By status these officials
“did not have in mind status on a national level, but status among one’s own relatives and local
community” (246). The authors conclude that “all politics is very local in Kyrgyzstan, where the

265

Ibid.
Interview with author, October 22, 2013, KYG1_Int1_3_ii.
267
KYG1_int1_49_#7.
266

220

most powerful geographical attachments are not to the nation, or to the north or the south, or
even to one of the country’s seven regions, but to one’s district or village” (252).
Speaking generally about local officials who later get promotions, one unemployed man
in Osh province commented that, “of course they will work for all of Kyrgyzstan, but at some
level, even if it is minor, they will help their hometown or the community in which they were
raised.”268 One person even claimed that the president has a legal obligation to give 15% of his
income to his home village.269 Though certainly apocryphal, the fact that someone thinks it to be
true signifies an expectation that state officials have obligations to help their home communities
as they obtain higher-level offices. It is to assume that moral norms have the status of state law.
While the president certainly has no legal obligation to help his own village, he might still have a
moral obligation to do so.
Indeed, in a rare but telling moment of sympathy for the plight of the two presidents who
were chased from power, both of whom ran unapologetically nepotistic governments, one
villager in Jalalabad province explained that they were only doing what was expected of them.
They were obligated to help their friends and family:
Yes, state officials are sometimes corrupt, helping their own village, or maybe just even their own friends
and relatives. But, they really don’t have a choice. Once they have this job they are expected to do all
these things. I know how they feel. Even when I go home [to Akman village] everyone I know expects me
to do them favors and bring them things [because I now live in Bishkek]. It is an obligation.
It is the same for officials, but even more so. Take Akaev and Bakiev. Everyone said that they were
corrupt and distributed jobs and money to their own friends and relatives. But I can understand it. If you
put yourself in their shoes it is easy to understand. Every person whom they know from childhood to
adulthood, everyone in their village and from nearby villages expects favors and hundreds or maybe
thousands of people are waiting to get what they believe they are owed. And what choices did Akaev and
Bakiev really have? They had just as much obligation to help their people as I have to help mine, only
more so because they have so much power.
I think it is too simple to say that they are bad people, or corrupt. They have obligations to fulfill. I think
most people understand this. I think so many people were angry at Akaev and then at Bakiev not because
they gave jobs and money to friends and relatives; but because their own friends and relatives were not in a
268
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position to give jobs and money to them. Nobody is fighting for an honest system—everyone is fighting to
get their own people into power—the people whom they know and trust—so that they can benefit from it in
every way, from regional development, to jobs, to money, to favors…all of it.270

Indeed, when Akaev’s government crumbled during the Tulip Revolution in 2005, his
only base of support in the entire country proved to be his home district of Kemin (Chui oblast).
After Akaev’s allies in the capital quickly defected, the main concern was “violence breaking out
between the opposition and members of Akaev’s clan from Kemin, perhaps one of the few places
where the president’s ouster was greeted with more fear than rejoicing” (ICG 2005: 9). The
residents of Kemin “went into the streets” in anticipation of protestors arriving from Bishkek
while “in the capital the new authorities feared that groups from Kemin would try to retake
control” (ibid.).
Likewise, the “localist essence” of Bakiev’s presidency was revealed when, as a result of
the revolution in April 2010, Bakiev fled to his home village—Teyit (Suzak raion, Jalalabad
oblast)—not to one of the major urban centers in the south where he might have been expected
to find supporters (Ramas 2013: 140). In Teyit, with his uncles, brothers, and their many sons,
Bakiev hunkered down before ultimately fleeing to Minsk. The deposed president’s Ak Zhol
party, which was dominant at the time, crumbled almost instantly in the face of protests. Like
Bakiev himself, the party had “no social base to be mobilized beyond each member’s local
network,” a resource that was used by each member to protect his or her self rather than Bakiev
(Ramas 2013: 140). During his several days in Teyit, Bakiev made speeches and spoke to the
press in an attempt to shore up his supporters, but the very act of doing so underlined that he was
no longer president. Surrounded by ordinary villagers in Adidas sport suits or traditional Kyrgyz
dress—staple wardrobe stylings of the average villager—Bakiev looked more like the ayil
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okmotu of Teyit than the president of the country. The logic of his career trajectory was the
same for those I described above, only in this case he was making his exit from the state
apparatus rather than his entrance.

III. Local Social Ties, Moral Economy, and Accountability
The general dynamics described above are not unique to Central Asia. The presence and
effects of a moral economy in which local officials are embedded has been shown to have effects
on trust and accountability in other settings. That is to say, they represent generalizable
dynamics of local social ties and state-society relations. Tsai shows that even where the formal
institutions of accountability are weak or non-existent, social mechanisms of accountability are
still possible. Different kinds of local social ties in China, for example, shape different levels of
responsiveness and accountability among local officials through the mechanism of moral
standing (Tsai 2007a; 2007b).
In Tsai’s argument, the factor that shapes local officials’ ties to local communities is the
presence or absence of “social solidary groups,” which are groups defined by common norms
and shared interests. Local officials become subject to moral sanctioning and are more
responsive to local demands where social solidarity groups are both embedding and
encompassing. An encompassing social solidary group is one that includes or is open to all of
the people within the local government’s jurisdiction; an embedding group is one that includes
the local officials themselves as members.271 When a local official is embedded in a solidary
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group that encompasses the population of the village, they are subject to a common set of norms
and have strong moral obligations to provide for the collective good of the community. The
mechanism that compels them to provide for the public good is their moral standing within the
community, particularly their ability to secure esteem and respect in social settings where their
work is highly visible and subject to a common set of expectations.
The more that a solidary group encompasses all the citizens in a particular local governmental jurisdiction
and the more that a solidary group embeds local officials in its activities, the more effective it is at enabling
citizens to hold local officials accountable for public goods provision. When the boundaries of a solidary
group overlap with local administrative boundaries, embedded officials have a strong social obligation to
contribute to the good of the group (2007b, 96, emphasis in original).

In China, the institutions of local government do not formally vary across territory,
allowing Tsai to study the effects of these informal modes of accountability. It is only where
local government institutions and local solidary groups overlap territorially that accountability
can be produced. Tsai argues that village temples in China are embedding and encompassing
solidary groups. Using a sample of over 300 villages in China, she shows that the presence of
village temples had a strong positive correlation on the level of public goods provision in a
locality. Her main conclusion is that social mechanisms of accountability based on moral
standing and trust can still exist in the absence of the formal institutions that create
accountability in democracies. Inversely, the absence of village temples—and, therefore, the
absence of embedding and encompassing social solidary groups—was associated with lower
levels of accountability. Local officials in such settings were less susceptible to informal social
pressures to provide for the needs of the village.
Tsai’s social solidary groups resemble what Tilly calls “trust networks,” which “consist
of ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of strong ties, within which people set
valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes,
or failures of others” (Tilly 2005: 12). He stresses that trust is not an attitude, but a kind of social
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relationship. Importantly, trust networks are not one of a kind, but “vary from setting to setting,”
and can take multiple forms, such as “religious sects and solidarities, lineages, trade diasporas,
patron-client chains, credit networks, mutual aid societies, age grades, and local communities”
(Tilly 2005: 13). Moreover, he says, the ways in which trust networks are integrated into the
apparatus of state rule, to the extent that they are at all, varies across time and space and have
important implications for the kinds of state-society relations that emerge as a result (Tilly 2005:
30-51).
The cases of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, then, are not sui generis. But, they do provide
new insights into the possible effects of local social ties on state-society relations. In these cases
it is the formal local government institutions themselves that integrate or expel, and strengthen or
weaken, the social ties that define local officials’ place in the village. That is, the mechanisms of
moral sanctioning built upon interpersonal social relations are endogenous to the institutions of
local government. Institutions of local government in Kyrgyzstan embed local officials in local
communities and subject them to the moral sanctioning mechanisms of co-villagers.272 In
Kazakhstan, local government institutions, though they are encompassing, do not have the same
embedding effect and even insulate local officials from the very moral economies that might
produce trust and lead to greater levels of responsiveness and accountability. Thus, I emphasize
that the formal institutions of government themselves can differently interact with, incubate, or
preclude the informal social sanctioning mechanisms that come from social solidary groups or
trust networks.
This approach, then, elucidates the effect that formal institutions can have on informal
ones (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). It also suggests an answer to what Eisenstadt and Roniger

272

They are encompassing by definition.

225

describe as the “central problem” in analyzing friendship, personal relationships, and clientelism:
how to address “the construction and institutionalization of trust” in political and social orders
(1984: 29).
IV. Conclusions
In the first parts of this chapter, I outlined different patterns of trust in local versus
national level government institutions in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan using a combination of
ethnographic and interview data in conjunction with national level polling, survey data, and
secondary research. In Kyrgyzstan, ordinary people show the highest levels of trust and
evaluation for the institutions of local government in comparison with the president and other
national-level state institutions. In Kazakhstan, however, the highest levels of trust and support
were shown for the president and his political party. Local officials, in contrast, were not well
liked, and even despised. The central government—both the president and his party—have
obtained their popularity and support, at least in part, because of their ostensible responsiveness
to local complaints and occasional interventions into local government. In sum, the way that
people evaluate “the state” and its officials is disaggregated into its local and national
components.
I have also emphasized that these differences in local level social contexts and politics
shape broad patterns of overall state-society relations. The high levels of trust stemming from
the nature of local social relations in Kyrgyzstan shapes people’s expectations about what the
state can do for them and how it can do it. This politicizes the distinction between local and nonlocal cadre and creates strong preferences for the appointment of embedded local leaders
throughout the state apparatus. After all, they are the only ones who can be expected to provide
for the village and its inhabitants, and the only kinds of officials who can be trusted to represent
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its interests. In Kazakhstan, the distinction between local versus non-local cadre does not have
as much political significance.
This sets the stage for different kinds of contests related to cadre rotation, as I described
in chapter two. While ordinary people in Kazakhstan are indifferent to cadre rotation and might
even welcome it as a sign that the president is keeping corruption in check, residents in
Kyrgyzstan have strong preferences for who is appointed to govern which region. Moreover,
they are sometimes willing to fight to protect their own trusted cadre against relocation, or
against the appointment of an outsider. Indeed, Radnitz argues that high levels of protest
mobilization in Kyrgyzstan stem from the ability of socially embedded local elites to mobilize
their communities when they have conflicts with central state authorities (Radnitz 2005, 2006,
2010; see also Khamidov 2006).273
Frequently, these conflicts center on the right (or desire) of prominent local elites and
officials to hold or maintain their offices. Huskey and Isakova recount the testimony of one state
official in Kyrgyzstan who is quoted as saying, “if you part with your post [dolzhnost’], your life
has ended [propala tvoya zhizn’]…. If you aren’t a big official, it means that it’s over, it’s the
end of the world [u tebya vse, konets sveta]” (2010: 246). The authors note that this is related to
“the desire of former politicians to get back in the game” if they lose or are otherwise removed
from office (ibid., fn. 30). Likewise, Ramas argues that cadre rotation during the Akaev era
caused resentment and bitterness among regional officials, leading them to become increasingly
active in the opposition movement that culminated in the Tulip Revolution (Ramas 2013: 136).
In the following chapter, I return to the politics of regional cadre appointment that I
described in chapter two. In chapter two, I described the historical and social logic of cadre
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rotation, argued that it was a relevant indicator of state formation (or bureaucratic centralization)
in post-Soviet states, and showed differences in the outcome of its implementation in Kyrgyzstan
and Kazakhstan. While cadre rotation is the desired policy of central authorities in both states,
only Kazakhstan has been able to implement and achieve it. Central authorities in Kyrgyzstan,
in contrast, face continued resistance and opposition from local communities and local elites.
While there is some contention surrounding regional appointment politics in both states, the key
difference is that in Kyrgyzstan these are battles that the central government often loses, due
mainly to grassroots social mobilization in local communities. In the next chapter I review
contentious episodes of regional cadre appointment in detail, mapping how cases in Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan differ according to the socio-territorial origins of the officials themselves, in the
contexts of the offices they are being appointed to or removed from, along with differences in the
behavior of local communities. Taken in aggregate, I argue that these different patterns of
contentious politics in regional appointments represent contrasting trajectories of state
development during the post-Soviet period.
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Chapter 6: Contentious Episodes of Regional Appointment and Representation

In chapter two, I described broad contrasting patterns of regional appointment politics in
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan related to the policy of cadre rotation. Though each state has the
same policy—namely, the rotation of cadre across regions—only Kazakhstan has successfully
implemented it. Central authorities in Kyrgyzstan, in contrast, have frequently faced resistance
when attempting to remove locals from office, install non-locals in their place, or both.
Moreover, local officials, along with their supporters, have sometimes seized control of offices
they are not officially appointed to. In this chapter I present specific contentious episodes of
cadre appointment politics in more detail. Not all of these cases are directly related to an
appointed regional office; they include other state offices and seats in parliament. But, all are
cases of center-periphery conflict over who holds what office, and pit central authorities against
local and regional officials, and sometimes local populations.
Two clear patterns emerge: local and regional officials in Kazakhstan who exhibit too
much independence, or who directly challenge the president’s appointment powers, end up in jail
or in exile; their counterparts in Kyrgyzstan end up in power, either in their own region, or in the
central government itself. In every instance, they do so through the ability to mobilize local
communities, who, as I discussed in the previous chapter, have an interest in seeing known
members of the community hold offices locally, or obtain appointments to higher-level positions.
Indeed, the list of Kazakhstan’s provincial governors who became too powerful and
broke with Nazarbayev also became high-profile criminals, convicted of “corruption” or “abuse
of power”: Akezhan Kazhegeldin (exiled); Zamanbek Nurkadilov (mysteriously killed);
Galymzhan Zhakiyanov (jailed and exiled); Viktor Khrapunov (exiled); Bergei Ryskaliev
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(missing); Erlan Aryn (arrested). Their counterparts in Kyrgyzstan, in contrast, remain among
the most prominent officials in their home region, and sometimes go on to obtain significant
positions within the central government itself: Azimbek Beknazarov, Iskenderbek Aidaraliev,
Zhusubek Zheenbekov, Koisun Kurmanalieva, and Melis Myrzakmatov, among others. The key
difference is that these regional officials, unlike their counterparts in Kazakhstan, had substantial
public support in their home villages and regions. This enabled some to resist efforts to remove
or relocate them and others to seize control over local and regional offices that they were not
officially appointed to.

I. Center-Periphery Appointment Politics in Kyrgyzstan
While this dissertation is not about revolutions, and does not seek or claim to explain how
or why they occur, there is no way to address state power or contentious politics in Kyrgyzstan
without touching on the Tulip Revolution (2005) or the April Revolution (2010). These were
complex events with multiple causes and were not about regional appointment politics alone.
But, governor’s offices in every province were contested in both revolutions, usually leading to
the installment of a locally selected “people’s governor.” In fact, contention surrounding control
over regional representation—in both parliament and in governor’s offices—were the proximate
events leading to national-level conflict in both cases (Kulov 2008). In short, regional
appointment politics played at least some role in these revolutions. For the purposes of analysis,
I focus on specific contentious events rather than on the revolutions themselves (Sewell 1996).
In addressing these events through the prism of regional appointment and representation, I
highlight aspects of the revolutions that have remained on the periphery of analysis. In addition,
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I discuss contentious episodes of regional appointment before, between, and after the
revolutions, in 2002, 2006, and 2010-2014.
Much of the existing literature on Kyrgyzstan’s two revolutions has focused on inter-elite
politics at the national level. The overwhelming emphasis has been on national elites’
competition for relatively scarce patronage resources (Engvall 2011; McGlinchey 2011). Others
argue that Kyrgyzstan’s divided-executive system—which gives both the president and prime
minister substantial formal powers—reinforces “competing-pyramid” patronage networks pitting
national elites against one another and creating continual instability among them (Hale 2006,
2011, 2015: 61-94). Overall, these theories treat the revolutions as capital-city events. They
have less to say about center-periphery politics or whether and how the revolutions touched on
the interests of ordinary people, particularly those living in rural districts and villages.
Yet, these revolutions were not palace coups. They entailed the mass mobilization of
ordinary people and were initially led by regional elites with deep ties to particular local
communities. In both March 2005 and April 2010, protest mobilization started in the regions
and only later came to Bishkek as protestors literally travelled to the capital from the provinces.
This leaves questions about how and why ordinary people were willing to fight on behalf of their
regional leaders in large numbers, and at such great personal risk. What kinds of interests and
ties bound protesters to regional elites’ such that mass mobilization became possible?
Radnitz (2005, 2006, 2010) addresses this question in detail and argues that frequent and
large-scale social mobilization in Kyrgyzstan was facilitated by the social embeddedness of
regional and local elites, who can call on large networks of supporters in conflicts with central
authorities. Sometimes this protest activity remained regionalized, as in the “Aksy events” of
2002—which I address below—but, in other instances, regional elites coordinated through
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horizontal networks formed in parliament, which is how regionalized protests grew into nationallevel revolutions in 2005 and 2010 (Radnitz 2010). In all cases, though, the key players are
regional elites and the local communities in which they are socially embedded.
In discussing the contentious politics of regional appointment and representation in
Kyrgyzstan I rely heavily on Radnitz’s work, which emphasizes the social embeddedness of
local and regional elites and the mobilization of local communities to fight on their behalf in
conflicts with the central government. But, I offer a different perspective from Radnitz on two
key points: first, on the nature and origin of these local social ties; and, second, on what the
object of contention is in these and similar conflicts between center and periphery. In addressing
these differences, I use empirical cases to illustrate the main points, and also to highlight some of
the dynamics described in previous chapters.274 In doing so I seek to build on Radnitz’s theory
in a way that can tell us something about how these many contentious episodes have shaped the
centralization of the Kyrgyz state and administrative relations between center and periphery. At
the end of this chapter I will elaborate on these differences in more detail, drawing on the
empirical data presented here on both the Kazakh and Kyrgyz cases.
The events described below involve numerous individual actors in a variety of local
social contexts. For the sake of factual accuracy and precision, I include all the specific places
and actors. But, the dynamics of events themselves are far more important than any particular
place or person. In recounting the details of the contentious politics of regional appointment and
representation in Kyrgyzstan, I seek to highlight, above all else, one basic pattern: ordinary
people back local political figures, assisted their own officials in resisting central directives for
removal and transfer, and sometimes even deposed central government appointees in the
274

The differences are mainly theoretical and analytical, not empirical. I rely on Radntiz’s accounts of the Aksy
events and Tulip Revolution, supplemented by others, to recount a basic outline of what happened and when.
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provinces to install their local favorite as a “people’s governor.” While electrifying in their own
right, the distinctiveness of these events in the Kyrgyz context becomes more apparent through
comparison with Kazakhstan, which I address afterward.

The Aksy Events (2002)
The Aksy events refer to a series of protests in a rural district of southern Kyrgyzstan that
culminated in the use of violent state force against protestors and was then followed by state
concessions to protestors’ demands. The cause of these events was the arrest of the
parliamentarian, Azimbek Beknazarov, who represented his land-scarce home district of Aksy
(Jalalabad oblast), and was openly critical of a deal in which President Akaev ceded land to
China. Upon his arrest in January 2002, which was widely seen as politically motivated,
thousands of people from his village and district mobilized to fight for his release and for his
reinstatement in parliament. By June 2002, the central government conceded to these demands.
The grassroots campaign to free and reinstate Beknazarov was led by two childhood
friends from his home village (Kara-su), who were soon joined by other former schoolmates.
The “inner core” of his supporters were his family and close acquaintances from his village
(Radnitz 2005: 415). Within one month of Beknazarov’s arrest, his local supporters organized
protests. Part of this organization was a direct outgrowth of the local self-government system
and its officials who “were already well-connected, respected, and had experience in mobilizing
people” for the tasks associated with village governance (412).
During the first two months of protests, the number of participants in Aksy district
swelled into the thousands as Beknazarov’s family and friends activated their own social
networks, which included people in neighboring villages throughout the district. After several
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open conflicts with the district-level administration—including the kidnapping of several
officials by protesters—state security forces were dispatched to arrest the leaders. While
scuffling with marching protestors on March 17, state security forces opened fire, killing several
people.
As a result of the violence, local social mobilization nearly doubled. Across Aksy
district, nearly 8,000 people mobilized to fight for the reinstatement of their deputy (415). In
June, Beknazarov was given a one-year suspended sentence and released from custody, but was
denied his seat in parliament (414). In the days that followed, the protestors were relentless,
marching on every major administrative structure in the region in the hundreds or thousands.
Fearing wider conflict, President Akaev overturned the court ruling, allowing Beknazarov to
hold his office (414).275 Though this conflict was over an elected position and not an appointed
one, the core of the conflict—including its process and resolution—followed the logic of other
events, which I describe below: central authorities, when attempting to remove a local leader
from office, were met with powerful local resistance, and ultimately conceded to local
interests.276 Moreover, the ways in which local government institutions already connected local
leaders with local communities for purposes of village governance were important organizational
features in the mobilization that was now being directed against central authorities.
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Like others who survived these battles with central authorities, Beknazarov went on to obtain even higher-level
state positions. In 2005, he was appointed General Prosecutor of the Kyrgyz Republic. In August 2010, he was
appointed Vice Prime Minister.
276
They key difference with appointed office is that the central government has the formal legal authority to appoint
and remove its appointed officials. In this case they had no firm legal footing to remove Beknazarov in the first
place. Below I address cases of conflict over appointed offices, which follow a similar pattern.
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The Tulip Revolution (2005) and the Talas-Jalalabad Cadre Shuffle (2006)
As noted above, the revolutions in Kyrgyzstan have not been about provincial
governorships alone, but these offices have been deeply contested in both revolutions. In the
course of the Tulip Revolution, all but one of Akaev’s incumbent governors were either forced
from office by mass protest—in miniature versions of what happened to Akaev himself—or
immediately removed and replaced by the new government, led by Kurmanbek Bakiev.277
Among these was the governor of Jalalabad oblast, Zhusubek Sharipov, governor from 2002
until the revolution in March 2005.
Sharipov was an example of a non-local appointment, chosen by President Akaev from
outside the region and without local bases of support. He was born in the Kara-Kulja district of
Osh oblast and worked in several administrative positions in Osh and Bishkek before being
appointed as the governor of Issyk-kul oblast from 2000-2002. His subsequent transfer to
Jalalabad, in 2002, is one of the few examples of observable cadre rotation in Kyrgyzstan, which
is precisely what we should expect to find under Akaev’s explicit attempts to shuffle governors
across regions. So Sharipov’s fate as a deposed non-local governor of Jalalabad, mirroring
Akaev’s as the president of the country, tells us a lot about the fate of cadre rotation in
Kyrgyzstan.
The Tulip Revolution was sparked when supporters of a local candidate for parliament in
Jalalabad, Zhusubek Zheenbekov, lost his race to a pro-Akaev candidate and claimed
intimidation and fraud. Joined by the supporters of other disgruntled losing candidates in the
region—who were denied access to state office as a result—Zheenbekov and his local followers
marched on the governor’s office in Jalalabad city and demanded a meeting with Sharipov, the
277

The Tulip Revolution took place in March 2005. It consisted of large-scale protests in the capital city that led to
the ouster of President Askar Akaev. Here I focus only on specific contentious contests for regional state offices
that took place as the revolution unfolded.
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sitting governor, who was described above. Like Zheenbekov, the other losing candidates
“started the active mobilization of their supporters, the majority of whom were relatives, friends,
and fellow-villagers” (Temirkulov 2010: 593).278
When Governor Sharipov refused to meet with the protestors, they stormed and occupied
the governor’s office. After weeks of fighting with state security agents, the protestors
ultimately prevailed, taking full control of the provincial administrative building. They then
formed an unofficial people’s assembly (kurultai) that chose Zhusubek Zheenbekov as the new
governor of Jalalabad oblast. Within days more than 1,000 protestors had gathered in Osh; there,
too, the provincial governor fled as protestors seized and occupied the governor’s offices
(Khamidov 2006: 88). In a cascade effect, the governors of other provinces were soon being
deposed and replaced by large crowds who favored a local “people’s governor” against Akaev’s
appointed (and often non-local) appointees.
Only after this did attention turn toward Bishkek and President Akaev. Under the
organization of regional elites, in conjunction with an increasingly organized opposition
movement in Bishkek, led by Kurmanbek Bakiev, protestors travelled to the capital, arriving in
the tens of thousands from throughout the country, demanding Akaev’s resignation (Radnitz
2010: 131-166; Temirkulov 2010: 593). The contest for Zheenbekov’s seat in parliament and his
subsequent seizure of the governor’s office—both contests between center and periphery for
control of state offices—were by no means the causes of the Tulip Revolution. But, they were
the proximate events that sparked what followed. The deposed governor, Zhusubek Sharipov,
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Khamidov also notes that “the demonstrators were mainly villagers, relatives, friends, and close associates of the
candidates” and that there was no united opposition movement to depose the president at the outset of what later
became the Tulip Revolution; rather, “each opposition candidate waged a separate struggle in his or her own
locality” (2006: 87).
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whom Akaev appointed to Jalalabad from outside the region, had no social bases to protect him
when the president could not.
On March 25, 2005, the new president, Kurmanbek Bakiev, “confirmed” Zheenbekov as
acting governor of Jalalabad, an ex post facto concession that he probably could not challenge if
he wanted to. But, less than a year later he did, evidence that this initial confirmation was
merely a temporary concession to Zheenbekov’s local supporters. On January 1, 2006, Bakiev
sought to reclaim the state’s formal authority to select its own governors, attempting to remove
Zheenbekov from his post in Jalalabad and rotate him instead to Talas oblast where he would be
an outsider without local support. In response, however, Zheenbekov’s supporters, as they did in
March 2005, rallied in the streets of Jalalabad city, openly challenging Bakiev’s authority.279
The decision to move Zheenbekov to a new region was consistent with the general logic
of cadre rotation, but the choice of Talas oblast as a destination held a special significance. The
sitting governor of Talas oblast at the time, Iskenderbek Aidaraliev, was the only Akaev-era
governor who survived the revolution. Unlike his counterparts in other provinces, he did not
face public demands to resign or leave his post. Subsequent events showed that he had a
significant amount of local support. Thus, by switching Zheenbekov and Aidaraliev, Bakiev was
simultaneously breaking the local bases of support for two of his governors, attempting to make
them more dependent on the central government. He was, in accordance with the logic of cadre
rotation, seeking to dis-embed them from the communities that they were tied to, much as Akaev
had tried to do before him.
But, it was precisely because these two governors had such strong bases of local support
that Bakiev’s orders were fiercely resisted. When Aidaraliev arrived in Jalalabad in early
279

Bakiev himself is a native of Jalalabad oblast, and its former governor (1995-1997). Since Zheenbekov was a
member of an opposing political party (SDPK), we can assume that the two men were not political allies, which
might also have animated Bakiev’s decision to move him to Talas.
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January, in accordance with the president’s orders, he was met by an angry crowd of
Zheenbekov’s supporters, who demanded that Zheenbekov be reinstated. Aidaraiev fled back to
Talas, where his own supporters had amassed in the streets demanding the resignation of
Zheenbekov. In short, the population in each province was actively resisting cadre rotation. On
January 23, Aidaraliev’s supporters declared him the “people’s governor” of Talas. On this same
day, Bakiev met with Zheenbekov and some his supporters in Jalalabad. According to news
reports, a presidential spokesperson explained that Bakiev was “replacing [Zheenbekov] as part
of a policy of [cadre] rotation” (RFE/RL 2006).280
Momentarily, Bakiev appeared to concede, and promised to allow both governors to
remain in their posts—Zheenbekov in Jalalabad and Aidaraliev in Talas. But, the concession
was a ruse. When the crowds disbursed in both cities, Bakiev went ahead with the transfer. On
January 27, 2006, the governors traded places and Bakiev had successfully shuffled his regional
personnel.

The (Informal) Reshaping of Administrative Relations between Bishkek and Jalalabad (2010-14)
Though President Bakiev succeeded in getting his way in the case described above, he
had to overcome significant local resistance to do so. This event, early in his presidency,
demonstrated (again) that the government was not truly free to appoint whomever it wanted, that
there could be public pushback at the local level, and the consideration of the local populations
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Admittedly, Aidaraliev’s biography suggests that his connections to Talas oblast are tenuous, especially in
comparison with others, who are clearly local (like Zheenbekov) or not local (Sharipov, for example). Aidaraliev
was born in Jalalabad oblast but worked for most of his career in Issyk-kul oblast. It was not until 1999 that he
came to Talas, first as the akim of Talas raion and than as governor of Talas oblast (1999-2006). That makes his
case an outlier as he is the only official documented here whose status as a local was unclear yet was still able to
mobilize substantial public support in the locality.
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would need to be taken into account.281 Indeed, subsequent appointments by central authorities
appear to have been disciplined by the fear of local protests. In the aftermath of the 2010 April
Revolution, which I discuss in more detail below, Zheenbekov was again selected in an informal
people’s assembly (kurultai) to be reinstated as governor of Jalalabad. In the four-way contest
that ensued, he voluntarily ceded the post to one of his biggest supporters and allies, Bektur
Asanov (also a Jalalabad native), who was later confirmed by authorities in Bishkek. This, once
again, was not an appointment made by the central government, but an ex post facto concession
to local interests. Even still, Asanov continued to hold the post for nearly two years.
Eventually, in March 2014, Zheenbekov was formally appointed as the governor of
Jalalabad oblast. This was the third time he was selected for this post, but only the first time he
was formally appointed by Bishkek. This suggests that the central government may have
modified its selections based on local popular demand. This, too, is a constraint on its ability to
select whomever it wants, particularly if it prefers candidates from outside the region.
Zheenbekov’s successor, Dzhumagul Egamberdieva, has deep local roots as well. As I
described in the previous chapter, she worked for 23 years at the local school in her village,
Terek-Sai. In 2005, through direct elections, she became the head of Terek-Sai ayil okmotu.
Three years later, she was appointed as akim of Chatkalskii district. What her appointment as
governor represents in broader center-periphery politics is a major concession to local interests,
even as leaders in Bishkek tout the importance of cadre rotation as official policy. Jalalabad
oblast, it should be noted, has been one of the most contested governorships in the country.
Eighteen different contenders can be counted as having come to occupy the post, either legally or
illegally, and not all of them tied to the revolutions, more than in any other province.
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This was not Bakiev’s first chance to learn this lesson. He was the prime minister during the “Aksy events” of
2002. As noted above, Beknazarov ultimately won his battle with the central government. Bakiev, in contrast, was
forced to resign.
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Indeed, Zheenbekov’s state-appointed predecessor, Zhusubali Toromamatov (20122014), was chased from power in May 2013 when 200 protestors stormed the building and
installed a new “people’s governor,” Meder Usenov (Abdyraeva 2013). As a school director in
the region put it, “the old governor was too subordinate, he dances to the tune of the prime
minister, so they [the people] fired him.”282 Usenov occupied the post for only a few days before
being arrested. But, upon his arrest, his supporters came out in even larger numbers setting the
stage for a broader conflict.
The former “people’s governor” and Zheenbekov ally, Bektur Asanov (2010-11),
appeared to endorse Usenov and his supporters, urging the central government to concede. He
said in an interview, “It seems to me that you must take into consideration the demands of the
people. I will tell you honestly, if they do not let [Usenov] go, there will be no stop to the unrest
in Jalalabad” (Kasmalieva 2013). Authorities managed to prevent Usenov from becoming
governor, but they did let him go free even though he illegally seized control of the provincial
administrative office. Six months later, Toromamatov went to Bishkek with a request: “I asked
[Prime Minister] Satybaldiev to transfer me to a different job – closer to Bishkek”
(Dzhumasheva 2014).283 Toromamatov was replaced by the local favorite Zheenbekov (as
described above).
Meanwhile, Iskenderbek Aidaraliev, the former governor of Talas, went on to take
numerous high-level posts in the central government. Perhaps in exchange for his transfer to
Jalalabad in 2006, Aidaraliev was later appointed as Bakiev’s prime minister in 2007, and then
Minister of Land and Water Management and Manufacturing in 2009, and Minister of
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Interview with author, KYG1_Int1_46, October 16, 2013.
Both Toromamatov and Usenov are Jalalabad natives. Toromamatov is from the village Ak-Took, in Suzak
raion; Usenov is from Toboi village, also located in Suzak raion.
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Agriculture in 2010. He, like others, challenged Bishkek’s appointment authority only to end up
with even more power.
After the contentious events surrounding Aideraliev’s transfer in 2006, every governor
appointed in Talas was from the region save for one, Beishenbek Bolotbekov, the previous
governor of Naryn (1993-1996). Conflict between Bolotbekov and the local population led to
his deposition by a crowd of protesters and the selection of a new “people’s governor” in Talas
in 2010. This episode, to which I now turn, was among the proximate events that sparked a
second national-level revolution, leading to the deposition of governors in every province, and,
ultimately, President Bakiev himself.

The April Revolution and Talas oblast (2010).
Like the events that sparked the 2005 Tulip Revolution in Jalalabad, the sequence of
events that unfolded in 2010 are noteworthy because they show that the contestation of
governors’ offices is not necessarily the result of a general disorder that results from large-scale
political tumult. In this case, as in the last one, the seizure of a provincial governor’s office was
prior to the revolution that followed.
Beishenbek Bolotbekov was a native of Naryn oblast and had previously served as the
governor of Naryn (1993-1996), making him—like Sharipov, Zheenbekov, and Aidaraliev—one
of the governors whom central authorities had appointed to multiple regions, in accordance with
cadre rotation. As in these other cases, subsequent events showed how contentious the policy of
cadre rotation can be. Bolotbekov was ultimately deposed by protestors who backed a former
village-level official from the region, Koisun Kurmanalieva.
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The revolution of 2010 began in Talas with the arrest of Bolot Sherinyazov, a lifelong
native of Talas oblast. In 1994, Sherinyazov served in the local council of Manas district, where
he was born (Pushkin village). In 2000, he was elected to the national parliament, a position he
often used to bolster his standing in his home region against central authorities. In 2008,
Sherinyazov led a march to protest Presdient Bakiev’s agreement to cede disputed territory to
Kazakhstan. “Kazakhstan has a lot of land,” Sherinyazov said in an interview, “but together with
our land they are taking away our history, our pride and memory.” Vowing to fight until the end,
and implicitly referencing the Aksy events—which, as noted above, stemmed from the arrest of
Beknazarov when he criticized Akaev’s land deal with China—Sherinyazov taunted the
president: “It would be better if they shot me. I’m ready to die for these lands” (Kanazarov
2008).284
Sherinyazov was the vice-president of the opposition party Ata Meken, and his arrest in
2010 appeared to be purely political as it was linked to his planned participation in an informal
referendum on President Bakiev in Talas, set for April 6. However, the arrest jeopardized his
seat in parliament and, thus, “served as a stimulus for mass mobilization” in the area as “people
protested to protect the leader” (Temirkulov 2010: 597).285 Local protestors assembled in front
of the provincial administrative building demanding Sherinyazov’s release. When the governor
of the province, Beishenbek Bolotbekov, attempted to calm the situation, the crowd “stormed the
administration building and took the governor hostage” (Gullette 2010b: 91). They then took
over the local Ministry of Internal Affairs offices, and the Minister of Internal Affairs,
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Admittedly, Sherinyazov’s tone was more nationalistic than regional, given that the land in question was not
even part of Talas oblast, but neighboring Issyk-kul.
285
Like many of the other figures outlined above, Sherinyazov ultimately bested central authorities. After Bakiev
fled the country, the new transitional government named Sherinyazov its new Minister of Internal Affairs. Thus,
just two weeks after his initial arrest, he and Bakiev had virtually traded places. Sherinyazov held the post until July
2010 when he announced his intention to seek a seat in parliament.
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Modomusa Kongantiev, was “also taken captive and savagely beaten” (ibid.). Bolotbekov and
Kongantiev, who was dispatched directly from Bishkek, had no supporters in the region.
By the end of the day, the crowd had illegally elected a new “people’s governor” of
Talas, Koisun Kurmanalieva.286 Kurmanalieva was born in Orto-Aryk village, in Talas district,
Talas oblast, and lived and worked in the region for her entire career, primarily within the local
village government of Dolon.287 From 1987 to 1994, she served on the executive committee of
the Dolon village soviet, the Soviet-era predecessor to the village councils that were established
in 1994. She then served on her village council while simultaneously working as the head of the
Dolon village board (1997-2002). For all of the late Soviet period and the first 11 years after
independence, Kurmanalieva was a village-level official in the same village in which she was
born. Like many other village-level officials with strong local social bases, she was later
appointed or elected to higher-level state posts. From 2005 to 2008, she served as the deputy
head of state administration in Talas oblast and in 2008, she was elected as a deputy in the
district-level council of Talas raion.
It was her strong local social bases that enabled Kurmanalieva to take control over the
governor’s office in 2010. Though the governor is an official representative of the central
government in Talas, and central authorities have the formal authority to select whomever they
want, Kurmanalieva was chosen by her local supporters, without Bishkek’s input. The
transitional government—which came to power as a result of the revolution that followed these
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A different group of demonstrators chose a different people’s governor, Sheraly Abdyldaev, from the Manas
district of Talas oblast. Abdyldaev spent most of his career working as a mechanic, but throughout the 2000s held
various posts in the Manas district administration and also became the Chairman of the Talas oblast council (20032005) and Deputy Head of Talas oblast (2005-2006). How and why Kurmanalieva ultimately emerged as the victor
of this contest is not known. Though Bishkek did not select either candidate, it is possible that they resolved
potential conflict between the two of them. Within weeks the government confirmed Kurmalalieva as governor and
appointed Abdyldaev as Minister of State Property.
287
Dolon ayil okmotu consists of three villages, Kurmanalieva’s home village (Orto-Aryk) and two others.
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events—confirmed her appointment only after the fact. Nevertheless, she held the post for five
years before resigning.
Kurmanalieva was not the only local person who took control of regional state offices at
this time. She was simply the first. In the course of the April Revolution—as in the Tulip
Revolution before it—similar events unfolded in other provinces and districts throughout the
country. One report notes that opposition groups everywhere were “occupying the buildings of
local organs of power in the regions” (Fergana 2010a). Local people occupied administrative
buildings in Tokmok city (Chui oblast), and in the district-level akimats in Chui (Chui oblast),
Bazar-Korgon and Aksy (both in Jalalabad oblast) (Fergana 2010a). A village elder from BazarKorgon described what happened: “People went right away to the akimchilik. Everyone there
was appointed by Bakiev and people just went ahead and chose their own people instead …
people elected themselves, just regular people from Bazar Korgon. When they kicked out the
akim, we chose a new one, Kuban.”288
Similarly, in Sokulu district (Chui oblast), an “alternative ‘people’s akim’” (narodnyi
akim) was “appointed” by the population (Fergana 2010a). Protesters there also demanded the
release of “their fellow local” (ikh zemlyak) from Sukulu, Temir Sariev, an opposition leader
whom the government had detained (Fergana 2010b).289 In Naryn oblast, protestors stormed the
provincial governor’s office “demanding a change of the mayor of Naryn and the akim of
[Naryn] raion to their side” (TsentrAziya 2010). They then selected an “alternative ‘people’s’
governor,” Adyl Esenbekov (Fergana 2010b). This was in April, 2010; Esenbekov held the post
until July.
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Interview with author, KYG1_Int1_4, October 14, 2013.
As typical of a pattern in Kyrgyzstan (and in marked contrast to Kazakhstan), Sariev went on to obtain even
higher positions in the state. From 2010 to 2012 he served as Minister of Finance. In 2015, he was appointed Prime
Minister.
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Indeed, incumbent governors in all seven provinces were deposed and sometimes several
local contenders—“people’s governors”—vied for control. As in the Tulip Revolution, it was
only after this that protesters focused their attention on President Bakiev. The specific details of
who did what and where, though documented above, are less important than the broader pattern:
once again, the revolution started in the regions, was sparked by contests over local offices, and
entailed the mass mobilization of local communities in support of their preferred local officials.

The People’s Mayor, Melis Myrzakmatov (2009-2014)
One of the few Bakiev-era appointees to survive the revolution in 2010 was Melis
Myrzakmatov, the mayor of Osh city—the “capital of the south”—from January 2009 to
December 2013. As I describe below, the only reason he was able to hold his position for so
long was because of the enormous base of support he had within the city. During his tenure he
gained a reputation for his fierce independence and outright refusal to obey policies set in
Bishkek. When the central government sought to fire him for insubordination in August 2010,
thousands of his supporters protested until they relented. He continued to hold his post for
nearly three years after this, serving under a government that had the legal authority to fire him,
but that lacked the actual power to do so.
Myrzakmatov’s case somewhat complicates the framework I presented in previous
chapters. First, the status of Osh city as a unit of administration does not clearly fall under the
local, district, or provincial levels. Formally it has “oblast status,” meaning that it is equal to
other oblasts and is not formally governed as a unit within the oblast that it is territorially
situated in (Osh oblast).290 Yet, as a city, Osh is governed like other cities and villages,
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It is simultaneously the administrative center of Osh oblast.
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according to the framework of local self-government, with one main exception. When
Myrzakmatov was first chosen as mayor in 2009, the rules for selection in Osh and Bishkek
cities were the same as those for governors, not ayil okmotu or mayors.291 At least initially, then,
Myrzakmatov was appointed by the president, not elected by the population. Thus, the
delineation of local (village) and provincial levels that I used in prior chapters does not neatly
apply to Osh city, which is its own hybrid of city and province.
Related to the status of Osh as a city, Myrzakmatov’s local social ties are undoubtedly
more complex and less complete than his counterparts in villages and smaller cities. As noted
above, Myrzakmatov was directly appointed by the president. In addition, Osh city has a
population of approximately 250,000. That makes it significantly larger than any village and
precludes the possibility that Myrzakmatov personally knows all or even most of the city’s
residents. Moreover, as I discuss in more detail below, Myrzakmatov is a Kyrgyz nationalist in a
city that is ethnically divided, further complicating his ties to the population.
At the same time, Myrzakmatov is a local person who has lived and worked in Osh his
entire career. He was born in Kara-suu raion, the district that territorially encompasses Osh city,
in a village called Papan, which is located approximately fifteen miles from the city center. He
attended Osh Technological University, and took his first job in the Ministry of Internal Affairs
in Osh oblast and then as a state tax inspector in Osh city. He then worked as the deputy director
for a company, Koopsnab, for two years and as the director of a charitable fund, Eldik Demilge,
before being elected to parliament as a representative of his district.
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Unlike other units of local self-government, the laws governing the selection of mayors in Bishkek and Osh are
determined by parliament and have been subject to change over time. The mayors of these two cities have variously
been directly elected by the population, directly appointed by the president, or indirectly elected by the city council.
In itself this is evidence for the fact that the selection of regional officials is deeply contested, as central authorities
have never secured uncontested appointment powers in Kyrgyzstan’s two largest cities.
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Bakiev appointed Myrzakmatov as mayor of Osh city in 2009. But, unlike the many
other Bakiev appointees who were deposed during the revolution in 2010, Myrzakmatov cleverly
organized his supporters to help takeover the office he already held. Rather than defend his
office as its incumbent, he effectively did what Kurmanalieva did in Talas, and what Zheenbekov
had twice done in Jalalabad. The difference in Myrzakmatov’s case was that there was no
outsider to depose. He was already a popular local leader, and he succeeded in holding his office
because he was able to mobilize a large crowd of friends, family, and acquaintances to rally in
support of his tenure. According to Timur Kamchibekov, Myrzakmatov’s deputy, the mayor
“gathered a group of his people, his supporters, his relatives and they demanded that
Myrzakmatov [be kept on], that the people are for Melis Myrzakmatov and the people demand
that he [continue] to work as mayor and not leave his post” (Pannier 2010). Thus, even though
he came to office as a Bakiev appointee, he only continued to hold it as a “people’s mayor.”
This makes him very much like other “people’s governors” of the post-Bakiev period.
When a new transitional government took power after Bakiev fled in April 2010,
Myrzakmatov regularly relied on his powerful local support base to thwart subsequent efforts to
fire him. When rumors swirled in July 2010 that authorities in Bishkek planned to remove him,
Myrzakmatov warned that, “only the people can decide the question of my leaving office”
(Pannier 2010). In August 2010, when central authorities did decide it was time to replace the
mayor with their own candidate—in accordance with their formal legal authority—nearly 3,000
people rallied in the streets of Osh until the government backed down. Myrzakmatov, speaking
to the crowd that had assembled in front of City Hall, proclaimed defiantly “I am going nowhere.
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I am with the people. I am with you” to which the crowd responded by chanting “victory,
victory” (Brooke 2010).292 He later wrote that the government
…needed a person who would unconditionally execute all of their orders and who would crumble like glass
beads in front of them. In my opinion, the population of the city would never have accepted another
person, whom the transitional government appointed as mayor. Every day inhabitants come to support me
(Myrzakmatov 2011: 74).

Myrzakmatov did not merely hold his appointed office against the wishes of central
authorities. He argued that the government in Bishkek had no legal authority to replace him or
tell him what to do. When asked in an interview with a Russian newspaper, “why didn’t the
authorities [vlast] pressure you and try to force you to leave?” Myrzakmatov replied, “behind me
stand the people. If they say: Melis, you are wrong, I will leave. But directives from the
transitional government do not have any legal force in the south” (Kommersant 2010). A colonel
of the militsia in Osh City, who repeatedly described Myrzakmatov as “just a simple person,”
explained that, “because the people support him, he can stand up to them [central authorities].
When the central government says the wrong thing, he stands up to them and says it to their
faces. He doesn’t listen to them.”293 Another city resident noted that the central government
“has to be very careful with the mayor”; they “cannot just use force to take him out” because
“they know that if they did this they would have their own problems. If people support the
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According to his written account, the government first asked him to resign voluntarily. When he demanded that
the president sign a formal order removing him from his post, they sweetened the deal by offering him other
positions to detach him from his local supporters in Osh: “They offered me a few embassies, Minister of Natural
Resources, the Agency of Forest Management, [and] the Director of State Material Resources. They told me to pick
one of these positions […] I said to myself, even if I am left without a position, I will be together with my people. I
answered [to the president]: ‘Roza Isakovna I am not one of those who will throw himself at a position like a dog at
a bone, not one who is satisfied with slop. If you want, fire me right now, I won’t be offended’” (Myrzakmatov
2011: 75).
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Interview with author, September 30, 2013, KYG1_Int1_11. The colonel also described how Bishkek’s
appointment of militsia heads had been shaped by the mayor. Even though the Minister of Internal Affairs has the
full authority to make these appointments, they consult with Myrzakmatov and defer to his demands: “There were
situations when there was tension between the head of the militsia and the mayor, and the mayor protested and
continually called the Ministry to complain and finally the Ministry fired him. The mayor is like the owner of a
house—he is the owner of the city. He is extremely powerful here.” This, too, is another example of a constraint on
the central government’s formal appointment authority.
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mayor that is it.”294 He went on to describe the broader implications for Bishkek’s appointment
authority in the regions:
There should be a lesson learned for the government. They need to understand that they cannot mess with
local people. Local people should know better and do know better and this is good precedent for the
shaping of policy on this issue [regarding appointments]. They have to care, they must listen to people at
least about whom they appoint. They should be afraid of what will happen if they don’t.295

After the government’s failed bid to replace Myrzakmatov in August 2010, he continued
to hold his office for another three years. During his tenure he “continuously ignored the central
government by exerting full power in his ‘territory’ and often oppos[ed] decisions coming from
the capital city” going so far as to propose the creation of his own independent police force in
2011 (Osomonov 2011).
By all accounts, Myrzakmatov accomplished a great deal and was intensely popular,
partly because he succeeded in visibly improving the city’s infrastructure without any help from
Bishkek, earning him an “almost mythic status” among city residents (Ryskulova 2013). The
Deputy Chairman of the Osh City Council, Amanyllo Rozybaevich, complained that authorities
in Bishkek treat Osh “as a stepmother treats a stepson […] they discriminate against the whole
city because they don’t like the mayor.”296 He cited as an example the fact that, in 2013, from a
Turkish loan of $106 million, $35 million was given to Bishkek city, but nothing was given to
Osh. Despite the fact that “we don’t get any money” from Bishkek, “the mayor works hard to
find ways to complete these projects without the government’s help” (ibid.). It appears that this
only bolstered his popularity.
The mayor’s troubleshooting included a reputation for being deeply connected to the city
and its population. City myths hold that Myrzakmatov walks the streets at night helping people
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Interview with author, KYG1_Int1_8ii, October 30, 2013.
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Interview with author, September 27, 2013, KYG1_Int1_7.
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with their problems, and that he personally checked on the progress of public projects to ensure
their completion (Ryskulova 2013). A member of the city council described how, “every
Tuesday, [the mayor] sits in the first floor [of city hall], not in his office, and meets only with
city residents who come to speak with him.”297 In 2012, two local newspapers named
Myrzakmatov “mayor of the year” and “personality of 2012” (Mukhametrakhimova 2013).
According to some reports he was successful in improving the city’s drinking water and the
quality of heating in apartment buildings (Mukhametrakhimova 2013).298 In a state index
tracking citizen’s levels of personal trust, the Osh city organs of local self-government—which
includes the mayor’s office—received the highest ratings of any state institution in the entire
country, national or local (National Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic 2013).299
Myrzakmatov’s local popularity and his conflict with central authorities is admittedly
broader and more complex than his control over the mayor’s office alone. Part of the reason the
central authorities wanted to get rid of Myrzakmatov is because of the role he is believed to have
played in ethnic conflicts that broke out in parts of Jalalabad and Osh in June 2010, in the
months following the April Revolution.300 When fighting broke out between ethnic Kyrgyz and
Uzbeks in 2010, Myrzakmatov was accused of fomenting the violence and even assisting Kyrgyz
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Interview with author, October 1, 2013, KYG1_Int1_38. Numerous other city residents also made reference to
this weekly ritual.
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The frequent lack of heat in the south during winters inspires bitter regional rivalries. Kyrgyzstan has a central
heating system and the vast majority of all the country’s heat and electricity is consumed in Bishkek, leading to
shortages in other parts of the country, like Osh.
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On a scale from -100 to +100, the level of personal trust given to the organs of local self-government in Osh city
was +55.6. The next highest ranked local self-governments were significantly lower: Osh oblast (+25.1) and Batken
oblast (+22.1) – these are aggregate measures of all local governments within each province. As noted in the
previous chapter, the organs of local self-government had the highest overall ratings of trust for any state institutions
while nearly every organ of the central government was given a negative rating.
300
Like virtually all of the population centers in southern Kyrgyzstan, Osh has a large population of ethnic Uzbeks.
Demographically the city is approximately 45% Uzbek and 45% Kyrgyz, with the remaining population being made
up of other ethnic groups, mainly Russians.
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fighters. He also defied authorities in Bishkek as they made decisions about how to help bring
the conflict to an end.
His most notable act of insubordination came when the government in Bishkek, under its
formal authority to conduct foreign policy, agreed to allow an OSCE police advisory group to
monitor events in the south in the midst of the conflict. Myrzakmatov objected, noting that the
city council had “unambiguously said no” to a foreign presence in the region. Claiming that the
OSCE would only make the conflict worse, the mayor defiantly announced that, “we will not
allow a repeat of the Kosovo experience in the Fergana valley” (Kommersant 2010). Moreover,
he questioned the central government’s authority to make such an agreement with the OSCE in
the first place. The head of the mayoral apparatus, Aidar Kolievich, implicitly suggested that
authorities in Bishkek did not have any more right to make this decision than the mayor of Osh
city, “it was just a transitional government […] it does not mean we wanted to disobey them, it
means that we wanted to obey our own government, here in the south.”301
Myrzakmatov issued an implicit threat to the OSCE, saying that he could not ensure the
security of foreign observers in the south. Explicit threats were also delivered, albeit
unofficially, from people believed to be Myrzakmatov’s closest supporters. One of the 52
officers assigned to the advisory group said, “the OSCE started receiving threats that any OSCE
police in the south would be directly targeted, killed, burned alive, dragged through the streets,
and things like this.”302 In the end, the central government backed down and renegotiated the
OSCE mission into “a shell of what it was supposed to do,” consisting of “unarmed police
consultants” who would not be involved in any kind of police monitoring (ibid.). Even by
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Interview with author, September 26, 2013, KYG1_Int1_47.
Interview with author, November 4, 2013, KYG1_Mt1_27.
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December 2011, after President Atambayev took office, top members of his administration said
that “they have no way of influencing the situation” in the south (ICR 2012: i).
For these reasons, the center-periphery politics of cadre appointment and control in the
context of these ethnic conflicts is considerably more complicated than other cases. First,
Myrzakmatov’s support was both local and ethnic, and his stand against the central government
was not only construed through the prism of local versus national prerogative, but also as Kyrgyz
versus Uzbek.303 Indeed, as popular as the mayor was among ethnic Kyrgyz in the south, he was
not well liked (if not despised) by many Uzbeks. Second, Myrzakmatov’s defiance of the central
government was often explicitly framed according to the specific context of the revolution. He
did not so much question the abstract authority of Bishkek as he questioned the transitional
government specifically. They had illegally deposed his former patron. Naturally, he questioned
their legal right to issue orders.
In December 2013, central authorities were finally successful in replacing Myrzakmatov,
but only because he agreed to go without a fight, for reasons that remain somewhat mysterious.
Tensions between Bishkek and the mayor bubbled up again on November 20 when a popular
southern deputy (and former speaker), Akmatbek Keldibekov, was charged with corruption and
put under house arrest. Hundreds of Keldibekov’s family, friends, and supporters gathered in his
home region, Alai district (Osh oblast), and began to organize his “defense,” which consisted of
protests in Osh and Bishkek. By November 21, Keldibekov’s supporters were picketing in front
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At the same time an element of this conflict does reinforce center-periphery political dynamics. Though the
conflict in the south was between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks, ethnic Kyrgyz themselves are sharply divided
between north and south. Myrzakmatov’s position as a Kyrgyz nationalist in the south actually pits him against
ethnic Kyrgyz in the north, who do have some significant political alliances with the Uzbek community in the south.
Interestingly, the derogatory term “sart,” which ethnic Kyrgyz in the south apply to Uzbeks, is used by ethnic
Kyrgyz in the north as a generic (though still derogatory) term for all southerners in the country, whether they be
Uzbek or Kyrgyz.
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of the White House to demand his release.304 Protests escalated in the south, too. On December
2, thousands of Keldibekov’s supporters gathered in Osh, protesting in front of the governor’s
office. There, Myrzakmatov publicly backed Keldibekov and his supporters, calling the arrest
“nonsense” (Zozulya 2013). Protestors made a failed attempt to take over the provincial
administrative building of Osh oblast.305
Within days, Prime Minister Satybaldiev issued a decree to remove Myrzakmatov from
his post. The ostensible reason was for his participation in the protests. Discussing the firing,
Deputy Omurbek Tekebaev pointedly said, “maybe Myrzakmatov fails to understand the
interests of the state and the need for security. It looks like that’s why the prime minister
decided to sack him” (Erkin and Nurmatov 2013). Myrzakmatov’s supporters immediately
assembled in front of City Hall to protest his removal, but the mayor urged everyone to go home,
stating simply (and unexpectedly) that he agreed with the prime minister’s decision (ibid.).
While this appeared to be a major concession, it is more likely that Myrzakmatov and
central authorities had struck a deal. Only days after Myrzakmatov was fired, President
Atambayev signed a law that allowed for the mayors of Osh and Bishkek to be elected by a
secret ballot in the city council rather than appointed by Bishkek. Because Myrzakmatov’s own
political party (Uluttar Birimdigi) held a majority in the city council, the law was believed to
assure his continued dominance of the city. Thus, it appears that it was Bishkek, not
Myrzakmatov, that had made the biggest concession. They fired Myrzakmatov now, but gave up
their formal authority to appoint and fire other mayors later.
The election was held just weeks later, on January 15, 2014, meaning that Myrzakmatov
was only out of office for a little more than one month. Yet, despite the fact that his own party
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Personal observation, Bishkek. The White House is the colloquial name given to the building that houses the
president’s administrative offices.
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Keldibekov’s supporters continued their protests well into the summer of 2014.
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held 22 seats in the council, Myrzakmatov received only 19 votes in the secret ballot, raising
suspicions that central authorities had interfered with the process. Pointing his finger at “those in
power – those in the central power structures,” Myrzakmatov complained that “these elections
were held completely unfairly, completely unlawfully, in a way that anyone would despise”
(RFE/RL 2014). Several of his allies in the city council resigned in protest. A reported 10,000
people assembled in the central square of the city to demonstrate in support of the mayor,
including Osh’s former chief of police who burned a portrait of the president in protest (ibid.).
Strangely, though, Myrzakmatov called the protests off and urged everyone to go home,
announcing that the “real political struggle will take place in 15 days after the cold weather is
over” (ibid.). Two weeks passed. The spring came and went. Yet, nothing happened. How the
elections turned out as they did and why Myrzakmatov chose to go quietly when he could have
caused problems remain unknown.
Even considering these complicating factors and caveats, Myrzakmatov’s overall tenure
helps to underline the lack of control central authorities have over their own cadre and their
ability to appoint whom they want, where and when they want to. In repeated contests with
central authorities over who would control Osh city, how they would be selected, and what
orders they were going to carry out, Myrzakmatov seemed almost invincible. Even though they
got rid of him in the end, authorities in Bishkek ended up sacrificing their formal appointment
authority to do so.
The complicating factors of two revolutions and their aftermath hardly soften the
significance of the many cases outlined above. First, contention for provincial office was as
much a partial cause of the revolutions as an outcome. That is, these were not just opportunistic
seizures of power stemming from temporary lawlessness in the capital. The reverse is more
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accurate: temporary lawlessness in the capital partly resulted from seizures of power in the
regions. Second, when central authorities are challenged by regional officials as frequently as
they are in Kyrgyzstan, it cannot be considered exceptional or unusual, but representative of
normal center-periphery politics. Myrzakmatov’s relationship with Bishkek might be considered
extreme, but that is still relative to what passes for normal.
Popular mobilization against appointed incumbents is common enough that a Kyrgyz
neologism now exists to describe it: Ketsinizm is the phenomenon of demanding that an official
leave his or her appointed office.306 As a villager in Bazar Korgon put it, “if we don’t like the
[district] akim or the governor, we can tell him to go to hell!”307 A lawyer in Bishkek explained:
When there is a person who is appointed by the central government that the population does not accept they
will just bring their own person and say “get out of here, our person will work here.” If the prime minister
is smart enough he will appoint from the local level. But, if he is not smart, he will of course choose his
own person, and it will again bring such a situation when people will just remove him.308

As this testimony suggests, the distinction between local versus non-local appointments
lies at the heart of these politics. Moreover, socially embedded village-level officials are often
seen as the representatives of local interests, and those most deserving of district and provincial
level posts. One ayil okmotu argued that, “only the ayil okmotu knows the problems in the
village and so it would make him the most effective akim [of the district]. Even when there is
someone who is more qualified and educated, people want someone who is local. In every
region, in every village, people will only support someone who is from their community.”309
Sometimes the preference for local cadre over outsiders is expressed as antipathy for any
level of government higher than the village. The deputy of a local council in Bazar Korgon
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Ketsin! is the imperative “leave!” which is a ubiquitous demand heard at public rallies against incumbent
authorities throughout the country. The suffix –izm has the same meaning as its English counterpart, -ism.
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Interview with author, KYG1_Mt1_29, August 28, 2013.
309
Interview with author, KYG1_Int1_23, October 4, 2013.
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district said, “instead of increasing the status of the akims and governors [as the prime minister
had proposed], it is better to increase the power of village authorities because only local level
officials know the needs of the population. Only we work directly with the people.”310 A village
elder in a different village noted, “the akim does not really work in the village or know about
village issues. The ayil okmotu should have this power!”311 Likewise, a school director asked,
“What is the governor for? We don’t need him. We have an ayil okmotu and that is enough.
The prime minister can speak directly to the ayil okmotu, the others [akims and governors] are
just unnecessary.”312 Rather than fight for control over governor’s offices and district-level
akimats, they should be eliminated or diminished in power.
But, given that governors and akims do still exist, cadre rotation often leads to open
conflict. As in the cases above, the central government sometimes concedes to local demands
for fear of public backlash, which is also a constraint on its ability to select and control its own
cadre. A program manager of a local NGO in Bishkek noted that, “there is this regionalism in
Kyrgyzstan. If you are not from this region the people will not accept you, especially since
2010, it is almost impossible. The central government is very weak.”313 A former official in
Bishkek bemoaned local resistance to outside appointments. “People for sure will prefer
someone from their own locality, but this is not right, we need to have this rotation […] there is a
stereotype that a person who comes from a different region is not interested in helping to develop
the region that they work in. But this is a stereotype, and we should break it by explaining to
people what is best.”314
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As I attempted to show in chapters four and five, this “stereotype” is not a primordial
characteristic of the “Kyrgyz mentality” (as it is sometimes described); rather, it is a feature of
state-society relations that is endogenous to state formation in the post-independence period.
The institutions of local self-government forged state-society relations in such a way that local
social ties were incorporated into local state institutions. Moral economies of trust in villages
became state-society relations between local officials and local populations with the creation of
Kyrgyzstan’s system of local self-governance.

II. Center-Periphery Appointment Politics in Kazakhstan
Regional appointment politics in Kazakhstan differs from Kyrgyzstan in two notable
ways. First, there is less observable contention. In Kazakhstan, President Nazarbayev appoints
whom he wants, where he wants them, and he regularly relocates, fires, or imprisons the
governors and mayors of cities who become too independent, or who express broader political
ambitions. That is, there is rarely or never any significant pushback against the president’s
regional appointments, least of all from local populations, who are more likely to celebrate the
removal of a local or regional official for corruption than protest against it.
Second, in cases where contention is observable and regional governors or mayors try to
mobilize public support against the president, they invariably fail. They receive virtually no
public support at the local level, and are quickly subjected to investigations for corruption or
abuse of power. In the end, powerful regional officials who have challenged the president are
typically arrested, imprisoned, exiled, or end up dead or disappeared. Rarely do they remain in
power. As Junisbai suggests, the reason that provincial governors in Kazakhstan lack public
support in their fights with the president is because they are continually rotated through different
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offices in center and periphery (Junisbai 2010: 254-259). Through rotation, the president “has
kept akims from either becoming too popular with constituents or entrenching themselves,” in
local economic and social structures (ibid. 256). Junisbai’s point is to argue that center-periphery
politics in Kazakhstan are negligible. Yet, it would be a mistake to suggest that no struggle for
power exists simply because the president has routinely bested his regional cadre when conflict
arises. After all, if center-periphery politics were not relevant in Kazakhstan, the president
would have no need for cadre rotation policies in the first place.
Perhaps the most prominent case in Kazakhstan’s post-independence period is the arrest
and exile of Galymzhan Zhakiyanov, the former governor of Semipalatinsk oblast (1994-1997)
and Pavlodar oblast (1997-2001). I focus most extensively on the Zhakiyanov case for two
reasons. First, unlike other powerful regional officials, Zhakiyanov’s struggle with the president
was embedded in a larger opposition movement, the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan
(DVK).315 The DVK was the most significant opposition movement since Kazakhstan became
an independent country, and its ultimate demise—which consisted largely of Zhakiyanov’s
arrest—sheds light on how the president fares in battles with his regional and national opponents.
Second, while many powerful regional elites are arrested under political circumstances that are
hidden from public view, the case of the DVK and Zhakiyanov was public, and it was clearly
and explicitly related to the politics of regional appointment. Nazarbayev’s victory over
Zhakiyanov effectively ended public debate over the president’s regional appointment powers as
they were established under the constitution.
On November 18, 2001, the newly founded Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan issued a
declaration of political demands signed by a number of prominent elites. Zhakiyanov was the

315

The acronym is derived from the movement’s Russian name, Demokraticheskii Vybor Kazakhstana.

258

leader of the group, alongside Mukhtar Ablyazov. Both men were wealthy businessmen who
also held high-level state posts. Zhakiyanov, prior to his governorships, was the director of his
own firm, Toman, and general director of a financial-industrial group Semei. Ablyazov was a
wealthy businessman and former Minister of Energy (1998-1999). It is widely believed that
Ablyazov had a business dispute with President Nazarbayev’s then-powerful son-in-law, Rakhat
Aliev, leading him to help organize the DVK (Isaacs 2011: 69-70).316
Consisting mainly of wealthy state and economic elites whose status in Nazarbayev’s
inner circle was insecure, DVK’s main political goals were for protections of their independence
under the rubric of democratic style reforms (Junisbai and Junisbai 2005). Among these reforms
was eliminating the president’s power to appoint provincial governors (akims). Instead, the
group pushed for direct elections (Makhmutova 2004: 6). At a televised press conference on the
day of the organization’s founding, Zhakiyanov—then the governor of Pavlodar—said, “we
consider that power today is concentrated and overly centralized and we believe it to be a good
cause for this power to be dispersed and balanced, both by level—from top to bottom—and also
by branch. That is, there must be a balance.”317 Later, in front of DVK supporters in Almaty, he
declared that, “akims must be elected, responsible for and accountable to, and under the control
of their own people.”318 It was not the first time Zhakiyanov had made these demands. In
September 2001, just months before starting the DVK, Zhakiyanov had published an article titled
“Time to Make a Choice” (Vremya Delat Vybor). In it, he argued that provincial governors
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Later, Rakhat Aliev also fell from power, under circumstances that remain unclear. Long presumed to be
Nazarbayev’s successor, the government brought charges of kidnapping and treason against Aliev in 2008. At the
time, he was serving as ambassador to Austria and lived in hiding for the next several years shuffling between
Austria and Malta. Later Austrian officials opened their own investigation and, in 2014, arrested Aliev on charges
of kidnapping and murder. In February 2015, he was found dead in his jail cell while awaiting trial. It was ruled a
suicide.
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Galym Zhakiyanov speaking at a press conference in Almaty, November 18, 2001. The full press conference
can be viewed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bRBZp0XA_po last viewed June 2, 2015.
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z0vAEfxR-P0 at time marking 04:44, last viewed June 4, 2015.

259

should be directly elected (HRW 2004: 28). For governors like Zhakiyanov, direct elections
would mean political autonomy from the central government; for the president it would mean
losing the power to appoint and fire his top regional personnel.319
The government’s response to the DVK’s November 18 declaration was immediate and
uncompromising. On November 20, Prime Minister Tokayev announced on television that
members of the DVK who still held government posts would be fired immediately, according to
the president’s orders. Zhaikyanov was mentioned by name, as were several others. In
subsequent days, four of Zhakiyanov’s deputies were also fired. Twenty other officials at the
provincial and local level in Pavlodar who were “perceived as DVK supporters” resigned
voluntarily, though likely under political pressure (Human Rights Watch 2004: 13).
Initially undeterred, the members of the DVK organized a public meeting for January 19,
2002, in the circus building in Almaty.320 The venue was chosen to accommodate a large
audience, which the organizers planned to televise. Zauresh Battalova, then a Senate Deputy and
original member of the DVK said, “it was broadcast live on television so everyone in the country
could see how many people came, and so they could hear what we were saying. Everyone gave
speeches, including Zhakiyanov, Duvanov, and myself and we discussed all of the themes in our
platform.”321 But, the meeting was interrupted. As Battalova recounted, “the broadcast was
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Other demands made by the DVK included creation of a parliamentary system, establishment of independent
courts, electoral reform, and the strengthening of an independent media. As Junisbai and Junisbai note, these were
not necessarily driven by idealistic notions of democracy, but instead represented wealthy elites’ attempts to obtain
legal protections for their political and business interests from Nazarbayev’s friends and family (2005).
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Since a meeting of the “Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan” would not be permitted, the group met as “A
Meeting of the Democratic Society of Kazakhstan” (Sobranie Demokraticheskoi Obshchestvennosti Kazakhstana).
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Interview with author, KAZ_Int2_50, June 26, 2014.
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stopped because somebody shot at the broadcasting equipment with an automatic weapon and
destroyed it.”322
In early February, formal criminal charges were filed against Zhakiyanov and Ablyazov.
By the end of March they were both arrested. Zhakiyanov was charged with abuse of power
while serving as akim of Pavlodar. Prosecutors alleged that he illegally sold state property below
market value (HRW 2004: 29-30). He was convicted and sentenced to seven years in prison.323
Amnesty International complained that the trials were politically motivated (2003) while Human
Rights Watch described Zhakiyanov as a “political prisoner” (2004: 27-34).
These arrests and convictions may have outraged international observers and prodemocracy urban intellectuals in Almaty, but they led to little reaction by ordinary Kazakhstanis.
This is because the DVK and its members lacked grassroots social bases outside of Almaty.
Nearly all of its members were Moscow-educated wealthy business elites and powerful state
officials. One study notes that the members of the DVK were never able “translate [their]
organizational advantages into the creation of a wide base of popular support” (Junisbai and
Junisbai 2005: 389). The DVK’s January 2002 meeting in Almaty, which I described above,
underlines the point: it was both physically and socially removed from ordinary people, and did
not involve the participation of anyone outside of Almaty, save through the artificial and virtual
medium of television. These elites, in short, were socially unembedded.
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According to one account this happened only after the fact, as retribution to the television station that covered it,
and was accompanied by the firebombing of a newspaper office associated with one of DVK’s founders (Junisbai
and Junisbai 2005: 380); Human Rights Watch makes no mention of the shooting, but says simply that the television
stations covering the event were “abruptly taken off the air” (2004: 14).
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Ablyazov was sentenced to six years but was pardoned by the president in December 2003 under a presumed
agreement that he would no longer be involved in politics. He was given political asylum by the UK in 2011;
however, in late 2013 the High Court in London charged him with defrauding investors and embezzling $5 billion in
Russia and $400 million in Ukraine while he was head of BTA bank. He fled to France in January and was
apprehended by French authorities in July 2013. French courts ruled in October 2014 and March 2015 that he
should be extradited to Russia.
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Zhakiyanov, for example, was originally from Semipalatinsk and was only later moved to
Pavlodar, in accordance with the policy of cadre rotation. His bases of support and network of
social connections in Pavlodar—the province he was appointed to govern at the time he led the
DVK—could not have been deep or overlapping. Unlike his Kyrgyz counterparts whom I
described above—Myrzakmatov in Osh, Zheenbekov in Jalalabad, and Kurmanalieva in Talas—
Zhakiyanov had no local supporters to turn to when the central government decided to get rid of
him. Indeed, when his arrest was pending, Zhakiyanov did not flee to Semipalatinsk or
Pavlodar. Instead, he sought refuge with the international allies who supported his proposed
reforms and temporarily hunkered down in the French, British, and German embassies.324
Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry was forced to negotiate his release, promising to give him a fair
trial, and allowing him to meet regularly with representatives from the European Union (HRW
2004: 28).325 Later, after he was freed from prison, he fled to the United States. To ordinary
people in Pavlodar, Zhakiyanov was just a powerful businessman and high-level state official
who had little connection to them or their problems.
Some have argued that opposition leaders in Kazakhstan should be in a strong position to
challenge the central government because they are organized and united, they have vast amounts
of independent wealth to fund their activities, and they have a clearly defined legislative agenda
for reform (Junisbai and Junisbai 2005). Yet, “popular political mobilization” has “proven
challenging” for them (2005: 388). That is, they lack the connections to society that would
provide for wider bases of public support. In contrast, these scholars describe the opposition in
Kyrgyzstan as “the mirror opposite” (387). There, the opposition consists of “disorganized”
groups linked to different localities “which have not articulated a program for wider political
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The French, British, and German embassies in Almaty were all located in the same building.
According to Human Rights Watch, the Kazakhstani government violated the agreement once Zhakiyanov was
in custody.
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change beyond pressing for the interests of particular regions.” Yet, these regional leaders
“represent definite bases of popular support ….” (388). These different connections to society
and different patterns of state-society relations are why Zhakiyanov ended up in a jail while
Myrzakmatov, Zheenbekov, and Kurmanaliev seized and held power.
Zhakiyanov was released from prison after four years on the condition that he abandon
politics. Upon his release he made a public statement in Almaty, acknowledging that he never
had a real chance against the president:
If I’m to be sincere, I cannot say that I experience any kind of warm feelings toward him [President
Nazarbayev]. What happened, happened. At the same time I cannot say that what happened with me was
his fault alone. I have to hand it to him, he did warn me that this is how it would all end (Sidorov 2006).326

With that, Zhakiyanov left the country and has remained in self-imposed exile ever since,
living variously in the United States and China, pursuing his business interests. In many ways,
Zhakiyanov’s fate mirrors that of his predecessor, Akehan Kazhegeldin. In fact, the two men
were previously business partners. In 1990, they founded the firm Semei in their home city of
Semipalatinsk, which Zhakiyanov would later run. Kazhegeldin was then appointed as the akim
of Semipalatinsk oblast (1991-1993), the same position that Zhakiyanov would hold from 1994
to 1997. Both men were then rotated out of their home region, detaching them from whatever
local social bases they might have had: Zhakiyanov was sent to Pavlodar oblast while
Kazhegeldin became prime minister. After serving as prime minister from 1994 to 1997,
Kazhegeldin denounced Nazarbayev and announced plans to form his own party and run for
president in 1999. In short order he was charged with corruption and tax evasion. Before
authorities were able to arrest him, Kazhegeldin fled the country. In 2001, a court sentenced him
to 10 years in prison, and he has lived in self-imposed exile ever since. Isaacs suggests that
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Zhakiyanov’s defeat seemed total. In this address, he shocked attendees by suggesting that the country had
made good strides toward democratic reforms under Nazarbayev and that outside opposition was no longer needed
for further progress.
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Kazhegeldin’s defection is what led Nazarbayev to begin building Nur Otan into the party-state
organ that it would become, giving the president extra leverage over his regional cadre, as I
described in prior chapters (Isaacs 2011: 82).
Another prominent regional official, Zamanbek Nurkadilov, was believed to be
coordinating an opposition movement with Kazhegeldin in 2004 and 2005 (Kusainov 2005).
Throughout his career Nurkadilov was shuffled through a variety of high-level posts in the
regions and in the central government. He served variously as the akim of Almaty city (19901994), and the akim of Almaty oblast (1997-2001).327 He was later appointed as the Minister of
Emergency Situations in Astana. Nurkadilov publicly broke with Nazarbayev in 2004 when he
denounced the president as corrupt and called for his resignation. In November 2005, he was
found dead. Though he was shot three times, twice in the torso and once in the head, official
investigators ruled his death a suicide (RFE/RL 2005).
Viktor Khrapunov fared better, not because he bested the president, only because he
lived. After serving in multiple high level positions in the central government between 1995 and
1997, he was appointed as the akim of Almaty city (1997-2004) and then as the akim of EastKazakhstan oblast (2004-2007). Then he was reappointed to Astana as the Minister of
Emergency Situations (2007).328 He left his post when charges of corruption were brought
against him for illegal land deals during his tenure as akim of Almaty. Khrapunov managed to
escape to Switzerland, taking a massive fortune with him. He now lives there in exile.
Authorities in Kazakhstan have tried unsuccessfully to have him extradited.
It is widely believed that Khrapunov became subject to investigation because of his
personal connections to Mukhtar Ablyazov, the co-founder of the Democratic Choice of
327
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The administrative center of Almaty oblast is Taldykorgan, not Almaty city.
Khrapunov is originally from East Kazakhstan oblast.
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Kazakhstan. Khrapunov’s son married one of Ablyazov’s daughters, leading many to believe
that Nazarbayev no longer found him to be trustworthy, and possibly even suspected him of
having sympathies for Ablyazov’s political causes, which were described above.329 What we
know for sure is that when Nazarbayev chose to do so, he had no problem getting rid of him.
Khrapunov, like Kazhegeldin, Nurkadilov, and Zhakiyanov, had no local supporters. Because
they spent their careers scattered across various regions and localities, these officials hardly had
a place that they could call home. The charges brought against them had few implications for
anyone aside from themselves and their immediate families; the impact on local communities
was negligible, for there were no local communities to which these regional figures were firmly
attached.
Of all the disputes Nazarbayev had with his sitting and former governors, only one was
well entrenched in the region in which he was born and lived. That was Bergei Ryskaliev.
Ryskaliev was the governor of oil-rich Atyrau oblast for six years (2006-2012), which followed
a series of other high-level posts in the province under his political mentor and close Nazarbayev
ally, Aslan Musin.330 In August 2012, Nazarbayev flew to Atyrau to personally announce that
Ryskaliev would be transferred to a new position (Keene 2012). In fact, Ryskaliev had been
fired. The following month he was formally charged with corruption, prompting him to flee the
country (Gromova 2012). His whereabouts are unknown, though there are rumors that he has
been spotted in London.
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In fact, Ablyazov did not abide by the terms of his release from prison. Once safely outside the country he
began to fund a number of anti-Nazarbayev media enterprises.
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Musin, however, had been appointed from outside the region. He was born in Aktobe and was appointed there
as governor from 1995-2002. He was rotated to Aktau and served as governor there from 2002 to 2006 before going
on to take multiple high-level posts in the central government. Among Ryskaliev’s multiple posts in the region was
as Musin’s deputy (2005-2006).
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Ryskaliev is accused of conspiring with his brother, Amanzhan Ryskali, and at least 11
other people, for stealing up to $100 million from state coffers (Dave 2013: 13-14). The
chairman of Kazakhstan’s financial police assigned with fighting corruption described the
actions by Khrapunov and Ryskaliev as the “most damaging to the state” of any corruption
charges filed in recent years (Kapital 2013).
Ryskaliev’s removal and disappearance occurred within a broader context of centerperiphery conflict related to events in oil-rich Mangistau oblast. In December 2011, oil workers
went on strike in the city of Zhanaozen. Rather than mobilizing alongside local protestors
against the central government, as often happens in Kyrgyzstan, the local authorities in
Zhanaozen were themselves the targets of the demonstrations. In fact, protestors set fire to the
local akim’s office (Bissenova 2012). In response to the protests, local authorities dispatched
local police, who used violent force that killed 16 people and wounded dozens of others.
Nazarbayev blamed the conflict on the corruption of local and regional officials, fired several of
them, and pledged to tackle corruption in the oil regions more aggressively. Ryskaliev’s removal
was widely seen as taking place in this context (Keene 2012). By firing him, Nazarbayev
reinforced public perceptions that local and regional officials are corrupt, and that he had the
will, power, and authority to sack them.331 The key point in comparison with Kyrgyzstan is that
there was no form of local resistance when he chose to do so. In every instance, Nazarabayev
proved to have firm control over whom he appointed where, and when.
Save for Ablyazov and Zhakiyanov, whose break with the president was deliberately
public, the precise reasons for conflict between other high-level provincial officials and the
president are speculative. Still, we can be confident that these are political conflicts between the
331

Others believe that Ryskaliev’s firing centered on a conflict between the president and Ryskaliev’s powerful
patron, Aslan Musin, who was demoted at around the same time (Dave 2013: 14)

266

president and his regional appointees, not the dispassionate application of anti-corruption law. It
is only when Nazarbayev needs to eliminate a potential enemy that the law is applied; corruption
is prosecuted selectively, for political reasons. Put differently, the state officials charged with
corruption in Kazakhstan “typically have entered into personal or political rivalries with
Nazarbayev” (Lillis 2014: 309).332 Formal legal charges are merely forms of “selective
punishment” (Ledeneva 1998: 77-78; 2006: 13).
Most of the cases above describe regional officials who accumulated too much power, or
who may have been suspected of having too many independent political ambitions. The key
point is that when the president wanted to get rid of powerful regional officials, he had no
problem doing so. As one official put it, they all “broke their wings trying to increase their selfreliance and they were heavily punished.”333 None of these officials had deep social bases in
their own regions, nor did they have constituents in the broader population who had deep
interests in seeing them in office. No doubt, the regular charges of “corruption” and “abuse of
power” brought against regional officials even resonated with ordinary people, putting them on
the side of the president. This gives “selective punishment” a dual strength: it frames the
president’s political attacks against his regional subordinates in formal administrative-legal terms
rather than political ones, yet it undoubtedly has a political resonance with ordinary people, who
tend not to benefit from the corruption in which local and regional officials are engaged.
Moreover, it likely tempers the political ambitions of other potential upstarts. As noted at the
beginning of this section, it is not only the quality of contentious events in Kazakhstan that
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the charges filed against him.
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differs with Kyrgyzstan, but their quantity too. The majority of regional authorities in
Kazakhstan do not challenge the president’s authority at all; they are better integrated into the
state’s administrative hierarchy as subordinate officials.

III. Reassessing Localism and Social Embeddedness: Competing Explanations
As noted in the introductory section of this chapter, a focus on the social embeddedness
of local officials in facilitating or foreclosing social mobilization against central authorities
draws heavily on Radnitz. Here I elaborate on Radntiz’s theory. Using both the arguments of
social embeddedness presented in chapters 3 through 5 of this dissertation, and with the
backdrop of the empirical analysis presented above, I highlight the major points of departure on
localism and social embeddedness in Kyrgyzstan. I do so through comparison with Kazakhstan.
While there is strong agreement here about the fact that local social ties create serious
challenges for national authorities, there are two significant differences: first, the origin of local
social ties in Kyrgyzstan and their apparent absence in other Central Asian states; second, the
causal role that social ties play in shaping actors’ behavior at the local level. As I discuss below,
Radnitz takes a rationalistic view of social ties while I seek to reassess their social logic and
effects. These differences, in turn, change how we understand the nature of the contentious
episodes described above, including, in particular, what the object of contention is. For Radnitz,
these are contentious episodes revolving around the control of private wealth. As I have argued,
though, they can best be understood as contests for control over state offices themselves. In the
concluding section of this chapter, I reiterate the implications that this has for state formation
specifically, as center-periphery contests for state office have drastically different implications
for administrative centralization than contests for wealth alone.
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Where did local social ties in Kyrgyzstan come from, and why don’t they exist the same
way in Kazakhstan, or in Uzbekistan for that matter? In previous chapters I focused on the ways
in which the institutions of local government embedded officials in local communities and
reshaped the nature of state-society relations in Kyrgyzstan. Local officials in Kyrgyzstan are
simultaneously fused to the state through their office and embedded in local communities
because of how those offices are structured under the system of local self-government. These
relationships at the local level shape state-society relations more broadly by changing
expectations about what the state is, what it can do, and why it does things the way it does. As I
also noted in these same chapters, authorities in Kazakhstan developed different institutions of
local government, which tended to displace local officials from local social contexts and reduced
their overall levels of interaction with, and dependence on, ordinary villagers.
Radnitz, in contrast, argues that regional and local elites in Kyrgyzstan are defined by
their independence and distance from the state, which is what creates incentives for them to
develop social ties with local communities. What makes Kyrgyzstan unique among other
Central Asian states, Radnitz says, is that it underwent rapid economic liberalization in the early
1990s. This enabled elites to secure money, property, and enterprises for themselves, so that
they no longer depended on the state to secure wealth. As a result, these elites “occupy a tenuous
niche in the social and political hierarchy” because they are always potential rivals to state power
(Radnitz 2010: 17). Conversely, the state is always a threat to elites’ independent wealth
because it can seize wealth and property. As a mechanism of self-defense against a predatory
state, these elites embedded themselves in local communities. By providing badly needed
resources to desperately poor communities, local elites can call on the assistance of those
community members when central authorities threaten their wealth. Radnitz dubs this
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“subversive clientelism,” since it is designed to undermine state power (Radnitz 2010). At the
core of this story is a strong and clear dichotomy between state elites and economic elites who
are potential or actual rivals with each other.
Empirically, however, the boundary between state elites and economic elites in
Kyrgyzstan is blurry. This has important implications for what local elites and central authorities
are actually fighting to control—private wealth or the offices of the state itself.

I argue it is the

latter. State offices provide both personal income and public resources that can be delivered to
one’s home community, meeting local expectations, and fulfilling community obligations, as I
described in prior chapters. They also provide officials with prestige and respect in their home
communities (Huskey and Iskakova 2010). Finally, provincial governors and district akims
obtain significant appointment powers of their own, enabling them to dole out jobs to members
of their home communities within their own provinces, districts, villages, and cities. All of these
things provide members of local communities with incentives to see local cadre obtain control
over these offices.
Indeed, despite economic liberalization, the accumulation of wealth in Kyrgyzstan is still
deeply tied to the ability to hold and maintain public office. At the pinnacle of economic power
stands the president, not a private businessperson. Until the Tulip Revolution, the “Akaev
Family Business” referred to the sizeable economic assets controlled by the president and his
family (Spector 2008: 152). One study notes that, “during the formative period of economic and
political restructuring under Akaev, enrichment and political connections became synonymous”
(Engvall 2007: 36). When Bakiev succeeded Akaev as president, his family and friends took
control over Akaev’s businesses and then expanded control over other assets as well (Marat
2008).
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A list of Kyrgyzstan’s richest individuals published in a Bishkek newspaper334 in 2013
doubles as the country’s political elite, suggesting that it is dependence on state office that
generated great wealth, not autonomy from it. The list includes: Omurbek Babanov (former
prime minister); Askar Salymbekov (former governor of Naryn, member of parliament, and
former mayor of Bishkek); Almazbek Atambaev (former prime minister and current president);
Nariman Tiuleev (former mayor of Bishkek); Igor Chudinov (former prime minister); Melis
Myrzakmatov (former mayor of Osh city); Omurbek Tekebaev (former speaker of parliament
and leader of the Ata-Meken party); Kamchybek Tashiev (member of parliament and leader of
the Ata-Zhurt party) (Tokoeva 2013).
The only person on this list who has not held office is Temirbek Asanbekov, though he
was a candidate for president in 2011. Another on this list, Askar Salymbekov, was one of the
founders of Bishkek’s massive Dordoi bazaar, giving him a strong footing in the legitimate
business world. But, Salymbekov’s case only further highlights the interdependence of
economic and state power in Kyrgyzstan. While Salymbekov secured key government
appointments during the Akaev and Bakiev years—in both center and periphery—the original
co-owner of the bazaar, Kubat Baibolov, did not. Though he held high-level posts under Akaev,
he failed to secure an office under Bakiev and was subsequently “forced out of the business”
(Hale 2015: 315-16). As I discussed above, local populations frequently mobilized to protect
local officials whose tenure is challenged. But, nobody came to Baibolov’s defense when his
business interests were threatened.335 Indeed, it is notable that every contentious episode
described in the first sections of this chapter involved individuals who held or aspired to hold
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2010, Baibolov was embraced by the new transitional government. President Otunbaeva appointed him interior
minister in July 2010.
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state office. If the autonomy of economic elites refers to their distance from the state, none of
the actors involved in these events appears to qualify.
In fact, as noted above, it is precisely the control over state offices that enables one to
accumulate wealth. One study concludes that, in addition to informal social ties to high-level
state elites, “formal affiliations with political institutions […] can help business owners secure
assets” (Spector 2008: 150). Another notes that wealthy elites in Kyrgyzstan “seek political
capital (such as political appointments, offices, titles, connections) in order to reproduce power
and wealth” (Satybaldieva 2015: 374). In all of these cases, it appears that obtaining and
protecting one’s wealth requires a position within the state, not distance from it. It is for control
of state offices themselves, I argue, that center-periphery conflict occurs. People from
communities in the provinces have an interest in seeing cadre from their own locality and region
hold those offices because of the moral obligations that such individuals have to deliver a portion
of those resources to their home village or region.
I recall here the case of Koisun Kurmanalieva, the long-serving village official who went
on to become the “people’s governor” of Talas oblast in 2010, which I described above.
Kurmanalieva held the position of governor for five years only because of the wide base of
public support she enjoyed in the region. A relatively unknown figure outside of her home
region before seizing power, Kurmanalieva became the single wealthiest regional governor in the
country during her tenure, again highlighting the interconnectedness of state office and private
wealth (Podolskaya 2014). If Kurmanalieva operates according to the logic of moral obligation
of other local officials in Kyrgyzstan, which I outlined in chapters three through five, then we
can assume that her friends, family, and co-villagers benefited from the wealth she generated as
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the governor of Talas oblast, which better explains why she had so much local support when
seizing office in the first place.
Radnitz’s focus on the impact of privatization on elite formation in Kyrgyzstan comes
through comparison with Uzbekistan, one of the few “completely nonreformed” post-Soviet
countries where the state still formally controls much of the economy (Aslund 2007: 2-3). Also
in contrast to Kyrgyzstan, levels of social mobilization led by local and regional elites in
Uzbekistan are extremely limited. Hence, the links among privatization, independent economic
wealth, and regional social mobilization become salient.
But, comparison with Kazakhstan raises further questions about the role of privatization
in fostering an independently wealthy elite class. Levels of privatization in Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan were roughly equivalent. In 1996, the private sector share of GDP was 50% in
Kyrgyzstan and 40% in Kazakhstan; by 2010, it was 75% in Kyrgyzstan and 80% in Kazakhstan
(Junisbai 2012: 894-5). Hellman categorized both countries as “low intermediate reformers,” in
contrast to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which were “slow reformers” (Hellman 1998).
Overall, the effects of privatization on elite formation both inside and outside the state have been
comparable in each state (Junisbai 2012; Hale 2015: 102-03; 137-9). As in Kyrgyzstan, the
elites in Kazakhstan who have benefited most from privatization are those with access to state
office and deep connections to the ruling elite (Jusinbai 2010, 2012). Indeed, it seems that here,
as elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, the state “remains the major vehicle for
intergenerational transfer of wealth and status” (Beissinger 1997: 177). The loss of state posts
jeopardizes access to those resources.
Yet, in Kazakhstan, we do not see the emergence of elites with private assets becoming
socially embedded in local communities or mobilizing those populations to protect their wealth
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against the central government. The fate of Galymzhan Zhakiyanov—a self-made businessman
who became one of Kazakhstan’s most prominent regional governors, whom I described
above—is a case in point. When he was removed from office and thrown in jail after
challenging the president’s appointment powers, nobody protested. The same can be said for
Mukhtar Ablyazov and Akezhan Kazhegeldin—both private businessmen turned politicians,
who, nevertheless, were unable to develop sufficient social bases of support to challenge the
president in the same way as their Kyrgyz counterparts.
What distinguishes Kazakhstan from Kyrgyzstan is the degree to which the wealth and
resources generated from state office benefit ordinary people in local communities. As I
described in chapters three, four, and five, local officials in Kazakhstan are less likely to be
socially embedded and have fewer moral obligations or responsibilities to provide resources to
anyone at the local level. Thus, when local and regional officials in Kazakhstan are fired,
rotated, arrested, put in jail, or exiled, it has few implications for local interests. Put simply,
social ties connecting state officials to local communities are weak or nonexistent. In
Kyrgyzstan, however, local cadre are socially embedded in local communities, and they have
moral obligations to provide help and assistance to co-villagers. When their tenure in office is
threatened—either because they are fired, or assigned to a different region and replaced by an
“outsider” who lacks these same obligations—so are local interests.
As I emphasized in previous chapters, the reason state officials in Kyrgyzstan are more
socially embedded than their counterparts in Kazakhstan is not because of privatization, but
because of differences in how the state itself is organized and embedded in society at the local
level. Through the development of local self-government in Kyrgyzstan, it was not only local
elites who became socially embedded, but part of the state itself. This gives local and regional
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elites there strong social bases of support in their region, while their counterparts in Kazakhstan
are socially isolated and dependent solely on the president for their status and position. The
difference is crucial because it defines what regional elites and communities are fighting for
when they mobilize against central authorities. Are these regional and local elites protecting
their wealth from a predatory state? Or, are they fighting to control the regional and local organs
of the state itself? I argue it is the latter.
Indeed, the key players in contentious center-periphery politics in Kyrgyzstan are state
officials fighting to gain or maintain access to public offices, along with local supporters who
have a direct interest in seeing them do so. In the second section of this chapter I described the
contentious events surrounding the arrest and eventual release of the parliamentarian Azimbek
Beknazarov—the Aksy events of 2002. Radnitz himself wrote the most in-depth and widely
cited study of the 2002 “Asky events” (2005), which he also addresses under the theoretical
framework described above (2010: 103-130).
Importantly, Azimbek Beknazarov was not an independent elite with access to private
wealth, but a life-long public official who spent his entire career in state office. Most of these
positions were at the local and district levels, keeping both him and his family enmeshed in the
same social networks of the locality that they came from. During the Soviet period, Beknazarov
and his family worked as shepherds on the sovkhoz, Kyzyl-Tuu. In 1991, he received his law
degree from Kyrgyz State National University and went on to work in various state offices, first
at the district and provincial levels, and then in the central government. He was elected to the
parliament representing his home district in 2000. At no point before or after this did he have a
source of income outside of the state. And, though he undoubtedly secured resources through his
state positions that benefited both him and his co-villagers, the central conflict in the protests
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over his arrest was over his right to maintain his office. In short, Beknazarov was fighting
central authorities for his seat in parliament; he had such robust support from the members of his
village and district because they benefited from having a member of their community—someone
with social ties to the region and moral obligations to provide help and assistance—in a position
of power.
Whether these and other contentious events are fought over access to regional state
offices or individual private wealth leads to a related question: how and why are local elites
socially embedded in local communities in the first place? Here, too, I seek to build on
Radnitz’s work and attempt to shift perspectives by highlighting elements of social ties that his
theory does not fully incorporate.
According to Radnitz, local and regional elites are socially embedded as the result of a
deliberate rational calculation: we should “conceive of clientelist provision [to local
communities] as an investment portfolio” (2010: 82) and the production of social ties with local
communities as “medium-term investments in self-protection” (38). Subversive clientelism is
not a form of social organization based on personalized face-to-face affective relations; it is an
instrumental “strategy” whereby elites “make communities their arsenal of defense” against a
rapacious and predatory state (52). Local elites are not described as being passively embedded in
communities; rather, they are given enormous agency to “embed themselves” by making scarce
resources available in exchange for protection in the form of protest mobilization (5, 21, 82).
We might even say that these elites are rationally rather than socially embedded.
This rationalist approach, while theoretically parsimonious, renders social obligation and
moral economy invisible or superfluous, and thus changes how we understand what social ties
are and what they do. Do local elites contribute money and resources to become socially
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embedded in communities out of rational self-interest, or do they contribute those resources
because they are socially embedded and have moral obligations to do so? Conversely, is protest
by villagers the result of an elite-orchestrated contractual exchange, or is it motivated by genuine
outrage when central authorities threaten local interests, in the personage of their own
community members, leaders, and local officials? Rational and social accounts are not mutually
exclusive, but they do change our perspective and understanding of causation.
As Lewis argues, both the Tulip Revolution and the Aksy protests “involved genuine
political protest, informed primarily, but not only, by local concerns. It represented not merely
some manufactured discontent (or protestors being paid to demonstrate, as was sometimes
alleged), but deep levels of social and political anger” (Lewis 2008: 267). In fact, once
mobilized, local people in Kyrgyzstan engaged in protest repertoires that appear to go beyond
instrumental reciprocity and imply deep moral outrage. For example, after the 2002 arrest of
Beknazarov, described above, a number of his local supporters went on hunger strike, one of
whom died as a result (Olcott 2005). Others were shot and killed by government agents. The
willingness to take such extreme actions on Beknazarov’s behalf suggests a level of personal
commitment and moral outrage that cannot be easily reduced to the instrumentality of a costbenefit analysis (Jasper 1997). Similarly, during the earliest stages of the Tulip Revolution, most
protesters in the south trekked to Osh by foot, a two-day journey for some (Fuhrmann 2006: 22).
This harkens back to James Scott’s observation that personalized social ties between patron and
client are not merely instrumental, but can create “as firm a bond of affection and loyalty as that
between close relatives” (Scott 1972: 94). Indeed, clientelism is unique as a set of social
relations precisely because it can be built upon “mutual devotion,” not merely “mutual
advantage” (ibid.).
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While Radnitz’s theory privileges the rational aspects of these relations, much of his rich
empirical data, like what I described in chapters 4 and 5, suggests that elite behavior in
Kyrgyzstan is often governed by moral imperatives rather than sheer rational calculation and that
individuals in local communities, in fact, have a lot of agency in deciding to whom they will lend
support and why.
Indeed, for local elites, contributions to society are viewed as obligatory, rather than as
favors in need of repayment. “In many cases,” Radnitz says, “aspiring patrons were acting in a
milieu in which co-villagers believed that the wealthy and powerful had a moral obligation to
help” and that they “expected” local elites, including their local officials and parliamentary
deputies, to contribute “by spending their own money to help the district” (2010: 88-89).336 In
short, it seems that the only communities in which elites stand any chance of embedding
themselves rationally are the ones in which they are already embedded socially. If so, that leaves
central questions unanswered: Where did these expectations and social pressures come from?
Why do members of local communities expect so much of their local state officials in the first
place? I attempted to provide answers to these questions in prior chapters.
Likewise, the members of local communities were shown to be skeptical of the
motivations and roles of “outsiders,” as I described in chapter five. Radnitz notes that ordinary
people tended to view elite patronage as a “cynical ploy” when elites’ ties to the community
were limited to instrumental material contributions (2010: 89). That is, ordinary people would
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Likewise, Radnitz’s ethnography of one local elite, “Eldar,” depicts a person so deeply embedded in his
community that his compliance with local norms is shaped by his fear of social shame and ostracism, rather than his
rational self-interest. Eldar’s rational self recognizes that he would benefit by leaving the village and moving to the
capital city, but his deep ties and obligations to the community make it difficult for him to extricate (or dis-embed)
himself. In order to “maintain status in the community” one often had to “demonstrate adherence to local norms,
even if they were burdensome to uphold or at odds with one’s convictions” (2010: 47). For example, Eldar felt
compelled to build a garden and keep cows so that he was able to provide food for fellow villagers. He did so not
because he wanted to secure a client base, but because “he was ashamed” not to do what was expected of him (48).
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not support patrons whom they did not know personally. People would “remain immune to the
appeals of nonlocal(s),” thus leading to a “double standard” based upon a particular elite’s own
local origins (ibid.). Again, it appears that elites are not free to choose how and whether to
become socially embedded, which leads us back to the question: how and why are they socially
embedded in the first place? I argued it is the way that local government institutions themselves
fortified and expanded local officials’ social ties into the state itself, and reshaped state-society
relations more broadly, a factor that comes to the fore through comparison with Kazakhstan.
These distinctions lead to different perspectives about how and why contentious episodes
unfold the way they do in Kyrgyzstan, differences that are partly tied to what these arguments
intend to explain. Radnitz’s focus on social mobilization implies a great deal for state authority
and administrative relations between center and periphery, but says little about them explicitly.
In his comparison between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the state is depicted as fundamentally the
same kind of force in both countries: exogenous to and above society, powerful, predatory,
static, and fully formed at independence. It is only in conflict with an exogenous and powerful
state—in conjunction with privatization and rural poverty—that subversive clientelism
develops.337 This leaves important questions about the state unanswered: Is the state in
Kyrgyzstan weak because it is regularly confronted by social mobilization in the periphery, or is
social mobilization in the regions of Kyrgyzstan easier to accomplish because the central
government has less control over cadre?
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This is the reverse causal logic of how state power affects clientelism in the classic literature. According to
Scott, for example, clientelism at the local level thrives in the absence of a strong state. When powerful states were
developed during the colonial period in South East Asia, local patrons typically moved to the capital city, seeking
higher status and money, leaving local social structures in shambles (Scott 1972; 1976), similar to what Tocqueville
(1955) writes about the exodus of the French rural nobility to Paris during the nineteenth century. Here states did
not lead to the creation of clientelism at the local level, but its erosion. What all of these stories have in common,
though, is that the state remains detached from and exogenous to society.
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By shifting focus to the center-periphery politics of state formation and centralization, we
see endogenous aspects of state-society relations and the ways in which state power and social
forces shape one another through an interactive process (Migdal 2001). The kind of state that
emerges over time depends largely on whether and how its administrative personnel are
embedded in society or integrated into the state apparatus. This approach seeks to show that the
“state” is not a unified and fully formed actor at independence, nor is it inherently threatening to
regional elites. Rather, its formation and its relation to regional elites depends upon how those
elites are incorporated into the state itself, and whether and how they maintain social ties to local
communities once they are. It is here that we see dramatic differences in the state formation
outcomes of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, as I tried to lay out in chapters two through five. The
empirical cases of contentious regional appointments outlined in this chapter further highlight
these main points.
IV. Conclusions
This chapter builds on and supplements the broader patterns of center-periphery politics
outlined in chapter two. Both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are unitary states where central
authorities have the formal authority to appoint and remove provincial governors, who serve as
representatives of the government in the regions, not as representatives of the people living there.
Central authorities in both states have sought to utilize the policy of cadre rotation to socially
disembed regional cadre from local social settings and integrate them into the state’s
administrative hierarchy, as subordinate agents of central directives.
Yet, as has been discussed here, central authorities in Kyrgyzstan have not been nearly as
successful as their counterparts in Kazakhstan, and the centralization of state administration has
been undermined as a result. Throughout Kyrgyzstan’s provinces and districts, regional cadre
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have relied on their local supporters to resist attempts to remove them from office, or rotate them
across regions. In other instances, local elites have successfully taken over and occupied
administrative offices with local support, gaining Bishkek’s approval only after the fact. In still
other instances, authorities in Bishkek have seemed to modify their cadre selections in
anticipation of public backlash. What all of these cases have in common is that local and
regional cadre have been able to mobilize significant public support in their home regions in
conflicts with the central government over who will hold which office. This sometimes allows
them to best central authorities, thus loosening Bishkek’s hold over its own personnel and over
state administration itself.
As was shown here, this support often derives from the very lowest levels of government,
from the officials’ own home village or government. As I describe in chapters three through
five, it was the implementation of a local self-government system in Kyrgyzstan that cemented
local elites’ social ties in local communities, reinforced their social embeddedness, reshaped
broader state-society relations, and, ultimately, undermined cadre rotation in the provinces. In
many cases, the unsanctioned contenders for provincial office—people’s governors—were
themselves long-serving members of local self-governments with deep ties to the region.
In Kazakhstan, President Nazarbayev has successfully rotated cadre across regions, and
between center and periphery. In doing so, it seems he has successfully cut them off from the
local and regional bases of social support that they might have enjoyed otherwise. In those rare
but notable instances when regional cadre have sought independence from the center—primarily
from the president—they have been met with swift and uncompromising penalties, and without
generating any significant public support for their cause. In Kazakhstan, unlike Kyrgyzstan, the
policy of cadre rotation was applied to an administrative system that was hierarchical from top to
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bottom, and, therefore, more coherent and effective. Unlike Kyrgyzstan’s system of local selfgovernment, village-level authorities in Kazakhstan are appointed, interact with the local
population minimally, and rely on them for nothing, as described in chapters 3 through 5. This
has undercut officials’ local social ties and re-forged state-society relations in such a way that
cadre rotation itself was more feasible and successful. This has allowed central authorities to
better integrate their regional cadre into state administration, helping them to better centralize the
state’s administrative hierarchy.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
I. The Puzzle and Question
This dissertation examines the process of administrative centralization in newly
independent states using data from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan during the period 1991 to 2013.
Much of the existing work on Central Asia couches the specific events recounted here in terms of
regime dynamics. By focusing more directly on administration centralization, this dissertation
not only contributes to a broader theoretical literature on state formation, it also offers a unique
vantage point for analyzing events in Central Asia specifically. It stresses, for instance, that the
representation of communities at the local level may be an aspect of democratization, but it also
stands at odds with state centralization and administration.
Indeed, common accounts of regime politics in the region leave us with puzzles that are
best solved by shifting perspectives to state formation. Observers of Central Asian politics agree,
for example, that Kazakhstan is an entrenched authoritarian regime. On the other hand,
Kyrgyzstan is described as being both too democratic and not democratic enough. While nobody
would suggest that Kyrgyzstan is a consolidated democracy, the country is often characterized as
having extraordinarily high levels of participation in politics—whether through direct
participation in local governance, elections, or protest mobilization. Sometimes this participation
is unruly, consisting of intense center-periphery conflict that undermines central authorities,
which is why there is “too much” of it. The paradox is captured by a news report about a
proposal for Bishkek to formally recognize the decisions of informal popular assemblies, or
kurultais (Rickleton 2011). As discussed in chapter six, kurultais have been one of the forums
through which local populations and local elites have undermined the central government’s
appointment powers, illegally electing their own “people’s governors” in place of Bishkek’s
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official choice. It is for this reason, the article notes, that the kurultai has “become a byword for
instability.” Hence, the ominous question it poses for the capital city: “Is Another Layer of
Democracy Too Much for Bishkek?” (ibid.).
Framed as a problem of administrative centralization rather than democratization,
Kyrgyzstan’s democracy paradox comes into clearer focus, particularly in comparison with
Kazakhstan. In fact, through the prism of state formation, Kyrgyzstani politics is hardly a
paradox at all. What looks simultaneously like too much and too little democracy is merely the
consequence of decentralization in the absence of an established centralized state; it is, in short,
the result of decentralizing authority that has never been adequately centralized.
Indeed, as I have stressed throughout, underlying the political regimes in Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan are very different kinds of states and state-society relations, defined by different
levels of bureaucratic centralization, social embeddedness of officials, and control over regional
cadre and appointments. At least one reason why center-periphery politics in Kyrgyzstan are
contentious is that central authorities have so little control over their regional cadre. Instead,
regional and local officials are deeply embedded in local communities, and alliances between
local officials and local communities—as sometimes expressed through the insurgent politics of
the kurultai—undermine Bishkek’s authority in the regions, and over the state itself. While
scholars disagree on the precise causes of Kyrgyzstan’s two revolutions, the empirical facts are
not disputed: they were initiated by regional elites and officials, in collaboration with their local
supporters, usually family, friends, and other acquaintances.
In contrast, a key aspect of what observers see when they describe President
Nazarbayev’s authoritarianism is his firm grip over the state’s administrative bureaucracy, which
entails the swift and merciless punishment of insubordinate cadre. Nazarbayev succeeded in
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centralizing state power by uprooting local officials from local social contexts, incorporating
them into the state bureaucracy, and isolating them from social bases of support in the regions.
In the few instances when regional elites have challenged Astana’s authority, or undermined the
president’s formal appointment powers, they were sent to jail, or exiled. The lack of public
support that these regional officials garnered in conflicts with the president cannot be lost on
other potential upstarts, which might be one reason why there seem to be so few of them.
According to Nazarbayev, the presidential administration has “the ultimate
responsibility” for maintaining “an effective system of state governance” and is “the main
controlling organ for the implementation of decisions and assignments, [for] coordinating the
work of regional and central executive organs” (Tengrinews 2014). Building a strong centralized
state in Kazakhstan is one of the accomplishments that President Nazarbayev boasts about most
often. His public development strategy—Kazakhstan 2050—lists “the establishment of a strong
state” as the first among his many self-proclaimed achievements.338 This entails, among other
things, that the “regions are united in their activities” (Nazarbayev: 2012: 6-7). Likewise,
“stability” (stabilnost) has been one of the major themes of Nazarbayev’s presidency, invoked in
nearly every major policy proposal and in most public speeches. Whenever possible,
Nazarbayev reminds state officials and the public alike that the stable political order Kazakhstan
has today was not an inevitable outcome.
We passed through the terrible breakdown of the Soviet Union, a major crisis. From 1992 to 1996 we
tumbled around while answering the question: will there be a Kazakhstan or not? It seemed that it was not
possible to emerge from that darkness, that chaos, but we survived together (Tashkinbaev 2014).

In this same speech, Nazarbayev implicitly asks his audience to imagine a counterfactual
outcome, referencing political instability in Egypt, Syria, Ukraine, and Libya, where, he noted,
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Quite literally, the opening section of the document is titled “Our Achievements: Establishing the Modern State
of Kazakhstan.”
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“the state practically does not exist” (Tashkinbaev). In other instances, state elites in Kazakhstan
use the post-Soviet examples of Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan as explicit
counter-examples to their own experience. Alikhan Baimenov, then the Chairman of
Kazakhstan’s Agency for Civil Service Affairs, noted that one of Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine’s
biggest problems was to allow local elections because it enhances “the influence of informal
relations” allowing them to “play a big role in choosing local officials.” Citing the post-Soviet
experiences of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine, he argued that elections in all
cases led to the fragmentation of state power. “We need to understand,” he said, “that in the
transition [period] we were attempting to build a new statehood and a new unified country.”339
We would be remiss to dismiss or condemn these sentiments because they do not accord
with democratic principles. Behind them lies some truth, one that resonates broadly with the
public, even if it also happens to bolster a government that many westerners find morally
repugnant. After all, the projects of state building and authoritarian consolidation are hardly
mutually exclusive, and can sometimes be overlapping (Slater 2010). This is all the more true if
bureaucratic centralization requires that regional officials are insulated from society and rendered
non-responsive to local demands. Indeed, insofar as democratization requires the opposite
process—one by which regional and local officials are made to represent local interests—the
process of bureaucratic centralization does not look democratic at all. Thus, formal policies to
disembed local officials—like controlling appointments in villages (local government
institutions) and provinces (cadre rotation) may, indeed, bolster Nazarbayev’s authoritarian
regime. But, that is not their only effect, and may not even be their primary purpose. Observers
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might differ on how to categorize regime types in Central Asia, but nobody disputes that
Kazakhstan is a more centralized and robust state than its small southern neighbor.
How precisely did these states arrive at such dramatically different outcomes given their
remarkably similar starting points in 1991? How did Nazarbayev succeed where successive
presidents of Kyrgyzstan failed, and what does this tell us about state formation—understood
here as bureaucratic centralization—in the contemporary historical period? Even more broadly,
how do some rulers succeed in integrating regional officials into the state’s administrative
hierarchy as subordinate agents to the capital city, and why do they sometimes fail?

II. The Argument
The core argument made in this dissertation is that the nature of local social ties and
state-society relations shape whether and how bureaucratic centralization proceeds. As noted
above, this process might be at odds with democratization. This is hardly a new idea, given the
classic literature on bureaucracy, which I outlined in chapter one. Weber’s “iron cage” not only
symbolizes officials’ strict obedience to rules and procedures; it also suggests that they are held
apart from society. The cage insulates them from the multiple social forces from below, or
socially “disembeds” them. As a process, Weber’s image of state bureaucracy is rigid and rule
bound—as a set of social relations it is clinical, unfeeling, and inhuman. Importantly, Weber
emphasizes the importance of appointments for state bureaucrats, which ensures their strict
obedience to the decisions of higher authorities; elections, by contrast, subject them to the
interests of society from below, thus undermining the formation of the state’s administrative
hierarchy. State bureaucrats—in both rational-legal and patrimonial bureaucracies—exist to
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represent and carry out the policies of higher authorities, not to represent the interests of local or
regional communities.
During the process of bureaucratic centralization, a key challenge for central authorities
is to recruit and control their regional subordinates in the periphery, integrating them into a
singular administrative structure—the state. It is for this reason that virtually all of the classic
literature on state formation explains differences in bureaucratic centralization by looking at the
forms of preexisting social and political organization in the periphery. This is the social context
that shapes whether and how central authorities recruit local elites into the nascent state
bureaucracy, continue to bargain with them as outsiders, or seek to displace them altogether with
their own agents. Moreover, preexisting social and political organization shaped the likelihood
that powerful or popular local notables could resist centralization and mobilize social forces
against the capital city. As social and political organization varied in different peripheral
territories, so too did the kinds of regional elites that central authorities encountered, as
determined by the ties that bound them to society. Thus, in different territories, states emerged
along different trajectories of development, leaving notable variations in the levels of
bureaucratic centralization and in the character of subsequent center-periphery relations.
What makes contemporary cases of state formation different in world-historical context is
the international political pressure that is brought to bear on new national authorities. As part of
the neoliberal world order and the emergence of western liberal hegemony after the Cold War,
bureaucratic centralization was reframed as undemocratic. Particularly in the former Soviet
Union, state centralization was viewed mainly as a legacy that needed to be overcome. Instead
of centralization, international organizations and western states—particularly the United States—
promoted democratization and decentralization. Importantly, the “transition paradigm” that
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undergirded these policies made important assumptions about states; namely, that they were all
equally centralized, coherent, and developed to begin with (Carothers 2002). International
proponents of decentralization and democratization invariably focused more on “the
redistribution of state power” than its accumulation (ibid. 17). Put differently, they put the
decentralization of state power ahead of its centralization.
Anthropologists studying postsocialist states seemed to suggest, by contrast, that central
authority in newly independent states had virtually ceased to exist. Only later did it become
clear to others that many of the countries nominally in “transition” to democracy “have faced
fundamental state-building challenges” and, ultimately, the paradigm could not stand on the
underlying weakness of its assumptions (Carothers 2002: 16). Yet, recognizing the faults of the
transition paradigm does little to answer the fundamental question about state formation that it
uncovered. To say that not all states end up as democracies is only half of the problem. The
question remains: what kinds of effects did these policies have on the states that formed during
this period? Put more broadly, how does the post-Cold War context of neoliberal western
hegemony shape the trajectories and outcomes of state formation in newly independent states?
Through a comparative analysis of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, this dissertation outlines
one possible answer. I argue that the main factor that set these two states along different
trajectories of state formation was the institutions that national authorities built at the lowest
levels of state administration, in villages and small cities. Throughout the early- to late- 1990s,
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan created dramatically different institutions of local government, due
largely to the contrasting levels of influence that international donor organizations had in each
country. This had significant impacts on the level of social embeddedness of local officials, and
fundamentally reshaped state-society relations in ways that led to different patterns of center-
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periphery politics, and, ultimately, different levels of cadre control and bureaucratic
centralization.
This account contrasts with other accounts of localism and social embeddedness in
Kyrgyzstan, and its absence in other Central Asian states. As discussed in chapter six, Radnitz
depicts social embeddedness in Kyrgyzstan as the result of rational and strategic investments
made by newly independent elites who obtained private wealth as a result of early market
reform. These elites socially embedded themselves as a form of self-defense against a predatory
state (2010). For McGlinchey, in contrast, localism in Kyrgyzstan is the result of increasing
levels of “Islamic revival.” The dense local networks formed as a result of increasing interaction
with religious institutions “can and are mobilized against the central state when local populations
feel aggrieved” (McGlinchey 2011: 38).
Both of these approaches, however, have little to say about the state itself. Rather, they
make a common assumption that the state was strong, cohesive, and predatory from the moment
of independence.340 In doing so, they gloss over state-society relations: Is the state in
Kyrgyzstan weak because social embeddedness in the periphery leads to high levels of social
mobilization, or is there so much social mobilization in the periphery because central authorities
lack firm control over regional cadre? By looking at the development of the state itself through
the prism of state-society relations, and in comparison with Kazakhstan, the argument presented
in this dissertation highlights the latter. In doing so, it explains social embeddedness in
Kyrgyzstan as stemming from the institutions of the state itself, making it endogenous to the
process of state formation. It was not economic liberalization, Islamic revivalism, or the Kyrgyz
“mentality,” that fostered dense social networks between local elites and local communities.
340

McGlinchey’s account does problematize this to some extent, but mainly through looking at differences in styles
of authoritarian patronage. Kyrgyzstan’s state differs from its neighbors to the extent that state elite themselves are
more internally divided.
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Rather, it was the institutions of local government that were created in the decade after
independence, which embedded local officials in local communities and made them dependent
on their own social networks during the process of village governance.
This argument also highlights aspects of state formation that are absent in the existing
literature in comparative politics. As noted above, the classic literature on state formation
portrays the aspiring rulers of nascent states and the social forces they encounter in the periphery
as discrete and mutually exogenous. Rulers encounter preexisting forms of social and political
organization in the periphery that they must contend with, seemingly at a moment in time. Even
in the interaction that ensues—which shapes the trajectory of state formation—these two sides,
center and periphery (or state elites and regional elites) remain distinct and separate. What these
cases from Central Asia show us, though, is that peripheral forms of social and political
organization were not merely preexisting; they were being created and reformed during the same
period that bureaucracies were being centralized. This means that peripheral social forces that
central authorities had to content with were partly endogenous. Put more concretely, new social
and political institutions in the periphery were themselves produced during the process of state
formation, as were the manifold effects that these new institutions had on local social ties and
state-society relations over time.
If the social forces that these new institutions incubated were partly endogenous to the
process of state formation, the impetus behind their creation was not. As I outline in chapter
three, the direct political influence of international actors is what caused differences in
institutional design at the local level in each state. From the moment of independence,
Kyrgyzstan was heavily dependent on international donor organizations and foreign aid.
National authorities in Bishkek were under pressure to adopt the kinds of institutional reforms
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that these donors favored. This included a highly decentralized system of local self-government
based on western models. The particular features of Kyrgyzstan’s local self-government system,
which were created in fits and starts during the first decade of independence, included an elected
local executive (ayil okmotu), elected local councils, an independent local budget, and the direct
participation of local populations in local governance, both in decision-making processes and
implementation. Local self-government in Kyrgyzstan gave local officials, in collaboration with
local communities, the responsibility for solving “problems of local significance” however they
saw fit, with whatever means they could muster.
Kazakhstan, in contrast, had significant oil resources that insulated central authorities
from international and western pressures to decentralize. There, authorities proceeded with
institutional reforms that bolstered the power of the central government (and the president), over
and above their local and regional subordinates. That is, they created subordinate officials at the
village level to start. In marked contrast to Kyrgyzstan, the main features in Kazakhstan’s
system of local state administration in villages and small cities included an appointed local
executive (akim), the absence of representative village councils, and a centralized budgetary
system that renders villages entirely dependent on higher levels of administration for both policy
making and resources. Unlike in Kyrgyzstan, the institutions of local government ensure that
local populations play little formal role in local governance; in fact, ordinary people are entirely
excluded from both decision-making processes and implementation within their locality.
However, the core argument in this dissertation is not merely that decentralization can
undermine centralization—which is tautological—but to outline precisely how and why it does
so. In fact, it was not the formal differences in local government institutions that mattered most.
Rather, it is how these institutions fostered different levels of social embeddedness for local
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officials, which shaped subsequent state-society relations and broader center-periphery politics
over time. As I described in chapters four and five, the institutions of local government in
Kyrgyzstan socially embedded officials in local communities; in Kazakhstan, these institutions
were different and had the opposite effect, leading to the social alienation of local officials,
producing space between state and society that rendered these officials increasingly dependent
on the capital city, unable to form independent social bases of support in the periphery.
Chapter four documents the ways in which the institutions of local government in
Kyrgyzstan produced socially embedded local officials. It did so in the following ways: first,
local elections made it more likely that local officials were selected from among the village
population, rather than from outside. This meant that they governed the same places where they
had lived their entire lives, and where they had multiple and overlapping networks of family,
friends, and other life-long acquaintances from all spheres of everyday life.
Even more significant, however, was the creation of an independent local budget, which
established a unique process of local governance. The independent local budget allowed local
officials to secure resources directly from international donor organizations. Yet, these funds
had strings attached. In order to secure donor money, local officials had to gather a “local
contribution”—either in cash, labor, or in-kind contribution—that was put toward
implementation of the project in question. The very purpose of the local contribution, according
to the donors themselves, is to make local officials more dependent on their local communities,
and less dependent on Bishkek. Indeed, to mobilize the local contribution, local officials rely on
their own local social networks, calling on family, friends, and local acquaintances for direct
assistance, or to help mobilize others in the community. This had multiple effects: it continually
activated and reinforced the importance of the local officials’ own social ties in the village and
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district. It also integrated these social ties into the process of local governance, and, in effect,
institutionalized them. In short, the local officials’ social relations were built into the state itself
at the local level.
Importantly, this had significant implications for broader state-society relations, as I
discuss in chapters four and five. Social embeddedness is a two-way street of reciprocal and
moral obligation. The socially embedded local official in Kyrgyzstan can call on a broad
network of support during the process of local governance, but he or she also has obligations to
offer help and assistance in return. The ayil okmotu could call on his neighbor to help fix a
village road. But, later this neighbor might ask the ayil okmotu for a ride to the village center.
These are but a few of the empirical examples from the ethnographic research I presented in
chapter four.
When such interactions occur between state officials and local populations, the lines
between state and society are continually being blurred. In fact, it is not always clear if the
request for help and favors is occurring in the public or private sphere. When the local official
calls on his brother to help to dig an irrigation canal, is he asking in his role as an official, or in
his personal capacity as kin? When his brother later asks for help fixing the roof of his home, is
he asking his brother, or is he asking a public official? The answer is both and neither. The
point is that the distinction becomes unimportant. These social relations are multiple and
overlapping, encompassing and intertwining political, social, and economic aspects of everyday
life. Importantly, these local social relations are strengthened and reproduced by the institutions
of local government themselves. This is what it means to say that the institutions of local
government reshaped local social ties and state-society relations, as I attempted to show in
chapters three through six.
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The institutions of local government in Kazakhstan also shaped local social ties and statesociety relations. But not in the same way and not with the same outcome. In Kazakhstan, the
institutions of local government created after independence disembedded local officials from
local social contexts and alienated local populations from the process of local governance,
creating significant space between state and society. There, the institutions of local government
dictate that village officials are appointed, not elected. The result is that they are more likely
than their counterparts in Kyrgyzstan to be selected from outside the village, dispatched and sent
to a place, rather than originating from it. This means that they are less likely to govern among
their life-long social acquaintances. In other words, they are less likely to have deep and
overlapping social ties.
However, even when local officials are selected from among the village population in
Kazakhstan—which they commonly are, more frequently than we might expect under a system
of appointments—the process of everyday village governance renders these officials’ social ties
relatively unimportant. That is, even if the local official has deep social ties in the village to
start, he or she rarely activates or mobilizes them through the process of village governance.
Those social ties are kept outside of the state, and might even begin to whither away as they
become increasingly neglected.
Why can’t local officials in Kazakhstan do as their counterparts in Kyrgyzstan and utilize
these social ties if they have them? As I show in chapter four, Kazakhstan’s centralized
budgetary system makes local officials more dependent on higher levels of state administration.
There, village officials do not decide what projects to undertake, or how to implement them.
Funds are allocated for specific projects as determined at the district- or provincial-levels, or
even in the capital city. The local officials’ job is merely to carry out orders from above,
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regardless of (and possibly in contradiction to) local communities’ preferences. Put differently,
the local official in Kazakhstan rarely or never activates his or her own social networks in the
process of village governance.
In fact, as I showed in chapter four, because the process of local governance in
Kazakhstan is so dependent on higher levels of administration—and not on the local
population—village officials spend much of their time outside of the locality. In practice, village
governance does not occur in the village at all, and the village official spends the majority of his
or her time in the district or provincial center, meeting with the authorities who dictate which
jobs will be performed and how. Thus, even the native-born candidate for office is likely to
govern as an absentee official. Indeed, village officials in Kazakhstan depend on higher
authorities not only for how they will do their jobs, but whether they will do so at all. As noted
above, higher-level administrators are not only the gatekeepers to scarce village resources, they
also decide who will be appointed to which village administration and when they will be
removed. For the village-level official, the social ties that matter most are with higher-level
officials in the state administration, who will determine what job they will do, how they will do
it, and whether they can have a future in state service.
In chapter five, I laid out the impact that these different patterns of local social relations
have on broader state-society relations. Because local officials in Kyrgyzstan are embedded
members of local communities and participate in villages’ moral economy, they are among the
most trusted officials in the entire state apparatus. Data from local research organizations,
NGOs, and state bodies offer strong support for this claim.
In addition, the ethnographic data I presented in this chapter show that the distinction
between local and non-local officials in Kyrgyzstan has become politically meaningful to

296

ordinary people. Local officials in Kyrgyzstan are deemed more trustworthy and honest
precisely because they are long-standing members of the community. Not only are they
perceived to have a direct stake in their own communities’ development, they also have personal
obligations to help many of its individual members, who are not merely “citizens,” but also
“friends,” and “relatives.” In contrast, the incentives and motivations of outsiders to help local
residents or develop local infrastructure is open to question, and perhaps tinged by widespread
perceptions that officials at a greater distance—in the capital city especially—are disinterested in
local problems and also hopelessly corrupt. Indeed, the same data that show local officials to
receive the highest marks for trust and effectiveness also show central authorities in Bishkek to
be the least well regarded, and the most likely to be perceived as corrupt.
In Kazakhstan, by contrast, the disembedded and absentee local official is not responsive
to local interests or particular requests for help and assistance from individuals within the
community. This is for the reasons described above. Formally, it is not part of a local officials’
job to respond to local interests or complaints. But, even informally, as an outsider to the
community, local officials lack the same private or personal obligations to individuals as their
Kyrgyzstani counterparts. In these settings there may still be a moral economy in the village, but
the local official plays no part in it, owes favors to no one, and lacks a sense of personal
obligation to do anything. If we can say that the local official in Kyrgyzstan is likely to have
both public and private obligations to his or her community, we can add that the Kazakhstani
counterpart has neither public nor private obligations. The boundaries between the public and
private realms are, thus, drawn differently in each state, and so too is the relationship between
state and society.
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This points toward significant differences in the patterns of state-society relations in each
state. While data show that the local official in Kyrgyzstan is among the most trusted and
praised in the entire state apparatus, as I described above, local officials in Kazakhstan are
almost universally despised. If not viewed as corrupt and self-interested, village officials there
are typically regarded as ineffective, uncaring, and nonresponsive to local needs.
The social dislocation of village officials in Kazakhstan is further reinforced by the role
played by the president’s political party, Nur Otan. The party’s public campaigns encourage
citizens to interact directly with the party, not with the state administration. In fact, as I showed
in chapters four and five, Nur Otan has proven to be relatively responsive to local demands,
sometimes taking action against corrupt local officials on citizens’ requests, thereby further
distancing the social alienation of local officials from the community while simultaneously
bolstering the president’s own popularity. Indeed, even Nazarbayev’s staunchest critics concede
that his levels of public support are broad, deep, and genuine. This, again, stands in marked
contrast to Kyrgyzstan, where local officials are more highly regarded than those in the capital
city.
What broader effects did these local social ties have on bureaucratic centralization? In
answering this question, the analysis presented in this dissertation not only disaggregates the
state into center and periphery, but further breaks down the periphery into province, district, and
village. If changes in local social ties had no effects beyond the village level, it would be
difficult to suggest that they affected broader patterns of state formation. But, as this dissertation
demonstrates, through the data presented in chapters two and six, the patterns of relations
between central authorities and their provincial governors—who are their highest-level regional
functionaries—follow from differences in social ties at the village level. In this way, the effects
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of local social relations in the village are traced upward to the district and provincial levels,
leading to dramatically different center-periphery politics surrounding regional appointments.
Indeed, despite their significant differences in the institutions of local government, both
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan adopted the same formal systems for the administration of
provinces. They are both unitary states, provincial governors are supposed to represent the
central authorities in the regions, not the populations living there, and central authorities retain
the formal authority to appoint and remove their provincial governors for any reason, or no
reason at all. As I discussed in chapter two, the central authorities in each state also adopted
similar policies to manage and control regional cadre in an effort to ensure their subordination
and centralize state authority. Cognizant of the challenges that socially embedded governors
could present to the centralized hierarchical administration of the state, central authorities in both
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan adopted the same formal policy of “cadre rotation,” seeking to
continually shuffle regional personnel across regions, and between center and periphery, thus
undermining their independent social bases in the periphery.
Cadre rotation is hardly unique to post-Soviet Central Asia. In chapter two I present
historical data from multiple world regions and across different eras of history to demonstrate
that cadre rotation has long been a strategy adopted by aspiring national rulers. As a matter of
historical significance for post-Soviet states, cadre rotation was also frequently employed in the
Soviet Union itself, and well known to the officials who came of age in the Soviet era. What all
of these historical cases show is that cadre rotation tends to go hand-in-hand with the process of
bureaucratic centralization: the purpose is to disembed officials from regional social contexts
and make them more dependent on, and better integrated into, the state’s administrative
hierarchy.
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Yet, as I also showed in chapter two, Kazakhstan succeeded in implementing this policy
while Kyrgyzstan failed. Using an original database of governors’ biographies and career
trajectories in every province from 1991 to 2013, I showed that governors in Kazakhstan had
previously served as the governor of some other province in nearly half of all cases; but, in
Kyrgyzstan this was true in only fourteen percent of cases. Moreover, local communities in
Kyrgyzstan have often mobilized against central authorities when the tenure of a native governor
is challenged, or when Bishkek seeks to bring in an outsider from a different region. There, we
see numerous instances of “people’s governors” being installed by local supporters, directly
undermining the central government’s appointment authority. Oftentimes, central authorities
conceded to these choices, in effect, forfeiting their ability to select and control their own toplevel regional officials. In short, politics at the provincial level—though formally identical in
each case—show dramatically different patterns in outcomes, suggesting significant ongoing
challenges for the project of bureaucratic centralization in Kyrgyzstan, but relative success in
Kazakhstan.
Chapter six examines some of these contentious episodes in empirical detail. By doing
so, it demonstrates clear links between the local, district, and provincial levels. In fact, many of
Kyrgyzstan’s insurgent “people’s governors” were former village-level authorities with deep
life-long connections to their home villages. In chapter five, I outlined the career trajectories of
two prominent examples, Koisun Kurmanalieva and Dzhumagul Egamberdieva. Parallel
examples of prominent local officials forcing their way onto the provincial and national stage
also included parliamentarians—like Abdimutalip Kochkorbaev and Esengul Isakov—who had
long careers in their home-village governments.
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The same pattern characterized the contentious tenure of Melis Myrzakmatov, the mayor
of Osh city from 2009 to 2013.341 Myrzakmatov used his dense networks of local social ties to
resist Bishkek’s multiple attempts to fire him; formally, national authorities had the legal
authority to do so, but repeated mass rallies in support of Myrzakmatov undermined their actual
power. Likewise, I show that in the course of Kyrgyzstan’s two revolutions, in 2005 and 2010,
there were numerous instances of both district- and provincial-level administrative offices being
ransacked and occupied by local elites and their local supporters, usually friends, family and
acquaintances from their home villages.342 Indeed, the proximate causes of both revolutions
were center-periphery conflicts over who could hold what office. Also, the process through
which both revolutions unfolded entailed local elites, deposed regional officials, and other local
notables activating and mobilizing social ties in their home villages and districts against Bishkek.
The same chapter demonstrates that current and former officials in Kazakhstan’s regions
did not enjoy the same levels of social support in their contests for power with central
authorities. The most famous of these cases stems from the short-lived Democratic Movement
of Kazakhstan (DVK). The DVK sought to eliminate President Nazarbayev’s constitutional
authority to appoint regional governors, among other things. The primary leader of the DVK,
Galymzhan Zhakiyanov, himself the incumbent governor of Pavlodar oblast—though, in
accordance with cadre rotation, also the former governor of Semipalatinsk oblast—called for the
direct election of governors, thereby creating social links between the top-level regional state
officials and local populations. When the president summarily fired Zhakiyanov—along with
341

As I explained in chapter six, Osh City has a hybrid administrative status. As a city, it falls under the domain of
the same local-self government system as villages. But, as the second-largest city in the country, it also has the
administrative status as an independent province. During Myrzakmatov’s tenure, the position of mayor was
appointed, not elected; thus, it closely resembled the position of provincial governor.
342
Tellingly, a similar dynamic occurred for those falling from power; when both Presidents Akaev and Bakiev fled
from office in 2005 and 2010, respectively, they both sought refuge in their home villages, seeking to mobilize their
own life-long acquaintances for support.
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dozens of his DVK cohorts—nobody protested. Later, when prosecutors issued a warrant for
Zhakiyanov’s arrest, the insurgent governor did not seek refuge in his home region, or in
Pavlodar, where he was not a native anyway. As indicative of his thin social ties to ordinary
members of society and total dependence on other state elites, Zhakiyanov turned instead to the
westerners who supported his goals of decentralizing power. He hunkered down in the French,
British, and German Embassies in Almaty until Kazakhstani authorities could negotiate his
release. After ultimately serving jail time, he went into self-imposed exile like many of his
upstart predecessors.
At the broadest level of center-periphery politics and cadre control, a clear contrasting
pattern can be seen in these two states: Kyrgyzstan’s socially embedded regional and local elites
who challenge the capital city have often succeeded in seizing and holding power in their
regions, effectively wresting those offices from the state’s administrative hierarchy. Their
counterparts in Kazakhstan, however, end up in jail or exile. Without social bases of support in
the regions, efforts to challenge central authority become futile, and the offices of the state
become firmly integrated into the president’s “vertical of power.” Put differently, officials in
Kazakhstan’s regions have been disembedded from society and integrated into the state
hierarchy, thus facilitating bureaucratic centralization; their counterparts in Kyrgyzstan maintain
deep social ties to their communities, undermine the state’s administrative hierarchy, and hinder
bureaucratic centralization.

III. Implications and Conclusions
Among the contributions of the research presented here is to suggest that local social ties
and political organization are endogenous to the process of state formation. National authorities
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do not always contend with preexisting social forces in the periphery. Rather, the strategies they
pursue and institutions they build can have unintended consequences, even reshaping the very
social forces that they seek to control going forward. This finding also suggests that state
formation is not only an elite process; ordinary people also play a role, to the degree that they
are—or not—enmeshed in deep and overlapping social relations with state officials in their own
territories.
As I have also suggested, this theoretical insight might stem from the historical context of
state formation in the neoliberal era of globalization. International policy actors in the post-Cold
War period have been quick to promote—if not force—their preferences for democratization and
decentralization on newly independent states. This is true regardless of how centralized these
states are to begin with. Thus, this research also highlights a weakness in the developmental
strategies of international policy actors: while democratization might be a noble goal, the
unintended consequences of decentralization on state formation must also be considered. That
is, democratization and decentralization can transform local social ties and state-society relations
in ways that undermine bureaucratic centralization and state effectiveness.
Thirdly, this research suggests that both the literature on state formation and the
international policy community share a problematic ontology of state formation and political
development. Almost without exception, “the state” that is undergoing formation (or
deformation and decentralization) is treated as a singular entity. The argument made here not
only urges us to disaggregate the state into its component parts (Migdal 2001), but also to
suggest that different parts of the state can develop independently of one another, changing the
ways in which the different parts fit together, and in the ways they connect to society. If this is
true, then the “state” is not undergoing formation at all; rather, villages, districts, provinces, and
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capital cities are undergoing their own processes, sometimes in ways that do not coherently align
with each other. The state-society relationships that are forged in villages, for example, might
undermine central authorities’ strategies for cadre control in provinces. In Kazakhstan, the
provincial-level policy of cadre rotation complemented the institutions of government that were
developed in villages in small cities; in Kyrgyzstan, the same provincial-level policy clashed
with different institutional developments at the local level, however. The way that ongoing
changes in provinces and villages interacted with each other, in turn, had dramatic impacts on the
capital city, on relations between center and periphery, and in the overall levels and quality of
bureaucratic centralization in each case.
At the same time, the proposition that state formation may take place in multiple arenas
simultaneously is an empirical question as much as a conceptual and theoretical one. The fact
that states might not always develop as or into coherent entities does not preclude the possibility
that such a developmental path exists. We should treat state cohesion as a developmental
question, asking not how or why “states” develop, but whether and under what circumstances
relatively singular cohesive centers emerge that encompass regions and localities within a
centralized administrative structure. Thus, this study responds to Migdal’s call for an
“anthropology of the state” (Migdal 2001: 97-134). It also follows anthropologists who have
urged us to pay closer attention to all levels of state and society when exploring the
reconfiguration of state power in the post-communist context. An “ethnography of the state”
asks us to study the state “at close range from within its daily routines and practices,” to “treat
states not as things but as sets of social processes and relations,” and to use these perspectives to
better understand the “destatizing” and “restatizing” tendencies in the postsocialist era (Verdery
1996: 209).
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With regard to the specific cases of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, competing explanations
might stress these two states’ overall levels of economic wealth, and the fact that one state is
more democratic than the other. As I discussed in chapter 1, a reorientation toward social ties
and state formation is not so much an alternative to these other approaches, but an effort to
explain how and why disparities in economic wealth and democratization shape different
trajectories and outcomes of administrative centralization. Kazakhstan’s wealth not only
insulated it from the demands of international donor organizations, but also enabled central
authorities to maintain a centralized budget system that better ensured the dependence of
subnational officials at all levels of administration. The onset of economic crisis in Kyrgyzstan
following independence, by contrast, not only made it more dependent on international donors
for policy advice and assistance, but also meant that local officials were less reliant on Bishkek
for resources and direction, giving them higher levels of autonomy from the center while
simultaneously more dependent on their own local social networks.
Likewise, this approach does not dismiss the differences in regime type between
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, but stresses precisely how and why specific regime characteristics
shape the process of bureaucratic centralization. This study focused primarily on differences in
regime characteristics at the subnational level, as manifested in each state’s institutions of local
government. In shifting perspectives from normative theories about regime transition toward
state formation, this study sheds light on aspects of regimes that have received relatively less
attention, as I noted at the outset of this chapter. Indeed, the findings of this study have many
implications for the possible relationships between bureaucratization and democratization, two
issues that are much studied, but not always in connection with each other. Sadly, for the
proponents of democratization, the findings presented here suggest that these two processes are

305

not fully compatible with each other. This, however, merely echoes the idea that
democratization can only proceed where strong state institutions already exist (Rueschemeyer,
Stephens, and Stephens 1992: 63-69) and reflects the tautological proposition that one cannot
decentralize power that has not first been centralized. What is different about the approach taken
here is that it contributes to this debate by drawing our attention to how local social ties and
state-society relations affect (and are affected by) these processes. It seems that
bureaucratization and democratization might be incompatible precisely because of the different
kinds of local social relations that each are built upon.343
Drawing on Max Weber’s images of bureaucracy, I have stressed that bureaucratization
goes hand-in-hand with social disembeddedness, extracting state officials out of local social
contexts and integrating them into the administrative structures of the state. It is for this reason
that state bureaucrats—to the degree that they have truly been disembedded from society—are
(or are supposed to be) dispassionate, unfeeling, and unmoved by the particularistic situations of
individuals’ or communities’ circumstances.
When fully developed, bureaucracy also stands, in a specific sense, under the principle of sine ira ac studio
[without anger and fondness]. Bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the more it is “dehumanized,” the
more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal,
irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation (Weber 1978: 975).

It is for this reason, perhaps, that democracy is so valued. Democracy socially grounds
an already bureaucratized state, makes it more representative of and responsive to social
demands from the bottom-up. If bureaucratization entails the dehumanization of the state, to
borrow Weber’s terminology, then democratization entails its re-humanization. But, as this
study suggests, a key qualifier in this proposition is that the state be already bureaucratized.
343

In fact, when bureaucracies are discussed in the context of democratization, the focus is almost always on the
rule of law rather than social ties. Thus, the development of a rational-legal bureaucracy is seen as establishing the
impartial rules necessary for democracy to function, but it does so without considering the effects that
democratization itself has on the formation of a functioning administrative system.
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Democracy might soften the edges of a rigid bureaucratic structure, but it can undermine the
potential for bureaucratization to occur in the future if it has not been accomplished already. To
reiterate a theme that was highlighted above, power that is not yet centralized cannot be
decentralized, and authority that is not concentrated cannot be devolved.
What difference does it make if state administration is centralized and cohesive at all?
Since this study focuses primarily on whether and how state administrative bureaucracies are
centralized, it can provide only limited and inconclusive answers to this secondary yet extremely
important question. I provide tentative and anecdotal examples here not with the intention that
they should provide definitive answers so much as to suggest avenues for further research.
Broadly speaking, administrative centralization and cadre control might affect other key
processes of state formation, the stability of the political order, and the nature and quality of state
governance.
First, as others have argued, the centralization of bureaucratic administration is crucial for
realizing other aspects of state formation, including the nationalization of taxation and the
monopolization of coercion (Tin-bor Hui 2005: 38-53; Vu 2010). This suggests that bureaucratic
centralization and the control of cadre are prerequisites for the formation of other key
components of state power. If central authorities cannot control their own subordinates, and
appoint whom they want where they want them, it follows that they will not have full command
over policymaking and implementation. This also tends to be the view from the center. As
Stalin noted early in his tenure, giving orders is not enough; it is “necessary to choose cadre in
such a way as to fill the various posts with people who are capable of carrying out the policy
directives, able to understand the directives, able to accept these directives as their own and
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capable of putting them into effect. Otherwise the policy becomes meaningless, becomes mere
gesticulation.”344
The analysis in this dissertation is centered on the question of how central authorities
achieve this control. It is based on the assumption that central authorities do, in fact, see the
subordination of regional cadre as an important priority and a prerequisite to achieving other
goals for the state, and for their own leadership. This assumption is grounded in the actual cadre
policies of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and as expressed through policy documents and
interviews with state officials in both states, as described in chapter two. It does not, however,
offer conclusive evidence that national authorities are justified in making this a priority.
Whether control over cadre is truly a prerequisite for the fulfillment of other state goals is an
empirical question, and one that can only be addressed through additional research.
At the same time, the lack of cadre control in Kyrgyzstan but not in Kazakhstan does
provide some anecdotal evidence that control over cadre shapes the realization of state policy
and power in key ways. For example, the failure of central authorities in Kyrgyzstan to integrate
Melis Myrzakmatov into the state’s administrative apparatus also undermined their monopoly on
coercion, and their ability to establish political stability in the south after the revolution in April
2010. Not only did central authorities accuse Myrzakmatov of participating in the subsequent
ethnic conflicts that erupted in June of that year, which they were trying to quell, but
Myrzakmatov himself proposed the establishment of his own police forces, which would operate
outside of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It was the very fact that leaders in Bishkek were
unable to remove or replace Myrzakmatov that he was able to act with such strident
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The 12th Party Congress, April 1923.
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independence and insubordination. And it was the fact that he had such a dense network of local
grassroots support that authorities in Bishkek struggled to remove or replace him.
Related to this, control over cadre in a centralized administration might contribute to the
creation of a more stable political order. The analysis presented in this dissertation shows that
political instability in Kyrgyzstan has entailed contentious politics over regional appointment and
representation. Central authorities, in numerous different instances since 1991, have been
challenged by protest mobilization when attempting to fire, replace, remove, and rotate cadre.
This account does not capture every element of Kyrgyzstan’s two revolutions, nor does it fully
explain why they happened, but it does highlight the appointment politics that were part of these
events, which have often been overlooked in other accounts. It is not a coincidence, in this light,
that state building, cadre control, and political stability have often been explicitly linked by
central authorities in Kazakhstan during the post-independence period, as noted in the beginning
of this chapter.
Additionally, bureaucratic centralization and control over cadre have major implications
for the quality of state governance. Prior research, for example, shows that the centralization of
administration and the ways in which elites are integrated into or interact with the bureaucracy
shape the degree to which central authorities can achieve economic growth and industrialization
(Evans 1995; Kohli 2004).
The data presented in this dissertation do not allow us to draw any conclusions about
whether Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan is better governed, only that they are differently governed.
Because these data stem largely from citizens’ own accounts of how they understand, interact
with, and evaluate the state, it does not speak to objective differences in the quality of state
governance or the provision of public goods. Moreover, even these subjective bases of
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understanding the state do now allow us to evaluate state governance as an aggregate category.
The key dynamic uncovered by these data is that people have different ways of evaluating and
understanding the work of state officials at different levels of administration, based, in part on
the way that state institutions structure their own relationships and interactions with those
officials. Kyrgyzstan’s system of local self-government is responsive to local demands and is
evaluated positively by ordinary people. But those same people are likely to criticize, denounce,
and disparage the work of officials in the capital city. Conversely, the evaluation of the work of
local officials in Kazakhstan is resoundingly negative, yet support for the president and his
political party appears to be deep and genuine. In short, this study does a better job
problematizing the aggregate concept of state governance than evaluating what makes it better or
worse.
There are other notable shortcomings that stem from this. For example, emphasizing the
differences in local governance between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan has the analytical effect of
homogenizing villages and small cities within each state, rendering internal variations in local
governance invisible. Uncovering the variations in local governance within each state—rather
than between them—suggests a series of additional questions to be answered. For example, how
do variations in local social ties and state-society relations across regions and localities in a
single state shape other important domestic processes? How do differences in the social relations
between ordinary people and local officials shape the social dynamics of corruption,
democratization, and economic growth? Additional research is needed to answer these
questions.
Finally, additional research would be needed to test the generalizability of these findings.
The scope conditions of this study are limited to states that are newly independent, non-
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democratic, and unitary. Within these limitations, the general proposition is that the
centralization of state administration will be hindered in territories where the social ties between
state officials and ordinary people are deep, multiple, and overlapping. Other post-Soviet
Central Asian states—Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan—would be the most suitable
cases for testing, modifying, and expanding this proposition in future research.
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Annex:
Diagram 3.1a: Captions and Commentary for Diagrams 3.1b, c, d, and e
Diagrams 3.1b, c, d, and e were made by village executives in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. In
most instances, local officials made drawings by their own initiative while trying to explain the
distinctions between levels of government. The four selected here, two from each state, are
representative of a larger sample of fifteen different images.
There are two patterns: local officials in Kyrgyzstan depict local government as separate from
and parallel to the state while their counterparts in Kazakhstan depict the local and the state as a
unified and integrated and hierarchical structure.
Kyrgyzstan
Diagrams 3.1b and c were drawn by two different ayil okmotu in Kyrgyzstan, one from the north
and one from the south. They both depict non-hierarchical relationships between the “state” and
the “locality.”
Diagram 3.1b shows the government (okmot) divided into two components that are parallel,
rather than hierarchical. The left side depicts the levels of “state administration,” while the right
side depicts “local self government” (or LSG, here denoted as MSU). The English language
caption at the bottom distinguishing “state” versus “local” structures was added later for clarity.
Diagram 3.1c also points to the separation between “state” authority and “local” authority. State
authority (gosudarstvennaya vlast) is on top and local authority (mestnaya vlast) is on the
bottom. Despite the vertical orientation of this diagram (compared to the horizontal orientation
of 3.1b), the horizontal line running through the middle is meant to depict the mutual separation
and independence of each realm.
Kazakhstan
Diagrams 3.1 d and e were drawn by two different village akims in Kazakhstan, also from
different regions. Here, hierarchy and subordination are the key themes as the local level is
depicted as being a subsidiary part of the state, rather than as independent form of authority
parallel to it.
Diagram 3.1d is the state hierarchy drawn as a pyramid, with subordinate akims positioned in
the pyramid’s lower levels. The diagram also notes the parallel structure of the president’s party
(here simply called “the party”) with the “leader of the party,” Nazarbayev himself, at the top
station of the pyramid.
Diagram 3.1e also has a clear hierarchical structure. It shows the “government” at the top, with
provinces, districts, and villages in descending subordinate positions. Astana and Almaty are
noted as parallel structures to the provinces and were labeled subsequently by me (the English
label “village” was also added later, under the original designation of selo).
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Diagram 3.1(b)
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Diagram 3.1(c)
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Diagram 3.1(d)
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Diagram 3.1(e)
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